Opinion
Bankruptcy Case No. 14-16938 EEB
2021-09-23
IN RE: LAKEVIEW DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Debtor.
Aaron J. Conrardy, Littleton, CO, Daniel A. Hepner, Daniel A. Hepner P.C., Broomfield, CO, Sender Wasserman Wadsworth, PC, Denver, CO, for Trustee Joli A. Lofstedt.
Aaron J. Conrardy, Littleton, CO, Daniel A. Hepner, Daniel A. Hepner P.C., Broomfield, CO, Sender Wasserman Wadsworth, PC, Denver, CO, for Trustee Joli A. Lofstedt.
ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR ALLOWANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE
Elizabeth E. Brown, Bankruptcy Judge THIS MATTER is before the Court following an evidentiary hearing on the Amended Motion for Allowance of Administrative Expense Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 503, filed by David Summers ("Summers") and the objection of the chapter 7 trustee, Joli Lofstedt (the "Trustee"). The dispute between the parties is whether the Debtor's President and Chief Operating Officer (COO) is entitled to compensation for his postpetition services at his contract rate.
Joel Laufer, P.C., another administrative claimant, also objected but elected at trial not to present any evidence or argument.
I. FINDINGS
Lakeview Development Corporation (the "Debtor") acquired land near Loveland, Colorado for redevelopment as a residential community. Its development plan called for the building of 232 single-family home sites, situated with views of Boyd Lake, the Front Range mountains, and across from a state park. There were to be nineteen estate lots on the lakefront, with boat docks. It included plans for a country-club style clubhouse, a childcare facility, an extensive master-planned trail system, and parks and playgrounds with every "neighborhood pod."
The Debtor purchased heavy construction equipment to reclaim and maintain eroding shorelines and to deepen the lake near the shorelines. It put in infrastructure necessary to obtain building permits. But according to the Debtor, the City of Loveland imposed numerous delays in the permitting process, straining the patience of the Debtor's secured lenders. And then just as the Debtor had acquired building permits for twenty-seven lots, the managing partner of its primary secured lender died suddenly of a heart attack. While this lender had previously extended the due date on the loans many times, new management had no appetite for this project and immediately called the loans due, triggering a twenty-four percent default rate of interest on approximately $11 million in secured loans. Within a couple of months, this lender commenced foreclosure. In a dominoes fashion, the Debtor's other lenders called their loans due, imposing eighteen percent default rates.
This left the Debtor with no traditional means of financing and no time to obtain refinancing. Faced with no other viable alternatives, the Debtor filed chapter 11 on May 20, 2014. At that time, the Debtor valued its real property at only $5-7 million and its personal property (including heavy construction equipment) at $13 million, but it had debts in excess of $44 million.
Immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing, the Debtor's independent board of directors authorized the Debtor to enter into an employment agreement with Summers as its President and Chief Operating Officer. For many years prior to its bankruptcy, the Debtor had retained Summers as an independent contractor to provide it with both management and legal expertise. Summers is a graduate of Cornell Law School, who practiced with one of Denver's oldest and largest law firms for a number of years before starting his own firm, where he concentrated his legal services in the areas of corporate, securities, business, and franchise law. Summers was also an officer, director, and shareholder of the Debtor. He was in charge of its day-to-day operations and he held both secured and unsecured claims against the Debtor. He further served as a member of the Lakeview Metropolitan District. With all his connections to the Debtor and this project, he was willing to work as an independent contractor for only half his usual hourly rate as an attorney. When it came time to formalize the arrangement prior to filing bankruptcy, the Debtor's board offered him a monthly salary of approximately $15,000. It arrived at this amount based on an average of his compensation while an independent contractor of the Debtor.
Reorganization efforts did not proceed smoothly. Prepetition animosity between Summers and the Debtor's creditors carried over into the bankruptcy case. The unsecured creditors' committee (the "Committee") opposed many of the Debtor's motions. Eventually, the Debtor tried to change the membership of the committee, albeit unsuccessfully. The Debtor and its secured creditors asserted claims against each other in adversary proceedings and they were unable to agree on the treatment of the secured claims in a chapter 11 plan. In the meantime, the Debtor sold no lots and generated no operating revenue. While the Debtor obtained court approval for some postpetition financing, those funds were insufficient to pay the estate's mounting administrative expenses, let alone to fund the completion of the development.
