When the father challenged the temporary order as part of his direct appeal from the final judgment, we dismissed the challenge on the same grounds, again citing section 109.001(c). See In re Marriage of Koenig (Koenig II ), No. 14-16-00319-CV, 2017 WL 2704081, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 22, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Section 109.001 has since been amended to add subsection (b-5), which states, "A party may seek review of the trial court's temporary order under this section by: (1) petition for writ of mandamus; or (2) proper assignment in the party's brief."
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.252 (West 2014). A trial court may, however, condition parental access, for example, by imposing supervised visitation, when it is in the child's best interest. In re Marriage of Koenig, No. 14-16-00319-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 5747, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 22, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 432 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) ("It is beyond question that, in an appropriate case, a trial court may order a parent's visitation to be supervised"). Restrictions or limitations placed on a parent's right of possession or access may not exceed those necessary to protect the best interest of the child.
A trial court, however, may place conditions on a parent's access, such as supervised visitation, when it is in the child's best interest. In re Marriage of Koenig, No. 14-16-00319-CV, 2017 WL 2704081, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 22, 2017, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); see alsoIn re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 432 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) ("It is beyond question that, in an appropriate case, a trial court may order a parent's visitation to be supervised."). Restrictions or limitations placed on a parent's right of possession or access may not exceed those necessary to protect the best interests of the child.
This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding of a material and substantial change. See id.; see also McAleer v. McAleer, 394 S.W.3d 613, 620 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (concluding that it was bound by unchallenged finding of fact because "there [was] some evidence in the record supporting this finding"); see also In re Marriage of Koenig, No. 14-16-00319-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 5747, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 22, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that "court is not confined to rigid or definite guidelines in determining whether a material and substantial change has occurred" and listing material changes that can support modification); Arredondo v. Betancourt, 383 S.W.3d 730, 734-35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (explaining that whether a material and substantial change of circumstances has occurred "is fact specific and must be made according to the circumstances as they arise" and listing material changes that may support modification). Similarly, the trial court found that it was in the child's best interest to appoint Gasaway sole managing conservator and to limit Bailey's possession and access to supervised visitation.