In re Keller

19 Citing cases

  1. People v. Romo

    256 Cal.App.2d 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 27 times
    Hearing in Supreme Court denied January 24, 1968

    In 1945 the Legislature enacted Penal Code provisions for the establishment of a state correctional facility called "California Vocational Institution" and in 1951 adopted amendments changing its name to Deuel Vocational Institution. (Stats. 1945, ch. 1454; Stats. 1951, ch. 1663; see In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921].) These provisions were section 2035 et seq., comprising article 4, chapter 1, title 1, part 3, of the Penal Code.

  2. Parks v. Chrones

    No. 1: 05-cv-00963 ALA HC (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2007)

    ) IT IS ALSO RELEVANT THAT A STATUTE CONTAINING LANGUAGE SIMILAR TO THAT FOUND IN SECTION 667.5, FORMER PENAL CODE SECTION 644, WAS REPEATEDLY. HELD INAPPLICABLE TO CYA COMMITMENTS. (PEOPLE V. LOCKWOOD 1956) 146 Cal. App. 2d 189, 192 [ 303 P.2d 621]; IN RE KELLER (1965) 232 Cal. App. 2d 520, 526 [ 42 Cal. Rptr. 921]; PEOPLE V. WILKINS (1967) 251 Cal. App. 2d 823, 829 [ 60 Cal. Rptr. 49]; 17 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 34 IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THE LEGISLATURE KWEN, WHEN IT SIMULTANEOUSLY ENACTED SECTION 667.5 AND REPEALED SECTION 644, THAT A CYA COMMITMENT HAD BEEN HELD NOT TO CONSTITUTE A PRISON TERM FOR PURPOSES OF THE LATTER STATUTE. THE REHABILITATION, AND REFORMATORY EDUCATIONAL DISCIPLINE OR OTHER TREATMENT, AS APPEARS FROM THE LEGISLATIVE DECLARATION OF POLICY, IS TO BE CARRIED OUT FOR NONPUNISHMENT AND NONPUNITIVE PURPOSES. IT IS THE POLICY OF THIS STATE TO CONSTRUE A WELFARE INSTITUTION CODE AS FAVORABLY TO THE DEFENDANT AS ITS LANGUAGE AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ITS APPLICATION MAY REASONABLY PERMIT; JUST AS IN THIS CASE OF A QUESTION OF FACT, THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLE TO THE BENEFITS OF EVERY REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO THE TRUE INTERRETATION OF WORDS OR THE CONSTRUTION OF LANGUAGE USED IN A STATUTE.

  3. People v. Hannon

    5 Cal.3d 330 (Cal. 1971)   Cited 20 times
    Concluding that the statutory language of § 17(b) was plain and unequivocal

    (See, e.g., In re Branch (1969) 70 Cal.2d 200, 215-217 [ 74 Cal.Rptr. 238, 449 P.2d 174]; In re Keller (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 525 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Scherbing (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 736, 740-741 [ 209 P.2d 796].) Furthermore, the Authority may continue to hold a misdemeanant until he is 23 years old (Welf.

  4. In re Wright

    65 Cal.2d 650 (Cal. 1967)   Cited 177 times
    Kidnapping for robbery

    As the appellate court there explained (227 Cal.App.2d at p. 756) that procedure reasonably reconciles the policies involved in applying section 654 to protect the rights of both the state and the defendant. Accord: People v. Jones (1962) 211 Cal.App.2d 63, 74 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 429]; People v. Frye (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 799, 803 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 699]; People v. Bynes (1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 268, 272, 274 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 633]; People v. Rainey (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 93, 102 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 291]; People v. Bailey (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 440, 442, 443 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 718]; People v. Morrison (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 707, 715 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 874]; People v. Gay (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 102, 105 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 778]; People v. Buice (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 324, 347 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 877]; People v. Alvarado (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 789, 795 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 310]; In reKeller (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 523 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Nelson (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 440, 446 [ 43 Cal.Rptr. 626]; People v. Sipult (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 862, 870 [ 44 Cal.Rptr. 846]; In re Allen (1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 23, 25 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 345]; People v. Thomsen (1965) 239 Cal.App.2d 84, 97, 98 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 455]; People v. Davis (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 51, 56 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 215]; People v. Brumley (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 124, 131 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 131]; People v. Helms (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 484]; People v. Remme (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 618, 621 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 665]. As to each petitioner the sentence for robbery of Bayliss is set aside.

  5. In re Smith

    64 Cal.2d 437 (Cal. 1966)   Cited 19 times

    At the time of the assault, he was "undergoing" that sentence, as he was "in" a state prison, both in the sense that he was physically there and in the sense that he was confined there by force of law. (See People v. Temple, 203 Cal.App.2d 654, 658 [4] [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 633] .) In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921], relied on by petitioner, is not applicable to the present case. Section 644 of the Penal Code provides that a person who has been convicted of certain enumerated felonies shall be adjudged a habitual criminal and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life if he has twice previously been convicted upon charges separately brought and tried and has served separate terms therefor in any state prison and/or federal penal institution.

