Opinion
528 WDA 2024 J-S34003-24
12-18-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.L.G., A MINOR APPEAL OF: I.W., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered April 6, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000147-2023
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
MEMORANDUM
DUBOW, J.
Appellant I.W. ("Mother") appeals from the April 6, 2024 order entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas that terminated her parental rights to then-twenty-one-month-old K.L.G. ("Child"). Upon careful review, we affirm.
We glean the following procedural and factual history from the certified record. Mother and child's putative father, J.G. ("Father") (collectively, "Parents"), both have a history of substance abuse. The family has been known to the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (the "Agency") since November 2017 when Child's three older siblings were removed from Parents' care due to Parents' substance abuse. In October 2018, the older siblings were reunited with Parents but after one year, in October 2019, the Agency again removed them from Parents' care. In July 2021, the trial court awarded permanent legal custody of Child's older siblings to their paternal grandmother.
We note that the trial court and the parties all reference exhibits in their briefs to this Court, however the exhibits are not included in the certified record.
The trial court also terminated Father's parental rights to Child. Father is not a party to this appeal.
In June of 2022, Child tested positive for cocaine and fentanyl at birth. Parents both admitted their substance abuse to the Agency. The Agency obtained emergency custody of Child and, upon Child's discharge from the hospital, placed her in kinship care with Child's paternal aunt, C.G. ("Paternal Aunt"), where Child remains.
On September 21, 2022, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent for lack of proper parental care or control due to Mother's ongoing substance abuse. The court found that the conditions requiring placement included Mother's need to participate in the recommended level of drug and alcohol treatment and establish and maintain sobriety, her need to establish and maintain a relationship with Child, and her need to demonstrate appropriate parenting ability. The court ordered Mother to participate in drug and alcohol treatment and maintain sobriety, obtain appropriate housing, and participate in parenting classes.
Mother entered a thirty-day inpatient detox treatment program at Twin Lakes. Upon completion, Mother was supposed to continue with inpatient drug and alcohol treatment at Jade Wellness, but she failed to provide any documentation of compliance to the Agency.
For the first six months that Child was in kinship care, Mother failed to maintain contact with the Agency or with Child. On March 8, 2023, the trial court found aggravated circumstances due to Mother's lack of contact with Child for a period of six months. However, the court ordered the Agency to continue to make reasonable efforts to reunify Child with Mother.
During this time, Parents lived together and shared a cell phone that only worked if it was connected to wireless internet, which Parents did not have in their home. To make a phone call, Mother would have to walk three doors down to the restaurant on the corner and use the restaurant's wireless internet. The Agency attempted to maintain contact with Mother, calling her over a dozen times and going out to her home approximately eight times, but Mother continued to fail to maintain contact with the Agency.
Mother was evicted from her residence in the Spring of 2023, which the Agency caseworker discovered when she, once again, went to Mother's home to attempt to contact her.
From June 2022 until June 2023, Mother only visited with Child on six occasions for an hour or two during family holiday gatherings. Mother also failed to attend any medical appointments for Child.
Mother, once again, entered an inpatient detox treatment program at Gateway on June 17, 2023. Six days later, on June 23, 2023, the Agency filed a termination of parental rights petition. On July 7, 2023, the Agency served Mother with notice of the petition.
Also in July of 2023, Mother reached out to the Agency and began having weekly phone and video contact with Child from her inpatient program. In December of 2023, Mother began having weekly supervised in-person visits with Child with no reported concerns.
On March 22, 2024, the trial court held a termination of parental rights hearing. The trial court appointed KidsVoice to serve as both Child's legal counsel and guardian ad litem ("GAL") after determining that there was no conflict between the dual roles. The Agency presented testimony from
Gregory Lobb, Ph.D., licensed psychologist; Mallory Conti, Agency case work supervisor; and Heidi Hysong, Agency permanency caseworker. Mother testified on her own behalf and presented testimony from Nicole Leeper-Husk, Clinical Manager at Gateway/Greenbriar Lighthouse for Women.