On June 15, 2015, the judge originally assigned to this case ordered the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee at the request of the Committee. In its ruling, the court expressed its concern about: the amount of administrative expenses and postpetition borrowing that the estate had incurred; Summers' inability to fully cooperate or negotiate with creditors; and his failure to advise the court and parties about the costs to complete the real estate development. It concluded that the Debtor's prospects for reorganization were "weak and remote."
The United States Trustee appointed the Trustee as the Debtor's chapter 11 trustee on June 23, 2015. One week later, on June 30, 2015, the Trustee filed her motion to reject Summers' employment agreement. She did so because of the animosity between Summers and the estate's creditors. Yet when the Trustee filed her own chapter 11 plan shortly after her appointment, she had no better luck negotiating with the creditors. In fact, shortly after her appointment, the estate's major secured creditors obtained relief from stay to proceed with foreclosure.
At the time of his contract's rejection, the Debtor had paid Summers about $122,000 in postpetition salary but still owed him $82,820.87. This amount represents his unpaid salary from January 15, 2015, the date when the Debtor no longer had funds to pay him, until June 30, 2015, the day on which the Trustee moved for rejection. Although his employment agreement gave him the right to a sixty-day notice of termination and full payment during that notice period, Summers has not elected to seek payment beyond June 30, 2015. He now seeks $82,820.87 as a chapter 11 administrative expense.
Upon the retirement of the judge originally assigned to this case, the clerk of the court reassigned it to this Court. Shortly thereafter, the United States Trustee filed a motion to convert to chapter 7. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Court held the Debtor had no prospects for reorganization and converted the case to chapter 7 on April 11, 2016. The United States Trustee reappointed the Trustee as the Debtor's chapter 7 trustee.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standards
Summers contends he is entitled to an administrative expense priority claim under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A)(i). This section of the Bankruptcy Code grants administrative expense priority to claims for "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate including ... wages, salaries, and commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case." In the Tenth Circuit, a party asserting an administrative expense claim must demonstrate that it "arises out of a transaction between the creditor and the bankrupt's trustee or debtor in possession and only to the extent that the consideration supporting the claimant's right to payment was both supplied to and beneficial to the debtor-in-possession in the operation of the business." Isaac v. Temex Energy, Inc. (In re Amarex) , 853 F.2d 1526, 1530 (10th Cir. 1988). The Amarex case directed courts to construe this priority claim narrowly "because the presumption in bankruptcy cases is that the debtor's limited resources will be equally distributed among his creditors." Id.
Unless specified otherwise, all further references to "section" or "§" are to the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11, United States Code.
When an administrative claimant establishes a prima facie case under § 503(b)(1), the burden of producing evidence shifts to the objector. "Mere allegations, unsupported by evidence, are insufficient to rebut the movant's prima facie case." Toma Steel Supply, Inc. v. GHR Energy Corp. (In re TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp.), 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992). But the ultimate burden of persuasion, by a preponderance of the evidence, remains with the claimant. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. v. Martin (In re Mid Region Petroleum, Inc.) , 1 F.3d 1130, 1132 (10th Cir. 1993) ; In re TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. , 978 F.2d at 1416.
If an employee establishes both prongs of the Amarex test, the employee is entitled to an administrative expense priority claim for the reasonable value of the postpetition services he provided to the debtor-in-possession. The "reasonable value" measure comes from the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco , 465 U.S. 513, 104 S.Ct. 1188, 79 L.Ed.2d 482 (1984) (" Bildisco "). In Bildisco , the court explained that "[i]f the debtor-in-possession elects to continue to receive benefits from the other party to an executory contract pending a decision to reject or assume the contract, the debtor-in-possession is obligated to pay for the reasonable value of those services, which, depending on the circumstances, may be what is specified in the contract." Id. at 531, 104 S.Ct. 1188 (citation omitted).
Here, there is no dispute that Summers' claim satisfies the first element of the test. Summers' claim arises from postpetition services he rendered to the debtor-in-possession. The dispute centers on the remaining factor – whether those services benefitted the Debtor in the operation of its business during the chapter 11 case.
