Summary
In King v. Walt Burnett, W.C. No. 4-260-746 (June 3, 1997), we held that a consistent and harmonious reading of § 8-46-104 and § 8-41-304(2) "leads to the conclusion that the General Assembly intended to establish a bright line rule concerning SIF liability in occupational disease cases."
Summary of this case from In re Tsosie, W.C. NoOpinion
W.C. No. 4-260-746
June 3, 1997
FINAL ORDER
The Subsequent Injury Fund (SIF) seeks review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Martinez (ALJ) which held it liable for a portion of the claimant's death benefits. We affirm.
The pertinent facts are not in dispute. The decedent was a uranium miner who was diagnosed with lung cancer in July 1993. The disease immediately disabled the decedent from work, and ultimately caused his death on September 2, 1994. The claimant is the decedent's widow, and she filed a claim for death benefits in November 1994.
The ALJ held that the employer's insurer, the Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority (CCIA), is liable for up to $10,000 of benefits. The ALJ then ordered the SIF to pay "all additional benefits."
In reaching this result, the ALJ rejected the SIF's argument that it is not liable because the SIF was closed under § 8-46-104, C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.). The ALJ reasoned that, although the death occurred after the closure of the SIF, the decedent's occupational disease "occurred" in July 1993.
On review, the SIF argues that the SIF was closed and that the ALJ misinterpreted § 8-46-104. The SIF reasons that claims for death benefits are governed by the law in effect on the date of death. Under this logic, the SIF asserts that its liability is governed by the current version of § 8-41-304(2), C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.), which provides that in cases of death caused by radioactive materials the last employer is liable for all compensation, including death benefits. The SIF further contends that this result is consistent with the "rule of independence" applicable to death claims, and the General Assembly's intent to close the SIF in order to save money. We are not persuaded.
The current version of § 8-46-104 was enacted in 1993. 1993 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 351 at 2142. The statute provides as follows:
"No cases shall be accepted into the subsequent injury fund for injuries occurring on or after July 1, 1993, or for occupational diseases occurring on or after April 1, 1994. When all payments have been made for all cases accepted into the fund, any remaining balance shall revert to the general fund."
Significantly, § 8-41-304(2) was also amended in 1993. The amendment deleted the prior reference to SIF liability, and made the "last employer" liable for all benefits attributable to disability and death caused by exposure to radioactive materials. 1993 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 351 at 2140. The amendment to § 8-41-304(2) was to take effect April 1, 1994. 1993 Colo. Sess. Laws, ch. 351 at 2145.
In interpreting these provisions, we recognize that the principal objective is to give effect to the legislative intent. To the extent the legislative intent is unclear, we may consider the legislative history as well as the state of the law prior to the Act. We should construe the statutes in a manner that gives consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Henderson v. RSI, Inc., 824 P.2d 91 (Colo.App. 1991).
Significantly, § 8-46-104 makes no distinction between closure of the SIF in cases involving disability and those involving death. Rather, the statute distinguishes between injuries and diseases, and provides that cases will not be accepted into the SIF where the occupational disease occurs on or after April 1, 1994. Thus, as the CCIA argues, the linchpin of SIF liability in cases of occupational disease appears to be the date the disease was incurred, not the date of any particular consequence of the disease, including death.
Moreover, we agree with the CCIA that this conclusion is consistent with the 1993 modifications to § 8-41-304(2). Prior to the amendments, the statute provided for SIF liability for all benefits in excess of $10,000, including death benefits. It would seem anomalous to now interpret the statute to mean that the SIF is liable for all disability and medical benefits over $10,000 if the decedent incurred the disease prior to April 1, 1994, but is exonerated from further liability if death occurs after April 1.
Consequently, we hold that a consistent and harmonious reading of the statute leads to the conclusion that the General Assembly intended to establish a bright line rule concerning SIF liability in occupational disease cases. It did so by providing that the SIF is liable in cases where the disease "occurred" prior to April 1, 1994, but is not liable in cases where the disease occurred after that date. We consider the express statutory direction of the General Assembly to supersede the ordinary rules governing the law of death claims. Cf. Martinez v. Regional Transportation District, 832 P.2d 1060 (Colo.App. 1992).
Moreover, we consider this case to be distinguishable from Green v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 789 P.2d 481(Colo.App. 1990). In Green, the claimant sustained a heart attack which occurred subsequent to the industrial injury. Although the heart attack was causally related to the industrial injury, it was a distinct and separate event which occurred after the legislature enacted a statute closing the major medical insurance fund for "injuries" after July 1, 1981. Under these circumstances, the court held that the heart attack was a "separate injury," and not to be compensated under the fund.
Here, the claimant's death does not constitute an event which is distinguishable from the claimant's occupational disease. Rather, as the ALJ found, death was directly caused by the progression of the disease itself. Death cannot constitute a separate "occupational disease" for purposes of § 8-46-104. Therefore, we are unpersuaded that the reasoning in Green is applicable here.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated November 20, 1996, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
______________________________ David Cain
______________________________ Bill WhitacreNOTICE This Order is final unless an action to modify or vacate the Order is commenced in the Colorado Court of Appeals, 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, Colorado 80203, by filing a petition to review with the court, with service of a copy of the petition upon the Industrial Claim Appeals Office and all other parties, within twenty (20) days after the date the Order was mailed, pursuant to §§ 8-43-301(10) and 307, C. R. S. (1996 Cum. Supp.).
Copies of this decision were mailed June 3, 1997 to the following parties:
Marian L. King, 1675 Rhine Ct., Montrose, CO 81401
Union Carbide Corp., P.O. Box 1029, Grand Junction, CO 81502
Subsequent Injury Fund — Interagency Mail
Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority, Attn: Brandee L. DeFalco-Galvin, Esq. (Interagency Mail)
Thomas W. Blake, Esq., 744 Horizon Ct., Ste. 360, Grand Junction, CO 81506 (For the CCIA Respondents)
Christopher Seidman, Esq., P.O. Box 3207, Grand Junction, CO 81502 (For the Claimant)
Roxane D. Baca, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Litigation Section, 1525 Sherman St., 5th Floor, Denver, CO 80203 (For SIF)
By: _______________________________