Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 01JVSQ2359401
DUARTE, J.
Appellant, mother of the minor, appeals from the order of the juvenile court summarily denying her modification petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 388, 395.) Mother contends the court erred when it summarily denied the petition on the date set for hearing. Because we hold that any error was harmless, we affirm.
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The year-old minor was removed from parental care in October 2001 due to mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues and was placed with the maternal grandmother. The grandmother was concerned about mother’s instability and violent behavior toward her in the minor’s presence. Mother also accused the grandmother of molesting the minor. Nonetheless, both parents decided they wanted the grandmother to be the minor’s legal guardian and waived reunification services. At the disposition hearing in February 2002, the court ordered guardianship with the grandmother as the minor’s plan.
In August 2002, mother filed a modification petition, seeking to modify the guardianship order, claiming the grandmother had not returned the minor to mother as promised and was cruel and abusive. A mediation report in October 2002 stated mother was uncooperative and obsessed with the possible molestation of the minor by the grandmother. The report further stated mother had no rational basis to believe that any molestation had occurred and mother had demonstrated fixed delusions and poor insight. The court denied the modification petition, finding no evidence that the changes sought were in the minor’s best interests.
In August 2003, mother filed another modification petition, claiming she had participated in services and reiterating her belief that the grandmother was molesting the minor. Again, there was a report which concluded the allegations of molest were not based in fact and the minor was doing well in the grandmother’s care. The court denied the second modification petition.
In October 2009, mother, in propria persona, filed a third modification petition, seeking either to terminate the guardianship and return custody of the minor to mother, or to establish a specific visitation schedule between mother and the minor. Mother claimed changed circumstances in that she had completed substance abuse treatment and other services and had been clean and sober for 21 months. Mother further alleged the proposed modification was in the minor’s best interests because the minor had reported to mother that she was being sexually molested, mother had observed sexual abuse of the minor by the guardian, and the minor was acting out sexually. Various letters and certificates were attached in support of the claimed changed circumstances but no evidence supported that the modification sought would be in the minor’s best interests.
The juvenile court ordered a hearing on the modification petition, checking a form box containing a finding that the “best interest of the child may be promoted by the request.” The court reinstated dependency and appointed counsel for mother. The hearing was continued twice at the request of mother’s appointed counsel and once at the request of County Counsel.
On March 18, 2010, the Shasta County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) filed a response to the modification petition in the form of a report detailing the history of the case and the previous investigations of mother’s multiple claims (all unfounded) that the grandmother was molesting the minor. The social worker met with mother who said that she wanted visitation with the minor to determine what sexual abuse has been inflicted on the minor. The response recommended denial of the modification petition, noting that mother’s obsession with unfounded allegations of molestation would have a negative impact on the minor during visits, and the minor was doing well in the guardianship.
In June 2010, the hearing was held. At the hearing, the juvenile court signaled that it intended to deny the modification petition. Mother was not present at the hearing and the matter was continued.
We note that although the court orally signaled its inclination to deny the petition, its minute order more precisely expresses this obvious inclination. However, mother’s counsel came to the September 2010 appearance prepared for a “full hearing.” Counsel proffered the evidence he was prepared to present on mother’s behalf, including calling mother as a witness. He then submitted on the issue of whether there had been a prima facie showing of best interests.
Mother was present at the September 2010 hearing. After argument by both counsel and a proffer of available evidence from mother’s counsel, the juvenile court concluded the modification petition did not contain the required prima facie showing and should have been denied outright. The court denied the modification petition, orally finding no change in circumstances and issuing a written order finding neither changed circumstances nor a showing that the proposed order was in the minor’s best interests.
DISCUSSION
I
The Law
Section 388 permits any parent to file a modification petition related to any order of the juvenile court based on new evidence or a showing of changed circumstances. To establish the right to an evidentiary hearing, the modification petition must include facts constituting a prima facie showing 1) of changed circumstances; and 2) that “the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change in order.” (In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 672-673; In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806; In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d).) More than general conclusory allegations are required to make this showing even when the modification petition is liberally construed. (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) “The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence... would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.” (In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.) “In determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case.” (In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258.)
Section 388 provides, in part: “Any parent... may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court... for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.... [¶] [¶] If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order, recognition of a sibling relationship, termination of jurisdiction, or clear and convincing evidence supports revocation or termination of court-ordered reunification services, the court shall order that hearing be held....” (§ 388, subds. (a), (d).)
A court may, on its own motion, reconsider a prior order and thereby correct its own errors. (Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 110, 116 (Nickolas F.) It is of no consequence how the information that triggers the reconsideration comes before the court. (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108.) If the court does conclude it is necessary to reconsider a prior ruling, the parties should be given an opportunity to be heard on the matter. (Ibid.; Nickolas F., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 117.)
II
The Court’s Denial of an Evidentiary Hearing
Here, the juvenile court initially determined that the pleading was sufficient to justify a hearing by order filed on October 29, 2009. It later indicated (orally at the June 2010 hearing and in the subsequent minute order) that it intended to deny the modification petition for failure to state a prima facie case. At the September 2010 hearing, the parties addressed and argued the question of summary denial and the court ultimately determined that the petition failed to make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances or best interests of the minor.
Precisely what triggered the juvenile court’s reconsideration of its order setting a hearing on the petition is of no import. The juvenile court was permitted to reconsider its prior ruling granting a hearing. It properly allowed the parties to address the question under consideration before issuing a final order.
However, the record clearly shows that the Agency’s evidence in support of its position opposing the modification petition was considered by the juvenile court in March 2010--prior to the June hearing. Mother proffered evidence at the September hearing, but the court refused to consider it. The juvenile court’s prior consideration of the evidence submitted by the Agency combined with its subsequent refusal to hear evidence proffered by mother was error.
Under the circumstances of this case, however, the error in the procedure for reconsideration was harmless whether analyzed under the Watson (reasonably probable a more favorable result would have been reached in the absence of the error) or the Chapman standard (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.) (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705].)
Even assuming that the juvenile court fully considered the Agency’s March 2010 report, the report contained little to no new information that was unfavorable to mother. The report contained information from mother regarding her self-improvement, as well as her continued assertions that the minor was being molested. It also contained the Agency’s conclusion that mother remained obsessed with the idea that the minor was being molested, and that the minor was doing well with her grandmother. But this negative information (as to mother) had also been revealed to the court in numerous past proceedings.
The record is unclear as to whether the court even considered the evidence contained in the report in connection with its summary denial of the modification petition.
Even more importantly, when the report is removed from consideration, construing the modification petition liberally in light of the history of the case, as well as mother’s proffered testimony and evidence, mother did not allege facts that suggested any current molestation of the minor by the grandmother or any other circumstances that had changed with respect to the minor’s best interests in the six years since mother’s most recent petition. Indeed, the allegations of molestation in the current petition closely resembled prior statements by mother which were fully investigated and found baseless. Moreover, mother did not suggest at either the June 2010 or the September 2010 hearing that there was any evidence that it was in the minor’s best interest to disturb the stability of the minor’s eight-year guardianship placement by returning the minor to mother’s custody or mandating additional visits. At most, mother offered evidence to show she and the minor had an ongoing relationship.
Mother’s primary focus was instead on evidence of changed circumstances. Even assuming for the sake of argument that mother established changed circumstances, absent a showing of best interests, a hearing on the petition was not justified. Mother cannot show she was prejudiced in any way by the juvenile court’s error in the process of reconsidering its ruling.
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., BUTZ, J.