Opinion
24A-JT-977
11-13-2024
In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: Lan.C. and Lay.C. (Minor Children) v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee/Petitioner and K.T. (Mother) and S.C. (Father), Appellants/Respondents
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT K.T. Jessica L. Richert Richmond, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT S.C. Amy Dudas Richmond, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Katherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to, this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Wayne Superior Court The Honorable Mark I. Cox, Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 89D03-2312-JT-49 89D03-2312-JT-50
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT K.T. Jessica L. Richert Richmond, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT S.C. Amy Dudas Richmond, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Katherine A. Cornelius Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Bailey and Foley concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Lan.C. and Lay.C. (collectively, "the Children") were born to K.T. ("Mother") and S.C. ("Father") (collectively, "Parents") on March 1, 2021, and April 23, 2022, respectively. In January of 2022, Lan.C. was removed from Parents' home by the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS") after ingesting amphetamine while in Parents' care. In May of 2022, Lay.C. was removed from Parents' care after Mother informed DCS that she had used methamphetamine while pregnant with her. Both Children were found to be children in need of services ("CHINS"), and Parents were ordered to participate in a variety of services. Parents' compliance with the ordered services was never more than generally sporadic, and both regularly tested positive for illegal drugs on the somewhat infrequent occasions when they agreed to submit to testing. Concerns about domestic violence also arose during the CHINS proceedings, concerns that ultimately were not addressed.
[¶2] In December of 2023, DCS petitioned the juvenile court to terminate Parents' parental rights to the Children, and, following an evidentiary hearing in January, the juvenile court granted the petitions in March of 2024. In this consolidated appeal, Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the conditions that had resulted in the Children's removal from her home would not be remedied. Father contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the reasons for the Children's removal would not be remedied and that termination of his parental rights was in the Children's best interests. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On January 9, 2022, Lan.C. was taken to a Wayne County hospital after ingesting amphetamine while in Parents' care. Lan.C. was detained by DCS, who petitioned the next day to have him found to be a CHINS, which Parents eventually admitted. Meanwhile, Lay.C. was born on April 23, 2022, and detained by DCS on May 12, 2022, after Mother informed DCS that she had used methamphetamine while pregnant with her. On May 16, 2022, DCS petitioned to have Lay.C. found to be a CHINS due to Parents' ongoing drug use and observations that they appeared to be impaired while caring for her. Mother began involvement with a substance-abuse program at Centerstone beginning in March of 2022, but was discharged two months later for lack of engagement.
[¶4] On May 20, 2022, a dispositional hearing regarding Lan.C. was conducted, after which Parents were ordered to participate in services, including contacting the DCS Family Case Manager ("FCM") weekly, keeping all appointments with the FCM or court-appointed special advocate ("CASA"), maintaining suitable and safe housing, maintaining a legal and stable source of income, refraining from using illegal drugs, completing a substance-abuse assessment and following all recommendations, and attending all visitations. On July 8, 2022, the juvenile court found Lay.C. to be a CHINS on the basis that Parents had failed to provide her with drug-free care and supervision. The juvenile court also found that Mother had admitted to using methamphetamine, her drug screens had been positive, she had refused to engage in substance-abuse treatment, and she had experienced suicidal ideations. On August 1, 2022, the juvenile court issued a dispositional order for Lay.C., in which it ordered services similar to those in Lan.C.'s dispositional order. By September of 2022, Father had been discharged from a substance-abuse program run by Centerstone for a lack of engagement, to which program he had been referred in January of 2022.
[¶5] On January 4 and 13, 2023, permanency hearings were held for Lan.C. and Lay.C., respectively, and, in both cases, the juvenile court added a concurrent plan of adoption to the permanency plan. On April 27, 2023, DCS filed petitions to terminate Parents' parental rights to the Children ("TPR petitions"), which TPR petitions were denied. On July 10, 2023, the juvenile court ordered Parents to address issues with domestic violence in their relationship. Father attended one or two domestic-violence sessions before stopping. Mother could have addressed domestic violence during her referred individual therapy, but never attended. On November 14, 2023, the permanency plan for the Children was changed to adoption only. On December 18, 2023, the juvenile court found Parents to be in contempt of court for failing to abide by the terms of the dispositional orders and sentenced each to thirty days of incarceration, suspended on the condition that they begin to comply.
[¶6] On December 19, 2023, DCS again filed TPR petitions. On February 27, 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing on the new TPR petitions. CASA Karen Bowen testified she had attended team meetings, had been to Parents' home more than once and interacted with the Children, who had lived with their placement, Brandi Lee, most of their lives. CASA Bowen opined that termination and adoption was in the Children's best interests because Parents had continued to test positive for drug use, even in the seven months after the first TPR Petitions had been denied.
