Opinion
No. COA12–26.
2012-05-15
In the Matter of L.A.T. and L.M.T.
J. Tyrone Browder for petitioner-appellee Stokes County Department of Social Services. Pamela Newell for guardian ad litem.
Appeal by respondent mother from orders entered 7 October 2011 by Judge William F. Southern, III in Stokes County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 May 2012. J. Tyrone Browder for petitioner-appellee Stokes County Department of Social Services. Pamela Newell for guardian ad litem.
Duncan B. McCormick for mother, respondent-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
The trial court did not err in terminating respondent's parental rights.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 28 October 2009, N.T. (“mother”) and the children's father were arrested on felony drug charges. The parents placed the children with mother's brother and his roommate. Stokes County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received a child protective services report expressing concern about the mental stability of the people with whom the children had been placed. DSS worked with mother to find an appropriate alternative placement for the children but no other family members were willing or able to care for the children. On 30 October 2009, DSS filed juvenile petitions alleging that the children were neglected and dependent. On that same date, the trial court entered non-secure custody orders placing the children in the custody of DSS.
The matter came on for adjudication on 3 December 2009. The parents stipulated that the children were dependent, and the trial court adjudicated the children dependent. The trial court placed the children in the legal custody of DSS and authorized DSS to place the children with mother. Mother entered into a family services case plan and DSS placed the children in mother's home. On 20 January 2010 DSS received another report regarding the family. The report alleged domestic violence between mother and the children's father. A social worker visited the home, and based upon her observations, the children were removed from mother's home and placed in a foster home.
On 19 August 2010, the trial court held a review hearing and ordered reunification efforts with mother ceased. A permanency planning review hearing was held on 16 September 2010. The trial court established a permanent plan of adoption with a concurrent plan of reunification with the children's father. The children's father relinquished his parental rights on 9 March 2011. The trial court then established a permanent plan of adoption.
DSS filed motions to terminate mother's parental rights on 28 June 2011 alleging the following grounds for termination: (1) neglect; (2) willfully leaving the juveniles in foster care for more than twelve months without showing reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to removal; and (3) dependency. The matter came on for a termination of parental rights hearing on 7 September 2011. The trial court entered an order on 7 October 2011 concluding that all three grounds existed to terminate mother's parental rights. On that same date, the trial court entered an order concluding that termination of mother's parental rights was in the best interest of the children.
Mother appeals.
II. Mother's Appeal
In her only argument on appeal, mother contends that the trial court erred in concluding grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
On appeal, we determine whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. In re Huff, 140 N.C.App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000). The statutory grounds for terminating parental rights are set forth in N .C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111. A finding of any one of the enumerated grounds is sufficient to support termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C.App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233–34 (1990).
B. Analysis
Mother contends that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support findings of fact 25, 36, and 37. The trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact:
16. On December 3, 2009, the mother entered into a Family Services Plan and the juveniles were placed back with the mother.
....
19. Social workers Woolrich and Maser arrived at the mother's apartment around 1:15pm on January 20, 2010. [L.A.T.] and [L.M.T.] were sitting in their respective cribs. Social worker Woolrich then witnessed the mother changing [L.M.T.'s] diaper. [L.M.T. ] had a diaper rash and it looked as if the diaper had not been changed for some time. The diaper was full in the front from urine and the stool was loose. Social worker Woolrich then asked if [L.A.T.] needed to be changed as well. She observed the mother changing [L.A .T.] and noticed that her diaper was also soaked with urine and was filled with stool as well, though she did not have a diaper rash. Both children had dirty faces covered from nose to chin with mucus. When asked if the girls had colds, the mother stated that they had not. Their feet and hands were dirty and it appeared that the children we're [sic] just getting out of their cribs for the first time that day.
20. The juveniles were placed in the same foster home where they had been before and have remained there from January 20, 2010 to the present.
....
