Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JD05913 & JD06011
ELIA, J.
Appellant J.P. appeals from the orders of the juvenile court dismissing the dependency cases for his daughters L. P. and K. P. and awarding physical custody to their mother, L. R., with joint legal custody to J.P. and L.R. He contends, "The trial court erred in finding there was insufficient evidence to continue dependency jurisdiction in this case." We affirm.
Background
In 1994, L.P. (born in 1991) and K.P. (born in 1994) became dependents of the juvenile court. Their mother, L.R. was in custody and their father, appellant J.P., was in violation of a family court order giving custody of L.P. and K.P. to their maternal grandparents. Both parents had histories of arrests and convictions for substance abuse. The juvenile court ordered family maintenance services for L.R. and reunification services for appellant. A supplemental petition filed by the Department of Family and Children's Services (Department) in 1995 alleged that L.R. had left the children with a friend for five days and had tested positive for cocaine. The juvenile court ordered the children released to the maternal grandparents. In 1997, after a period of family reunification services, the juvenile court placed the children in legal guardianship with their grandparents and dismissed the dependency cases. Visitation by the parents was to be at the grandparents' discretion.
Appellant filed a number of Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions for modification seeking regular visitation. These were dismissed or denied. However, in March 2006, the juvenile court reinstated the dependency cases. The grandfather had told the social worker that he had asthma and diabetes. It was later determined that he had not been honest about his health and that he had liver cancer. Also, the social worker was concerned that he was not the primary caregiver for the children. L.R. was allowed daily unsupervised visitation. The court also granted L.R. a three year restraining order against appellant.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
In June 2006, the paternal grandfather died. In September 2006, the juvenile court ordered the children returned to L.R. on a plan of family maintenance services. No visitation was ordered for appellant. In February 2007, the juvenile court ordered family maintenance services continued with the Department to provide Wraparound Services. L.P. was running away to relatives' homes, drinking, using marijuana, and had been suspended from school. K.P. was doing well but seemed depressed. L.R. was undergoing dialysis treatments. There was no visitation, contact, or communication allowed between the children and appellant.
In August 2007, the juvenile court again continued the family maintenance services. K.P. had performed poorly academically and a court-appointed special advocate recommended that she be assessed for attention deficit disorder. L.P. had been truant and was still running away, drinking, and using marijuana. She also had other behavioral problems, including being physically aggressive with L.R.'s partner, Ms. L.
In February 2008, the court continued family maintenance services. The court ordered that appellant be allowed twice monthly 30-minute supervised speakerphone visits if the children requested them. The whole family seemed reluctant to engage in services, and L.R. had admitted that the only reason she was participating was to keep her daughters from being removed from the home. K.P. was in need of support from professionals and her family. In March and September, 2008, protective custody warrants were issued for L.P. for running away.
On October 1, 2008, the juvenile court held a hearing to consider the recommendation of the Department in the August status review report that the juvenile court dismiss the dependencies. K.P. was 14 and L.P. was 16. In a report prepared for the hearing, the social worker said that L.R. and Ms. L. had "demonstrated their ability to meet the basic needs" of L.P. and K.P. She described them as a "very loving family" that has "continued to work with the service providers and have demonstrated progress in their family treatment goals." L.R. had a "terminal illness" but was "stable at this time" with continued dialysis and medical monitoring.
The social worker wrote about L.P. that she "continues to lack the coping skills to deal with family conflict and peer pressures, however, there is no apparent risk of abuse by [L.R.] or [Ms. L.] towards the children." The report stated, "The children appear to be loved and very well cared for, and both [L.R.] and [Ms. L.] ensure that the children's needs are being met." The girls had stated that they wanted to remain in their mother's care, and, if she became incapable of caring for them, they would like to remain with Ms. L. K.P. did not want to have any contact with appellant and L.P. wanted only supervised telephone contact.
At the hearing, counsel for the Department asked the court to dismiss the dependency cases and make family court custody orders. Counsel for L.R. waived L.R.'s appearance because she was in the hospital. Counsel stated that L.R. was in favor of the dismissal of the dependency cases but that she would like sole legal custody as well as sole physical custody. Counsel for K.P. and L.P. said, "Both girls are ready for this case to be dismissed."
Counsel for appellant appeared and appellant, who lived out of state, appeared via speakerphone. Appellant told the court that his "rights were being violated all the way through" the dependency cases. He went on at length about the ways in which he believed he had been unfairly treated in juvenile court over the years. Appellant asked the court if the court had read some "paperwork" that he had submitted. The court said that it had read the materials but acknowledged, "I don't understand some of what you sent in about post human artificial intelligence and stuff like that." Appellant asked the court to continue the matter because he had not yet received a response to a letter he had written to the presiding judge. The court denied the continuance request.
Counsel for appellant told the court that appellant objected to the dismissal of the dependency because "the failing health of the mother has the potential to exacerbate the stresses that are going on in the family that led to the acting out behavior by the girls that place them and everyone at risk." He said that appellant "was concerned that the girls want to visit with him and their voice is not being heard." He also stated that it was not "appropriate" to dismiss the case because, "Things are too volatile."
