In re Kirkman

12 Citing cases

  1. Alberti v. Manufactured Homes, Inc.

    329 N.C. 727 (N.C. 1991)   Cited 47 times
    Holding privity not required where manufacturer's oral representations made to retailer are intended to be communicated to remote buyers to induce purchase

    Legislative intent may be inferred from the nature and purpose of the statute and the consequences which would follow, respectively, from various constructions. In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 273 S.E.2d 712 (1981); Campbell v. Church, 298 N.C. 476, 259 S.E.2d 558 (1979). Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a statute's expression of specific exceptions implies the exclusion of other exceptions. Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck, 319 N.C. 298, 354 S.E.2d 495 (1987).

  2. In re Hayes

    199 N.C. App. 69 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 9 times
    Rejecting proffered interpretation of statutory provision that would render a term redundant

    See In reAppeal of Bass Income Fund, 115 N.C.App. 703, 705, 446 S.E.2d 594, 595 (1994) (" ‘ The words and phrases of a statute must be interpreted contextually,’ and read in a manner which effectuates the legislative purpose." (quoting In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 167, 273 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1981))). In Tew, 280 N.C. at 618, 187 S.E.2d at 17, the Supreme Court explained that the Legislature had a dual purpose in requiring automatic commitment for insanity acquittees: " The commitment of such a person following an acquittal is imposed for the protection of society and the individual confined-not as punishment for crime."

  3. State v. Fowler

    676 S.E.2d 523 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 16 times
    In State v. Fowler, __ N.C.App. __, 676 S.E.2d 523 (2009), this Court determined that, after the superior court considers an appeal by the State pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 20-38.

    When strictly construing a statute to determine whether it authorizes the State to appeal in a criminal case, we must " resort first to the words of the statute," and be certain to interpret the " words and phrases of a statute ... contextually, in a manner which harmonizes with the underlying reason and purpose of the statute." SeeIn re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 167, 273 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1981). Additionally, while " the caption [of a statute] will not be permitted to control when the meaning of the text is clear," " [w]here the meaning of a statute is doubtful, its title may be called in aid of construction."

  4. State v. Fowler

    197 N.C. App. 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 1 times
    In Fowler, for instance, the court interpreted subsection 20-38.7(a) and section 15A-1432, the provisions at issue here.

    When strictly construing a statute to determine whether it authorizes the State to appeal in a criminal case, we must "resort first to the words of the statute," and be certain to interpret the "words and phrases of a statute . . . contextually, in a manner which harmonizes with the underlying reason and purpose of the statute." See In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 167, 273 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1981). Additionally, while "the caption [of a statute] will not be permitted to control when the meaning of the text is clear," "[w]here the meaning of a statute is doubtful, its title may be called in aid of construction."

  5. In re Appeal of Bass Income Fund

    115 N.C. App. 703 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 15 times
    Noting that "it would have been a simple matter to include [an] explicit phrase" in statute, thus giving it a certain effect

    In seeking to observe this rule, a court should consider the "nature and purpose of the statute" as well as the consequences which would follow proposed interpretations. In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 167, 273 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1981). In addition, the statute should be read as a whole.

  6. Hill v. Cox

    108 N.C. App. 454 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 5 times

    The purpose of this statute is to insure that parties with meritorious challenges to a will or trust agreement are not discouraged from bringing those claims by the prospect of incurring legal fees. In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 273 S.E.2d 712 (1981). In the absence of abuse or arbitrariness, a discretionary order of the trial court in this regard is conclusive on appeal. State Highway Commission v. Hemphill, 269 N.C. 535, 153 S.E.2d 22 (1967).

  7. In re Estate of Tucci

    104 N.C. App. 142 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 18 times
    Stating that an appeal cannot be withdrawn without the appellate court's consent

    Where a surviving spouse is forced to engage in litigation to determine whether a right of dissent exists, we hold that the discretionary power given the trial judge under G.S. 6-21(2) includes the power to award attorneys' fees for the surviving spouse when, in the opinion of the trial court, the proceeding was one with substantial merit. In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 169, 273 S.E.2d 712, 716 (1981). Thus, as long as a dissent has substantial merit, the court may exercise its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney's fees.

  8. Smith v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co.

    84 N.C. App. 120 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 10 times   1 Legal Analyses

    See In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 161 S.E.2d 1 (1968). Consequently, we must discern its meaning from the context in which it is used. In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 273 S.E.2d 712 (1981). In doing so, we again analogize this situation to that in Great American I.

  9. In re Estate of Outen

    77 N.C. App. 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 7 times
    Noting that an agreement adding a beneficiary affected the distribution scheme

    "To establish the right to dissent, a spouse must make a timely filing pursuant to G.S. 30-2, and must show an entitlement to that right under G.S. 30-1." In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 166, 273 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1981). The right time, manner and effect of the filing and recording of a dissent to a will are all matters within the probate jurisdiction of the clerk of superior court.

  10. Loeb v. Loeb

    72 N.C. App. 205 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 32 times
    Holding separate portion of hybrid property transmuted to marital property because party was "unable to state the value of her alleged `separate property'"

    The language of the statute itself and the purpose behind the legislation supply the strongest indicia of the legislative intent. State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Public Staff, 309 N.C. 195, 306 S.E.2d 435 (1983); In re Kirkman, 302 N.C. 164, 273 S.E.2d 712 (1981). The introductory provision of the Act reveals its equitable purpose: "Upon application of a party, the court shall determine what is the marital property and shall provide for an equitable distribution of the marital property between the parties . . . ."