The Agency witnesses testified in accordance with the above-stated facts. In addition, Dr. Lobb testified as an expert in child and forensic psychology. Dr. Lobb performed a bonding evaluation between Mother and Child on October 16, 2023. He informed the court that he performed an individual evaluation of Mother on November 28, 2023, and diagnosed Mother with unspecified depressive disorder, opioid use disorder in early remission, and stimulant use disorder in early remission. Dr. Lobb testified that Paternal Aunt was Child's "psychological parent" or the "go-to parent" that Child relies on for "day to day needs" and who is "there for [Child] consistently, unconditionally" and has a "necessary and beneficial relationship" with Child. N.T. Hearing, 3/22/24, at 18-19.
Dr. Lobb testified that during the evaluation, Mother laughed and played with Child and was very attentive and aware of Child's needs. Dr. Lobb observed that there was a "secure attachment" and "bond" between Mother and Child. Id. at 17. However, Dr. Lobb explained that the relationship between Mother and Child was not "necessary and beneficial" to Child. Id. at 19. Moreover, Dr. Lobb testified that the secure attachment that Child has with Mother is a reflection of the quality of parenting that Child has received from Paternal Aunt.
Dr. Lobb recommended that the court terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. Dr. Lobb testified that there would not be any detriment to Child if the court terminated Mother's parental rights but, in the alternative, that it "would be very difficult" and a "hard transition" if Child were removed from the care of Paternal Aunt. Id. at 20. Dr. Lobb acknowledged that Mother was currently in a structured substance abuse treatment center but testified that it would be approximately seven to nine months until Child could be reunified with Mother because Mother would need to have her own residence, obtain employment, and maintain sobriety. Dr. Lobb further testified that he has concerns about delaying Child's permanency to see how Mother progresses given the fact that Child has already been in placement for approximately twenty-one months, or almost Child's entire life. Dr. Lobb stated, "I worry that [] not having permanency can kind of create this profound sense of loss and not belonging anywhere to a child, and I fear that [] waiting when we're not sure what's going to happen could prolong this unnecessarily." Id. at 21. Dr. Lobb explained that at Child's age she is beginning to form memories and developing relationships with a parental figure that will "be there long term [would help] with [Child's] development later in life with relationships as she grows." Id. at 21-22.
Ms. Conti testified that Child has a "very positive bonding relationship" with Paternal Aunt, "adores" her foster sister and has a "strong and secure bond" with her and sees her older siblings regularly because they are placed with Paternal Aunt's mother. Id. at 63-64. Ms. Conti also testified that Paternal Aunt met all of Child's developmental, educational, and psychological needs and Mother was not meeting Child's needs. Ms. Conti testified that a termination of Mother's parental rights would be in Child's best interest because it would provide permanency, stability, and a safe environment for Child.
Ms. Hysong testified that Mother has made a lot of progress since the Agency filed a termination of parental rights petition and that Mother is compliant with treatment. Ms. Hysong explained that Mother is still living in a structured setting and Child is not allowed to live with Mother in that setting. Ms. Hysong testified that the Agency would like to see Mother maintain sobriety outside of a structured setting, have appropriate housing, be able to pay rent, and maintain a relationship with Child for six to twelve months before the Agency would recommend reunification.
Mother testified that she has been sober since June 18, 2023, and that Gateway has taught her coping skills and she has learned from her past mistakes. Mother further testified that she "needed to change and work on my inner self and can't be around or do any drugs or drinking alcohol. My environment was not a healthy one." Id. at 121. Mother testified that she is working at Arby's and has filled out the housing application to move from a halfway house to a three-quarter house with less supervision. Mother informed the court that her weekly two-hour visits with Child are going "extremely well" and that she plays with Child, reads to Child, feeds Child, and changes Child's diaper. Mother testified that she wants to reunify with Child. Mother explained "I still like have a bond with her and she knows me. She calls me by my name, you know, I just don't want her thinking I abandoned her, you know . . . I love all my kids." Id. at 126.
On April 6, 2024, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (8) and (b).
