Opinion
No. COA15-1130
05-03-2016
IN THE MATTER OF: K.L.
Brooke L. Clark, for petitioner-appellee Robeson County Department of Social Services. Parker, Poe, Adams, & Bernstein, L.L.P., by Matthew H. Mall, for petitioner-appellee Guardian ad Litem. J. Lee Gilliam, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellant mother.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Robeson County, No. 12 JT 304 Appeal by respondent-mother by writ of certiorari from order entered 30 March 2015 by Judge John B. Carter, Jr. in Robeson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 April 2016. Brooke L. Clark, for petitioner-appellee Robeson County Department of Social Services. Parker, Poe, Adams, & Bernstein, L.L.P., by Matthew H. Mall, for petitioner-appellee Guardian ad Litem. J. Lee Gilliam, Assistant Appellate Defender, for respondent-appellant mother. CALABRIA, Judge.
Respondent-mother, Tiffany Chavis ("mother"), appeals by writ of certiorari from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, Kaiden. Kaiden's father, James Locklear, relinquished his parental rights and is not a party to this appeal. We affirm.
A pseudonym is used to protect the minor's identity.
I. Background
Kaiden was born on 3 April 2010 to mother, who has given birth to two other children in addition to Kaiden; mother is no longer in a relationship with any of the children's fathers. In 2014, her oldest child's father and paternal grandparents were awarded custody when the child was seven months old, and her youngest child is currently in the custody of Robeson County Department of Social Services ("DSS") in kinship placement.
In October 2012, DSS filed a juvenile petition after an investigative assessment alleged that mother failed to provide Kaiden with sufficient food or stable housing, that she abused drugs, that she was involuntarily committed for mental health issues, and that there was domestic violence in Kaiden's home. Subsequently, the court adjudicated Kaiden as a dependent child and placed him in the temporary custody of DSS.
In November 2012, mother began working on a permanent plan with DSS toward reunification. This effort was unsuccessful. In May 2014, the trial court ordered that the permanent plan be changed from reunification with mother to adoption. In August 2014, mother was again involuntarily committed for eight days. After failing to make child support payments, in violation of her child support order, mother was held in contempt in November 2014 and made a purge payment.
Subsequently, mother made two payments, each for approximately half of one month's care, between November and the termination of parental rights ("TPR") hearing and, at the time of the TPR hearing, was substantially in arrears. The court granted two continuances requested by mother in November and December 2014. Then, on 21 January and 25 February 2015, the court heard evidence on the petition to terminate parental rights, where it ordered the termination of mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) on three separate grounds: failure to show reasonable progress, failure to pay reasonable portion of cost of care, and incapability of providing proper care and supervision. Mother appeals.
II. Termination of Parental Rights
Mother argues that the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law. The trial court's findings of fact supported by clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive, even where some evidence supports contrary findings.In re J.L.H., 224 N.C. App. 52, 53-54, 741 S.E.2d 333, 334 (2012) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Although the trial court concluded grounds existed to terminate mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), (3), and (6), a finding of only one ground of termination is dispositive. See In re K.J.L., 206 N.C. App. 530, 534, 698 S.E.2d 150, 153 (2010) ("A finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support a termination [of parental rights].").
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2015), a court may terminate parental rights when:
[T]he parent is incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a dependent juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101, and that there is a reasonable probability that such incapability will continue for the foreseeable future. Incapability under this subdivision may be the result of substance abuse, mental retardation, mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or any other cause or condition that renders the parent unable or unavailable to parent the juvenile and the parent lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.
Mother does not dispute any aspect of the previous order adjudicating Kaiden dependent, or that she is unable to parent, but contends that the trial court erred under this ground, because it failed to find that she lacked an alternative childcare arrangement. We disagree.
"Section 7B-1111(a)(6) requires that in addition to a parent having a condition which renders her unable or unavailable to parent the juvenile, the parent also must have no appropriate alternative child care arrangement in order to terminate parental rights." In re C.N.C.B., 197 N.C. App. 553, 558, 678 S.E.2d 240, 243 (2009). "Absent such a finding of fact, the order does not support the conclusion of law that sufficient grounds exist pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(6) to terminate respondent's parental rights." Id.
In In re C.N.C.B., this Court reversed and remanded a TPR order entered pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(6) on the ground that the order "contain[ed] no finding of fact that respondent lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement." Id. at 558, 678 S.E.2d at 243. In In re N.B., this Court reversed and remanded a termination order entered pursuant to section (a)(6) on the basis that the trial court failed to "make any findings of fact which directly address whether Respondent lacked an appropriate alternative childcare arrangement." 200 N.C. App. 773, 779, 688 S.E.2d 713, 717 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
However, in In re L.H., this Court held that a trial court's finding that "neither parent has offered an alternative placement for the juvenile" was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that the respondent father lacked an appropriate alternative child care arrangement. 210 N.C. App. 355, 363, 708 S.E.2d 191, 197 (2011). Where a statute requires written findings of fact regarding certain criteria, those findings are adequate, if they address the concerns of the statute despite not using the exact statutory language. In re L.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 168, 752 S.E.2d 453, 455 (2013) ("The trial court's written findings must address the statute's concerns, but need not quote its exact language.").
In the instant case, according to the TPR order, the trial court took judicial notice of the 18 March 2013 order adjudicating Kaiden dependent and placing him in the custody of DSS. The adjudication of dependency contained an unchallenged finding, binding on appeal, that mother at that time "could not provide any other [kinship] placements." After the TPR hearings in January and February 2015, the trial court entered an order that found the following unchallenged facts:
[T]here have been numerous hearing [sic] in Court and individuals that the mother has brought forward prior to today's hearing . . . were not suitable individuals to assist the mother with the care of the minor child.
