In re K.G.S.

7 Citing cases

  1. Mathis v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs.

    No. 04-22-00123-CV (Tex. App. Oct. 12, 2022)   Cited 1 times

    The Department is a Texas state agency, and, as a state agency, it is entitled to sovereign immunity unless it has been waived. See Brice v. Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 14-20-00506-CV, 2022 WL 1310876, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 3, 2022, no pet.); In re K.G.S., No. 14-12-00673-CV, 2014 WL 801127, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 2014, no pet.); In re R.L., 353 S.W.3d 524, 527-28 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.); Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Atwood, 176 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 58.0051(a)(2)(C) (defining "juvenile service provider" as a governmental entity, specifying the term includes the Department of Family and Protective Services).

  2. Motheral v. Black

    No. 03-21-00671-CV (Tex. App. May. 6, 2022)   Cited 2 times

    See In re K.G.S, No. 14-12-00673-CV, 2014 WL 801127, at *9 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.)

  3. Brice v. The Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs.

    No. 14-20-00506-CV (Tex. App. May. 3, 2022)   Cited 3 times

    Because the Department is an agency of the State of Texas, the Department generally enjoys sovereign immunity. See In re K.G.S, No. 14-12-00673-CV, 2014 WL 801127, at *5, *9 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] Feb. 27, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.). Sovereign immunity has two components: immunity from liability and immunity from suit.

  4. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Center-El Paso v. Bustillos

    556 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. App. 2018)   Cited 6 times   1 Legal Analyses

    SeeTex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu , 233 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. 2007) ("It is up to the Legislature to institute such a waiver, and to date it has not seen fit to do so."); Cannon , 383 S.W.3d at 575 ; In re K.G.S., No. 14-12-00673-CV, 2014 WL 801127, at *5 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.)(recognizing that Texas has not legislatively waived its sovereign immunity for § 1983 claims). Accordingly, the State of Texas and any arms of the State are not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court.

  5. Tex. Dep't of Ins. v. Green

    NO. 01-15-00321-CV (Tex. App. May. 10, 2016)   Cited 5 times
    Finding no waiver of immunity for UDJA suit by workers' compensation claimant against Division regarding interpretation and application of TWCA

    When a government agency joins the lawsuit but does not seek "its own affirmative claims for monetary relief," it does not waive immunity. See City of Dallas v. Jill Herz, P.C., 363 S.W.3d 896, 900-01 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (holding that City's intervention did not waive immunity because City did not assert affirmative claims for monetary relief); In re K.G.S., No. 14-12-00673-CV, 2014 WL 801127, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that agency's intervention in suit did not waive sovereign immunity because agency did not request monetary relief). The Division's "sole purpose" in intervening in this lawsuit was to "assert that the [trial court] does not have jurisdiction to sign Green's proposed final judgment because Green improperly sought to resolve her suit for judicial review of a Division decision by seeking declaratory relief . . . ."

  6. Tex. Dep't of Ins. v. Green

    NO. 01-15-00321-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 22, 2015)

    When a government agency joins the lawsuit but does not seek "its own affirmative claims for monetary relief," it does not waive immunity. See City of Dallas v. Jill Herz, P.C., 363 S.W.3d 896, 900-01 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (holding that City's intervention did not waive immunity because City did not assert affirmative claims for monetary relief); In re K.G.S., No. 14-12-00673-CV, 2014 WL 801127, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that agency's intervention in suit did not waive sovereign immunity because agency did not request monetary relief). The Division's "sole purpose" in intervening in this lawsuit was to "assert that the [trial court] does not have jurisdiction to sign Green's proposed final judgment because Green improperly sought to resolve her suit for judicial review of a Division decision by seeking declaratory relief . . . ."

  7. Min v. H & S Crane Sales, Inc.

    472 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. App. 2015)   Cited 7 times

    Min's argument is flawed because the trial court's amended final judgment was reversed by this Court on the ground that it incorrectly awarded money to H & S's attorneys, the Hodge Law Firm and Charles Kaufman, who were not parties to the lawsuit. H & S Crane Sales, Inc., 2013 WL 5306101, at *3–4; seeIn re K.G.S., No. 14–12–00673–CV, 2014 WL 801127, at *10 (Tex.App.—Houston 14th Dist. Feb. 27, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem.op.) (“Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, decisions rendered in former appeals are generally binding in a later appeal of the same case.”). A reversed judgment is ineffective and unenforceable.