The court reasoned that, under DO 97, the Chief of Appeals lacked authority to enter closing agreements with respect to issues pending before the tax court. Because the Chief of Appeals lacked authority to enter into the closing agreement it was void. 216 B.R. 42 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997).Id. at 43-44.

Some of the Hoyt partnerships in which the Crowells and the Olcsvarys had invested had proceedings pertaining to certain years docketed before the tax court at the time the agreements were executed. Consequently, if DO 97 applies, then Spooner, an associate chief of appeals, lacked authority to execute the agreements with respect to those cases and years. See In re Klee, 216 B.R. 42, 44-45 (Bkrtcy.D.Or. 1997) (holding that Spooner did not have authority to execute closing agreement under DO 97 and therefore agreement was invalid). This language is taken from the 1995 version of DO 97, Deleg. Order No. 97 (Rev.32), 1995 WL 768847, the version in effect at the time Spooner executed the agreements with the Crowells and the Olcsvarys.

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon has explicitly held that Spooner lacked authority, under DO 97, to execute a closing agreement under similar circumstances. In re Klee, 216 B.R. 42, 44 (Bkrtcy.D.Or.1997) . The absence of such authority, as the Klee court held, voids the agreement.

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Oregon has explicitly held that Spooner lacked authority, under DO 97, to execute a closing agreement under similar circumstances. In re Klee, 216 B.R. 42, 44 (D. Or. 1997). The absence of such authority, as the Klee court held, voids the agreement. Id. at 44-45.

Id. at 289. Since Botany, other courts have echoed the ruling that unauthorized closing agreements are invalid or void, In re Klee, 216 B.R. 42, 44-45 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997) (collecting cases), but no court has decided the estoppel question reserved in Botany, that is, whether the United States can estop a private party to deny the validity of a void agreement. The IRS argues that estoppel does apply in this situation, and it offers as authority several cases in which courts have applied estoppel against taxpayers who tried to disavow "settlement agreements" they made with the IRS, those agreements being of a lower order and formality than the closing agreements at issue in this case.

Id. at 289, 49 S.Ct. 129. Since Botany, other courts have echoed the ruling that unauthorized closing agreements are invalid or void, In re Klee, 216 B.R. 42, 44-45 (Bankr.D.Or.1997) (collecting cases), but no court has decided the estoppel question reserved in Botany, that is, whether the United States can estop a private party to deny the validity of a void agreement.         The IRS argues that estoppel does apply in this situation, and it offers as authority several cases in which courts have applied estoppel against taxpayers who tried to disavow "settlement agreements" they made with the IRS, those agreements being of a lower order and formality than the closing agreements at issue in this case.