Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DL027906, Ronald P. Kreber, Judge.
William Flenniken, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Melissa Mandel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FYBEL, J.
INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court declared K.M., born in March 1989, a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after finding true beyond a reasonable doubt that she had committed misdemeanor driving under the influence of drugs and misdemeanor driving a motor vehicle without a valid license. K. solely contends the juvenile court erred by admitting into evidence a certified record from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), showing that she has not been issued a driver’s license.
We affirm. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the CLETS document into evidence after concluding that the foundational requirements of the official record exception to the hearsay rule were met. (See Evid. Code, § 1280.)
FACTS
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on December 13, 2006, Officer Peter Perez of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department was dispatched to an injury traffic collision at a location where Interstate 5 meets Los Mares. He found an overturned vehicle blocking the number one lane of traffic. The vehicle “sustained total damage.”
Perez located the driver of the vehicle, 17-year-old K., sitting on the center median. K. told Perez she was trying to return home, or going to get something to drink, after attending a party in Capistrano Beach. She said that as she was approaching the off-ramp, she looked down to either answer or pick up her phone. When she looked up, she could not avoid colliding with the center divider. After striking the center divider, she struck a tree within the center divider which, Perez opined, caused the vehicle to overturn.
Perez described K. as lethargic and “very sleepy.” Her speech was quiet and slurred, and her eyes were droopy and watery. K. told Perez she had taken two Xanax pills, smoked a small amount of marijuana, and had drunk some sort of vodka drink. An analysis of a sample of K.’s blood showed the presence of Xanax and a metabolite of tetryahydrocannabinol which is a metabolite of the active ingredient of marijuana.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2007, a petition was filed in the juvenile court, alleging K. committed one misdemeanor count of driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), and one misdemeanor count of driving a motor vehicle without a license in violation of section 12500, subdivision (a).
During trial, the prosecution requested that the court admit into evidence a certified CLETS document showing K. had not been issued a driver’s license. K.’s counsel objected to the exhibit on grounds including that it lacked a proper foundation and was inadmissible hearsay.
Citing People v. McClary (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, the juvenile court admitted the CLETS document under the official records exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1280.) The court stated: “In that case, the sole contention on appeal [wa]s that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the California law enforcement record which detailed defendant’s prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol. The court in that case admitted into evidence a record which had been teletyped without a witness being called to testify as to how the document was prepared. [¶] In this particular case, the court has examined petitioner’s number 2 [the CLETS document], and the court would admit number 2.”
The juvenile court found all of the allegations of the petition as to both counts true beyond a reasonable doubt and declared K. a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The court placed K. on probation under terms and conditions which included her participation in a juvenile drinking driver education program and a youth drug and alcohol deterrence program. K. appealed.
DISCUSSION
K. contends that because “the provisions of Evidence Code section 1280 are not self-authenticating, a testimonial foundation was required” but was not provided before the certified CLETS printout was admitted into evidence as an official record. As explained in detail post, K.’s argument is without merit.
The official records exception to the hearsay rule is codified at Evidence Code section 1280, which provides: “Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered in any civil or criminal proceeding to prove the act, condition, or event if all of the following applies: [¶] (a) The writing was made by and within the scope of duty of a public employee. [¶] (b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event. [¶] (c) The sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.”
“‘Although similar to the business records exception [citation], the official records exception differs in one important respect. Evidence Code section 1271 “requires a witness to testify as to the identity of the record and its mode of preparation in every instance. In contrast, [Evidence Code] [s]ection 1280 . . . permits the court to admit an official record or report without necessarily requiring a witness to testify as to its identity and mode of preparation [italics added] if the court takes judicial notice or if sufficient independent evidence shows that the record or report was prepared in such a manner as to assure its trustworthiness [original italics].” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘The object of this hearsay exception “is to eliminate the calling of each witness involved in preparation of the record and substitute the record of the transaction instead [italics added]. [Citations.]”’ [Citation.] ‘Accordingly, for the exception to apply, “[i]t is not necessary that the person making the entry have personal knowledge of the transaction. [Citations.]”’” (Bhatt v. State Dept. of Health Services (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 923, 929.)
A trial court has “broad discretion” in determining whether a party has established the foundational requirements of Evidence Code section 1280. (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 119-120.) “Its ruling on admissibility ‘implies whatever finding of fact is prerequisite thereto . . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reviewing court may overturn the trial court’s exercise of discretion ‘“only upon a clear showing of abuse.”’” (Id. at p. 120.) “In addition to taking judicial notice, a court may rely on the rebuttable presumption that official duty has been regularly performed (Evid. Code, § 664) as a basis for finding that the foundational requirements of Evidence Code section 1280 are met.” (People v. Dunlap (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1477 (Dunlap).) Evidence Code section 664 provides in relevant part, “[i]t is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.”
Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 1468 is directly on point. In Dunlap, the appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a certified CLETS rap sheet as an official record within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1280. (Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1471.) The CLETS rap sheet in Dunlap contained a stamp that stated: “‘This is to certify that the above is a true and original document received from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, by the District Attorney’s Discovery Unit.’” (Id. at p. 1472.) The prosecution did not present any evidence, independent of the certified CLETS rap sheet itself, bearing on the foundational requirements of Evidence Code section 1280. (Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at. p. 1477.)
The Dunlap court concluded the first foundational requirement of Evidence Code section 1280—the writing was made by and within the scope of a duty of a public employee—was satisfied because the trial court was required to take judicial notice of showing the CLETS rap sheet was prepared in the scope of a duty of a public employee. (Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1478.) The court stated, “[t]he Legislature has enacted statutes dealing with the recording and reporting of a person’s criminal history” and Penal Code section 11105 “requires the Department of Justice to maintain a master record of information ‘pertaining to the identification and criminal history of any person,’ including information commonly found in rap sheets, and to furnish the information to various public agencies or officers, including district attorneys, ‘when needed in the course of their duties.’” (Id. at pp. 1477-1478.) The Dunlap court further noted: “Effective July 1, 1978, the Legislature added chapter 2 to title 3 of part 4 of the Penal Code (commencing with § 13100) providing a comprehensive scheme for the recording, reporting, storage, analysis, and dissemination of criminal offender record information within this state.” (Id. at p. 1478.) The court further reasoned the trial court was required to take judicial notice of this statutory scheme and such notice was sufficient to support the trial court’s implied finding that the first foundational requirement of Evidence Code section 1280 was satisfied. (Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1478.)
The certified CLETS printout here contains a stamp similar to the one on the CLETS rap sheet in Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1472. The stamp here is entitled “Official Certified Record” and states, “[t]his is to certify that this is a true and original document received from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, by the Office of the District Attorney, County of Orange.” The stamp is signed “Tony Rackauckas, District Attorney [¶] By,” followed by the signature of what appears to be “Ric Reese/NV.” The printout itself contains K.’s personal identification data, as that term is defined in Penal Code section 13125, including her name, date of birth, address, weight, hair color, eye color, and California driver’s license information. Such information is considered “criminal offender record information” as that term is defined in Penal Code section 13102.
Thus, the juvenile court was required to take judicial notice of the above referenced statutes establishing the Department of Justice’s obligation to maintain a master record of the information contained in the certified CLETS printout at issue. We conclude the first foundational requirement of Evidence Code section 1280 was therefore satisfied.
As to the second foundational requirement under Evidence Code section 1280—the writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event—the appellate court in Dunlap concluded that in light of the statutory purpose and objective of the scheme for recording, reporting, storing, analyzing, and disseminating criminal offender record information within the state, “the Department of Justice had a duty to record information as to each event shown on appellant’s rap sheet within a short period of its receipt from the reporting agency.” (Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1479.) The court further stated the presumption that an official duty was regularly performed under Evidence Code section 664 therefore “supports the trial court’s implied finding that the Department of Justice recorded the information at or near the time of the recorded event.” (Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1478-1479.)
Here, we similarly conclude that in light of the statutory framework within which the certified CLETS printout was generated and provided to the district attorney’s office, it is reasonable to presume that the public officials regularly performed their official duties of recording, reporting, storing, analyzing, and disseminating the information contained therein. K. does not argue otherwise. As in Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at page 1479, that presumption therefore supports the juvenile court’s implied finding the Department of Justice recorded the information at or near the time of the recorded event.
The final foundational requirement of the official records exception to the hearsay rule is that the “sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.” (Evid. Code, § 1280, subd. (c).) “‘The trustworthiness requirement . . . is established by a showing that the written report is based upon the observations of public employees who have a duty to observe the facts and report and record them correctly.’ [Citation.] ‘Whether the trustworthiness requirement has been met is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.’” (Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1479.)
Here, the certified CLETS printout contains objective facts such as K.’s name and address and that no driver’s license had been issued to her. It does not appear that the CLETS printout contains information from a source other than a public employee. As in Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at pages 1479-1480, in light of the statutory scheme and the presumption that official duties in connection with its preparation were regularly performed, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by impliedly finding the certified CLETS printout trustworthy. Indeed, as pointed out in Dunlap, Penal Code section 13100 specifically states, “[t]he Legislature finds and declares as follows: [¶] (a) That the criminal justice agencies in this state require, for the performance of their official duties, accurate and reasonably complete criminal offender record information.” (Italics added.) The Dunlap court stated, “[w]e have no difficulty inferring from the statutes that the public employees involved in the recording or reporting of criminal offender record information in the CLETS system have a duty to employ methods ensuring a reasonable level of accuracy and reliability. Otherwise, the legislative objectives could not be met. The mere fact that all criminal justice agencies in California depend upon the system is an indication of is trustworthiness.” (Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1480.)
The trial court did not err.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O’LEARY, ACTING P. J., MOORE, J.