Opinion
2019–10981 Docket No. D–8312–19
11-18-2020
In the MATTER OF KEVIN A.H. (Anonymous), appellant.
Laurette D. Mulry, Central Islip, N.Y. (Steven Flaumenhaft and John B. Belmonte of counsel), for appellant. Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Edward A. Bannan of counsel), for respondent.
Laurette D. Mulry, Central Islip, N.Y. (Steven Flaumenhaft and John B. Belmonte of counsel), for appellant.
Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Edward A. Bannan of counsel), for respondent.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, HECTOR D. LASALLE, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, Kevin A.H. appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Frank A. Tantone, J.), dated September 3, 2019. The order, after a hearing, found that Kevin A.H. committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of sexual abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child, adjudicated him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for placement in a non-secure facility until May 31, 2020. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Frank A. Tantone, J.), of that branch of Kevin A. H.'s motion which was to suppress his statements overheard by law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as placed Kevin A.H. in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for placement in a non-secure facility until May 31, 2020, is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.
The appeal from so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as placed the appellant in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for placement in a non-secure facility until May 31, 2020, has been rendered academic, as the period of placement has expired (see Matter of Stanley F., 76 A.D.3d 1067, 1068, 907 N.Y.S.2d 882 ). However, because there may be collateral consequences resulting from the adjudication of delinquency, the appeal from so much of the order of fact-finding and disposition as adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent has not been rendered academic (see Family Ct Act § 783 ; Matter of Dorothy D., 49 N.Y.2d 212, 424 N.Y.S.2d 890, 400 N.E.2d 1342 ; Matter of Stanley F., 76 A.D.3d at 1068, 907 N.Y.S.2d 882 ).
After a fact-finding hearing, the Family Court found that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of sexual abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child.
The appellant's contention that the incriminating statement he made to his mother which was overheard by the police should have been suppressed as the product of custodial interrogation for which he did not receive Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ) is without merit. Under the circumstances presented, the appellant's statement was noncustodial and not made in response to police interrogation (see generally Matter of Kwok T., 43 N.Y.2d 213, 219, 401 N.Y.S.2d 52, 371 N.E.2d 814 ). Thus, contrary to the appellant's contention, his incriminating statement was not the product of any failure to advise him of his Miranda rights, or any violation of Family Court Act § 305.2 (see Matter of Jimmy D., 15 N.Y.3d 417, 421–423, 912 N.Y.S.2d 537, 938 N.E.2d 970 ). Accordingly, we agree with the Family Court's determination denying suppression of the appellant's statement.
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.
CHAMBERS, J.P., COHEN, LASALLE and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.