Opinion
B189800
12-7-2006
In re KIMBERLY L., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CLAUDIA L., Defendant and Appellant.
Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, and Liana Serobian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Claudia L. (mother), mother of 13-year-old Kimberly L., 11-year-old Crystal L., 10-year-old Marlene L., 9 year-old Brenda S., 7-year-old Naomi S., and 5-year-old James S., appeals from an order of the juvenile court denying her petition under Welfare & Institutions Code section 388. Mother also appeals the courts visitation orders as to all six children. We affirm the orders of the juvenile court.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
CONTENTIONS
Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition as to her two oldest children. Mother further contends that the trial court erred when it limited mothers visitation with all six children.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. The initial section 300 petition
Kimberly, Crystal, Marlene, Brenda, Naomi, and James first came to the attention of the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in February 2002, when a referral alleged that the oldest three girls were being sexually and physically abused by their stepfather, Enrique S. At the time, mother agreed to receive family preservation services and attend a parenting class. She also agreed to sexual abuse, domestic violence, and general counseling. However, the six children were detained from mother in July 2002, after mother disappeared for three days, leaving the children with a maternal aunt.
On August 2, 2002, DCFS filed a petition on behalf of the children pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (g). The petition alleged that mother failed to protect the children from physical abuse inflicted by Enrique S., that mother left the children with a maternal aunt without making provisions for their ongoing care, support, and supervision, and that Enrique S. had sexually abused Kimberly, Crystal, and Marlene. At the detention hearing on August 2, 2002, the court found that prima facie evidence supported the allegations in the petition and ordered the children detained in shelter care. The court ordered DCFS to provide mother with family reunification services and unmonitored visits with the children.
On September 12, 2002, the juvenile court held a jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Mother submitted to the allegations in the petition. The court sustained the petition and declared the children dependents of the court. The court ordered mother to participate in individual counseling to address domestic violence and anger management issues, and to complete a parent education program and a sexual abuse awareness program. The court further ordered DCFS to enroll the children in individual counseling, as well as sexual abuse counseling for victims.
During the first six months of reunification services, mother completed her parent education class but her attendance and progress in individual counseling and the domestic violence program were not satisfactory. She was visiting the children only twice per month, although she had been granted weekly visits. In addition, DCFS reported that mother was inappropriate during her visits. For example, she brought her new boyfriend to a visit despite the social workers advice not to do so until his criminal and child abuse background was checked. Mothers telephone conversations with the children were also inappropriate. During the telephone conversations, she discussed issues related to her boyfriends, the childrens fathers, and court events. DCFS reported that the children were negatively affected by mothers inappropriate behavior.
The 12-month status review report dated September 11, 2003, reported that Kimberly continued to participate in, and benefit from, therapy. However, on March 17, 2003, Crystal had a nervous breakdown and was diagnosed with adjustment disorder, depression, and possible post-traumatic stress disorder. She was treated without medication and began therapy. Crystals therapist reported that Crystal had made some progress, but refused to talk about the abuse she had endured while living with mother and Enrique. During this period of review, however, mother was visiting the children on a weekly basis in an appropriate and timely manner. Mother had been very active in therapy and had done a wonderful job discussing issues of domestic violence and anger management. Mothers therapist stated that mother was ready to regain custody of her children. DCFS recommended the return of all six children to mothers custody as soon as she secured adequate housing. On October 6, 2003, the children were placed back in mothers home.
2. The supplemental petition and second detention
On November 13, 2003, DCFS received a child abuse referral reporting that during a home visit, four of the children, including Kimberly and Crystal, told the social worker that mothers live-in boyfriend, Victor P., had used physical force on them. On November 19, 2003, DCFS filed a supplemental dependency petition pursuant to section 387 alleging that mother lacked adequate housing, that the children were exposed to domestic violence between mother and Victor P., and that Victor P. inappropriately disciplined Kimberly and Crystal. At the section 387 detention hearing on November 19, 2003, the court found that prima facie evidence supported the allegations in the petition and ordered the children detained in shelter care.
