Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Becky L. Dugan, Judge. Affirmed. Super.Ct.No. J212465
On transfer for disposition from the Superior Court of Riverside County, Riverside Superior Court case No. RIJ113281.
Robert McLaughlin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Danielle E. Wuchenich, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Karen L. Dodd, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST, J.
Appellant Arthur R. challenges a juvenile court’s dispositional order denying him reunification services as to K.R. (the child). He contends that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) failed to exercise reasonable diligence in its effort to locate him, and that the juvenile court’s order denying him reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) (whereabouts of parent unknown) was thus not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise noted.
Counsel for the child filed a letter brief on May 21, 2007, urging us to affirm the court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 4, 2006, Q.D. (mother) asked the department to take her two minor children, K.D. and the child (who was one year old), into custody because she was unable to care for them adequately. Mother told the department that appellant was the child’s father, but that he was not active in the child’s life, and that she did not know his whereabouts. On November 7, 2006, the department filed a petition, pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), which alleged that appellant was the child’s father; however, his whereabouts were unknown, and he had not provided care or support for the child. The next day, the court detained the child.
Mother is not a party to this appeal.
K.D. is not a subject of this appeal.
On November 30, 2006, a social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report, in which it was recommended that appellant be denied reunification services, since he could not be located. The social worker reported that mother said he was in jail, but she refused to disclose his location. The social worker attached a “Declaration of Search” to the jurisdiction/disposition report, listing the search efforts made, as follows: 1) she checked the telephone directory/directory assistance for Ontario and Riverside; 2) she requested information from mother; 3) she mailed notice to the last known address on Monterey Avenue in Ontario; 4) she checked the department’s records, the local jails, and the Prison Locator; and 5) she referred this case to the department’s Parent Locator Unit for further search. Appellant’s name was not found in the Riverside County jail system. The social worker checked the Prison Locator, which identified an Arthur R. who was on parole in Ontario. The social worker reported that there was no phone listing in Ontario for Arthur R. However, a search of the department’s records showed active cases for childcare, food stamps, and MediCal, with an address on Monterey Avenue in Ontario. The department mailed notice to appellant at that address.
At the jurisdiction hearing on December 4, 2006, the court noted that the department made no attempt to notify the parole office to find defendant. The court stated that the department needed to do so. The court then set the matter contested and continued the hearing to January 2, 2007.
The social worker filed an addendum report on December 28, 2006, and recommended that reunification services be denied to appellant, since he still had not been located. The social worker attached another “Declaration of Search” noting the Parent Locator Unit’s efforts to find appellant. On November 30, 2006, the Parent Locator Unit spoke with staff at the San Bernardino County jail and was informed that appellant was at the West Valley Detention Center in Rancho Cucamonga. The parent locator search was thus closed. The social worker sent notice of the January 2, 2007, hearing on December 20, 2006, but listed appellant’s address as unknown. On December 21, 2006, the department received an email from the sheriff’s department stating that appellant was transferred out of the custody of the sheriff’s department that day. The email further stated that appellant was in the custody of “an unspecified agency outside of the jurisdiction of” the sheriff’s department.
At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on January 2, 2007, the court found that notice had been given as required by law, and that the child came within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The court adjudged the child a dependent of the court. The court ordered reunification services for mother, but denied reunification services to appellant under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1). The court also ordered the case transferred to San Bernardino County, based on mother’s residence in Ontario.
At some point, the department received a copy of the minutes of appellant’s criminal sentencing hearing dated November 27, 2006. It stated that appellant was sentenced to state prison for one year and four months and was delivered to the California Department of Corrections in Chino.
On January 29, 2007, a transfer-in hearing was held in the San Bernardino County Juvenile Court. The court noted that appellant was not present in court, but was in custody in state prison. The court accepted all proceedings from Riverside County. The court further noted that there may be possible defects in the noticing of appellant and scheduled an appearance review for March 5, 2007.
