Opinion
No. 2-028 / 01-0904.
Filed March 13, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, WILLIAM S. OWENS, Associate Juvenile Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. AFFIRMED.
Lori M. Holm, Des Moines, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert Bozwell, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Thomas Anders, Centerville, guardian ad litem, for minor children.
Considered by HABHAB, PETERSON, and HARRIS, S.J.
Senior judges assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (1999).
The parental rights of S.R. (mother) and R.R. (father) to their daughter, K.R., eight years of age, and their son, B.R., five years of age, were terminated on May 10, 2001. Termination was pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116 (1)(e) and (f) (1999). The court further determined that termination was in the best interest of the children. Their mother appeals. Their father does not. We affirm.
I. In addition to K.R. and B.R., S.R. had three other children: April, who was placed in voluntary foster care in April of 1996, and Dustin and Alyssa, who have been adjudicated children in need of assistance.
In July of 1996, Dustin and Alyssa were removed from their mother's legal custody and placed with their father. At the time of the termination hearing, April and Dustin were in long-term foster care, and the mother's parental rights to Alyssa had been terminated. Only K.R. and B.R. are involved in these proceedings.
II. The Iowa Department of Human Services filed a termination petition, and the juvenile court terminated S.R.'s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) and (f). Although, from our de novo review of the record, we find there is sufficient evidence to terminate the mother's parental rights under both sections, we affirm termination under section (e) only. When a juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, the appellate court only needs to find grounds to terminate parental rights under one of the sections cited by the juvenile court. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).
III. Iowa Code section 232.116(1) provides that termination may occur when:
e . The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1)The child is four years of age or older.
(2)The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3)The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child's parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.
(4)There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child's parents as provided in section 232.102.
In cases meeting the criteria set forth in section 232.116(1)(e), the legislature "has made a categorical determination that the needs of a child are promoted by termination of parental rights." In re M.W., 458 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Iowa 1990). Termination is in the best interest of the child whenever there is sufficient evidence to prove any of the statutory grounds for termination. In re L.M.F., 490 N.W.2d 66, 68 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992). The supreme court has stated that after the statutory limit of twelve months, the case must be viewed with a sense of urgency. In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990).
Appellate court review of parent-child termination proceedings is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 4; In re S.N., 500 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Iowa 1993); In re M.N.W., 577 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). Accordingly, we review the facts as well as the law and adjudicate rights anew. L.L., 459 N.W.2d at 493. We give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(7); In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Iowa 1993); In re J.L.W., 523 N.W.2d 622, 623 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best interest of the child. Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(15). The Department of Human Services (department) has the burden of proving the grounds for termination of a parent-child relationship by clear and convincing evidence. Iowa Code § 232.116(1); Iowa Code § 232.117(2) and (3); In re T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 480, 481 (Iowa 1993); In re E.K., 568 N.W.2d 829, 830 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). If the department does not prove the allegations of its petition by clear and convincing evidence, Iowa's Code requires dismissal of the petition. Iowa Code § 232.117(2).
"Clear and convincing evidence" means there are no serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness or conclusions of law drawn from the evidence. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000); In re F.J.M., 539 N.W.2d 496, 497 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). The "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof is more than a preponderance of the evidence and less than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. King v. King, 291 N.W.2d 22, 23 (Iowa 1980); In re L.G., 532 N.W.2d 478, 479 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
IV. The appellant, in her brief, concedes that the department has proven by clear and convincing evidence elements (1), (2), and (3) of section 232.116(1)(e). The appellant asserts that the department has failed to prove that K.R. and B.R. cannot be returned to the custody of S.R. as provided for in Iowa Code section 232.102. The appellant states:
The DHS proved, by clear and convincing evidence that K.R. and B.R. are four years of age or older, that K.R. and B.R. had been adjudicated children in need of assistance and that K.R. and B.R. had been removed from S.R.'s custody for a period of at least twelve consecutive months. However, the DHS failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that K.R. and B.R. could not be returned to the custody of S.R. as provided for in Iowa Code section 232.102. As already noted, when alleging a section 232.116(1)(e) ground for termination, the DHS must prove that the children cannot be returned to the custody of S.R. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493.
Contrary to the assertions of the appellant, and from our de novo review of the record, we find there is clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the two children cannot be returned to the custody of their mother as provided in section 232.102.
On November 20, 1997, a child in need of assistance petition was filed on behalf of K.R. and B.R. The children were adjudicated to be children in need of assistance. The adjudication order found that the mother had been a victim of childhood sexual abuse and had been diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder and depression. The court also noted concerns that K.R. had been sexually abused. K.R. and B.R. were allowed to remain in the custody of their parents with protective supervision.
A social history was prepared in February 1998 that revealed that April was in residential treatment due to a history of sexual abuse and behavior problems; Dustin was in residential treatment as a victim of sexual abuse and behavior/anger problems; and Alyssa was in family foster care and receiving individual therapy. Alyssa had witnessed the sexual abuse of her sister.