In the jurisdiction/disposition report dated January 14, 2004, the DCFS social worker opined that although Victors behavior and discipline methods were inappropriate, there was no clear evidence that he intended to hurt the children. The social worker opined that the children would not be in grave danger if returned to mothers care. However, mother was in the late stages of pregnancy and continued to reside with Victor and a roommate in a one-bedroom apartment, and stated that she was unable to care for the children at that time. At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on January 23, 2004, the court adopted the recommendations agreed upon by mother, DCFS, and the childrens counsel in a mediation agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the court declared the children dependents of the court, ordered the children placed in foster care, and ordered DCFS to provide reunification services and unmonitored visits to mother.
Victor P., Jr. (Victor, Jr.) was born to mother in February 2004. Mother continued to reside in a one-bedroom apartment with Victor P., Sr., an adult roommate, and the new baby. Victor P., Sr. was noncompliant with court orders to take parenting classes. Mother completed domestic violence and anger management treatment, but was resistant to sexual abuse awareness treatment. DCFS also reported that mother was disrupting the older six childrens foster placement by making allegations against the foster parents. Further, DCFS expressed concern that mother inappropriately brought a "male friend" to visitation and discussed her personal life with the children. In the status review report dated January 21, 2005, DCFS reported that mother had visited the children inconsistently and attended only 8 out of a possible 22 visits. Mother did not visit the children for the entire month of December nor did she telephone them for the holidays. Mother had been late to many of the visits, and on one occasion, had arrived three-and-a-half hours late to a four-hour visit.
On May 10, 2005, the juvenile court found mother noncompliant and followed the recommendation of DCFS to terminate reunification services. A section 366.26 permanency planning hearing was scheduled.
3. Mothers section 388 petition
On October 27, 2005, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting that the court modify its previous order terminating family reunification services and setting the section 366.26 hearing. Mother wanted the children returned to her care with intervening weekend or overnight visits. As changed circumstances, mother alleged that since May 10, 2005, she had complied with the court ordered case plan and continued to visit the children. She argued that the change was in the best interest of the children because she had taken excellent care of Victor, Jr. as illustrated by the courts termination of jurisdiction over the child, and was able to offer a home to all of her children.
In its report addressing mothers section 388 petition DCFS included the childrens therapists observation of whether the children wanted their foster parents to become their legal guardians. While the children expressed fear of being disloyal to their mother, they admitted that they enjoyed the amenities, stability, and educational support that they received in their foster home. At one supervised visit, mother stated that she knew the children were receiving privileges that she could not offer them. She stated that she wanted the children to study and be successful in life, "so you dont have to be like me, with no education, working on my knees scrubbing floors, and working for a low wage." After these comments, the children appeared accepting of the legal guardianship plan, and in fact, asked their foster parents to please become their legal guardians. The childrens therapist further opined that mother may not be able to handle the childrens behavior as skillfully as the foster parents. Each of the four older children suffered from varying configurations of post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, emotional withdrawal, and depression. Kimberly was rebellious, and Crystal needed braces, was taking psychotropic medication, needed individual therapy, and needed tutoring.
Mother was living with her new boyfriend Pedro, along with Victor, Jr., in a one-bedroom apartment. The DCFS social worker opined that mothers need to have men in her life was putting the children at risk of abuse. Mother had recently taken two different boyfriends to visits with the children and informed the children that Enrique was not the father of the two younger children although they had his last name, but that Humberto C. was Naomis real father and Javier S. was Jamess real father. DCFS further presented evidence that after visits with mother, the older two girls exhibited negative behavior.
On March 7, 2006, DCFS reported that there was a police report on file dated September 2005 regarding alleged physical abuse of Victor, Jr., who was noted to have a black eye. The police report stated that mother, who was then four months pregnant, called the police reporting that Pedro and a roommate attempted to choke her. When confronted with the incident, mother said that Pedro was fighting with his girlfriend and mother removed them from the residence with police assistance. In February 2006, mother reported that Pedro no longer lived with her.