The court adopted the recommendations of the Department, dismissed the dependency cases, and granted joint legal custody to both parents with sole physical custody to L.R. The court said it was doing so based on "the facts stated in the report as well as... Volumes I and II of the file." The court made reference to an earlier hearing that appellant had claimed he had been "kicked out" of and said that "the minute order doesn't reflect that." The court addressed appellant, saying, "However, there is a handwritten letter from you that is attached to documents that appear to have been submitted at the time, along with things that you've copied about mediated realities, cyborgs that are living and dead, and other things that -- like, artificial intelligence -- other things that appear to me to have no relationship to the issues in the case, that raise concerns in the Court's mind about your ability to relate to your children, and also possible detriment to them. That you have been so focused on these issues about post human cyborgs living and dead for so long, I just think it is – I can understand why the girls do not wish to have – well, one does not wish to have contact and [L.P.] wants to have supervised contact."
The record contains a long letter from appellant to the juvenile court asking for a formal investigation into his case. The letter, while interesting, is difficult to summarize. Attached to the letter are articles from various sources with titles such as, "How We Became Posthuman: Humanistic Implications of Recent Research into Cognitive Science and Artificial Life," "Introduction to Mediated Reality," "Saving Human Rights from the Human Racists," "Cyborg Liberation Front," and "Enabled Cyborgs, Living and Dead."
Discussion
Appellant contends, "The trial court erred in finding there was insufficient evidence to continue dependency jurisdiction in this case." The Department argues, "The court's decision to terminate supervision of this family was well within the bounds of the court's sound discretion." Counsel for the children argues, "There was substantial evidence to support the court's dismissal of the dependency."
Section 364, subdivision (c), provides that at the hearing to review the status of an in-home dependent, "After hearing any evidence presented by the social worker, the parent, the guardian, or the child, the court shall determine whether continued supervision is necessary. The court shall terminate its jurisdiction unless the social worker or his or her department establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn. Failure of the parent or guardian to participate regularly in any court ordered treatment program shall constitute prima facie evidence that the conditions which justified initial assumption of jurisdiction still exist and that continued supervision is necessary."
This section allocates the burden of proof to the Department when it seeks to continue the court's jurisdiction. The section does not address who bears the burden where, as here, the father rather than the Department seeks to continue the court's jurisdiction.
An order terminating dependency jurisdiction is reviewed for substantial evidence. (See In re N.S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 172; In re Marcus G. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014.) "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we look to the entire record for substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court. [Citations.] Evidence sufficient to support the court's finding must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case." (In re N.S., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 172.) "[W]e presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) Under this standard, this court does not "evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion." (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947, criticized on another point in In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1017.) It is appellant's burden to show that the order is not supported by substantial evidence. (In re Megan S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 247, 251.)
The issue for this court is not, as appellant has artfully phrased it, whether the juvenile court "erred in finding there was insufficient evidence to continue dependency jurisdiction in this case." Rather, the issue is whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's order. Appellant contends, "The evidence presented in this whole record established that the trial court should have continued the dependency jurisdiction since the mother had not regularly participated in services or made substantial progress, and the conditions justifying the initial assumption of jurisdiction were likely to exist when supervision was withdrawn."
Here, the record before the juvenile court showed that L.P. and K.P. were "not at any risk of harm by either [L.R.] or [Ms. L.]. The children will behave and display some typical and overtly difficult teenage behaviors, especially [L.P.], however based on the children's ages, this presents low risk in relation to abuse and neglect. [L.R.] and [Ms. L.] love the children very much and continue to ensure that the children's needs are met as best that the[y] can arrange."
The social worker noted that L.R. and Ms. L. "acknowledge their family's need for therapy" and had stated that they would pursue this even when the dependencies were dismissed. Appellant states, "Other than Pollyanna promises to behave and to seek counseling that had been ordered over six months before, the trial court had no assurance that these teen-age girls -- who had been dependents with the juvenile court for a large portion of their lives -- would continue to receive the services they still needed." Appellant argues, "Because the mother had a history of misleading the court, the trial court could not be assured the minors would receive the counseling services they needed absent court involvement." He points to various incidents throughout the dependencies, especially the family's lack of candor about the grandfather's terminal illness, and argues that this "information [is] important... because it shows the history this family, including the mother and her partner, has of lying to both the Department and the court." This is essentially an argument that the juvenile court should not have believed L.R. and Ms. L. This court must accept the credibility determinations of the juvenile court.
Appellant challenges the part of the report that stated that L.R.'s medical condition was stable. Appellant points to L.R.'s inability to attend the October 1 hearing because she was hospitalized. He argues, that "this should have been a sizeable red flag for the Department, the court, and minors' counsel." It was the juvenile court's role to make a determination that the information presented by the social worker in the report was accurate.
Appellant's other arguments invite this court to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, and resolve evidentiary conflicts. Instead, we have drawn all reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile court's findings and considered the record most favorably to the juvenile court's order. We affirm the order because it is supported by substantial evidence.
Disposition
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: RUSHING, P. J., PREMO, J.