Opinion
04-20-00563-CV
03-30-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF K.J.G., a Child
From the County Court at Law, Kerr County, Texas Trial Court No. 09352C Honorable Susan Harris, Judge Presiding
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Irene Rios, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Irene Rios, Justice
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Appellant Mark Hector Mena appeals the trial court's order dismissing his suit to "confirm child support arrears" for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court found Mena filed his motion to confirm arrears more than ten years after his child support obligation ended and subsection 157.005(b) of the Texas Family Code divested the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on the motion. Mena disputes the date the trial court determined his child support obligation ended. Mena also argues section 157.005's limitation on the trial court's jurisdiction did not apply to his motion and the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to ratify an agreement between Mena and K.J.G.'s 1 biological mother, Patricia Garces, to reduce the child support arrears to zero dollars. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The trial court's order mistakenly referred to subsection 158.005(b) of the Texas Family Code. It is clear from the record that the trial court meant to refer to subsection 157.005(b) of the Texas Family Code in its order to dismiss.
Background
The Office of the Attorney General of Texas ("the OAG") initiated a suit in Bandera County to establish the parent-child relationship between Mena and the child. On August 29, 2005, the trial court in Bandera County rendered an order establishing Mena's child support obligations. On April 6, 2009, the trial court in Bandera County entered an order confirming arrears and rendering a cumulative money judgment for child support in the amount of $9, 853.91 and medical support in the amount of $1, 118.49.
The clerk's record does not contain any filings prior to Mena's motion to confirm child support arrearages, filed on April 22, 2020. We derive the facts occurring before April 22, 2020 from the record.
In 2009, the Department of Family and Protective Services ("the Department") filed a petition seeking temporary managing conservatorship of the child and termination of Garces's and Mena's parental rights in Kerr County. In April 2009, the trial court in Kerr County rendered an order granting the Department temporary managing conservatorship. On April 30, 2010, the trial court in Kerr County entered an order terminating Garces's and Mena's parental rights.Subsequently, the Bandera County case was transferred to Kerr County and consolidated with the Kerr County case initiated by the Department. At some point during the Kerr County case, Mena's current child support obligation was terminated; however, interest continued to accrue on the child support that was confirmed on April 6, 2009.
The parties agree the child was adopted after Garces's and Mena's parental rights were terminated; however, the record does not reflect when the adoption occurred.
It appears from the hearing transcript that the Bandera County case was not transferred and consolidated with the Kerr County case until after Garces's and Mena's parental rights were terminated.
The record does not reflect the date Mena's child support obligation was terminated.
On April 22, 2020, Mena filed a "Motion to Confirm Child Support Arrearage" requesting the trial court reduce his child support arrears to zero dollars. Mena argued in the motion that his 2 "subsequent termination of parental rights and ultimate adoption of the child along with a considerable amount of time lapse since the adoption requires the confirmation of support to zero."
On August 27, 2020, the OAG filed a motion to dismiss Mena's suit arguing the trial court lacks jurisdiction to hear a motion to confirm arrears and render a cumulative money judgment for past-due child support, as provided by section 157.263 of the Texas Family Code. On October 13, 2020, the trial court rendered an order granting the OAG's motion to dismiss Mena's suit. The trial court determined Mena's motion was a motion for a cumulative money judgment under 157.263 of the Texas Family Code, the motion was filed more than ten years after Mena's current child support obligation ended, and-pursuant to section 157.005 of the Texas Family Code-the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion. Mena appealed.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Section 157.005 of the Texas Family Code is a limitation on the trial court's jurisdiction to confirm arrears and render a cumulative money judgment when a motion for enforcement is filed under section 157.263 of the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.005(b); Id. § 157.263.
In his second issue, Mena argues the trial court erred in dismissing his case because section 157.005 only applies to a motion to enforce child support obligations under section 157.263. Because he did not file a motion to enforce child support obligations, Mena argues the jurisdictional limitation imposed by section 157.005 does not apply and the trial court erred by dismissing his suit.
Standard of Review
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Kendall v. Kendall, 340 S.W.3d 483, 495 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Whether a court 3 has jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Holmes v. Williams, 355 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
Whether Mena's Motion to Confirm Arrears was an Enforcement Motion?
Section 157.263 of the Texas Family Code states: "If a motion for enforcement of child support requests a money judgment for arrearages, the court shall confirm the amount of arrearages and render cumulative money judgments [for child support, medical support, and dental support owed.]" Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.263.
Subsection 157.005(b) limits a trial court's jurisdiction to hear a motion for enforcement filed under section 157.263, stating:
The court retains jurisdiction to confirm the total amount of child support, medical support, and dental support arrearages and render cumulative money judgments for past-due child support, medical support, and dental support, as provided by [s]ection 157.263, if a motion for enforcement requesting a money judgment is filed not later than the 10th anniversary after the date:
(1) the child becomes an adult; or
(2) on which the child support obligation terminates under the support order or by operation of law.Id. § 157.005(b).
"When there is an existing child support order, a party who is an obligee under the order may file a motion to enforce the order and seek a judgment confirming a child support arrearage." In re D.G.R., III, No. 04-05-00439-CV, 2006 WL 3611156, at *3 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (emphasis added). "A cumulative money judgment for past-due child support results only after the obligee files a motion for the enforcement of child support requesting a money judgment for arrearage." Holmes, 355 S.W.3d at 219 (emphasis added).
Our sister court observed that section 157.263 "specifically and unambiguously refer[s] to 'a motion for enforcement'" and the obligor's motion in that case "was not one for enforcement" 4 against himself. See In re H.G.L., No. 14-08-00087-CV, 2009 WL 3817871, at *4-5 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). Similarly, Mena's motion here is not a motion for enforcement and, therefore, cannot be an action brought under section 157.263.
Because "section 157.005(b) only applies to [a motion to enforce child support arrears by requesting] cumulative money judgments for past-due child support as provided by section 157.263," we conclude the trial court erred when it dismissed Mena's suit under the jurisdictional limitation set forth in section 157.005(b). In re D.W.G., 391 S.W.3d 154, 160 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, no pet.). Accordingly, we sustain Mena's second issue and need not address his first issue.
Ratification of the Agreement
In his third issue, Mena argues the trial court erred when it did not ratify his agreement with Garces to reduce his child support arrears to zero dollars. The trial court did not reach the merits of Mena's claims. Accordingly, the only holding at issue in this appeal is whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and we decline to address Mena's third issue. See Combs v. Kaufman County, 274 S.W.3d 922, 925 n.7 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, pet. denied).
Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 5