Legislative intent may be inferred from the nature and purpose of the statute and the consequences which would follow, respectively, from various constructions. In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 273 S.E.2d 712 (1981); Campbell v. Church, 298 N.C. 476, 259 S.E.2d 558 (1979). Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a statute's expression of specific exceptions implies the exclusion of other exceptions. Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck, 319 N.C. 298, 354 S.E.2d 495 (1987).
See In reAppeal of Bass Income Fund, 115 N.C.App. 703, 705, 446 S.E.2d 594, 595 (1994) (" ‘ The words and phrases of a statute must be interpreted contextually,’ and read in a manner which effectuates the legislative purpose." (quoting In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 167, 273 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1981))). In Tew, 280 N.C. at 618, 187 S.E.2d at 17, the Supreme Court explained that the Legislature had a dual purpose in requiring automatic commitment for insanity acquittees: " The commitment of such a person following an acquittal is imposed for the protection of society and the individual confined-not as punishment for crime."
When strictly construing a statute to determine whether it authorizes the State to appeal in a criminal case, we must " resort first to the words of the statute," and be certain to interpret the " words and phrases of a statute ... contextually, in a manner which harmonizes with the underlying reason and purpose of the statute." SeeIn re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 167, 273 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1981). Additionally, while " the caption [of a statute] will not be permitted to control when the meaning of the text is clear," " [w]here the meaning of a statute is doubtful, its title may be called in aid of construction."
When strictly construing a statute to determine whether it authorizes the State to appeal in a criminal case, we must "resort first to the words of the statute," and be certain to interpret the "words and phrases of a statute . . . contextually, in a manner which harmonizes with the underlying reason and purpose of the statute." See In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 167, 273 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1981). Additionally, while "the caption [of a statute] will not be permitted to control when the meaning of the text is clear," "[w]here the meaning of a statute is doubtful, its title may be called in aid of construction."
In seeking to observe this rule, a court should consider the "nature and purpose of the statute" as well as the consequences which would follow proposed interpretations. In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 167, 273 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1981). In addition, the statute should be read as a whole.
The purpose of this statute is to insure that parties with meritorious challenges to a will or trust agreement are not discouraged from bringing those claims by the prospect of incurring legal fees. In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 273 S.E.2d 712 (1981). In the absence of abuse or arbitrariness, a discretionary order of the trial court in this regard is conclusive on appeal. State Highway Commission v. Hemphill, 269 N.C. 535, 153 S.E.2d 22 (1967).
Where a surviving spouse is forced to engage in litigation to determine whether a right of dissent exists, we hold that the discretionary power given the trial judge under G.S. 6-21(2) includes the power to award attorneys' fees for the surviving spouse when, in the opinion of the trial court, the proceeding was one with substantial merit. In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 169, 273 S.E.2d 712, 716 (1981). Thus, as long as a dissent has substantial merit, the court may exercise its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney's fees.
See In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 161 S.E.2d 1 (1968). Consequently, we must discern its meaning from the context in which it is used. In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 273 S.E.2d 712 (1981). In doing so, we again analogize this situation to that in Great American I.
"To establish the right to dissent, a spouse must make a timely filing pursuant to G.S. 30-2, and must show an entitlement to that right under G.S. 30-1." In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 166, 273 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1981). The right time, manner and effect of the filing and recording of a dissent to a will are all matters within the probate jurisdiction of the clerk of superior court.
The language of the statute itself and the purpose behind the legislation supply the strongest indicia of the legislative intent. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Public Staff, 309 N.C. 195, 306 S.E.2d 435 (1983); In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 273 S.E.2d 712 (1981). The introductory provision of the Act reveals its equitable purpose: "Upon application of a party, the court shall determine what is the marital property and shall provide for an equitable distribution of the marital property between the parties . . . ."