Opinion
2018–04872 2018–04873 Index No. 163/18
06-19-2019
In the MATTER OF Ariel KEIS, Appellant.
Ariel Keis, Patchogue, NY, appellant pro se.
Ariel Keis, Patchogue, NY, appellant pro se.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, ROBERT J. MILLER, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER In a proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to Civil Rights Law article 6 for leave to change the petitioner's name, the petitioner appeals from two ex parte orders of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Joseph Pastoressa, J.), both dated February 16, 2018. The orders, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the ex parte petition which was to change the petitioner's race/nationality.
ORDERED that on the Court's own motion, the appeals from so much of the orders as denied that branch of the ex parte petition which was to change the petitioner's race/nationality are deemed applications pursuant to CPLR 5704(a) to modify those portions of the orders, and the applications are denied.
The petitioner, a United States citizen, commenced this proceeding pursuant to Civil Rights Law article 6 to change his name and to change his race/nationality from "black/African American" to "Moor/Americas Aboriginal." The Supreme Court, by two ex parte orders, both dated February 16, 2018, granted that branch of the ex parte petition which was to change the petitioner's name, but denied that branch of the ex parte petition which was to change the petitioner's race/nationality. The petitioner appeals.
An ex parte order is not appealable (see CPLR 5704 ; Tsionis v. Eriora Corp., 123 A.D.3d 694, 694, 998 N.Y.S.2d 117 ; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Sobanke, 101 A.D.3d 1065, 1065, 957 N.Y.S.2d 379 ). However, under the circumstances of this case, we deem it appropriate to treat the instant notices of appeal as applications for review pursuant to CPLR 5704(a) (see Matter of Austin, 295 A.D.2d 721, 722 n, 743 N.Y.S.2d 333 ; see also Matter of Alvarado, 166 A.D.2d 932, 560 N.Y.S.2d 586 ).
We agree with the Supreme Court's denial of that branch of the petition which was to change the petitioner's race/nationality, as the petitioner presented no authority for the court to grant him such relief. Article 6 of the Civil Rights Law, which governs petitions for leave to assume another name, does not provide such authority. Further, a person's race is a matter of self-identification. As to nationality, the sole means by which the petitioner may renounce his nationality as a United States citizen is to satisfy one of the conditions set forth in 8 USC § 1481(a) (see Matter of State of New York v. Horowitz, 119 A.D.3d 1029, 1031, 989 N.Y.S.2d 516 ). The petitioner made no showing that he met any of these conditions.
The petitioner's remaining contention is without merit.
MASTRO, J.P., AUSTIN, MILLER and MALTESE, JJ., concur.