Hendler reviewed petitioner's complete job description and opined that petitioner's disability was mild and he was able to do his job. Although petitioner's treating physician testified that petitioner was unable to perform his job duties as a result of his knee injury, his opinion was discounted based upon his written comments indicating that petitioner's injury was mild and that his subjective complaints were not supported by the objective findings. According due deference to that credibility determination ( see Matter of Wilson v New York State Local Police Fire Retirement Sys., 53 AD3d 762, 763; Matter of Harvey v McCall, 237 AD2d 863, 864), we are satisfied that the testimony and reports submitted by the Retirement System constitute substantial evidence supporting respondent's determination ( see Matter of Maiorano v New York State Comptroller, 78 AD3d 1462, 1463; Matter of Stern v DiNapoli, 57 AD3d 1076, 1077-1078). Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
tady v. McCall, 245 A.D.2d 708, 709). Arthur Leve, a physician who evaluated petitioner on behalf of the State and Local Employees' Retirement System, indicated that the findings of his examination and his review of petitioner's medical records were insufficient to consider petitioner permanently incapacitated from the performance of his duties as a motor equipment operator. Although the record contains contradictory medical evidence indicating that petitioner was permanently disabled, it was within respondent's discretion to evaluate the differing medical opinions and resolve the conflict against petitioner (see, Matter of Senecal v. McCall, 252 A.D.2d 630, 631; Matter of Gallello v. McCall, 247 A.D.2d 693; Matter of Sloan v. McCall, 238 A.D.2d 666, 667). Because our resolution of this issue is determinative of both of petitioner's applications (see, Retirement and Social Security Law ยงยง 62 Retire. Soc. Sec., 63 Retire. Soc. Sec.), we need not address his remaining arguments (see,Matter of Harvey v. McCall, 237 A.D.2d 863, 864). Cardona, P.J., Crew III, Spain and Mugglin, JJ., concur.
We do not agree with petitioner's argument that because Guidarelli, an orthopedist, was an expert in a different medical discipline than the expert neurologists, respondent was required to adopt his opinion that Coker was disabled. In our view, respondent still had the responsibility to determine whether Coker had a condition that disabled him from his employment based on an evaluation of all the medical testimony ( see, e.g., Matter of Harvey v. McCall, 237 A.D.2d 863, 863-864; Matter of Orsini v. McCall, 221 A.D.2d 690, 691; Matter of Leone v. Regan, 146 A.D.2d 869). Therefore, respondent had the discretion to limit the weight given to the expert opinion of Guidarelli and Belmonte and accept the opinion of Lava given respondent's finding that Coker's subjective complaints of pain were not credible and the apparent reliance given to these complaints by the orthopedist and the occupational physician ( see, Matter of Malacynski v. McCall, 221 A.D.2d 764, 764-765).