  6. People v. Redman

    125 Cal.App.3d 317 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 10 times
    In People v. Redman (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 317 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 49], this district concluded that a commitment to the CYA did not constitute a prior prison term within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).

    It is also relevant that a statute containing language similar to that found in section 667.5, former Penal Code section 644, was repeatedly held inapplicable to CYA commitments.People v. Lockwood (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 189, 192 [ 303 P.2d 621]; In re Keller (1965) 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 526 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Wilkins (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 823, 829 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 49]; 17 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 34. It is reasonable to assume the Legislature knew, when it simultaneously enacted section 667.5 and repealed section 644, that a CYA commitment had been held not to constitute a prison term for purposes of the latter statute.

  7. People v. Getty

    50 Cal.App.3d 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 26 times
    In People v. Getty, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at pages 106-107, footnote 3, and Rosato v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 190, 230-231, these concerns led courts to refuse to consider summary denials of writs as establishing the law of the case, even though they were accompanied by brief explanatory comments which went beyond mere recitations that the denials were on the merits, because the explanations did not amount to formal opinions and the "important" right to present oral argument was not afforded the petitioners.

    " ( In re Benny G., 24 Cal.App.3d 371, 375 fn. 3 [ 101 Cal.Rptr. 28]. See also In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 525-526 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921].)

  8. People v. Barstow

    42 Cal.App.3d 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 2 times

    At the request of appellant's trial counsel and on the recommendation of the probation officer, the trial court, having found that appellant was 20 years of age at the time of apprehension for the crime, committed appellant to the Youth Authority on count I, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5 Appellant did not receive a sentence of imprisonment in the state prison. ( In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 526 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921].) Welfare and Institutions Code section 1731.5 reads: "After certification to the Governor as provided in this article a court may commit to the authority any person convicted of a public offense who comes within subdivisions (a), (b), and (c), or subdivisions (a), (b), and (d), below:

  9. People v. DeVaney

    33 Cal.App.3d 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 12 times
    In People v. DeVaney (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 630, 637-638 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 276] the defendant claimed the court erroneously imposed the lesser sentence rather than the greater.

    In cases of multiple convictions subject to the proscription against double punishment, the cases have usually stated that such punishment is avoided by eliminating the effect of the judgment as to the lesser offense. (See People v. McFarland, 58 Cal.2d 748, 762-763 [ 26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449]; People v. Hicks, 63 Cal.2d 764, 766 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 139, 408 P.2d 747]; In re Pratt, 66 Cal.2d 154, 156-157 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 895, 424 P.2d 335] [modified 5 Cal.3d 46 ( 95 Cal.Rptr. 11, 484 P.2d 1355)]; People v. Diaz, 66 Cal.2d 801, 807 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 729, 427 P.2d 505]; People v. Rosenberg, 212 Cal.App.2d 773, 777 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 214]; In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520, 523 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Brumley, 242 Cal.App.2d 124, 131 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 131]; People v. Johnson, 242 Cal.App.2d 870, 876 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 38]; People v. Root, 246 Cal.App.2d 600, 607 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 89]; People v. Moore, 249 Cal.App.2d 509, 514 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 449]; People v. Flores, 267 Cal.App.2d 452, 460 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 118]; People v. Solo, 8 Cal.App.3d 201, 208 [ 86 Cal.Rptr. 829]; People v. Venegas, 10 Cal.App.3d 814, 821 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 103].) Section 654 of the Penal Code provides: "An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; . . ."

  10. People v. Stevenson

    275 Cal.App.2d 645 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 17 times
    In People v. Stevenson, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d 645, the court disposed of a similar claim by a defendant committed to the Youth Authority as follows: "In the case before us, the certification to the Youth Authority was made before any sentence was pronounced;... It would be presumptuous for us to assume that if defendant is ever returned in accordance with Welfare and Institutions Code section 1737.1 the court will pronounce sentence other than in accordance with the provisions of Penal Code section 654."

    So long as defendant remains committed to the Youth Authority, our expressions made in People v. Wheeler, 271 Cal.App.2d 205 at page 209 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 842] warrant repetition. There, we said: "In California, commitment to the Youth Authority is not the equivalent of a sentence to state prison for punishment of a criminal conviction ( People v. Wilkens, 251 Cal.App.2d 823, 829 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 49]; In re Keller, 232 Cal.App.2d 520 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 921]; People v. Zaccaria, 216 Cal.App.2d 787 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 383].) Hence, Penal Code section 654, which says that `[a]n act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of the code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one, . . .' (italics added), does not apply where commitment is in accordance with the provisions of section 1731.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. [Footnote omitted.]