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In re K.P.

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Feb 6, 2002
No. 1-874 / 01-0937 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2002)

Opinion

No. 1-874 / 01-0937.

Filed February 6, 2002.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, DONNA PAULSEN, Judge.

Mother appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to two of her minor children. AFFIRMED.

Tiffany Koenig, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee-State.

Nicole Garbis Nolan, Des Moines, for minor child.

Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.


Mother appeals from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to two of her minor children. She contends the court erred in finding the State met its burden of proving that the children could not be returned to her custody and determining termination was in the children's best interest. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Wendy is the mother of Tyler, born May 6, 1992 and Kirsty, born December 27, 1998. She is also the mother of two older children, Angela, born March 21, 1986 and Kristeen, born October 5, 1987, however they are not children in interest in this appeal. The children's fathers have not been involved in their lives and are not involved in this appeal either.

The children were removed from Wendy's care on March 9, 2000 and have thereafter remained in the custody of the Iowa Department of Human Services. The children were removed from Wendy's care at that time due to Wendy's long history of methamphetamine addiction, her inadequate parenting practices, her continuing illegal drug use and the sexual abuse of her eldest daughter by Wendy's boyfriend. Tyler and Kirsty were found to be children in need of assistance on May 12, 2000 under Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), (d) and (n) (1999) and placed in foster care. Wendy was ordered to participate in drug treatment at that time.

As a result of the children's removal Wendy was offered a multitude of services by the State including: family preservation services; substance abuse evaluations; urinalysis; substance abuse treatment programs; psycho-social evaluation; foster care services; parenting classes; parenting skill services; and supervised visits with her children. Wendy availed herself of some of these services but her participation in the majority of the services was sporadic and entered into with only the bare minimum level of commitment on her part. For example while Wendy was in drug treatment she continued to test positive for methamphetamine and she made little progress with individual therapy due to her poor attendance and lack of investment in the therapy.

Based on Wendy's lack of improvement the State filed petitions to terminate her parental rights to Kirsty and Tyler on November 6, 2000 and February 5, 2001 respectively. The juvenile court began a termination hearing concerning Kirsty on January 12, 2001, and continued the hearing as to both Kirsty and Tyler on March 8, March 9, and April 6, 2001. The juvenile court filed an order on May 14, 2001 terminating Wendy's parental rights to Tyler and Kirsty under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) and (g) respectively. The court determined that while Wendy loved her children, Tyler and Kirsty simply required more time and attention than Wendy was in a position to provide at the time of termination. Furthermore, as of the time of termination Wendy was unable to provide the court with any credible evidence of current employment or plausible explanation of how she was paying her bills. The court found,

While Wendy has taken responsibility for some of the unwise decisions she made while in the grips of drug dependency, she has yet to convincingly demonstrate the necessary commitment to a stable lifestyle that would ensure a safe and secure environment for Tyler and Kirsty. . . . Based on Wendy's perpetually unstable lifestyle and history of poor parenting, she is unable to act as an appropriate parental role model. Returning Tyler and Kirsty to Wendy's custody would be damaging to their physical and emotional well being. The court finds they cannot be safely returned at this time.

The court also determined the overwhelming evidence indicated that termination of parental rights would serve Tyler and Kirsty's best interests.

II. SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review termination proceedings de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 4; In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). Accordingly, we review both the facts and the law and adjudicate rights anew. In re T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Iowa 1993). We give weight to the factual determinations of the juvenile court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Id. The grounds for termination must be proven by the State by clear and convincing evidence. In re E.K., 568 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re A.B., 554 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).

III. MERITS

Wendy argues the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to her care at the time of termination. This is the final required element the State must prove under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) and (g). The requirement is met when it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the parent because the child remains in need of assistance as defined by section 232.2(6). In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Wendy argues the children would suffer no adjudicatory harm if they were returned to her and that she has changed her lifestyle and will no longer neglect her children.

The controlling standard applied in cases involving the termination of parental rights is the best interest of the children involved. In re Dameron, 306 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Iowa 1981).

We look to the child's long-range, as well as immediate, interests. We consider what the future holds for the child if returned to his or her parents. Insight for this determination can be gained from evidence of the parent's past performance, for that performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care the parent is capable of providing. Our statutory termination provisions are preventative as well as remedial. They are designed to prevent probable harm to the child.

In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 601 (Iowa 1998) (quoting In re C.M.W., 503 N.W.2d 874, 875 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993)). It is well established there exists a parental interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit. Dameron, 306 N.W.2d at 745. This interest, however, is not absolute and may be forfeited by certain parental conduct. Id. The State has a duty to assure that every child within its borders receives proper care and treatment and it must intercede when parents abdicate that responsibility. Id. A good prediction of the future conduct of a parent is to look at their past conduct. In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). The parent's past performance may indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997).