[T]he mother has mentioned many names here today in Court including, [L.M.]; [M.C.]; [R.L.]; [C.L.] and none of those individuals have come forward or provide suitable to either assist with placement of the child or to assist the mother in caring for the child.
[T]he maternal grandfather, Paul Chavis appeared today and has indicated a willingness to assist the mother . . . . Chavis does not have any criminal charges but there have been credible reports of domestic violence in his home.
Unlike the TPR orders in In re C.N.C.B. and In re N.B., the trial court's TPR order in this case contained findings that directly and substantively addressed the concerns of the statute. The challenged concern is the requirement that the trial court consider alternative child care presented by mother. The trial court's findings, although not written in the exact statutory language, adequately address the mother's lack of alternative child care placement. Furthermore, that the trial court found mother lacked alternative placement in March 2013, while not dispositive as to whether she lacked alternative placement at the time of the TPR hearings as required, it strengthens our conclusion that the trial court considered and adequately found that mother could not present an appropriate alternative placement. Because the findings required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, the trial court did not err in terminating mother's parental rights under this statutory ground. Therefore, we overrule mother's challenge. Because we found one statutorily enumerated ground sufficient to support the order terminating mother's parental rights to Kaiden, we need not address her remaining challenges on the other grounds for termination found by the trial court. See In re C.R.B., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 781 S.E.2d 846, 851 (2016).
As a secondary matter, mother contends that the trial court's termination made under this ground was done in error because, although the written order found that "the mother . . . is incapable of providing for the proper care and supervision of the child, such that the child is dependent, and there is a reasonable probability that such incapability will continue for the foreseeable future[,]" it "did not specifically find the ground of dependency when it rendered its order in open court." However, "[i]f the written judgment conforms generally with the oral judgment, the judgment is valid." Edwards v. Taylor, 182 N.C. App. 722, 727, 643 S.E.2d 51, 54 (2007).
In its oral order, the trial court found: "[mother's] issues of substance abuse will continue in the coming years; . . . [mother's] psychosis and limited capability of providing support will continue; . . . [mother] on at least one occasion has threatened to commit suicide by running herself and the child in question off the road in a truck[;]" and "nothing has changed in [mother's] life since the plan was changed from reunification to termination of parental rights[.]" Because these oral findings generally conform with the court's written finding that mother is unable to parent Kaiden, and given the court's finding that this incapability will continue, the finding of dependency was proper. Furthermore, because mother does not challenge that the finding of dependency is not supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, it is binding on appeal. Therefore, we overrule mother's challenge.
III. Extraneous Findings of Fact
Mother contends findings 6 to 544 should be disregarded because "they are prefaced with the words, so-and-so 'stated,' or some synonym of 'stated,' such as 'reported' or 'informed,' and are simply cut and pasted from the social workers' recollection of what various people said to them as found in DSS reports." "When a trial court is required to make findings of fact, it must make the findings of fact specially." In re Harton, 156 N.C. App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003) (citations omitted).
As this Court recently explained in the context of findings contained in a TPR order:
[T]he trial court must, through processes of logical reasoning, based on the evidentiary facts before it, find the ultimate facts essential to support the conclusions of law. The findings must be the specific ultimate facts sufficient for the appellate court to determine that the judgment is adequately supported by competent evidence. As a result of the foregoing principles, this Court has repeatedly stated that the trial court's findings must consist of more than a recitation of the allegations contained in the juvenile petition.In re M.K. (I), ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 773 S.E.2d 535, 538 (2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, "[o]ur Supreme Court has . . . long required a trial court's findings to reflect a true reconciliation and adjudication of all facts in evidence to enable the appellate courts to review the trial court's conclusions." Id. (citation omitted).
The purpose of the requirement that the court make findings of those specific facts which support its ultimate disposition of the case is to allow a reviewing court to determine from the record whether the judgment—and the legal conclusions which underlie it—represent a correct application of the law. The requirement for appropriately detailed findings is thus not a mere formality or a rule of empty ritual; it is designed instead to dispose of the issues raised by the pleadings and to allow the appellate courts to perform their proper function in the judicial system.Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 712, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
"We again caution the trial court that its order, upon which the trial judge's signature appears and which we review, must reflect an adjudication, not mere one-sided recitations of allegations presented at the hearing." In re M.K. at ___, 773 S.E.2d at 538. Nonetheless, "we will examine whether the record of the proceedings demonstrates that the trial court, through processes of logical reasoning, based on the evidentiary facts before it, found the ultimate facts necessary to dispose of the case." In re J.W., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 772 S.E.2d 249, 251, disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 776 S.E.2d 202 (2015).
In the instant case, it logically follows that, because we concluded that the trial court's ultimate findings necessary to terminate mother's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and that the findings underlying this ground to terminate were unchallenged, it is not reversible error in this case that some of the trial court's findings appear to be "cut-and-pasted" from DSS allegations and testimony by DSS social workers. See In re T.M., 180 N.C. App. 539, 547, 638 S.E.2d 236, 240-41 (2006) (holding that erroneous findings unnecessary to conclusions do not constitute reversible error where the adjudication is supported by sufficient additional findings grounded in competent evidence). Therefore, we dismiss mother's challenge.
IV. Conclusion
The trial court's findings support its conclusion that grounds existed upon which to terminate mother's parental rights to Kaiden, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6). Therefore, the trial court's termination of mother's parental rights is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges HUNTER and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).