In support, the State notes that five sister states have upheld similar statutes. In re Kimbler, 100 Cal.App.3d 453, 161 Cal.Rptr. 53 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bono, 7 Mass. App. 849; People v. Illardo, 48 N.Y.2d 408, 423 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1979); State v. Lesieure, 121 R.I. 859, 404 A.2d 457 (1979); State v. J-R Distributors, Inc., 82 Wn.2d 584. The State advances a number of bases for the statutory distinction drawn between movie projectionists and bookstore clerks which we find persuasive.
) That the Legislature did not exclude minors from the solicitation for prostitution statute does not offend the constitutional principle of equal protection, because it does not require mathematical perfection in classifications. (In re Kimbler (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 453, 459.) Defendant has therefore failed to establish the existence of a legislative classification establishing similarly situated groups subject to disparate treatment.
Because the statute does not infringe upon a fundamental right (as discussed supra ), it is presumed to be constitutional and it will be sustained against an equal protection challenge if it rests on a classification which is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. (See In re Flodihn (1979) 25 Cal.3d 561, 568, 159 Cal.Rptr. 327, 601 P.2d 559; In re Kimbler (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 453, 457, 161 Cal.Rptr. 53; Department of Motor Vehicles v. Superior Court (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 936, 941, 130 Cal.Rptr. 311.) In making that challenge here, appellants bear the burden of proving that the statutory differentiation is unreasonable.