Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD225119 & JD225120
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
S. B. (appellant), the mother of K. B. and C. B. (the minors), appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating appellant’s parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395; further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant contends that substantial evidence does not support the order terminating her parental rights because she satisfied the requirements of a statutory exception to adoption. Disagreeing with that claim, we affirm.
On January 29, 2009, this court ordered the appeal filed by D. B., the father of the minors, dismissed for his failure to file an opening brief.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 21, 2006, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed original juvenile dependency petitions pursuant to section 300 on behalf of days-old K. B. and two-year-old C. B. Those petitions alleged in part that appellant had a substance abuse problem impairing her ability to provide adequate care for the minors. DHHS also alleged appellant and the father of the minors had engaged in domestic violence.
The juvenile court sustained amended petitions, adjudged the minors dependent children, and ordered them removed from parental custody. The court also ordered appellant to participate in counseling, and granted appellant regular visitation with the minors.
On June 13, 2007, the juvenile court ordered the minors placed with their maternal grandmother. Appellant visited with the minors on a weekly, supervised basis, and those visits were described as “going very well.” Appellant was consistent and appropriate in her visitation, and the minors appeared to be bonded with appellant.
Unfortunately, appellant failed to participate regularly in reunification services. Accordingly, DHHS recommended termination of those services. Thereafter, on August 28, 2007, the juvenile court terminated appellant’s reunification services.
In its December 2007 report prepared for the section 366.26 hearing, DHHS opined the minors were adoptable generally. According to that report, the minors appeared to have a positive relationship with their maternal grandmother. Although the grandmother expressed a desire to adopt the minors, she required additional time in which to prepare for the adoption process. In a supplemental report, the social worker noted appellant was visiting the minors twice monthly for two hours. According to the social worker, neither appellant nor the minors’ father had a significant bond with the minors and termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the minors.
At the July 31, 2008, section 366.26 hearing, appellant testified her visits with the minors went well. Believing termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to the minors, she opposed the recommended adoption of the minors. Social worker Dorothy Robertson testified that, although she had not observed visits between appellant and the minors, she believed termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the minors. Robertson based her opinion on the circumstances surrounding the minors’ placement with their grandmother, including their “closeness,” and the frequency of their visits with appellant.
Appellant’s counsel opposed the recommendation by DHHS to terminate parental rights, citing two statutory exceptions to adoption. The juvenile court found it likely the minors would be adopted and rejected any statutory exception to adoption. In doing so, the court stated in part as follows: “As to [appellant], she has maintained regular visitation. It’s a different situation with [appellant]. She has maintained regular visitation, so she does meet that prong of the exception, but again based on all the evidence [sic] while the visits are generally positive, I don’t find sufficient evidence of a compelling nature to determine that termination would be detrimental when you’re balancing the preference for adoption.”
The juvenile court ordered appellant's parental rights terminated.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the juvenile court committed reversible error in terminating her parental rights because the court’s finding the minors would not benefit from continuing their relationship with appellant is not supported by substantial evidence. Noting evidence of regular visitation, a long-term relationship with C. B., a parental role assumed by appellant pertaining to the minors, and the strong bond existing between them, appellant argues the record contains evidence that severance of that relationship would cause great harm to the minors.
“‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child.... The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368 .)
One of the circumstances under which termination of parental rights might be detrimental to the minor is: “The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The benefit to the child must promote “the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn H.).)
The parent has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1372-1373.) The juvenile court is not required to find that termination of parental rights will not be detrimental due to specified circumstances. (Id. at p. 1373.) Even frequent and loving contact is not sufficient to establish the benefit exception absent significant, positive emotional attachment between parent and child. (In re Teneka W. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728-729; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.)
In this case, it is true appellant had regular contact with the minors, and that a bond existed between them, as both DHHS and the juvenile court recognized. It also is true the minors required permanency, and had been with their maternal grandmother for more than a year. Moreover, the minors had become closely bonded with their grandmother.