Based on our de novo review of the entire record we agree with the district court's findings and determine the children cannot be safety returned to Wendy's care at the present time. The record shows that the children were removed from Wendy's care due to her drug addiction, her choices in lifestyle and partners, and her general lack of supervision and parenting of the children. We, like the juvenile court, acknowledge Wendy has participated in some of the services the State has provided her, such as individual therapy and drug treatment, and has made some progress in improving her parenting skills, as noted by caseworkers during supervised visits. However, we also agree with the court's determination that the progress she has made unfortunately is overshadowed by the many obstacles that continue to hinder her ability to provide a safe and secure environment for Kirsty and Tyler.

Although Wendy argues she has changed her lifestyle and will no longer neglect her children there is little indication Wendy's lifestyle has significantly changed despite the time and numerous services the State has expended in attempting to help her. She could not provide any credible evidence of current employment or how she was paying her bills. She stated she was working for a friend's cleaning business as a bookkeeper but was unable to provide a business phone, the names of clients, or any other employees' names in order for the court to verify this alleged employment. At the time of the termination her oldest daughter reported Wendy was still employed as an exotic dancer. Furthermore, there are continuing concerns regarding Wendy's drug usage. During the CINA and termination proceedings Wendy initially continued to test positive for methamphetamine. Later, her results were often negative, although the levels of methamphetamine were fluctuating and she would often test late. Although at the time of termination Wendy was in aftercare she had not provided any information regarding attendance of NA meetings or of a sponsor.

The juvenile court found,

The priorities Wendy established in her life often rendered her children an afterthought. They were frequently left to care for themselves. Stable employment and the ability to supervise and support her children as needed have been issues plaguing Wendy's progress since the inception of this case. No progress has been made in employment since this case began. Wendy was referred to Work Force Development but has not sought their services. The Court questions Wendy's credibility. Because many issues directly relating to the child's safety have yet to be successfully resolved, the Court is unwilling to extend the children's state of parental limbo while waiting to find out if Wendy can successfully change her life once and for all.

Based on our de novo review of the record we agree with the juvenile court's determinations and adopt them as our own. We conclude the children could not be returned to Wendy's care at the present time because many of the dangers which prompted the court to adjudicate them to be children in need of assistance still exist at the present time. The juvenile court properly found that grounds had been proven for termination of Wendy's parental rights as to Tyler under section 232.116(1)(e) and as to Kirsty under section 232.116(1)(g).

Wendy further claims the termination of her parental rights is not in the children's best interest. She points to the testimony of one of the case workers who supervised her visits with Kirsty and Tyler who testified she would not see a problem with the children's visits increasing with less supervision, that Wendy took her criticisms and incorporated them into her parenting, and that the bond between Kirsty and Wendy had increased in the last three months.

Even if the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights are met, the decision to terminate must still be in the best interest of the children. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). In determining the best interests of the children, the court looks to their long-range as well as immediate interests.

C.K., 558 N.W.2d at 172. The court must consider the physical, mental, and emotional needs of the children in deciding whether to terminate parental rights. In re C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).

We find termination of Wendy's parental rights to be in the best interests of Tyler and Kirsty. As noted above, insight for determining what is in the children's long-range best interests can be gained from evidence of the parent's past performance. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000); Dameron, 306 N.W.2d at 745. Wendy's past and present performance does not bode well for her future ability to change her lifestyle, control her drug problems, and put the needs of her children before her own.

It is not this State's public policy to force children to wait interminably for their parents to become responsible enough or mature enough to parent them. Children need the stability of a permanent home. A child should not be forced to endlessly suffer the parentless limbo of foster care. In re D.J.R., 454 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Iowa 1990). "The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems." In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987). "Children simply cannot wait for responsible parenting. Parenting cannot be turned off and on like a spigot. It must be constant, responsible, and reliable." In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 1990). Both Kirsty and Tyler are in pre-adoptive homes and it is clearly not in their best interests to make them wait any longer for Wendy to become a responsible parent. We find it is in the children's best interest to terminate Wendy's parental rights in order to allow them to achieve the stability, security and permanency they so deserve.

We affirm the juvenile court's decision to terminate Wendy's parental rights to Tyler and Kirsty under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e) and (g) respectively.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

In re K.P.

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Feb 6, 2002
No. 1-874 / 01-0937 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2002)
Case details for

In re K.P.

Case Details

Full title:In re K.P. AND T.H., Minor Children, W.P., Mother, Appellant

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: Feb 6, 2002

Citations

No. 1-874 / 01-0937 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2002)