Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. OJ08009280-01
Margulies, J.
K.B. (K.) was removed from her home after she reported to her school principal that she had been physically abused by her mother, D.B. (Mother). Several months earlier, her father (Father) had been convicted of similar abuse. At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, Mother denied that she had abused K. K. became distraught during in camera testimony, and her testimony was stricken. A psychologist who had interviewed K. testified that K. had recently shown signs of mental instability, and she had been hospitalized briefly for her own protection. Largely on the basis of K.’s prior statements contained in departmental reports, the juvenile court found the jurisdictional allegations true. Mother contends that the juvenile court’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 10, 2008, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (the Agency) filed a child dependency petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging that Mother had pushed K. into a wall, pressed painfully on K.’s breast, and struck her with a belt; that this was the second incident of abuse in less than a year; that Father had previously been arrested for abusing her; and that K. refused to return home. Following a hearing, K. was ordered detained.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
When the petition was filed, K. was 12 years old. The departmental reports prepared for the juvenile court stated that in August 2007, Father was arrested after neighbors reported that he would engage in extended verbal rages toward K. When questioned, K. told police that Father had recently disciplined her with a belt when he became frustrated with her training for a swimming competition, and she described other abusive and inappropriate behavior. She said that Mother did not protect her from this conduct. Father was eventually ordered by the court to take anger management training.
Immediately prior to the filing of the dependency petition, K. reported to her principal that she had been abused by Mother approximately two weeks before. When interviewed by officials, K. explained that while she was practicing the violin, Mother became frustrated with her playing and pushed her into a wall, causing her to fall. When K. tried to stand up, Mother pressed down painfully on her breast. She then found a belt and hit K. repeatedly.
As a result of this incident, K. had become fearful of her parents, refused to return home, and had suicidal thoughts. When asked about K.’s claims, Mother denied having abused her, although she acknowledged an argument about violin practice. Both parents believed that K. had come under the influence of “bad girls” at school who had persuaded her to invent a story of abuse in order to escape from home.
Following her detention, K. showed signs of emotional instability. She reported hearing voices, said she wanted to hurt herself and another child living in her foster home, whispered inappropriately, and spoke and “mouthed” to herself. Although K. is apparently an exceptionally intelligent child, having skipped a grade in school, her explanations were “awkward and not all sensible.” The Agency caseworker described her conduct during this time as becoming “more and more strange.” Within two weeks of her detention, K. was hospitalized briefly for her own protection. On April 22, 2008, an amended petition was filed under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c), alleging the foregoing facts regarding K.’s apparent instability and asserting that “there is no known history of any regular therapeutic help for the minor and the parents admit that they were never aware of or received any information regarding the minor’s thoughts about suicide or the serious level of her mental health condition.”
Immediately prior to the contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on April 29, K. continued to resist returning home and expressed great anger and fear toward Father. Despite K.’s symptoms of mental instability, no formal psychological evaluation of K. had been performed.
At the hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony from Mother, the caseworker responsible for K., and a psychologist who had seen K. periodically. The court took some direct testimony from K. in camera, but when K. became tearful her attorney terminated the testimony. In response to a motion to strike K.’s partial testimony, the court stated that it would disregard her testimony, but because the testimony was consistent with the Agency’s reports, the court noted that it would “accept the representations made in the reports provided.”
The psychologist testified that she had seen K. initially and briefly in August 2007, after Father was arrested for abusing her. K. continued to have sporadic, uninvited contact with the psychologist thereafter, making confused reports of fear without any clear indication of abuse. When the psychologist saw her again in March 2008, K. was anxious and depressed, and her behavior was “odd.” She maintained minimal eye contact, talked to herself, and reported hearing five different voices and having violent and suicidal thoughts. The psychologist viewed this conduct, at a minimum, as a sign of stress, but the psychologist was reluctant to draw any other conclusions because of her brief contact with K. The social worker testified briefly that K. was very afraid of Father and did not want to return home.
Mother explained that on the day in question, K. refused to finish violin practice on an evening when they had planned to go to the movies with K.’s maternal aunt and her family. When Mother told K. to finish up, K. rolled her eyes and walked away. Mother reprimanded her for walking away, but she neither yelled nor used physical force against K. That evening, K. went to the movies with Mother, Mother’s sister, and the sister’s boyfriend and son, and everything was normal. Mother had never noticed any “bizarre” behavior by K., such as reporting voices or talking to herself, and, prior to the filing of the petition, was unaware K. was afraid of Father. Nonetheless, Mother had considered therapy for K., but she did not pursue therapy because it appeared to involve medication. Mother acknowledged that prior to Father’s arrest, she had hit K. with a belt and had yelled at her when upset. Father also had used a belt to discipline K. prior to his arrest.
Mother’s explanation of her consideration of therapy for K. was vague and confused, and Mother might have done nothing more than read a brochure about a Kaiser program.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations of the amended petition under section 300, noting that Mother had acknowledged the past use of corporal punishment. Given K.’s truthful report of past abuse by Father, the court concluded that “her current report in March of 2008, the abuse by her mother is entirely credible to the Court given the extraordinary stress and anxiety and depression she shows . . . and the information she provided . . . .” The court ordered reunification services.
II. DISCUSSION
Mother contends that the juvenile court’s findings under section 300, subdivision (b) that K. was abused were not supported by substantial evidence.
