Opinion
A117236
4-24-2008
In re K.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. K.J., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
K.J. appeals from a March 26, 2007 order continuing his wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) based on findings that he committed residential robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a)) and residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). As to the residential robbery, an enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(9)) was also found true. The court committed K.J. to the Division of Juvenile Facilities for a maximum term of six years. On appeal, K.J. contends the court prejudicially erred in limiting his cross-examination of the key prosecution witness, Christina M. (the victim). We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
The victim testified that on the morning of December 5, 2006, K.J. knocked on the door of her apartment in Novato. When the victim opened the door, K.J. asked for "Michael," and the victim said that Michael did not live there. About five minutes later, K.J. knocked on the victims door again. The victim opened the door, and K.J. grabbed her by her right arm and pulled her about three feet into her apartment. A second individual entered the victims apartment just after K.J. The victim screamed and struggled with K.J. for about 30 seconds, and eventually broke free and ran out of her apartment.
The victim ran outside and screamed for help. Her neighbors heard her and called the police. About four minutes after the victim left her apartment, one of her neighbors accompanied her back to her apartment and made sure that the intruders were gone. The police arrived soon after, and the victim reported the incident. She described K.J. to the police as a tall, skinny Black male, aged 19 or 20. K.J.s face was uncovered during the incident, and she had seen his face for a total of about 30 seconds. When the victim returned to her apartment, she found that her boyfriends marijuana, which he kept in her cupboard and had a "cannabis card" for, was missing. Nothing else was missing.
Later that day, the police showed the victim a photo line-up of possible suspects; K.J. was not pictured in that line-up. The victim did not identify anyone from the line-up. Ten days later, on December 15, 2006, the victim went to the Novato police station because she had "heard around" the neighborhood that somebody named "[K.]" was the intruder. The police showed her two photo line-ups, and the victim positively identified K.J. She testified that she was "positive" K.J. was the intruder, because she remembered his face. Before the robbery, the victim had seen K.J. around Novato, but she had not spoken to him and did not know his name.
On cross-examination, the victim admitted that she had smoked marijuana in the six hours prior to the robbery. She also acknowledged that her boyfriend had told her that he had been in an altercation with K.J. on an earlier occasion.
On December 29, 2006, a juvenile petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) alleged that K.J. had committed residential robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a)) and residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). The petition further alleged that the residential robbery was a violent felony (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (c)(9)) and a serious felony strike (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subds. (a), (b), (c)).
On March 7, 2007, the court held a contested jurisdictional hearing and sustained the robbery and burglary allegations. The court found that the robbery was a violent felony, but not a strike. On March 26, 2007, the court continued K.J. as a ward of the court and committed him to the Division of Juvenile Facilities for a maximum term of six years. K.J. filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
K.J. contends the juvenile court prejudicially erred in not permitting his trial counsel to cross-examine the victim about the possibility that she was involved in a criminal investigation at the time she identified K.J. from the photo line-up. We disagree.
On cross-examination, K.J. first sought to question the victim about whether she had a medical marijuana card. The court sustained an objection on relevance grounds. K.J. then sought to explore whether on the day the victim identified K.J. from the photo line-up (1) the victims boyfriend had been arrested on drug charges and (2) the police officers had asked to search the victims bedroom. The prosecution again objected on relevance grounds, and K.J.s counsel argued that the victims possible involvement in a police investigation was relevant to show her bias to cooperate with law enforcement. After argument by counsel, the court rejected this line of questioning under Evidence Code section 352, stating "Im going to disallow anything further on this. Its a vague suggestion that there is bias toward the police. I dont see any connection at all with K.J. or these allegations."
The confrontation clauses of the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art I, § 15) guarantee a criminal defendant, or a juvenile accused of criminal activity, the right to confront adverse witnesses (In re Anthony P. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 502, 506-507). " `Of particular relevance here, "[w]e have recognized that the exposure of a witness motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination." [Citation.] . . . [I]t does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsels inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant . . . "the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent the defense might wish." [Citations.]" (People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1091, disapproved on another ground in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 299, fn. 10.)
Thus, trial courts retain the authority to restrict cross-examination "under well-established principles such as those reflected in Evidence Code section 352, i.e., if the probative value of the evidence `is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, or confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. " (People v. Harris, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1091.)
Even if the court abuses its discretion to restrict cross-examination, the error is subject to harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 "based on factors such as: `the importance of the witness testimony in the prosecutions case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecutions case. [Citations.]" (People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1220.)
We conclude the trial court acted well within its discretion in preventing cross-examination of the victim on the subject of her possible involvement in a police investigation. First, K.J.s counsel failed to make an adequate showing of relevance. (Evid. Code, § 350.) A trial court can disallow cross-examination of a witness about his or her alleged wrongful activities where there is no indication that the witness is under police investigation for the alleged activities such that he or she might hope to favorably influence the investigation by cooperating with law enforcement. (People v. Johnson (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 163, 168-169.) K.J.s counsel made no offer of proof that the victim was under police investigation for any alleged illegal activity. At the jurisdictional hearing, after attempting to question the victim about her boyfriends alleged arrest, K.J.s counsel argued that the victim was "part of the investigation and participant in that criminal activity which is pending," but offered no evidence in support of this suggestion.
Second, the courts reliance on Evidence Code section 352 to exclude the proffered evidence of the victims possible involvement in a police investigation was not an abuse of discretion. The court could reasonably conclude that the evidences probative value was outweighed by the probability that its admission would require an undue consumption of time. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Evidence that the victim was under police investigation for illegal activity would have minimal probative value. There is only a tenuous link between the alleged police investigation of the victim and her alleged motive to cooperate with law enforcement and falsely identify K.J. as the person who robbed her. Furthermore, the trial court could reasonably conclude that cross-examination of the victim on this subject would involve an undue consumption of time, particularly if the victim had denied any knowledge of being the subject of an investigation.
Finally, even if the trial court erred in excluding the proffered evidence, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1220.) Even in the absence of evidence that the victim was under police investigation, her credibility had already been significantly impeached. The victim admitted that she had smoked marijuana in the six hours prior to the December 5 incident, and that her boyfriends marijuana was kept in her cupboard. In addition, she acknowledged that after she "heard around" that K.J. was the intruder, she and her boyfriend discussed K.J., and her boyfriend told her that he had been in an altercation with K.J. on an earlier occasion. Given these admissions, which could suggest that the victim was involved in illegal activity and was biased against K.J., the additional evidence that she was under police investigation would not have created a significantly different impression of the victims credibility.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur.
JONES, P.J.
NEEDHAM, J.