In re Food Barn Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 558, 564 (8th Cir. 1997); Matter of Chung King, Inc., 753 F.2d 547, 550 (7th Cir. 1985); see generally Smith v. Juhan, 311 F.2d 670, 672 (10th Cir. 1962); In re Stanley Engineering Corp., 164 F.2d 316, 318-319 (3rd Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847, 68 S.Ct. 351, 92 L.Ed. 417 (1948); Raleigh C.R. Co. v. Baltimore Nat. Bank, 41 F.Supp. 599, 601 (D.C.S.C. 1941); Bankers Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. House, 182 A.D.2d 602, 581 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y.A.D. 1992); Investors Sav. Bank v. Phelps, 303 S.C. 15, 397 S.E.2d 780 (S.C.App. 1990). Courts generally compare the proposed sale price against the appraised value of the property to determine the reasonableness of the winning bid. In re Stanley Engineering Corporation, 164 F.2d 316, 318-319 (3rd Cir. 1947); see also Smith v. Juhan, 311 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1962); In re Blue Coal Corp., 168 B.R. 553, 564-565 (Bankr. M.D.Pa. 1994); In re Kendall Foods Corp., 122 B.R. 792 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1990). At the hearing, the parties introduced the deposition of the expert testimony of appraiser Larry D. Clark ("Clark"). Clark is a State Certified General Appraiser with more than 30 years of experience, particularly in the area of industrial appraisal.
Moreover, the difference in price between its first and second bids is readily explained by the need for the trustee to cure defaults in the leasehold before the lessors of the Terminal Road property would consent to the transfer of the property and by the need to adjust the sale price to reflect the shortened lease term. Cf. In re Kendall Foods Corp., 122 B.R. 792, 793 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1990) (substantially larger bid made after close of bidding without any change in conditions of sale supported inference that winning bid was grossly inadequate). For these reasons, we affirm the authorization of the sale of the leasehold interest in the Terminal Road property to American Freightways, Inc.
In addition, Appellants contend the amended notice mailed on September 4, 1998, setting a September 17, 1998 hearing date, failed to provide the requisite 20-day notice mandated by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2002(a)(2). For their first point, Appellants cite In re Kendall Foods Corp. 122 B.R. 792 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1990) for the proposition that a 35% difference between an original and a subsequent bid is persuasive evidence that the lower initial bid was grossly inadequate. In re Kendall Foods Corp. is unpersuasive because it is factually distinguishable.