Opinion
No. 04-18-00283-CV
05-23-2018
IN RE Venkateswar Rao KODATI
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Original Mandamus Proceeding PER CURIAM Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice Irene Rios, Justice PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DISMISSED AS MOOT
This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2015-CI-02059, styled In the Interest of M.P.K. and P.S.K., Children, pending in the 73rd Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Renée Yanta presiding.
On March 16, 2018, the trial court signed the "Order on Motion for Enforcement and for Contempt . . ." (the "March 16 contempt order") at issue in this proceeding. Relator filed his petition for writ of mandamus and a motion for emergency temporary relief. We granted a stay of the March 16 contempt order and allowed the respondent and the real party in interest an opportunity to file a response. The respondent later filed an advisory with this court stating it had vacated the March 16 contempt order and issued a new order. Respondent believes, and we agree, this mandamus proceeding is now moot.
After the trial court filed its advisory, relator filed an emergency motion asserting the new order is void and should be vacated because the order was signed during the period of this court's stay. We disagree with relator. Our order stayed only the enforcement of the March 16 contempt order; it did not stay all trial court proceedings. Therefore, the May 16 order is not void.
MOOTNESS
Contempt orders that do not involve confinement are not appealable by habeas corpus; therefore, no adequate remedy by appeal exists. In re Braden, 483 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding) (per curiam). When, as here, the contempt order does not involve confinement, the only possible relief is a writ of mandamus. In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam on rehearing).
Nevertheless, "[a] case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the parties at any stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal." In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). For instance, when an order is superseded by a subsequent order, complaints regarding the prior order become moot. See In re Office of Atty. Gen., 276 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) (amended order superseded August 8 order and moots OAG's complaint about August 8 order); see also In re Messervey Tr., No. 04-00-00700-CV, 2001 WL 55642, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 24, 2001, orig. proceeding) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (appellate court lacked jurisdiction to issue writ of mandamus based on July 27 order because it was superseded by subsequent September 1 order). A court's duty to dismiss a case as moot arises from a proper respect for the judicial branch's unique role under our constitution to decide contested cases. Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home & Serv. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1993). We do not have jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions. Id.
In this case, respondent signed an "Order Vacating Prior Order and Orders on Clarification, Motion for Enforcement and for Contempt . . ." on May 16, 2018. Thus, the May 16 order supersedes the March 16 contempt order. Because the March 16 contempt order is no longer in effect, a justiciable controversy is now non-existent with respect to that order. Accordingly, relator's petition for writ of mandamus is moot.
CONCLUSION
For the reason explained above, we dismiss relator's petition for writ of mandamus as moot.
PER CURIAM