On January 30, 2007, appellant filed a notice of appeal of the January 2, 2007, order denying him reunification services.
ANALYSIS
I. Any Error in the Failure to Notice Appellant Was Harmless
Appellant argues that the department did not exercise due diligence in locating him, in order to give him notice of the proceedings. He accordingly contends that the court’s dispositional order under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) (whereabouts of parent unknown) must be reversed: 1) since the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him (“The juvenile court obtains personal jurisdiction over a parent when the individual is properly noticed. [Citation.]” (In re Claudia S. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 236, 247 (Claudia S.)); and 2) the order was not supported by substantial evidence. We ultimately conclude that any error in the department’s failure to notice appellant was harmless.
A. The Department Did Not Exercise Due Diligence
“If the whereabouts of a parent are unknown, the issue becomes whether due diligence was used to locate the parent. [Citation.] The term ‘reasonable or due diligence’ ‘“denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and inquiry conducted in good faith.”’ [Citation] Due process notice requirements are deemed satisfied where a parent cannot be located despite a reasonable search effort and the failure to give actual notice will not render the proceedings invalid. [Citation.]” (Claudia S., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 247.)
The record here shows that the department conducted a systematic investigation to locate appellant, but the search was not thorough. At the time the social worker filed the jurisdiction/disposition report dated December 4, 2006, her efforts in locating appellant included requesting information from mother, checking the telephone directory/directory assistance for Ontario and Riverside, checking the department’s records, checking the local jails and the Prison Locator, and referring the case to the department’s Parent Locator Unit. Mother said appellant was in jail, but would not disclose where. The Prison Locator indicated that appellant was on parole in Ontario. Since there was no phone listing for appellant in Ontario, the social worker mailed the notice to appellant at the last known address on Monterey Avenue in Ontario—the address that the department’s records listed for active cases for childcare, food stamps, and MediCal.
The record indicates that the social worker referred the case to the Parent Locator Unit on November 29, 2006, for a further search, and that the Parent Locator Unit learned that appellant was at the West Valley Detention Center the next day, November 30, 2006. The Parent Locator Unit left a message for the social worker informing her of appellant’s location that day. However, at the jurisdiction hearing on December 4, 2006, the court only had before it the social worker’s jurisdiction/disposition report filed on November 30, 2006, which indicated that defendant was on parole in Ontario. When the court noted that the department needed to contact the parole officer to find appellant, counsel for the department did not mention that appellant was located at the West Valley Detention Center, subsequent to the writing of that report.
On December 28, 2006, the social worker filed an addendum report, in which she then reported that the Parent Locator Unit found appellant at the West Valley Detention Center on November 30, 2006. However, there is no indication in the record that the social worker ever sent notice to appellant at the West Valley Detention Center. The social worker did send notice to the parties of the January 2, 2007, hearing on December 20, 2006, but listed appellant’s address as unknown. The department argues that, even if it had sent notice to appellant at the West Valley Detention Center, he would not have received it, since he was transferred out of the custody of the sheriff’s department on December 21, 2006 to “an unspecified agency outside of the jurisdiction of” the sheriff’s department. However, the social worker was informed that appellant was located at the West Valley Detention Center on November 30, 2006. Thus, she had nearly three weeks to send notice to appellant there, before he was transferred out.
We note that the record is confusing, in that it indicates that on November 27, 2006, appellant was sentenced to state prison for one year and four months and was delivered to the California Department of Corrections in Chino. The San Bernardino County jail apparently misinformed the Parent Locator Unit that appellant was at the West Valley Detention Center on November 30, 2006. In any case, the social worker’s efforts to locate appellant evidently ceased after she found out that he was transferred out of West Valley Detention Center. Appellant consequently was never given notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Because the social worker had information that appellant was located at the West Valley Detention Center, but failed to send him notice there, and also made no apparent effort to locate him after finding out that he was transferred, we conclude that the department did not conduct a thorough search to locate appellant.
