In re King

16 Citing cases

  1. People v. Nau

    153 Ill. 2d 406 (Ill. 1992)   Cited 70 times
    Holding that reversal of commitment order was not required based on a defect in notice under section 3–611 of the Mental Health Code, where the defect “could and should have been objected to immediately, could have been easily cured if timely objected to, and made no difference anyway”

    Respondent points to several appellate court opinions which have held that noncompliance with this particular requirement warrants reversal of the resulting commitment orders. See In re Long (1990), 203 Ill. App.3d 357; In re Price (1987), 152 Ill. App.3d 960; In re King (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 741 (reversing commitment orders because the respondent was not served with notice at the direction of the trial court). The State argues that reversal of the order was not warranted because respondent waived any challenge to the sufficiency of the notice he received by failing to object in the trial court.

  2. In re Splett

    194 Ill. App. 3d 391 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 9 times

    We agree. In his argument the respondent relies primarily upon In re Price (1987), 152 Ill. App.3d 960, 505 N.E.2d 37, and In re King (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 741, 499 N.E.2d 1032. In both Price and King, the respondents and the respondents' attorneys were present at the relevant involuntary admission hearings.

  3. In re Shaw

    153 Ill. App. 3d 939 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 9 times

    Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-815) ( In re Smith (1986), 145 Ill. App.3d 1002, 496 N.E.2d 497); and where the respondent was never served with either notice of the hearing or the petition for involuntary admission pursuant to section 3-706 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-706) ( In re King (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 741, 499 N.E.2d 1032; see also In re Price (1987), 152 Ill. App.3d 960). In each instance, this court recognized the compelling need in mental health cases for strict compliance with the relevant statutory provisions, as important liberty interests were affected.

  4. In re Splett

    143 Ill. 2d 225 (Ill. 1991)   Cited 69 times
    Holding State could pursue involuntary admission against a voluntary patient only after the voluntary patient made a written request for discharge, and rejecting an oral request as sufficient under the statute

    In support of its holding, the court relied on other appellate court decisions that had reached the same result in similar circumstances. (See In re Price (1987), 152 Ill. App.3d 960; In re King (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 741.) The court expressly declined to follow a decision under prior law that held that noncompliance with an analogous commitment provision was waived when respondent failed to raise an appropriate objection during the commitment hearing.

  5. Williams v. Olson

    2021 Ill. App. 191878 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    This court has held that even the presence of both the party and counsel did not cure a total noncompliance with Rule 12. See In re Plank, 169 Ill.App.3d 411, 415 (1988); In re King, 148 Ill.App.3d 741, 746 (1986). But those cases involved involuntary commitment, implicating a fundamental liberty interest, and thus may or may not be distinguishable from a case involving a judgment of nearly $100,000 against a party.

  6. In re Andrew B

    386 Ill. App. 3d 337 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 12 times

    We trace the misstatements from Shaw to our supreme court's decision in People ex rel. Curtin v. Heizer, 36 Ill. 2d 438 (1967). See Shaw, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 943, citing In re King, 148 Ill. App. 3d 741, 745 (1986), citing In re Whittenberg, 143 Ill. App. 3d 836, 838 (1986), citing In re Hays, 115 Ill. App. 3d 686, 689 (1983), and Heizer, 36 Ill. 2d 438. In Heizer, an appeal challenging whether a fire protection district had been properly organized pursuant to statutory requirements, the supreme court noted that "the county court derived its jurisdiction to proceed * * * solely from statute" and stated that, because "[t]he General Assembly * * * authorized the creation of [fire protection districts] upon certain conditions, those conditions must be complied with in the manner prescribed by statute, else the court is without jurisdiction" to establish the district.

  7. People v. Nau

    209 Ill. App. 3d 805 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 5 times

    • 1 Noncompliance with statutory involuntary commitment procedures renders the judgment in such a cause erroneous and of no effect. ( In re King (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 741, 745.) However, the Code does not require that an examiner's title appear on the face of the certificate; therefore, noncompliance with the Code cannot be premised on this absence.

  8. In re Long

    203 Ill. App. 3d 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 10 times

    Section 3-706 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-706) states that the court shall set the hearing and direct service of a notice after receipt of a second certificate or after a respondent is admitted to a facility, whichever is earlier. The respondent cites In re Price (1987), 152 Ill. App.3d 960, 961-62, and In re King (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 741, 746, for the proposition that the order of involuntary admission must be reversed when the exact requirements of section 3-706, which states the court must set the hearing, are not met. The State acknowledges that the rule enunciated in King and Price controls this situation but requests us to reconsider the rule, in light of the fact that the respondent received actual notice four days in advance, there was a properly acknowledged certificate of service, the respondent was actually prepared and had obtained the presence of her attorney and her friend, and that no party objected to the notice. However, this court has recently reviewed the rule of King and Price and concurred that any noncompliance with the statutory admission procedures renders the involuntary admission judgment erroneous and ineffective.

  9. In re Lamb

    560 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 8 times

    • 2 Respondent cites two cases for the proposition that where notice has been issued and served before the petition is filed and the hearing is set by the trial court, the order of involuntary admission must be reversed even though the respondent never objected to the improper service. ( In re Price (1987), 152 Ill. App.3d 960, 961-62; In re King (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 741, 746.) This court, following Price and King, reiterated the rule that "any noncompliance with statutory involuntary admission procedures renders an involuntary admission judgment erroneous and ineffective."

  10. In re Hatala

    558 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    Thus, we conclude that April 7, 1989, was the first day of the 180-day period. If April 7, 1989, is day one, then the 180-day order expired on October 3, 1989, and the State's petition, filed on October 4, 1989, was not timely. • 2-4 Involuntary commitment proceedings affect important liberty interests; thus, the need for strict compliance with statutory procedures is essential. ( In re Stone (1989), 178 Ill. App.3d 1084, 1086; In re King (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 741, 745.) Noncompliance with statutorily prescribed involuntary commitment procedures renders the judgment entered in such a cause erroneous and of no effect. ( In re Franklin (1989), 186 Ill. App.3d 245, 248.