[¶7] FCM Kathleen Langer testified that she had been involved with the cases from February to May of 2022, and had been reassigned back to the cases in February of 2023. FCM Langer testified that Parents had not been compliant with court-ordered services, although they had occasionally participated in visitation. All of FCM Langer's efforts to get Parents engaged in services had failed, with both Mother and Father having refused to work with her and having continued to test positive for drugs. Once, when FCM Langer had visited the home, she had been asked to leave, and all of her calls, voicemails, and service referrals had gone unanswered. Therapist Marquetta Stokes testified that she had supervised visitation from March to May of 2023; both Parents had eventually been discharged for non-compliance with the terms of visitation and/or failure to show.
[¶8] FCM Michelle Perkins testified that she had handled Parents' cases from May 10 to August 3, 2023. During FCM Perkins's tenure, the Children had never been returned to Parents' care, Father had not complied with the ordered services and had provided only one of eight drug-screen samples. Mother had also failed to complete ordered services, including having refused to comply with any of eight drug-screen requests. FCM Perkins's observations indicated that the Children had bonded with Lee and that she was able to meet their needs. FCM Langer testified that the Children were in a loving, safe, and stable home in which Lee is able to fulfill their "medical, mental, physical[,] and financial needs[.]" Tr. Vol. II p. 61. Lee testified that the Children were "definitely thriving, and smart little kiddos" who were hitting their milestones. Tr. Vol. II p. 46.
[¶9] FCM Jessica Strayer took over the cases in August of 2023. FCM Strayer testified that Father had not been compliant with services (with the exception of visitation) until completing a substance-abuse assessment in December of 2023. After that, however, Father had neither completed an intensive outpatient addiction program nor a batterer's intervention program to which he had been referred, and, when referred to domestic-abuse counseling, had initially indicated that he would "go ahead and knock it out" but had said "forget it" when informed it would involve twenty-six to twenty-nine sessions. Tr. Vol. II p. 156. FCM Strayer testified that Father had neither addressed his substance abuse, agreed that the positive screening results were accurate, nor addressed the domestic violence that had been reported. FCM Strayer testified that Lan.C. was "very bonded" with Lee, very comfortable in the placement, and had "just like a sibling relationship" with her children. Tr. Vol. II p. 164. FCM Strayer testified that Lay.C. was "very much adored by everyone in that household" and that Lee had never treated the Children as anything other than her own children. Tr. Vol. II p. 164.
[¶10] DCS provided evidence that both parents had submitted numerous samples for drug screens that had repeatedly returned positive results for methamphetamine and amphetamine. On January 25, February 10, May 10, May 25, and June 6, 2022, Mother had tested positive, also testing positive for THC on three of those dates. Father had tested positive on March 8, May 12, and May 25, 2022, also testing positive for THC on May 25. Parents had both tested positive on April 25, November 20, and November 27, 2023, and January 26, 2024. Father had also tested positive on August 22, August 29, October 13, November 13, 2023. Every completed drug screen for both Parents since May 12, 2022, had been positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.
[¶11] On March 21, 2024, the juvenile court granted DCS's TPR petitions as to both Children. The juvenile court concluded, inter alia, that the conditions resulting in the Children's removal would not be remedied and that termination was in the Children's best interests. Mother and Father appealed separately, and, on July 16, 2024, we granted DCS's motion to consolidate their appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶12] "The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children." . Moreover, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is "one of the most valued relationships of our culture." Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents., trans. denied. Parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court has made clear that the "purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children." . Termination of parental rights is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened. . The juvenile court need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.
[¶13] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of . We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Neither Parent challenges any of the juvenile court's findings, so we proceed to the second step: We will deem a judgment clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact or the conclusions do not support the judgment.
[¶14] governs what DCS must allege and establish to support the termination of parental rights, and, for purposes of our disposition of this case, that was:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied [, and]
[..]
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child[.]
. Mother contends that DCS failed to establish that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal will not be remedied. Father also contends that DCS failed to establish that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal from him would not be remedied and also argues that DCS failed to establish that termination of his parental rights is in the Children's best interests.
was amended, effective March 11, 2024, but those provisions do not apply to this case.
