Opinion
No. 4-143 / 04-0116
Filed March 10, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, James McGlynn, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her three children. AFFIRMED.
Douglas E. Cook, Jewell, for appellant.
Thomas Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Timothy Schott, County Attorney, and Wendy Samuelson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Derek Johnson, Fort Dodge, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Veva is the mother of Kenneth, born April 30, 1992, Ashley, born February 1, 1996, and Jayd, born December 27, 2000. Veva has a long history of mental health issues and involvement with state authorities concerning her children. On February 5, 2002, the children were adjudicated in need of assistance after Veva's mental health condition resulted in their inadequate care. Following a short return to Veva's care, they were again removed two days later after her condition further deteriorated. The children thereafter remained in foster care until the State filed a petition to terminate Veva's parental rights on April 10, 2003. Following a subsequent trial, the juvenile court terminated Veva's parental rights to Kenneth and Ashley pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2003), her rights to Jayd pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h), and her rights to all three children under section 232.116(1)(k). Veva appeals from this order.
The juvenile court incorrectly cited Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(e), (g), and (j).
Although the children's fathers' parental rights were also terminated, they do not appeal.
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). While the district court terminated the parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we will affirm if at least one ground has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
On appeal Veva concedes the elements of the provisions under which her rights were terminated were proven by clear and convincing evidence. However, she maintains that even if those grounds do exist, the evidence still did not show the best interests of the children were promoted by the termination. See In re N.H., 383 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 1986) (noting that even if the statutory requirements for termination are met, the decision to terminate must still be in the best interest of the children). In addition, Veva asserts the juvenile court failed to adequately consider her prospects for mental health rehabilitation. We disagree on both accounts.
We believe the best interests of the children were clearly served by the termination. Veva has a long and troubling history of mental illness. Despite repeated hospitalizations and services, her unstable condition continued up to the date of the termination hearing. Within even a few months of hearing she had discussed suicide, expressed homicidal thoughts, and exhibited self-harming behaviors. We find in this record no reason to believe Veva has overcome the recurring ravages of mental illness. There is a notable absence in the record of evidence from Veva's treatment providers tending to prove her condition has significantly improved in recent months.
Further, we do not, as Veva alleges on appeal, believe the juvenile court improperly failed to consider her rehabilitation prospects. Rather, it appears this consideration was at the heart of its decision. The court noted Veva's institutionalization in a residential mental health facility at the time of the termination hearing, her need for continuing treatment, the recent manifestations of her illness, and the "lack of "any reasonable hope that [Veva] would some day be well enough to appropriately take care of these three young children." In addition, other than Veva's "guesstimate" that she would be released in February of 2004 from her institutionalization, there is no concrete evidence of a potential release date. Even if she were released as she speculates, we find no realistic probability the children could be returned to her care in the near term.
These children have been in and out of their mother's care and are in a prospective adoption placement. There is simply no indication appropriate care could be forthcoming if returned to Veva's care. The best interests of the children necessitate that her parental rights be terminated and that the children be opened for adoption. See In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Iowa 1997) (keeping adoptable children in long-term foster homes is not in their best interest). The time for patience with Veva has expired. We therefore affirm the termination order.