Section 366.26 requires both a showing of regular contact and a separate showing that the child actually would benefit from continuing the relationship. Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 567, interprets the statutory exception to involve a balancing test, and both Autumn H. and Beatrice M., supra, 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, posit a high level of parental-type involvement and attachment. Even assuming those decisions overemphasized the importance of the parental role, the record here does not support appellant’s suggestion that the minors would benefit substantially from continuing their relationship with her primarily because of the length of time C.B. had lived with her and the attachment existing between them. (Cf. In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 821-822.)
Appellant suggests the record establishes the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship between the minors, especially C.B., and herself, one that outweighs the benefits of adoption. The juvenile court was authorized to conclude the contrary was true. Evidence of a significant parent-child attachment by itself does not suffice. Instead, the record must show such benefit to the minor that the detrimental effect of termination of parental rights would outweigh the benefit of adoption to the minors. Here, as the court determined, the record was bereft of such a showing. Instead, there was evidence suggesting it was critical for the minors to obtain the benefits of a stable placement which, as we have seen, the record shows they were receiving in foster care with their grandmother.
In In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, cited by appellant, the juvenile court found it was in the best interests of the minors to establish a guardianship, rather than terminate parental rights, so the minors could maintain their relationship with their mother. (Id. at p. 1533.) Affirming, the Court of Appeal held substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s conclusion that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the minors, because their mother had maintained regular, beneficial visitation with them. (Id. at pp. 1533-1534, 1537-1538.)
In re Brandon C., supra, 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, is distinguishable from the proceedings here. The Brandon C. court found ample evidence of benefit to the minors of continued contact with their mother. (Id. at pp. 1537-1538.) Here, by contrast, as we have seen, the record supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that there would not be sufficient benefit to the minors if their relationship with appellant were continued. Moreover, as the record also suggests, the minors, especially C. B., had a need for stability and security, a need which only adoption could satisfy.
Appellant suggests that because she had maintained a significant parent-child relationship with the minors, which included playing a parental role, particularly with C. B., and regular contact with both minors while in placement, the circumstances of her case compare favorably with those found in other cases. We disagree. In In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51, cited by appellant, the Court of Appeal did not find an “exceptional case” where a beneficial relationship existed that would preclude adoption. Accordingly, the court in Casey D. affirmed the order that terminated parental rights. (Id. at pp. 53-54.) However, the court in Casey D. did recognize the possibility that a beneficial relationship might exist despite the absence of daily contact between parent and child. (Id. at p. 51.) The difficulty for appellant here, as the juvenile court found, is that she failed to establish the requisite beneficial relationship with the minors, in the absence of which the exception does not apply.
Here, the issue was as follows: In light of the minors’ adoptability, would a continued relationship with appellant benefit the minors to such a degree that it would outweigh the benefits the minors would gain in a permanent adoptive home? Substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s answer in the negative. On the record before it, the juvenile court could conclude, as it did, that only adoption, which is the preferred disposition (In re Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368), would promote the best interests of the minors. As the record reflects, the juvenile court had before it ample evidence on the matter, including social worker’s reports and the testimony of appellant and social workers at the section 366.26 hearing.
The record suggests the juvenile court was aware of the relationship existing between appellant and the minors and did not rely unduly on the limited contact appellant had with the minors in rejecting application of the benefit exception to adoption. It is true, as appellant emphasizes, that C. B. had spent a substantial portion of her life with appellant. However, the record does not reflect that appellant ever had unsupervised or lengthy visits with the minors. Finally, we reject appellant’s reliance on In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297, 299-301 which involved improper consideration by the juvenile court and social worker of external factors pertaining to the strength of the parent-child relationship, and which also required a showing of great harm to the minor caused by severance of the parent-child relationship before the exception to adoption would apply.
After it became apparent that appellant would not reunify with the minors, the juvenile court had to find an “exceptional situation existed to forego adoption.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) In this case, on the contrary, after a thorough examination of the circumstances, the court determined the minors would not benefit from continuing their relationship with appellant to such a degree that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minors. Appellant had the burden to demonstrate the statutory exception applied. We conclude she failed to make such a showing. Therefore, the court did not err in terminating appellant’s parental rights. (In re Amanda D., supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 821-822.)
DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court terminating appellant’s parental rights is affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, J., BUTZ, J.