I. Whether the Conditions that Resulted in Removal Will be Remedied
[¶15] Parents both argue that DCS has failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for the Children's continued removal would not be remedied. In making such a determination, a juvenile court engages in a two-step inquiry. First, the juvenile court must "ascertain what conditions led to their placement and retention in foster care." . After identifying these initial conditions, the juvenile court must determine whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying the children's continued "placement outside the home will not be remedied." (citation omitted), trans. denied. The statute focuses not only on the initial reasons for removal "but also those bases resulting in continued placement outside the home.", trans. denied. In making this second determination, the juvenile court must judge a parent's fitness to care for her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. . DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it must establish that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change., trans. denied. A parent's habitual patterns of conduct must also be evaluated to determine the probability of future negative behaviors. .
Mother also contends that the record does not support conclusions that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children or that the Children have adjudicated to be CHINS on two separate occasions. Because the juvenile court did not draw either of these conclusions (nor was it required to), we do not directly address these arguments.
[¶16] The reason for the initial removal of Children from Parents was, in both cases, directly related to Parents' substance abuse, with Lan.C. being removed after ingesting amphetamine while in the Parents' care and Lay.C. being removed after Mother informed DCS that she had used methamphetamine while pregnant with her. The reasons for continued placement outside Parents' home are continued substance abuse, consistent failure to engage in or complete court-ordered services, and unaddressed concerns about domestic violence.
[¶17] As for Parents' substance abuse, the record contains ample evidence that little to no progress has been made. On those occasions when Parents submitted to drug testing, the results were usually positive, including both testing positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine a month before the termination hearing. Father said that he would provide clean screens from another laboratory (but never did) and admitted that he needed more intensive treatment, but refused it when offered. For her part, Mother argues that her positive screens were too sporadic to establish that her substance abuse cannot be remedied. We do not find this argument to be persuasive; to the extent that Mother had only sporadically tested positive for drugs, it was reasonable to infer that this was due to her frequent refusals to submit to the tests, the results of which she assumed would be positive. See ("[A] parent whose drug use led to a child's removal cannot be permitted to refuse to submit to drug testing, then later claim the DCS has failed to prove that the drug use has continued."). The juvenile court did not err in concluding that Parents' issues with substance use would not likely be remedied.
[¶18] As for the reasons for continued placement away from Parents, it appears that, if anything, things have gotten worse since the removals, with concerns about domestic violence arising during the case and the juvenile court finding that it was an issue that needed to be addressed. Due to these concerns, DCS felt it necessary to alter visitation so that Parents would not visit with Children at the same time. Neither Parent, however, addressed the situation, which was one of the reasons the juvenile court found them to be in contempt of court in December of 2023.
[¶19] The record also contains ample evidence that Parents have not engaged in or completed court-ordered services in general. During FCM Langer's tenure, Parents were not compliant with court-ordered services, although they occasionally participated in visitation. All of FCM Langer's efforts to get Parents engaged in services failed, with both Mother and Father refusing to work with her and continuing to test positive for drugs. Both Parents were eventually discharged even from visitation, for non-compliance with the terms of visitation and/or failure to show. During FCM Perkins's tenure, the Children were never returned to Parents' care, Father did not comply with the ordered services and provided only one of eight drug-screen samples, while Mother also failed to complete ordered services, including refusing to comply with any of eight drug-screen requests. In summary, DCS presented more than enough evidence to support a conclusion that the reasons for the Children's removal from Parents' care, as well as the new reasons that had arisen, would not likely be remedied.
[¶20] Father's claim that there were gaps in the availability of services is not supported by the record. There is ample evidence that services remained open at all times but that Father would stop attending appointments and refuse to submit to drug testing. While Father testified that he had not completed substance-abuse treatment because he had believed that the juvenile court never should have found that his substance abuse had endangered Children, this belief is not supported by the record and consequently does not excuse his noncompliance. Parents may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then argue they were denied appropriate assistance. See . Father's argument amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See, e.g., In re Invol. Term. of .
II. Best Interests
[¶21] Father also argues that the juvenile court erred in concluding that termination of his parental rights was in the Children's best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of the Children, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. . In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. "[W]e have previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.", trans. denied. Here, CASA Bowen opined that termination of Parents' parental rights and adoption was in Children's best interests because they had continued to test positive for drugs. This testimony, however, does not stand alone.
[¶22] As already covered in greater detail, the record contains copious evidence of Parents' issues with substance abuse and domestic violence and their inability of refusal to address those issues, including noncompliance with services, frequent failure to submit to drug-screens, frequent positive screens when they did submit, and failure to take advantage of the services offered to them. Moreover, DCS produced evidence that the Children were thriving, safe, stable, and loved in their placement with Lee, who treats them as if they were her own children. This evidence, along with the testimony of CASA Bowen, is sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding that termination of Parents' parental rights is in the Children's best interests.
[¶23] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Foley, J., concur.