Mother timely appealed. Mother subsequently filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and the trial court filed a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Although Mother failed to file a Rule 1925(b) statement contemporaneously with her Notice of Appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), we decline to dismiss on this basis because no party asserted prejudice. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding that the failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement contemporaneously with a notice of appeal in a children's fast track case will result in a defective notice of appeal which this Court will address on a case-by-case basis, avoiding the extreme action of dismissal when the defect does not prejudice any party).
Mother raises the following issues for our review:
I. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (8)?
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of law in concluding that [the Agency] met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
Appellant's Br. at 6.
In addressing Mother's issues, we are mindful of our well settled standard of review. In cases involving the involuntary termination of parental rights, this Court's review is limited to determining whether the trial court's conclusion is supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021). When we review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, we must accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record supports them. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). "If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion." Id. (citation omitted). "Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand." In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
We may not reverse merely because the record could support a different result. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We give great deference to the trial courts "that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings." Id. Moreover, "[t]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence." In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
It is axiomatic that "[p]arents enjoy a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care, custody[,] and control of their children." L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591. "It cannot be denied that significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and child can follow the termination of parental rights, as there is an undeniable importance in a child's relationship with a biological parent." Id. Accordingly, "[i]n recognition of the gravity attendant to the termination of parental rights, the moving party must establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence; that is, evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Id. at 592 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, governs termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis. "Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent." In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d 1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As discussed above, "[t]he party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a)." Id. (citation omitted). If the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights, the court then engages in "the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child." Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, we need only agree with the court's decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). In the instant case, we concentrate our analysis on subsection 2511(a)(8).
Section 2511(a)(8) provides that grounds for termination exist where: "[t]he child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court [], 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). Thus, to terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that: "(1) the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child." Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 444 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
Moreover, "with respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection [(a)(8)] the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition." 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). "Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8), does not require an evaluation of Mother's willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to placement of her children." In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa. Super. 2006). Finally, this Court has recognized "that the application of Section (a)(8) may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the problems that had led to removal of her children." Id. at 513. "However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that led to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a child's life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities." Id. "The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future." Id.
Mother avers that the trial court abused its discretion when it terminated her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). Mother argues that she remedied the conditions that led to the removal of Child as evidenced by her participation in substance abuse treatment at Gateway. Mother's Br. at 21. Mother further argues that she initiated impatient detox treatment at Twin Lakes prior to the filing of the termination petition and, therefore, her participation should be considered by the court. Id. Mother's arguments are unpersuasive.
Instantly, the trial court credited both Dr. Lobb and Ms. Hysong's testimony that Mother would have to maintain sobriety outside of a structured setting for at least six or seven months, and possibly longer, before reunification would be a viable permanency goal. While the court did consider the extent of Mother's progress maintaining sobriety at Gateway, it found that the conditions which led to Child's placement continue to exist because Mother had failed to demonstrate sobriety outside of a structured setting. The court opined:
The evidence at the hearing revealed that other than a brief 31-day inpatient program prior to Child's adjudication, Mother's engagement in the necessary drug and alcohol treatment did not begin until one year after Child was removed from her care and only several days before the termination petition was filed. Permanency review orders over the life of the case reflect that the Court continuously ordered Mother to engage in treatment. While Mother has remained in treatment since June 2023, and currently has a good prognosis, none of her progress occurred until after CYF filed the termination petition. Further, Mother currently continues to reside in a structured setting. At no time over the life of the case has Mother demonstrated her sobriety outside of a structured setting.
Trial Ct. Op., 6/18/24, at 12.
Moreover, the trial court found that Mother failed to engage in consistent visitation with Child until after the Agency filed the termination petition. Once again, the trial court placed weight on the fact that Mother made no progress while Child was in placement for a year. The trial court opined:
Just as Mother delayed her engagement in treatment for about a year, her attention to establishing and maintaining a relationship with Child came similarly late. Mother attended only six visits with Child between removal and filing of the termination petition, most of which occurred during family gatherings. Such minimal contact is simply insufficient to create a meaningful relationship with a baby. The Court acknowledges that since entering treatment, Mother has maintained more consistent contact with Child via telephone and video as well as recent supervised visits which have allowed the two to develop some level of a relationship and bond. As with her sobriety, however, Mother's progress in this regard only began after CYF filed the termination petition.Id. at 12.