B. Any Error Was Harmless
We initially note appellant’s argument in his reply brief and at oral argument that a harmless error analysis is inappropriate in this case. Citing Claudia S., he claims that the court’s order denying him reunification services was simply void because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. However, Claudia S. is inapposite, since the court in that case did not even address the issue of harmless error. Moreover, Claudia S. was an unusual case. The mother had oral notice from the social worker of the detention hearing date, but she took the children to Mexico before the Agency commenced the proceedings by filing the petitions. (Claudia S., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 251.) Subsequently, “the court conducted the jurisdiction, disposition and review hearings without the children, the parents, or counsel for the parents, based on the social worker’s initial report.” (Id. at p. 250.) The appellate court considered the hearings to be “fictitious proceedings” since the Agency never detained the children and the parents never received any services. (Id. at pp. 250-251.) Given these unique circumstances, it is clear why the appellate court remanded the matter to the juvenile court without even considering whether the notice error was harmless.
In the instant case, having concluded appellant was not given notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, we turn to the question of whether the court’s order denying reunification services should be reversed. “Errors in notice do not automatically require reversal. [Citation.] We review such errors to determine whether they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (In re Daniel S. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 903, 912-913.) We conclude that the failure to notice appellant was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. Appellant Was an Alleged Father and Would Not Have Been Able to Establish Presumed Father Status
“An alleged biological father in dependency proceedings is a man who may be the father of a child, but whose biological paternity has not been established. [Citation.] ‘An alleged father in dependency or permanency proceedings does not have a known current interest because his paternity has not yet been established.’ [Citation.] An alleged biological father is entitled to notice of the proceedings. [Citation.] Notice provides an opportunity for him to appear and assert a position. [Citation.]” (In re Joseph G. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712, 715 (Joseph G.).) “‘[O]nly a presumed, not a mere biological, father is a “parent” entitled to receive reunification services under section 361.5. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Joshua R. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1025 (Joshua R.).)
Even if the department had located appellant and properly sent him notice, the dispositional order would not have changed. Appellant was, and according to the record on appeal still is, only an alleged father. Mother named him as the child’s father, but his biological paternity has not yet been established. (See Joseph G., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 715.) Appellant disagrees with the characterization of him as an alleged father, merely pointing out that the juvenile court “repeatedly referred to [him] as ‘father’ and ‘dad,’” and that he asserted “his status as [the child’s] father by filing this appeal.” However, since appellant has not actually established his paternity, he does not have a known current interest yet. He is an alleged father. (Ibid.)
Furthermore, even if he had established his biological paternity in the proceedings, we see no probability that the court would have ordered reunification services for him. Appellant was not the child’s presumed father. He was not married to mother and, according to mother, he had “not made [himself] available to provide the [child] with adequate care, support and protection.” (Fam. Code, § 7611, subds. (a) & (d).) He apparently had never provided support for the child, or in any manner embraced his parental responsibilities so as to qualify as a presumed father. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 449-450.) Moreover, there was no evidence that the child knew appellant or had any kind of relationship with him. As a biological, but not presumed father, appellant would have had no right to reunification services. (Joshua R., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1025.)
2. Appellant’s Period of Incarceration Exceeded the Reunification Period
Even if appellant could have established presumed father status, the court would have ordered services for only six months, since the child was less than three years old when she entered foster care. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(2).) The court could have extended services for an additional six months only if it found that there was a substantial probability that the child could be placed in appellant’s custody within that six-month period. (§ 366.21, subd. (e).) Appellant was sentenced to state prison for one year and four months on November 27, 2006. Thus, he was expected to be released from prison in March 2008. Since the child was detained on November 8, 2006, appellant’s release date exceeded the 12-month maximum period of reunification services which might have been provided. Given those circumstances, there is no probability that the court would have ordered reunification services for appellant, even if he had established presumed father status. Accordingly, he was not prejudiced by any failure to serve him with the notice of the proceedings.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: RAMIREZ, P.J., GAUT, J.