the testator must have sufficient mind and memory to understand the transaction in which he is then engaged, to comprehend generally the nature and extent of the property which constitutes his estate and of which he is contemplating disposition, and to recollect the objects of his bounty.In re Estate of Kessler, 35 Wn.2d 156, 160, 211 P.2d 496 (1949); In re Estate of Wiltzius, 42 Wn.2d 149, 151, 253 P.2d 954 (1953). "`Failure of memory is not alone enough to create testamentary incapacity, unless it extends so far as to be inconsistent with the `sound and disposing mind and memory' requisite for all wills.'" While testamentary capacity is determined as of the time the will is made, evidence related to the testator's mental condition during a reasonable time before and after the making of the will is relevant and admissible even if remoteness affects its weight. Courts have held, however, that a radical departure from a prior testamentary scheme supports an inference that the later will is the product of an unsound mind.

[10] A judgment, although based upon an erroneous ground, will nevertheless be sustained if correct upon any ground. In re Kessler's Estate, 35 Wn.2d 156, 211 P.2d 496; In re Bodvin's Estate, 37 Wn.2d 872, 226 P.2d 878; Senior Citizens League v. Department of Social Security, 38 Wn.2d 142, 228 P.2d 478. To summarize, we hold that respondent Grace Melville had a valid title to the Seattle property and to the Gold Bar property and the trial court properly dismissed appellant's action as to them.

[1] The rules of law applicable to these issues, and the requirement that the contestant sustain the burden of proof by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, have been set forth in many of our cases. In re Kessler's Estate, 35 Wn.2d 156, 160, 211 P.2d 496 (1949); In re Soderstran's Estate, 35 Wn.2d 448, 460, 213 P.2d 949 (1950), and cases cited. [2] Each of these cases depends upon its own facts.

This rule, however, must not be confused with the one that, in cases triable de novo, if the decision of the trial court can soundly rest on any ground it must be sustained. State ex rel. Spokane etc. Branch v. Justice Court, 189 Wn. 87, 63 P.2d 937; In re Kessler's Estate, 35 Wn.2d 156, 211 P.2d 496. However, in view of the new trial that is being awarded, we deem it proper to say that we are in entire accord with the view taken by the court.

Our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that the testator at the time he made his will was possessed of sufficient mind and memory to know and understand he was making his will, to know and comprehend the nature and extent of his property of which he contemplated disposing, and to recall his three children, who were the natural objects of his bounty. These are the tests prescribed in the case of In re Kessler's Estate, 35 Wn.2d 156, 211 P.2d 496, and the cases cited in that opinion. Although a testator meets these tests, he may, nevertheless, be laboring under one or more insane delusions which may have the effect of making his will a nullity.

We have adopted the rule that, even though a judgment of a trial court is based upon a theory which an appellate court may deem erroneous, if on a trial de novo the judgment can be sustained on any ground it will be affirmed. State ex rel. Spokane Eastern Branch, etc. v. Justice Court, 189 Wn. 87, 63 P.2d 937; Jones v. Standard Sales, Inc., 34 Wn.2d 546, 209 P.2d 446; In re Kessler's Estate, ante p. 156, 211 P.2d 496. The judgment is affirmed.

In the course of the opinion, we called attention to the fact that such a case, on appeal to this court, is considered de novo. In the recent case of In re Kessler's Estate, ante p. 156, 211 P.2d 496, George D. Anderson, as guardian of the person and estate of Mary A. Kessler, the daughter of the testatrix, brought an action against Delia F. Whatmore, as executrix of the estate of Rosa Kessler, asking that Mrs. Kessler's will be declared void because of her mental incompetency at the time the will was made, and because of undue influence exerted upon the testatrix to make the will in favor of Delia F. Whatmore. The trial court entered a decree declaring the will void because of the mental incompetency of the testatrix, making no finding upon the question of whether or not the will was executed pursuant to undue influence. This court, while of the opinion that the evidence did not afford a sufficient basis for holding that, at the time of the execution of the will, the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity, held that, from the record, it appeared that the will was executed in favor of the executrix by reason of undue influence exerted to that end, and affirmed the order of the tri