4. The combined section 388 and section 366.26 hearing
A section 366.26 hearing, during which the court also considered mothers section 388 petition, was held over the course of six days between October 2005 and March 2006. At the hearing, mother conceded that she was unable to care for the four younger children and submitted to the recommendation of DCFS that the foster parents be appointed legal guardians of those four children. Counsel for the children recommended a restricted visitation schedule because there was evidence that mother tried to sabotage the childrens placement by forcing them to make false allegations against the foster parents. Counsel did not want to jeopardize the childrens placement with the foster parents, who were described as having gone the extra mile to meet all the childrens needs. On March 9, 2006, the court ordered mother to have monitored monthly visits in a neutral setting with Marlene, Brenda, Naomi and James, and appointed the foster parents as their legal guardians.
On March 10, 2006, the court heard mothers section 388 petition as to Kimberly and Crystal. The DCFS social worker testified that, in her opinion, Kimberly and Crystal should not be returned to mothers care. After visits with mother, Kimberly became defiant, rebellious, and angry, and Crystal became withdrawn and sad. The social worker was concerned that Kimberly was parentified and would have to care for Victor, Jr., and the new baby that mother was expecting. As to Crystal, the social worker opined that a return to mother would result in more emotional trauma to the child.
Mother testified that she was living in a one-bedroom apartment with Victor, Jr., had an ongoing relationship with Pedro, and was due to have a new baby fathered by Pedro in four days. Pedro was currently not living with mother, but they had discussed the possibility of living together. Pedro apparently was married to another woman or had another familial obligation. Mother denied that Pedro tried to choke her. She testified that Victor, Jr. got a black eye when he accidentally hit the side of his face on a metal board. Mother admitted that she had not yet told Kimberly and Crystal that she was having another baby, and that they had not yet met Pedro.
Counsel for Kimberly and Crystal argued that a return to mother was not in their best interests. Mother had an ongoing relationship with Pedro, who had physically assaulted her. While she was not currently living with him, she planned to be involved with him in the future and possibly live with him. Counsel argued that it would be emotionally traumatic for the girls to live with another of mothers boyfriends. Further, they had no idea that mother was expecting another baby. Counsel requested restricted visitation but indicated she would agree at most to twice a month monitored visitation.
5. The trial courts ruling
As to mothers section 388 petition, the court found that mother had not shown a change in circumstances. Although she had completed all of the court ordered programs, she had not alleviated the problems that caused the first or second removal of the children from her care. Mother continued to put her relationships with men above her childrens interest. Further, the court believed that mother lied on the stand when she testified that the police report inaccurately described the incident with Pedro. In addition, mothers lifestyle was transient, as she had changed residences four times during the recent review period, and her one-bedroom apartment was inadequate for Kimberly and Crystal.
The court also found that to return Kimberly and Crystal to their mothers care would not be in the best interests of the two children. They would be taken away from a stable and positive environment, which they enjoyed, and placed in a chaotic environment. The court therefore denied mothers section 388 petition.
After finding that a return to mother would be detrimental to Kimberly and Crystal, the court ordered them into a permanent plan of legal guardianship and appointed their foster parents as their legal guardians. The court was concerned about mothers attempts to undermine the girls stable living situation with the foster parents, and therefore ordered mother to have once a month monitored visitation with Kimberly and Crystal. The court ordered DCFS to prepare a review report addressing the childrens visitation with mother, and indicated that the court was willing to increase visitation if the visits were successful.
On March 10, 2006, mother filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying mothers section 388 petition
Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her section 388 petition as to her two oldest children, Kimberly and Crystal. Under section 388, a parent whose child is a dependent of the juvenile court may petition the court for a hearing to determine whether to change, modify, or set aside a previous order of the juvenile court. (§ 388, subd. (a).) "If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held . . . ." (§ 388, subd. (c).) The juvenile court may modify a previous order if the parent shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, changed circumstances or new evidence and that the modification would promote the best interests of the child. (In re Michael B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1698, 1703.)