22. Under the Case Plan, the mother agreed to: (1) keep in touch with the social worker on a monthly basis; (2) establish and maintain a suitable, clean, safe and stable home environment for herself and the juvenile for a minimum of three months; (3) cooperate and successfully complete the SCAN Parenting Classes, a psychological evaluation; and (4) submit to random alcohol and drug screens.
23. The mother did maintain contact with her social worker during the period that she was not incarcerated after entering her case plan.
24. The mother did not establish and maintain a suitable home environment for the juvenile because her landlord would not renew her lease due to her felony charges and she moved in with her brother which was determined not to be a suitable environment for the children.
25. The mother inquired about the parenting classes but out of the seven months that she was not incarcerated and the nine months she was incarcerated in Raleigh, NC, where the parenting classes were available, she never began them. The mother has completed a ninety day intensive drug program and is now taking GED classes full time in prison.
26. The mother did submit to three random drug tests and tested positive for cocaine on March 10, 2010, but tested negative on the other two drug tests.
....
32. From March 16, 2010 to June 10, 2010 the mother exercised sporadic supervised visitation with the juveniles. Out of nineteen total planned visitations, the mother attended eight. Of the remaining eleven visits, the mother stated that she was unable to attend a majority of them due to lack of transportation, scheduled court days that conflicted with visitation dates, or illness.
....
36. The mother has taken very little action to regain custody of the juveniles. She has failed to take advantage of the available SCAN parenting classes while out of jail and while in a prison that offered such classes. The mother has also made no effort to contact the juveniles since her incarceration. This inaction by the mother constitutes continuing neglect.
37. After the mother's incarceration on July 20, 2010, she again failed to take advantage of the opportunity to attend parenting classes and failed to have any contact with the juveniles despite the fact that she had the ability to send them notes, cards and letters.
Mother argues that there was no evidence that the social worker attempted to help mother enroll in the SCAN parenting classes prior to mother's incarceration. As to the parenting classes offered in prison, mother argues there is no specific evidence as to the length of the classes, when the classes started, and when mother could have enrolled in classes. We conclude that these findings are supported by competent evidence in the record. The evidence shows that mother was not incarcerated from 3 December 2009 to 20 July 2010, and that during this time period, she inquired about the parenting classes but never attended the classes. In addition, the social worker testified that during mother's incarceration the parenting classes were available to mother but that she had not completed parenting classes in prison.
Mother further contends that the trial court erred in determining grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. A trial court may terminate parental rights where “[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile .” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111 (a)(2) (2011). In this case, the trial court concluded that mother willfully left L.A.T. and L.M.T. in foster care for more than twelve months without showing reasonable progress to correct the conditions that led to their removal. Mother contends the trial court erred in concluding that she willfully left the children in foster care and failed to make reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to the children's removal where she completed an intensive drug treatment program and was participating in a full-time GED program. “Willfulness is established when the respondent had the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make the effort.” In re McMillon, 143 N.C.App. 402, 410, 546 S.E.2d 169, 175 (2001). “A finding of willfulness is not precluded even if the respondent has made some efforts to regain custody of the children.” In re Nolen, 117 N.C.App. 693, 699, 453 S.E.2d 220, 224 (1995).
While the evidence and trial court's findings show that mother made some progress, we conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that mother failed to make reasonable progress during the relevant twelve-month period. As discussed above, mother did not complete parenting classes. The social worker testified that the parenting classes were an “essential part” of mother's case plan. Further, the evidence showed and the trial court found that mother did not establish and maintain a suitable home environment, that before her incarceration she maintained only sporadic visitation with the children, and that since her incarceration, she has not maintained contact with the children. We hold that the trial court did not err in ruling that grounds existed to terminate mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(2). “[W]here we determine the trial court properly concluded that one ground exists to support the termination of parental rights, we need not address the remaining grounds.” In re Clark, 159 N.C.App. 75, 84, 582 S.E.2d 657, 663 (2003).
III. Conclusion
The orders of the trial court are
AFFIRMED. Judges CALABRIA and BEASLEY concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).