B. Benefit to the Estate
Summers provided detailed and comprehensive testimony describing the countless hours he worked postpetition on behalf of the Debtor. This work included attending hearings, providing information to creditors, working on amended schedules, preparing for and attending depositions, working on amendments to the Debtor's plan and disclosure statement, assisting in the formation of an alternate creditors' committee, attempting to secure postpetition financing, arranging for the sale of construction equipment, negotiating with secured creditors, drafting pleadings for the main case and related adversary proceedings, reviewing and revising pleadings drafted by the estate's bankruptcy attorneys, and preparing the estate's monthly operating reports.
In addition to these services, Summers stressed how much time he spent educating himself on bankruptcy law. He said he became a "walking, talking encyclopedia" on several bankruptcy issues he believed were relevant to the Debtor's chapter 11 case. He contends that his experience and his acquired bankruptcy knowledge provided beneficial services to the estate and that he saved the estate more in legal fees than the amount he seeks as an administrative expense. But the Court agrees with the Trustee that the time Summers spent educating himself on bankruptcy law was both outside his job description and very unnecessary. The Debtor had employed sophisticated and cost-efficient bankruptcy counsel to handle its case.
While Summers spent less time on the day-to-day operations of the Debtor's business than on its bankruptcy case, his management services included maintaining insurance, working on a proposal to sell four lots, negotiating over the excavation expenses related to those lots, handling a dispute with an electrical contractor, and communicating with the City of Loveland concerning infrastructure repairs. Moreover, it is not possible for a corporate debtor to prosecute a chapter 11 case without someone to direct its continued business and to assist its bankruptcy attorneys with the administrative and litigation tasks that the reorganization process requires. Here, Summers was the only person available and able to provide those services. The Debtor had only one other employee – Summers' part-time secretary - during its chapter 11 case. His unrebutted testimony established that he devoted considerable time, sometimes more than eight hours a day, seven days a week, to the operation of the Debtor's business and the administration of its bankruptcy case.
In fact, the prior bankruptcy judge acknowledged Summers' "detailed, substantial and valuable knowledge of the history, operations, and status of the Debtor." While the court replaced Summers with the Trustee, it opined that Summers' background could be helpful to the chapter 11 trustee. It also noted that the existing plan and disclosure statement was "very much the product of [Summers]" and that Summers and his supporters could continue to pursue this plan despite a trustee appointment. Though it concluded that Summers' management of the Debtor, both pre- and postpetition was "unsuccessful," it ruled that the creditors' committee had failed to prove that Summers had "grossly mismanaged the Debtor in an incompetent manner." But according to the prior judge, "following a year of lengthy, very costly and a rather contentious life of the bankruptcy case, the practical realities and necessities of the case warrant[ed] the appointment of a trustee."
The Trustee has objected to any compensation of Summers for the time period of January 15, 2015 to June 30, 2015. She asserts that Summers' work harmed the estate more than it benefitted it. In doing so, she relied almost exclusively on the general findings of the prior judge. These findings included the court's observations that Summers bore responsibility for the litigiousness that contributed to delay and increased administrative expenses, that his actions in relation to the creditors' committee were unconventional, that he failed to "fully" cooperate and negotiate with the committee, that he failed to disclose completion costs, and that he failed to adequately explain the Debtor's failure to pursue avoidance actions against himself personally. The Trustee presented as her evidence copies of the various court orders with these findings, but she did not offer the testimony of any other party who was active in the case prior to the Trustee's appointment. This placed the Court in the rather difficult position of evaluating the prior court's findings in a vacuum.
And when this Court reviews the general findings of the prior court, it is left with the conviction that the prior court laid all the blame for the "litigiousness" of the parties at the feet of Summers. Yet a review of the docket in this case demonstrates that the Committee and the secured creditors also took many positions to obstruct progress in the case. The Trustee's subsequent lack of success in negotiating a resolution following her appointment also calls into question whether Summers was entirely at fault for the litigious, contentious relationships.
