In 1945 the Legislature enacted Penal Code provisions for the establishment of a state correctional facility called "California Vocational Institution" and in 1951 adopted amendments changing its name to Deuel Vocational Institution. (Stats. 1945, ch. 1454; Stats. 1951, ch. 1663; see In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921].) These provisions were section 2035 et seq., comprising article 4, chapter 1, title 1, part 3, of the Penal Code.
) IT IS ALSO RELEVANT THAT A STATUTE CONTAINING LANGUAGE SIMILAR TO THAT FOUND IN SECTION 667.5, FORMER PENAL CODE SECTION 644, WAS REPEATEDLY. HELD INAPPLICABLE TO CYA COMMITMENTS. (PEOPLE V. LOCKWOOD 1956) 146 Cal. App. 2d 189, 192 [ 303 P.2d 621]; IN RE KELLER (1965) 232 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 921]; PEOPLE V. WILKINS (1967) 251 Cal. App. 2d 823, 829 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 49]; 17 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 34 IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THE LEGISLATURE KWEN, WHEN IT SIMULTANEOUSLY ENACTED SECTION 667.5 AND REPEALED SECTION 644, THAT A CYA COMMITMENT HAD BEEN HELD NOT TO CONSTITUTE A PRISON TERM FOR PURPOSES OF THE LATTER STATUTE. THE REHABILITATION, AND REFORMATORY EDUCATIONAL DISCIPLINE OR OTHER TREATMENT, AS APPEARS FROM THE LEGISLATIVE DECLARATION OF POLICY, IS TO BE CARRIED OUT FOR NONPUNISHMENT AND NONPUNITIVE PURPOSES. IT IS THE POLICY OF THIS STATE TO CONSTRUE A WELFARE INSTITUTION CODE AS FAVORABLY TO THE DEFENDANT AS ITS LANGUAGE AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ITS APPLICATION MAY REASONABLY PERMIT; JUST AS IN THIS CASE OF A QUESTION OF FACT, THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLE TO THE BENEFITS OF EVERY REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE TRUE INTERRETATION OF WORDS OR THE CONSTRUTION OF LANGUAGE USED IN A STATUTE.
(See, e.g., In re Branch (1969) 70 Cal.2d 200, 215-217 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 238, 449 P.2d 174]; In re Keller (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 525 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Scherbing (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 736, 740-741 [ 209 P.2d 796].) Furthermore, the Authority may continue to hold a misdemeanant until he is 23 years old (Welf.
As the appellate court there explained (227 Cal.App.2d at p. 756) that procedure reasonably reconciles the policies involved in applying section 654 to protect the rights of both the state and the defendant. Accord: People v. Jones (1962) 211 Cal.App.2d 63, 74 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 429]; People v. Frye (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 799, 803 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 699]; People v. Bynes (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 268, 272, 274 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 633]; People v. Rainey (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 93, 102 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 291]; People v. Bailey (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 440, 442, 443 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 718]; People v. Morrison (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 707, 715 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 874]; People v. Gay (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 102, 105 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 778]; People v. Buice (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 324, 347 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 877]; People v. Alvarado (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 789, 795 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 310]; In reKeller (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 523 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Nelson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 626]; People v. Sipult (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846]; In re Allen (1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 23, 25 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 345]; People v. Thomsen (1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 84, 97, 98 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 455]; People v. Davis (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 51, 56 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 215]; People v. Brumley (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 124, 131 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 131]; People v. Helms (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484]; People v. Remme (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 618, 621 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 665]. As to each petitioner the sentence for robbery of Bayliss is set aside.
At the time of the assault, he was "undergoing" that sentence, as he was "in" a state prison, both in the sense that he was physically there and in the sense that he was confined there by force of law. (See People v. Temple, 203 Cal.App.2d 654, 658 [4] [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 633] .) In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921], relied on by petitioner, is not applicable to the present case. Section 644 of the Penal Code provides that a person who has been convicted of certain enumerated felonies shall be adjudged a habitual criminal and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life if he has twice previously been convicted upon charges separately brought and tried and has served separate terms therefor in any state prison and/or federal penal institution.
It is also relevant that a statute containing language similar to that found in section 667.5, former Penal Code section 644, was repeatedly held inapplicable to CYA commitments.People v. Lockwood (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 189, 192 [ 303 P.2d 621]; In re Keller (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 526 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Wilkins (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 823, 829 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 49]; 17 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 34. It is reasonable to assume the Legislature knew, when it simultaneously enacted section 667.5 and repealed section 644, that a CYA commitment had been held not to constitute a prison term for purposes of the latter statute.
" ( In re Benny G., 24 Cal.App.3d 371, 375 fn. 3 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 28]. See also In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 525-526 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921].)
At the request of appellant's trial counsel and on the recommendation of the probation officer, the trial court, having found that appellant was 20 years of age at the time of apprehension for the crime, committed appellant to the Youth Authority on count I, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5 Appellant did not receive a sentence of imprisonment in the state prison. ( In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 526 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921].) Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5 reads: "After certification to the Governor as provided in this article a court may commit to the authority any person convicted of a public offense who comes within subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), or subdivisions (a), (b), and (d), below:
In cases of multiple convictions subject to the proscription against double punishment, the cases have usually stated that such punishment is avoided by eliminating the effect of the judgment as to the lesser offense. (See People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 762-763 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449]; People v. Hicks, 63 Cal.2d 764, 766 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 139, 408 P.2d 747]; In re Pratt, 66 Cal.2d 154, 156-157 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 895, 424 P.2d 335] [modified 5 Cal.3d 46 ( 95 Cal.Rptr. 11, 484 P.2d 1355)]; People v. Diaz, 66 Cal.2d 801, 807 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 729, 427 P.2d 505]; People v. Rosenberg, 212 Cal.App.2d 773, 777 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 214]; In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 523 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Brumley, 242 Cal.App.2d 124, 131 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 131]; People v. Johnson, 242 Cal.App.2d 870, 876 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 38]; People v. Root, 246 Cal.App.2d 600, 607 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 89]; People v. Moore, 249 Cal.App.2d 509, 514 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 449]; People v. Flores, 267 Cal.App.2d 452, 460 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 118]; People v. Solo, 8 Cal.App.3d 201, 208 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 829]; People v. Venegas, 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 821 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 103].) Section 654 of the Penal Code provides: "An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; . . ."
So long as defendant remains committed to the Youth Authority, our expressions made in People v. Wheeler, 271 Cal.App.2d 205 at page 209 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 842] warrant repetition. There, we said: "In California, commitment to the Youth Authority is not the equivalent of a sentence to state prison for punishment of a criminal conviction ( People v. Wilkens, 251 Cal.App.2d 823, 829 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 49]; In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Zaccaria, 216 Cal.App.2d 787 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 383].) Hence, Penal Code section 654, which says that `[a]n act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of the code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one, . . .' (italics added), does not apply where commitment is in accordance with the provisions of section 1731.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. [Footnote omitted.]