The trial court denied mothers section 388 petition because mother failed to show a change of circumstance or that the best interests of Kimberly and Crystal would be promoted by her proposed modification of the trial courts order. We review the trial courts denial of mothers section 388 petition for an abuse of discretion. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 460.) An abuse of discretion occurs when the courts decision exceeds the bounds of reason or is arbitrary or capricious. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
As set forth below, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that mother failed to show either changed circumstances or that her proposed modification to the prior order was in the best interests of Kimberly and Crystal.
A. Changed circumstances
Mother first takes issue with the trial courts determination that she failed to show a change of circumstance. Mother argues that Kimberly, Crystal, and their four younger siblings entered the juvenile dependency system in 2002 because of mothers failure to intercede to protect the children from their stepfather Enrique S. By the time of the section 388 hearing, mother fully rectified the causes of dependency and was a fine parent to the childrens younger sibling, Victor, Jr. She had no relationship with Enrique S., and DCFS conceded that mother had established a residence of her own with no cohabitating male partner. In other words, mother argues, she had completed every aspect of her reunification services case plan except sexual abuse awareness treatment, with which she was voluntarily compliant.
DCFS points out that under section 388, "the change of circumstances . . . must be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modification of the challenged prior order." (Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477, 485.) Further, a section 388 petition must be considered in the context of the entire dependency proceeding. (See In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307.)
Mother correctly indicates that the proceeding was initiated due to sexual abuse by her ex-husband Enrique. However, she ignores the reasons the children were removed from her care for a second time, and the reasons they were never returned to her. The childrens second removal was due to mothers failure to protect them from her live-in boyfriend, Victor P., who threatened the children physically. Mother has since ended her relationship with Victor P. However, the trial court found that she still puts her interest in having men in her life above her childrens interests in having a stable, loving, and protective environment. Mother is currently involved in a relationship with Pedro, a man who reportedly tried to choke her in September 2005.
DCFS argues that the only change in mothers circumstances at the time that the court heard her section 388 petition was that she did not have a live-in boyfriend. However, DCFS presented evidence that mother and Pedro had discussed the possibility of living together in the future. Thus, DCFS contends, mothers changes were not significant enough, especially when measured against the gravity of the emotional, physical and sexual abuse suffered by the children as a result of mothers ongoing negative relationships with abusive men and her inability to focus on her childrens interests before her own.
We agree with DCFS that the evidence does not show an abuse of the trial courts discretion. The trial court properly considered the entire dependency proceeding when evaluating mothers claim of changed circumstances. Despite her completion of various court ordered programs, mother continued to prioritize her relationships with abusive men. In addition, her residence continued to be inadequate for Kimberly and Crystal. Thus, we find that the trial courts determination that mother failed to show a change of circumstances was not an abuse of discretion.
B. Best interests of the children
The second factor in deciding a petition under section 388 is whether the parent has demonstrated that the proposed change to the prior order is in the best interests of the children. Mother points to In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532 as support for her position that she has met her burden of proving that the return of Kimberly and Crystal to her care would be in their best interests. The Kimberly F. court set forth three factors that the court must weigh when considering a childs best interests in the context of a section 388 petition. Those factors are: (1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of the relative bonds between the dependent children and both the parent and the present caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been. (Id. at p. 532.) Mother argues that these three factors weigh heavily in her favor.
First, mother claims that she alleviated the problem which led to the dependency. Secondly, mother notes that Kimberly and Crystal were strongly bonded to her. And finally, mother argues that both the trial court and DCFS minimized mothers "enormous progress" in completing court ordered programs and correcting problems.
The trial court took a different view of the evidence. The court found that the most significant factor in both removals — mothers relationships with abusive men — had not changed. Mother was not living with her current abusive boyfriend at the time of the section 388 hearing, but the girls would not be shielded from frequent contact with him. Such contact would be inevitable as he remained mothers boyfriend, supporter, and the father of her most recent child. The trial court determined that placing the girls in mothers home under these circumstances would not serve their best interests.