In fact, while the prior judge found Summers management "unsuccessful" and "inadequate," he expressly declined to find that Summers "grossly mismanaged the Debtor in an incompetent fashion." The court did not rule or even suggest that Summers failed to confer any benefit on the estate. To the contrary, the court recognized that Summers' detailed knowledge of the Debtor's history and business operations was beneficial in the case and that the plan he formulated might provide a path to reorganization even after a chapter 11 trustee took over. It appears to this Court that the prior judge appointed a chapter 11 trustee in the case not because Summers had harmed the estate, but because it believed the involvement of an impartial party might help all parties make progress towards reorganization.
As a result, the Trustee's evidence fails to convince the Court that Summers services harmed the estate and provided no benefit whatsoever to the Debtor during the relevant time period. Nor does the Court believe it is appropriate to find that prior management of the Debtor provided no benefit simply because the reorganization efforts ultimately failed. On the contrary, Summers did work that was necessary, both for the bankruptcy case and for the continuation of the Debtor's business. There was no one else willing or available to do this work. His work allowed the Debtor to pursue its attempt to reorganize, even though the attempt was ultimately unsuccessful. Therefore, he is entitled to an administrative claim for the reasonable value of his services.
C. Reasonable Value of the Services
Summers offered two forms of evidence to support the amount of his administrative claim. He offered his employment agreement, along with his testimony as to how the Debtor's board arrived at his salary. Then he offered expert testimony as to the reasonableness of his compensation for the position he held. Based on whatever strategic reasons, the Trustee presented no evidence in support of an alternative position that the reasonable value of Summers' compensation should be set at a different rate than his contract rate, essentially waiving her right to dispute the reasonableness of his agreed compensation.
1. Contract Rate
Summers testified that, under his employment agreement, he was entitled to a monthly salary of approximately $15,000, which equates to an annual salary of $180,000. As previously mentioned, an independent board of directors approved this employment contract. They arrived at the amount of his salary by averaging the amount he had billed the Debtor prepetition for both management and legal services as an independent contractor.
In cross examination of Summers, the Trustee did not question the amount of his salary or the reasons the board set this amount. But she did question the necessity of Summers teaching himself bankruptcy law and the Court agrees that these services were both unnecessary and duplicative. Yet no party offered any evidence, such as daily time records, from which the Court could apportion his time into compensated versus uncompensated time. More importantly, even if he performed unnecessary services, this does not negate the fact that he was still fulfilling a necessary role as the Debtor's only manager and representative. And his arrangement was to provide these services based on a set salary. There was nothing in his employment contract that tied his compensation to the accomplishment of certain tasks, i.e. selling lots, obtaining permits, attending court hearings, and the like.
Summers requests that the Court find the "reasonable" value of his unpaid services to be the rate set in his employment contract. As also previously mentioned, the Supreme Court has recognized that the price a pre-bankruptcy contract specifies may constitute the reasonable value of the goods or services provided. Bildisco , 465 U.S. at 531, 104 S.Ct. 1188. Courts differ on their interpretation of Bildisco's language and what evidentiary weight to give a contract's price. Some courts have held that Bildisco establishes a rebuttable presumption that the contract price is the reasonable value. These courts require the debtor-in-possession or trustee to overcome the presumption with contrary evidence. See, e.g., In re CNB Int'l, Inc., 307 B.R. 363, 371 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2004) ; In re Beverage Canners Int'l Corp. , 255 B.R. 89, 93 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000). Some courts even go so far as to say this presumption may only be overcome by "convincing evidence" to the contrary. See, e.g., In re ID Liquidation One, LLC , 503 B.R. 392, 400 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013) (applying presumption to claims of debtor's CEO and other insiders for management services); In re Pettingill Enter. Inc., 486 B.R. 524, 533 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2013) ; In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., 425 B.R. 735, 741 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) ; In re Bethlehem Steel , 291 B.R. 260, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) ; In re Washington-St. Tammany Elec. Coop., Inc. , 111 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1989).
Other courts read Bildisco less expansively. They consider a pre-bankruptcy contract's rate as probative, but not dispositive, of the measure of the reasonable value of services. These courts do not shift the burden from the claimant to the objector. See, e.g., Boruff v. Cook Inlet Energy LLC (In re Cook Inlet Energy LLC) , 583 B.R. 494, 506 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2018). In Cook Inlet , the debtor's executive chairman asserted an administrative expense claim for unpaid salary at his contract rate. The court rejected his argument that Bildisco creates a presumption, noting that Bildisco itself said only that, "depending on the circumstances," a contract "may" establish the reasonable value of services. In the context of a rejected employment contract, it observed that courts have "almost uniformly ruled that although the contract wages are probative, they are not binding, and courts have not given them presumptive weight." Id . at 503.