In April 1999, S.R. completed a psychosocial evaluation. This evaluation revealed that the mother had been sexually abused by her brothers and her cousins. The evaluation concluded that:
[The mother] has consistently been involved with men who were either abusive, alcoholics or both. [The mother's] family of origin is entrenched with incest for generations. She has continued to allow [sic] known perpetrators to be a part of her family, thus exposing her children to sexual abuse repeatedly. [The mother's] insight and degree of proactive protection responses varies considerably. She is highly inconsistent and attributes this to her MPD. [The mother] has not integrated the six remaining Alters at the time of this evaluation. Two of Alyssa's older siblings have had to had [sic] PMIC placement since their removal. These siblings have engaged in sexual activity with each other at both [the mother's] and [the father's] homes according to collateral information. The oldest sibling has been sexually abused by at least six perpetrators. Alyssa's two half-siblings continue to live with [the mother], although they were CINA'd after a Confirmed DOCC case in March 1998.
On July 8, 1999, a motion for change of disposition was filed. The department expressed concern with the lack of supervision the mother provided the children. The mother voluntarily placed the children in foster care on July 13, 1999. On the same day, she was committed to the hospital for suicidal threats where she remained until July 19, 1999. She was prescribed medications for migraines, depression, and nerves. The mother had intense headaches that affected her ability to interact with the children during visits. She reported she was terminally ill. This was later determined to be untrue. On the same day, the termination of parental rights hearing was concluded regarding Alyssa.
The hearing on the motion for change of disposition was heard on October 18, 1999. The juvenile court found the children would be in imminent risk to life or health unless removed, that continuation in the home would be contrary to the welfare of the children, and that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the children from the home.
Thereafter the mother completed a psychological evaluation. The evaluation stated:
For complex or ambiguous issues, however, such as protecting her children from the subtle, insidious effects of family members affected by sexual abuse, her simplistic solutions are inadequate. She tends to make decisions hastily, which further limits her ability to consider what should go into making a good decision. She does not routinely perceive the world in ways that are shared by most others. The distortions in what she perceives contribute significantly to flawed judgment and inability to anticipate the consequences of her actions.
The petition for termination of parental rights was filed and hearing was held in conjunction with a permanency hearing on December 7, 2000, January 18, 2001, and February 23, 2001. Dr. Rainey, the mother's psychiatrist, testified that she saw the mother for six sessions of approximately twenty minutes in length regarding primarily medication issues. She believed that the children could not be returned to the care of the mother for six months to a year. The social worker for the department testified she had worked with the family since May 1997. She enumerated numerous services that had been provided to the mother since that time. In spite of all of the services provided for several years, the children could not be returned to either parent's home. It was concluded that the mother was unable to provide the children with a safe and structured home. It is clear the children had become integrated into the foster home and K.R. felt safer in the foster home than in her mother's home.
The juvenile court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to terminate the parental rights of the mother pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) and (f) on May 10, 2001. The juvenile court further determined that termination was in the best interests of the children.
K.R. and B.R. were placed in foster care by their mother in July 1999. The children have not been able to return to her care since that time. The mother, in her brief, directs us to the testimony of her individual therapist to support her assertion that she can parent the children. The juvenile court addressed this evidence and concluded that:
[T]he overwhelming weight of the testimony from professionals with the most combined experience with the family suggested otherwise. One of the mother's own witnesses, Dr. Debra Rainey, who conducted an assessment of [the mother] and now provides her with medication management, acknowledged that it will be six months to a year before [the mother] could have the children returned to her care.
The juvenile court also addressed the fact that the mother may have made some progress and concluded:
The history of this case shows that while progress might be made, it will likely take additional time and substantial effort on the part of the parents. The evidence is clear that the parents have not shown consistency in their efforts to have the children returned, and additional time would only serve to postpone establishing the permanency that these children desperately need. . . .
We agree with those findings of the juvenile court and adopt them as our own.
Our primary concern in a termination proceeding is the best interests of the child. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 275 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Those best interests are to be determined by looking at the child's long-range as well as immediate interests. We are to consider what the future likely holds for the child if that child is returned to his or her parents. Insight for that determination is to be gained from evidence of the parent's past performance, for that performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care that the parent is capable of providing. In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d at 493-94; In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981); In re T.T., 541 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Case history records are entitled to much probative force when a parent's record is being examined. Harter v. State, 260 Iowa 605, 608-09, 149 N.W.2d 827, 829 (1967).
The mother's record in this case shows that her children have been severely impacted by the sexual abuse within the family. B.R. needs a home that would be consistent in schedule and emotion. B.R. was not attached to his mother.
K.R.'s greatest need is security and safety. Permanency would provide her with this. It appears that K.R. has been sexually abused on multiple occasions. If K.R. were exposed to numerous contacts with child molesters, she would have a more difficult time working on her own sexual abuse issues and she would likely be abused again. K.R. does not trust her mother.
The juvenile court correctly concluded that termination was in the best interests of the children:
The evidence is clear that the parents have not shown consistency in their efforts to have the children returned, and additional time would only serve to postpone establishing the permanency that these children desperately need. Clearly the best interest of the children would be served by providing them with permanency, and the most credible evidence presented establishes that the only way that can be accomplished is to grant the Petitioner's request and terminate parent's parental rights.AFFIRMED.