Opinion
No. 338169
09-14-2017
In re L. M. B., Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2016-000241-AD Before: O'BRIEN, P.J., and JANSEN and MURRAY, JJ. PER CURIAM.
In this adoption matter, petitioners, the prospective adoptive parents, appeal as of right the trial court's order declining to terminate respondent father's parental rights pursuant to MCL 710.39(1) and closing the adoption proceeding. Because the matter has been rendered moot, we dismiss the appeal.
The facts of this matter are largely irrelevant to its disposition, and thus a detailed summary is unnecessary. LMB was conceived out of wedlock, and respondent mother and respondent father were never married. Shortly after respondent mother found out that she was pregnant, she informed respondent father. During her pregnancy, respondent mother decided that she wanted to place LMB up for adoption, although it was unclear whether respondent father would consent. An adoption agency placed respondent mother in contact with petitioners, who sought to adopt LMB. However, after LMB was born, respondent father objected to the adoption and sought custody of the child. The matter proceeded to a contested hearing. At the time of the hearing, respondent father was not LMB's legal father. As a result, the trial court was asked to decide whether termination of respondent father's parental rights was appropriate under MCL 710.39(1), which applies to putative fathers. The trial court declined to terminate respondent father's parental rights under this statutory provision, finding that LMB's best interests would not be served by termination. Petitioners filed the instant appeal challenging that ruling.
Specifically, this statute provides:
If the putative father does not come within the provisions of [MCL 710.39](2), and if the putative father appears at the hearing and requests custody of the child, the court shall inquire into his fitness and his ability to properly care for the child and shall determine whether the best interests of the child will be served by granting custody to him. If the court finds that it would not be in the best interests of the child to grant custody to the putative father, the court shall terminate his rights to the child.
However, while the adoption proceeding was pending, and apparently unknown to the trial court, respondent father filed a second suit in a different division of the Wayne Circuit Court. After petitioners filed the instant appeal, the trial court, in the second case, entered an order of filiation declaring respondent father to be the legal and biological father of LMB.
Although the order of filiation is not part of the record on appeal, we may take judicial notice of the fact that it was entered. MRE 201(b) states:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.MRE 201(e) provides that "[j]udicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding." Therefore, pursuant to MRE 201, this Court takes judicial notice of the order of filiation entered in the second case declaring respondent father the legal father of LMB. See Matter of Stowe, 162 Mich App 27, 32-33; 412 NW2d 655 (1987) (holding that a trial court could take judicial notice of a divorce judgment); Johnson v Dep't of Natural Resources, 310 Mich App 635, 649; 873 NW2d 842 (2015) (noting that MRE 201 allows this Court to take judicial notice of "a public record").
In light of the fact that father is the legal father of LMB, the instant appeal is moot. "An issue is deemed moot when an event occurs that renders it impossible for a reviewing court to grant relief" or "when it presents only abstract questions of law that do not rest upon existing facts or rights." B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359; 586 NW2d 117 (1998). The relief ultimately sought by petitioners is an order terminating respondent father's parental rights pursuant to MCL 710.39(1). By its terms, this statute only concerns the termination of the parental rights of putative fathers. See MCL 710.39(1). Because respondent father is LMB's biological and legal father, MCL 710.39(1) is no longer applicable. Accordingly, on the existing facts in this case, it is impossible for this Court to grant the relief petitioners request.
A putative father is a man who is "reputed, supposed or alleged to be the biological father of a child." Girard v Wagenmaker, 173 Mich App 735, 740; 434 NW2d 227 (1988), rev'd on other grounds 437 Mich 149 (1991). --------
Appeal dismissed as moot.
/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Christopher M. Murray