The Tenth Circuit has not explicitly ruled on this question. It has, however, affirmed the bankruptcy court's application of the contract rate. In the case of Peters v. Pikes Peak Musicians Ass'n , 462 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 2006), orchestra musicians asserted administrative claims for unpaid wages under the terms of their collective bargaining agreement. While they had not actually performed during the case due to a temporary shutdown of the business, the bankruptcy court ruled that the musicians had provided benefit to the bankruptcy estate by remaining available to perform at the orchestra's request. The Tenth Circuit not only affirmed this ruling but also rejected the debtor's request for a remand to the bankruptcy court to determine the reasonable value of the musicians' services. It ruled that the debtor had waived the issue by failing to raise it below. It further ruled, in the alternative, that "remand is unnecessary since the value of the services is easily computed from the terms of the agreement ." Pikes Peak, 462 F.3d at 1274 (emphasis added).
In this case, the Court need not resolve the question of how much weight to afford the contract price. Regardless of whether the contract price has presumptive weight, it clearly provides some evidence of reasonable value. Many courts have so held. See, e.g., Mason v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re FBI Distrib. Corp.), 330 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2003) ; Teamsters Local No. 310 v. Ingrum (In re Tucson Yellow Cab Co.), 789 F.2d 701, 703–04 (9th Cir.1986) ; Gill v. Tishman Constr. Corp. of California (In re Santa Monica Beach Hotel, Ltd.) , 209 B.R. 722, 727 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) ; In re American Plumbing & Mechanical, Inc., 323 B.R. 442, 462 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005). And, as this Court has previously held, in the absence of any other evidence, the contract price becomes determinative. In re Native American Systems, Inc. , 368 B.R. 75, 80 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006).
2. Expert Testimony
Summers did not limit his evidence to the contract rate. He also presented his expert, William Dixon, who is an executive compensation consultant. He works for a company whose primary business is to provide reports to board of directors' compensation committees. He has over forty years' experience in this industry. Mr. Dixon testified that Summers' salary was a reasonable salary for a "Senior Level Development Professional" engaged in commercial or residential real estate development. Mr. Dixon relied on the 2015 Real Estate Compensation Survey prepared by Christensen Advisory Services. This survey compiled data from 132 companies on 121 different positions, all related to the real estate industry. According to that survey, a base salary of $180,000 per year was right at the fiftieth percentile for his job category. And Mr. Dixon believed this category best matched the information Summers' gave him about his job responsibilities.
The Trustee's cross-examination pointed out some discrepancies between Summers' duties and responsibilities and those inherent in the job description analyzed. But she did not elicit any testimony about how this difference would affect the expert's opinion or how much of a deduction from the median salary, if any, would be appropriate. Nor did she question Mr. Dixon as to whether a different title or category included in the survey better fit his actual role. Finally, she did not produce her own expert or put into evidence any other facts from which this Court could reach a different opinion as to how to value Summers' services.
In other cases where the court has reduced an insider's claim for management services, the party opposing the claim has provided concrete evidence demonstrating a "reasonable value" other than the contract price on which the court could base its reasoning. For example, in Stahl v. Bartley Lindsay Co. (In re Bartley Lindsay Co .), 137 B.R. 305, 310 (D. Minn. 1991), the court awarded the debtor's president an administrative claim commensurate with the salary the debtor paid its prior president. In In re Bernard Technologies, Inc ., 342 B.R. 174, 179 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006), a case with similar facts, the court reduced the executive's administrative expense claim to the lower salary he had received from the debtor in the year prior to bankruptcy. In In re ID Liquidation One , LLC , 503 B.R. at 406, the court allowed the administrative claim of the debtor's former president at the lower rate the debtor and other interested parties agreed to pay the chief restructuring officer who replaced him. And, in In re Cook Energy Inlet, Inc. , 583 B.R. at 506, the court determined that the reasonable value of the executive chairman's services was the same as the compensation the debtor paid its other board members. In each of these examples, there was some other evidence on which the court could base a value less than the contract rate.
