In re Estate of Sweeney, 210 Kan. 216, 500 P.2d 56, 67 (1972); Bailey v. Bailey, 86 Nev. 483, 471 P.2d 220, 223 (1970); Streight v. Estate of Streight, 226 Or. 386, 360 P.2d 304, 306 (1961).In re Estate of Sweeney, see note 3, 500 P.2d at 66, supra; Bailey v. Bailey, see note 3, 471 P.2d at 222; In re Estate of Fessman, 386 Pa. 447, 126 A.2d 676, 678 (1956); In re Estate of Kerby, 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814, 818 (1961).Rambo v. Hicks, 733 P.2d 405 (Okla.

We are not directed to such a concession in the record but accept the fact as correct since such an issue has not been presented in this appeal. This finding is in keeping with this Court's holding in Smith v. Phelps, 218 Tenn. 369, 403 S.W.2d 747, 749 (1966). See also T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(1), (2); and the teachings of In re Kerby's Estate, 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814 (1961). To the extent that the finding of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals concur, they shall be conclusive upon this Court if there be any evidence to support them. City of Columbia v. C.F.W. Construction Co., 557 S.W.2d 734 (Tenn.

While there is a sharp conflict of judicial authority on the question, many courts of last resort hold that, absent a contractual obligation binding the father to make payments for the support of his minor children after his death, courts are without power to make the support order a charge against his estate. ( Streight v. Streight, 226 Or. 386, 360 P.2d 304; Cooper v. Estate of Cooper, 350 Ill. App. 37, 111 N.E.2d 564; Byrne v. Byrne, 201 Misc. 913, 112 N.Y.S.2d 569; Fessman Estate, 386 Pa. 447, 126 A.2d 676; Bailey v. Bailey, 86 Nev. 483, 471 P.2d 220; Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731; Kruvant v. Kruvant, 100 N.J. Super. 107, 241 A.2d 259; In Re Kerby's Estate, 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814; Wiedrich v. Wiedrich [N.D.], 179 N.W.2d 728. Anno: 18 A.L.R.2d 1100; 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 856, p. 971; 27B C.J.S., Divorce, § 323f. p. 729.) We are of the opinion that a separation agreement entered into between parents of minor children in a divorce action pursuant to K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 60-1610 ( d), which expressly contains language binding the father's estate to make child support payments after his death, may constitute a valid claim against his estate.

* * *" Other cases holding that the death of the parent, who has been ordered to make payments for child support, terminates the order with respect to payments accruing after death, are as follows: Guinta v. Lo Re, 159 Fla. 448, 31 So.2d 704; Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731, 18 A.L.R.2d 1100; Bowling v. Robinson, Ky., 332 S.W.2d 285; Sandlin's Adm'x v. Allen, 262 Ky. 355, 90 S.W.2d 350; Mahaffey v. First National Bank, 231 Miss. 798, 97 So.2d 756, 767; In re Kerby's Estate, 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814; In re Moore's Estate, 34 Tenn. App. 131, 234 S.W.2d 847, 853 et seq.; Flagler v. Flagler, Fla., 94 So.2d 592; and Cooper v. Cooper's Estate, 350 Ill. App. 37, 111 N.E.2d 564. The case of Edelman v. Edelman, 65 Wyo. 271, 295, 199 P.2d 840, concludes that the child support payments should survive and be charged to the father's estate.

The general rule in this State is a decree providing for monthly payments of alimony are abated or terminated upon the death of the husband in the absence of some stipulation in the order which would require payments after death. Brandon v. Brandon, 175 Tenn. 463, 135 S.W.2d 929 (1940); In Re Kerby's Estate, 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814 (1961); In Re Moore's Estate, 34 Tenn. App. 131, 234 S.W.2d 847 (1949). In the case of In Re Kerby's Estate, supra, an opinion written by Judge Humphreys, certiorari denied by this Court, it was said:

The position of Claimants is intriguing. It is true that the process issuing from the Circuit Court of Davidson County on November 7, 2001, and, in fact, served upon the Claims Commission on that same date, provided notice of the facts in the Complaint and notice that a claim was being filed, albeit in a court not competent to adjudicate any issue. This same situation, however, was true in both Brown v. State and Locust v. State, though neither opinion indicates an assertion that such notice was sufficient under Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(a). If, however, Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402(a) and (b) or section 9-8-307(i)(1) are to be stretched in the face of the strict construction rule of Brown v. State, such must be accomplished by higher authority than this intermediate appellate court. In re: Kerby's Estate, 354 S.W.2d 814 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1961). The judgment of the Claims Commission is affirmed, and the case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary.

See also: Edwards v. Edwards, 713 S.W.2d 642 (Tenn. 1986) cert. denied 479 U.S. 1024, 107 S.Ct. 863, 93 L.Ed.2d 819 (1987); Smith v. Phelps, supra; In re Kerby's Estate, 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814 (1961); In re Moore's Estate, 34 Tenn. App. 131, 234 S.W.2d 847 (1949). In Bringhurst, this Court found that where a settlement agreement provides for payments "during her life" or "until her death or remarriage", such language could be interpreted as evidence of intent that obligation survive the death of the obligor.

The general rule in this state is that monthly payments of alimony provided for in a decree are abated or terminated upon the death of the husband in the absence of some stipulation in the order which would require payments after death. Smith v. Phelps (1966) 218 Tenn. 369, 403 S.W.2d 747; Brandon v. Brandon (1940) 175 Tenn. 463, 135 S.W.2d 929; In re Estate of Kerby (1961 M.S.) 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814; In re Moore's Estate (1949 W.S.) 34 Tenn. App. 131, 234 S.W.2d 847. A husband may bind his estate by agreement for alimony payments after his death.

See Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1126 (1951). Cases holding that the death of the parent who has been ordered to make payments for child support terminates the order with respect to payments accruing after death are: Whitman v. Whitman, 430 P.2d 802 (Okla. 1967); Layton v. Layton, 263 N.C. 453, 139 S.E.2d 732 (1965); Rauser v. Rauser, 47 Wis.2d 295, 177 N.W.2d 115 (1970); Riley v. Riley, 131 So.2d 491 (Fla.App. 1961); Cooper v. Cooper's Estate, 350 Ill. App. 37, 111 N.E.2d 564 (1953); Bowling v. Robinson, 332 S.W.2d 285 (Ky.App. 1960); Lewis v. Lewis, 239 Miss. 728, 125 So.2d 286 (1960); Byrne v. Byrne, 201 Misc. 913, 112 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1952); Streight v. Streight's Estate, 226 Or. 386, 360 P.2d 304 (1961); In re Kerby's Estate, 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814 (1961); Scudder v. Scudder, 55 Wn.2d 454, 348 P.2d 225 (1960); Bailey v. Bailey, 86 Nev. 483, 471 P.2d 220 (1970). Some courts recognize survival of payment provisions where the support payments are represented by contract and the divorce decree recognizes the existence of the agreement and pronounces judgment thereon.

Law as previously declared by the Supreme Court or enacted by the Legislature may be changed only by the Supreme Court or Legislature, and not by the Court of Appeals. In re Kerby's Estate, 49 Tenn. App. 329, 354 S.W.2d 814 (1961). Furthermore, to sustain plaintiff's contention, it would be necessary to overrule the recent pronouncements of this Court in Frazor v. Osborne, 57 Tenn. App. 10, 414 S.W.2d 118 (1966) and Hall v. De Saussure, 41 Tenn. App. 572, 297 S.W.2d 81 (1956).