Mother does not challenge the jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (c).
“At the jurisdictional hearing, the court determines whether the minor falls within any of the categories specified in section 300. [Citation.] ‘ “The petitioner in a dependency proceeding must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child . . . comes under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” ’ [Citation.] On appeal from an order making jurisdictional findings, we must uphold the court’s findings unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment, we determine there is no substantial evidence to support the findings. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (In re Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 185 (Veronica G.).)
The jurisdictional subdivision of section 300 relied on by the Agency, subdivision (b), provides for wardship if, among other grounds, “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.” “ ‘In determining what constitutes a substantial risk of serious physical harm [for purposes of section 300, subdivision (b)], some general guidance may be drawn from subdivision (a) of section 300, which uses the same language to authorize jurisdiction where ‘[t]he minor has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the minor will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the minor by the minor’s parent or guardian.’ For purposes of that subdivision ‘a court may find there is a substantial risk of serious future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the minor or the minor’s siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian, which indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm.’ ” (In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1134.)
“Thus, evidence of past events may have some probative value in considering current conditions. But under section 300, subdivision (b) this is only true if circumstances existing at the time of the hearing make it likely the children will suffer the same type of ‘serious physical harm or illness’ in the future. This is so because under subdivision (b) a child may be considered dependent ‘only so long as is necessary’ to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. For this reason, ‘the past infliction of physical harm by a caretaker, standing alone, does not establish a substantial risk of physical harm, “[t]here must be some reason to believe the acts may continue in the future.” ’ ” (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 377, 388, fns. omitted.)
The statements of K., included in the Agency’s reports, alone provided substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that K. faced a substantial risk of harm in her home. K. said that Father had beaten her with a belt less than a year before the jurisdictional hearing and had mistreated her in other ways. Father’s rage was so great that it was reported to the police by neighbors. Although Mother was aware of this abuse, she did nothing to prevent it. Moreover, despite Father’s arrest for this conduct, K. said that Mother inflicted similar abuse within two months of the hearing. Mother’s failure to protect K. from past abuse and her own willingness to use this type of discipline on K. despite Father’s arrest suggests that “circumstances existing at the time of the hearing make it likely [K.] will suffer the same type of ‘serious physical harm or illness’ in the future.” (In re Janet T., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 388.) As the juvenile court noted, the credibility of K.’s account was bolstered by her severe anxiety and fear.
Although Mother disputed K.’s claim of mistreatment in connection with the violin practice, she acknowledged that both she and Father had used a belt to discipline K. prior to Father’s arrest. The credibility of Mother’s testimony was partially undermined by a tendency to disregard or deny problems associated with K. Although Mother had apparently been concerned enough to explore therapy for K., Mother claimed to be unaware K. was afraid of Father, was suffering stress, or was behaving in an unusual manner. Both parents attributed K.’s difficult behavior to bad peer influences, rather than their own admittedly severe conduct, the circumstances in their home, or K.’s own emotional instability.
Mother contends that because the juvenile court elected to disregard K.’s in camera testimony, there was no testimony refuting Mother’s account of the violin incident. As the juvenile court noted, however, because the Agency’s reports were introduced into evidence without objection, the court was entitled to rely on K.’s statements as recorded in those reports.
Mother also contends that K.’s account of the violin incident was suspect because she showed no traces of injury or upset that evening when she went to the movies, a fact confirmed by Mother’s sister. The assault described by K., while painful, would not necessarily have led to disabling injuries or injuries not covered by K.’s clothing, and K. plausibly could have responded to a painful and shaming incident by attempting not to acknowledge it.
In addition, Mother objects that the Agency relied in part on evidence of Father’s abuse, which occurred several months before. Both Father, in his statements to the Agency, and Mother claimed to have stopped physical discipline of K. following Father’s arrest. As noted above, evidence of past violent incidents cannot be relied upon to establish jurisdiction under subdivision (b) unless there is some reason to believe that similar incidents will occur in the future. K.’s statements that Mother continued to engage in physical discipline after the August arrest, however, provides grounds for believing that, in the absence of the Agency’s intervention, K. continued to be at risk from a form of violence tolerated and used by both parents.
We agree with the Agency that this situation is similar to that of Veronica G., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th 179. In that case, two children reported during a welfare check that their mother abused them daily. The mother denied it, claiming that her physical discipline was limited to spanking. The children had no visible signs of abuse other than a small scar, purportedly from cigarette burns. (Id. at pp. 181–182.) Addressing a claim that there was no substantial evidence to support a finding under section 300, subdivision (b) because there were no visible signs of abuse and the most violent incidents were over a year old, the court held that the children’s statements alone provided sufficient evidence to support the ruling. That there were no bruises at the time of intake was not conclusive, since there was other evidence to support the credibility of the children’s reports of current abuse, including their fear of their mother. (Id. at pp. 185–186.)
Mother attempts to distinguish Veronica G. by pointing out that the accounts of the two children in Veronica G. supported each other and citing K.’s evident emotional instability, suggesting that K.’s claims should not have been believed. It was for the juvenile court, not this court, to judge the relative credibility of K. and Mother. We cannot say, on the evidence presented, that K.’s account was not credible as a matter of law.
III. DISPOSITION
The order of the juvenile court is affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P.J., Graham, J.
Retired judge of the Superior Court of Marin County assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.