Because the Trustee chose not to offer any contrary evidence of value, the Court is left with Summers' testimony, his expert's testimony, and the contract itself as the only valuation evidence it received. Does this mean that the burden shifted to the Trustee and she failed to meet it? Does it mean the Court must accept the claimant's evidence, especially the expert testimony? The answer to both questions is "not necessarily."
"A fact-finding body may disregard the opinion of an expert and use its own judgment in arriving at value." Phipps v. C.I.R., 127 F.2d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1942) (quoting Emerald Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 72 F.2d 681, 683 (10th Cir. 1934) ). "It may not, however, reject opinion evidence and make an arbitrary finding of value not supported by any substantial evidence." Id. In the case of Security-First Nat'l Bank of Los Angeles v. Lutz, 322 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1963), the trial court received the testimony of two experts on the value of the chief executive officer's services but arrived at its own conclusion that the services were worth less than ten percent of the lowest value offered by the experts. The appellate court held it was error for the court by some undisclosed measure to discount the services.
When a court receives conflicting valuation evidence from two parties, it is free to choose either valuation, neither valuation, or a value somewhere in between the two values offered. Berger v. Berger, 57 N.E.3d 166, 173 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) ; Stratton v. Stratton, 16 Va.App. 878, 433 S.E.2d 920, 922 (1993) ; Antinora v. Antinora, 125 A.D.3d 1336 , 3 N.Y.S.3d 500, 504 (2015). When it does, the court's value will be subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) ; Feitz v. Feitz, 533 N.E.2d 1287, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). But it abuses its discretion if it fails to articulate why it has selected the value ascribed and where the court's valuation finds no support in the record. In other words, the court's finding of value must be tethered to the evidence admitted. The court may base its findings on the credibility of experts, the credibility of lay witnesses, documentary support, or any combination of the same. But it cannot arbitrarily "split the baby" or select a different figure without articulating its basis in reliance on the evidence admitted. Vanzant v. Vanzant, 82 So. 3d 991, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) ; 2 Equit. Distrib. of Property § 7:12 n. 28 (4th ed. 2020).
For example, if wife's expert determines that the value of a marital asset is $10 million and the husband's expert testifies that the value is $5 million, the court cannot on that evidence alone set the value at $7.5 million. However, if wife's expert testifies that husband's expert used an improper multiplier in reaching his valuation and then provides an opinion as to the proper multiplier, the court could use either multiplier in determining valuation, thereby reaching a differing value supported by the evidence.
Berger v. Berger, 57 N.E.3d at 173.
Thus, in determining the value of Summers' postpetition services, this Court could reject the contract rate, the historical rate paid to Summers prepetition, and the expert testimony offered. But to do so, it would have to tie its different valuation to something else in the record. The problem is, however, that there is nothing else in this record to support a differing value. Thus, any other valuation would be purely arbitrary.
That is not to say that the Court found Mr. Dixon's testimony lacking in credibility or competence. Quite the contrary. It found both Mr. Dixon and Summers to be quite credible. And Mr. Dixon is clearly well-qualified to render an opinion on the reasonableness of a professional's compensation. The only thing that gives the Court some pause is that it suspects Summers spent a great deal of time teaching himself bankruptcy law and that he probably spent an inordinate amount of time "double checking" the work of the Debtor's bankruptcy professionals. But again, there was no evidence that he was not attending to matters affecting the Debtor's operations, only that he took uncompromising positions and, for whatever reasons, he "held his cards close to his vest" in terms of disclosing future plans for completion of the development. The Court was never told what the basis was for the animosity between Summers and the Committee. It may have been that Summers suspected one or more members of the Committee of holding a competing interest in the project, but that is only pure speculation on this Court's part. What is clear is that all of the evidence offered on valuation supports a finding that Summers' monthly salary of $15,000 was well within the range of reasonableness.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS that Summers' Amended Motion for Allowance of Administrative Expense Claim is GRANTED. The Court allows Summers' chapter 11 administrative expense claim under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A)(i) in the amount of $82,820.87.