In fact, nowhere in the response does Leach raise any issue with the constitutionality of OCGA § 19-7-3 (c). See In re L. C. , 273 Ga. 886, 889 (2), 548 S.E.2d 335 (2001) (constitutional challenge not properly raised when party does not specify either the particular part or parts of the statute being challenged or how those part or parts of the statute violated a constitutional provision). Neither did Leach raise a constitutional argument during trial.
Rather, he was tried as a child in the juvenile justice system where the goal is rehabilitation and treatment and where an adjudication of delinquency is not considered a conviction of a crime. See In re L.C., 273 Ga. 886, 887(1), 548 S.E.2d 335 (2001). Moreover, he was sentenced under OCGA § 15–11–63, the central purpose of which is “the rehabilitation and treatment of the child and not punishment.”
" 273 Ga. 886 ( 548 SE2d 335) (2001). See OCGA § 15-11-63 (a) (2) (B) (ii).
Certainly, as a general matter, this Court will not rule on a constitutional challenge to a statute unless the issue has been raised and ruled on in the trial court. In re L. C., 273 Ga. 886, 889 (2) ( 548 SE2d 335) (2001). However, this Court has recognized a limited exception to such general rule in the instance of a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute governing appellate procedure that is necessarily made for the first time on appeal.
Their conclusory statement, entirely devoid of argument and lacking any reference to applicable authority, was insufficient to preserve their argument that the Public Lawsuits Act is an unconstitutional restriction on the superior court’s jurisdiction.See In re L.C., 273 Ga. 886, 889 (2), 548 S.E.2d 335 (2001) (concluding that the appellant’s constitutional argument was "not properly raised below, as [he] did not specify either the particular part or parts of the statute that he was challenging or how those part or parts of the statute violated the constitutional provisions that he claimed were being violated"). Case No. A24A1013
Since the mother did not properly raise the constitutional challenges below or obtain a ruling from the trial judge, these claims are not properly presented for appellate review. In re L. C., 273 Ga. 886, 889 ( 548 SE2d 335) (2001). Judgment affirmed.
See OCGA § 15-11-66 (a) (applicable where child has been found, among other things, to be in need of treatment or rehabilitation and authorizing disposition best suited to the child's treatment, rehabilitation, and welfare). See generally In re L. C., 273 Ga. 886, 888-889 (1) ( 548 SE2d 335) (2001) (rejecting contention that an order of restrictive custody under OCGA § 15-11-63 was sufficiently like a criminal adjudication to invoke a constitutional right to a jury trial because, although that Code section has some punitive aspects, one of its primary functions is the treatment and rehabilitation of the child, and an adjudication thereunder is not a criminal conviction); In the Interest of J. W., 293 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 667 SE2d 161) (2008) (statutes relating to the same subject matter are construed together, and harmonized wherever possible, so as to ascertain the legislative intendment and give effect thereto). 2.
Davis v. State, 238 Ga. App. 84, 88 (5) ( 517 SE2d 808) (1999).In re L. C., 273 Ga. 886, 889 (2) ( 548 SE2d 335) (2001). Setting aside that Pless's enumeration of error does not address the following matter, we note that Pless further contends that the indictment failed to specify in what manner his dog was a public nuisance.
(Emphasis supplied.) In re L. C., 273 Ga. 886, 889 (1) ( 548 SE2d 335) (2001). For that reason, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that "an order of restrictive custody under [OCGA] § 15-11-63 is not sufficiently like a criminal adjudication to invoke a constitutional right to a trial by jury."
Ruffin, C.J., and Smith, P.J., concur.In re L.C., 273 Ga. 886, 888-889 (1) ( 548 SE2d 335) (2001). See In the Interest of A.M., 248 Ga. App. 241, 243 (3) ( 545 SE2d 688) (2001).