While mother correctly points out that both Kimberly and Crystal had expressed a desire to return to mothers care, mother overlooks evidence that the girls showed signs of highly conflicting feelings on the subject. All of the children, including Kimberly and Crystal, expressed fondness for their foster parents and an understanding that their foster parents could fulfill their needs better than their mother could. As the girls therapist explained, "while the children welcome the stability which the guardianship offers them, they express — each in their own way — emotional conflict over this issue, since they interpret their desire to become members of the [foster parents] family as an act of disloyalty to their mother."
In addition, neither Kimberly nor Crystal had ever met mothers boyfriend, nor were they aware that mother was about to have a new baby. Kimberly specifically stated that she did not like mothers boyfriends and was upset when mother tried to bring two of her other boyfriends to visit on separate occasions. Both the girls therapist and their social worker noted that Kimberly appeared to be parentified and worried that she would have to care for Victor, Jr. and the new baby that mother was expecting.
In sum, mother had not ameliorated the problem which led to Kimberly and Crystals removal from her care. Her children had been removed twice due to the threat of violence from her boyfriends. She changed boyfriends several times throughout the proceeding, and took some of them to visits against DCFS orders. She was currently involved with a man whose child she was due to have and who had reportedly abused her in the past. We therefore find that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a return to this "chaotic" environment, where they "[wouldnt] even know what to expect," was not in the best interests of Kimberly and Crystal.
II. The trial court did not err in ordering monthly monitored visits
Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing her only monthly monitored visits with all six children. Mother further contends that the visitation orders were unconstitutional in that they denied mother any meaningful opportunity to raise the "parent-child bond" exception to adoption in the future.
A. Jurisdiction over the visitation order as to Marlene, Brenda, Naomi, and James
We first address DCFSs contention that we lack jurisdiction to hear mothers appeal of the trial courts visitation order as to the four younger children. Mothers notice of appeal indicated that she intended to appeal the denial of her section 388 petition, but specified the date of March 10, 2006 as the date of the relevant orders. The orders that the trial court issued on March 10, 2006 related to Kimberly and Crystal only. DCFS argues that because the visitation order as to Marlene, Brenda, Naomi, and James was made on March 9, 2006, it is outside of the scope of this appeal. Quoting Soldate v. Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1073, DCFS argues that "`[o]ur jurisdiction on appeal is limited in scope to the notice of appeal and the judgment or order appealed from. [Citation]."
DCFS concedes that California Rules of Court, rule 1(a)(2) (hereafter rule 1(a)(2)) provides that a notice of appeal must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. However, DCFS cites case law indicating that rule 1(a)(2) does not apply where there is an unambiguous intention to appeal from only one of two separately appealable judgments or orders. (Norman I. Krug Real Estate Investments, Inc. v. Praszker (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 35, 47.)
Mothers notice of appeal was sufficiently ambiguous to allow us to invoke rule 1(a)(2)s policy of liberal construction. While the notice of appeal does specify the "Orders of March 10, 2006," it also indicates mothers intention to appeal the trial courts denial of her "W.I.C. 388 Petition." The hearing on that petition, which involved all six children, spanned several court dates, including March 9, 2006. We therefore construe mothers notice of appeal to include the orders resulting from the denial of her section 388 petition that were issued on March 9, 2006, and we address the merits of mothers contentions regarding the trial courts visitation orders as to all six children.
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering monthly monitored visits
Mother contends that the trial court unreasonably held that expanded visits were not in the best interests of the children, erroneously assuming that visits with mother, not the absence thereof, caused the children to behave badly. Further, mother contends that the distance between mothers residence and that of the foster parents was the only factor which led the childrens social worker to recommend limiting visitation to once per month.