Finally, the trial court found that Mother's delayed compliance with substance abuse treatment and consistent visitation left her unable to demonstrate that she was able to parent Child:
Unfortunately, Mother's lack of progress with her sobriety and failure to establish a relationship with Child between removal and the filing of the termination petition inevitably left her unable to demonstrate any level of parenting ability.Id. at 13.
Our review of the record supports the trial court's findings. When the Agency filed the termination petition, it is undisputed that Child had been in placement for over a year. Moreover, the record supports the trial court's findings that Mother failed to remedy the conditions which led to placement, namely maintaining sobriety outside of a structured setting. Finally, the trial court made a finding that terminating Mother's parental rights would be in Child's best interest, which, as discussed below, is supported by the record. Accordingly, the Agency demonstrated the grounds to terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) by clear and convincing evidence and we find no abuse of discretion.
In her second issue, Mother avers that the trial court abused its discretion when it terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). Mother's Br. at 6. Mother argues that Child is attached and bonded to her, as evidenced by Dr. Lobb's testimony that Child had a secure attachment with Mother. Id. at 26.
With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the effect that terminating the parental bond will have on the child. This Court reviews whether "termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child." In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is well settled that "[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into needs and welfare of the child." In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005).
One major aspect of the "needs and welfare" analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond that the child has with the parent, "with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond." In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa Super. 2018) (citation omitted). The fact that a child has a bond with a parent does not preclude the termination of parental rights. In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. Super. 2014). Rather, the trial court must examine the depth of the bond to determine whether it is so meaningful to the child that its termination would destroy an existing, necessary, and beneficial relationship. Id. at 898. Moreover, the trial court may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the adoptive resource. In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). Ultimately, the concern is the needs and welfare of the child. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Instantly, the trial court considered Dr. Lobb's testimony that Mother had a secure attachment with Child but placed greater weight on Dr. Lobb's expert opinion that, despite the bond, Child's relationship with Mother is neither necessary nor beneficial due to Mother's sporadic contact with Child and delayed progress towards sobriety. The court opined:
Mother's visitation history with Child, the first year of which demonstrates a lack of initiative to see Child independently of family gatherings, inevitably affected the nature and quality of Child's relationship with her. While Dr. Lobb testified that Mother and Child have been able to develop a relationship and that Child displays a secure attachment and bond with Mother, he opined that their relationship is neither necessary nor beneficial. In arriving at this conclusion, Dr. Lobb noted the minimal level of contact and limited amount of progress toward sobriety over a considerable amount of time.
Trial Ct. Op. at 18. The trial court also credited the Agency's testimony that Child has a loving bond with Paternal Aunt and views Paternal Aunt as a "psychological parent." Id. at 19. The court opined:
Child has spent all but one month of her life in her placement with [Paternal Aunt]. During that time, Child has become bonded and attached to [Paternal Aunt] and has thrived in her care. The CYF caseworker has observed [Paternal Aunt] and Child to have a loving bond and that Child looks to [Paternal Aunt] to meet all her
needs. Similarly, during the interactional evaluation, Dr. Lobb observed Child to have a secure attachment to [Paternal Aunt] and concluded that Child viewed [Paternal Aunt] as her psychological parent. This bond and attachment, Dr. Lobb opined, could mitigate any potential detriment to Child from termination of Mother's parental rights.Id. Finally, the court found that severing the parent child bond would not have a detrimental impact on Child:
While Child and Mother may share a bond as observed by Dr. Lobb, the evidence demonstrated that this bond is neither necessary nor beneficial, and consequently, Child will not suffer extreme emotional consequences from termination of Mother's parental rights. Rather, to remove Child from the only caregiver she has known would be "very difficult" and a "very hard transition[.]"Id. at 19-20.
Our review of the record supports the trial court's findings. We decline to usurp the trial court's credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
In conclusion, our review of the record supports the trial court's findings. We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court's conclusion that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a) and (b).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.