Our review of the record reveals that the trial court considered many factors in deciding on the visitation schedules for the six children. One of the factors was preservation of the childrens placement with their foster family. The court expressed the opinion that the children were fortunate to have a foster family willing to provide for all six children. As counsel for the three older children expressed, the foster family had "really gone the extra mile" to provide support and stability to all of the children. The burden of having to take them for numerous visits, in addition to the other services that the foster family was facilitating, would be too disruptive. While mother portrays this as a decision based on the distance between the two residences, it was in fact a decision designed to promote the interests of the children in preserving the beneficial placement where the children were stabilizing.
The logistics of carrying out the visitations with mother was not the only factor which led to the courts decision to order monthly monitored visits. DCFS pointed to the childrens therapists recommendation that visits with mother be limited to once per month, with a suggestion of an exchange of letters in between, because "[t]hese children have been harmed emotionally by a multitude of stressors and traumatic experience and will need long-term therapy to resolve the issues regarding distrust, insincerity, conflicts, chronic anxiety, flashbacks, low self-esteem and peer relationship." The court also took issue with mothers position that their desire to be with her caused them to act out. While it was agreed that the children tended to act out after visits with their mother, the parties took opposing views as to the reasons for such behavior. DCFS argued, "The acting out is not because these children want to be with the parent. The acting out occurs because when theyre with the parent, the emotions come out, again. And when they get back to that place where they lived for 2 years where theyve been stable, where theyve gotten what they needed in terms of whatever comfort can be given to them, they test it." The trial court indicated its belief that DCFSs position was correct. Further, the court noted its concern that the mother had previously during an unmonitored visit made the children write false allegations of abuse against the foster parents.
Based on all of the factors above, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering monitored monthly visits. In addition, we note that the court ordered DCFS to prepare a review report addressing the childrens visitation with mother, and indicated that the court was willing to increase visitation if the visits were successful.
C. The visitation orders were not unconstitutional
Mothers final argument is that the visitation orders were unconstitutional in that they denied her a meaningful opportunity to raise the "parent-child bond" exception to adoption in the future.
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) provides an exception to termination of parental rights when "[t]he parents or guardians have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." Mothers contention of unconstitutionality anticipates that at some point in the future, one or more of her children may be the subject of a section 366.26 hearing at which it is contemplated that the child or children may be adopted and her parental rights terminated. To establish the exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), the parent must show that the parent has regularly visited the child and that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 307.)
The cases mother cites do not support her position that the trial courts order of monthly monitored visits unconstitutionally limits her contact with the children. Mother cites In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 49 for the proposition that visitation rights arise from the very fact of parenthood and the constitutionally protected rights to marry, establish a home and bring up children. However, Julie M. is factually inapplicable. In it, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, determined that the trial court abused its discretion in giving the subject children absolute discretion in deciding whether their mother could visit with them. (Id. at pp. 48-49.) The court held that "the ultimate supervision and control over [visitation] must remain with the court," which must balance the competing concerns regarding the rights of the parent and the needs of the children. (Id. at p. 51.) We note that in so holding, the court emphasized that "a parents liberty interest in the care, custody and companionship of children cannot be maintained at the expense of their well-being. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 50.)
In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 298-299 also fails to bolster mothers constitutional argument. In Monica C., the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reversed a judgment terminating parental rights because reasonable reunification services had not been provided to mother, who was incarcerated during the relevant review period. The mother in Monica C. had not been provided with a plan for continuing visitation. (Id. at p. 306.) In this case, mother can make no such claim. We disagree with her argument that her visitation order is "tantamount to no visitation." She has been provided with a plan allowing for monthly monitored visits and an opportunity to increase those visits if they are successful. Thus, she has not been denied her right to visitation.
In re Brittany S. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1399, and In re Precious J. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1463, also cited by mother in support of her constitutional argument, presented the same situation: an incarcerated parent who was not provided with visitation prior to termination of parental rights.
Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering monthly monitored visits, and because the order was not unconstitutional, we affirm the trial courts visitation orders as to all six children.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
We Concur:
BOREN, P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.