Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD225274
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
Russell B. (appellant), the father of K. (the minor), appeals from orders of the juvenile court adjudging the minor a dependent child of the court and removing the minor from parental custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395; further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s jurisdictional finding and dispositional order of removal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 23, 2007, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed an amended juvenile dependency petition pursuant to section 300 on behalf of the days-old minor. That petition alleged in part appellant had a history of substance abuse from which he had failed to rehabilitate and which impaired his ability to provide adequate care for the minor. According to the petition, appellant had been incarcerated for his failure to complete a drug treatment program. Moreover, averred the petition, after his release from custody, appellant had continued to use marijuana, which he used last in December 2006. Finally, the petition alleged appellant’s continued use of illegal drugs placed the minor at a substantial risk of suffering physical harm or neglect.
According to the January 2007 report prepared by DHHS for the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, appellant was on parole until September 2007 for a drug-related conviction. Appellant told the social worker that this last use of methamphetamine was in June 2006, he completed a drug treatment program in September 2006, and he had smoked marijuana just once since then, in December 2006. Appellant acknowledged he was aware the minor’s mother had used methamphetamine during her pregnancy with the minor. Appellant indicated he was ready and willing to become the minor’s caregiver.
Appellant was living with the minor’s paternal grandmother and great-grandparents in a three-bedroom home. DHHS evaluated the home and determined it was suitable for the minor. Appellant was seeking employment and was willing to participate in reunification services. During visits with the minor, appellant was attentive and behaved appropriately.
The record reflects that, over a two-month period, appellant had undergone substance abuse testing three times, each with negative results. However, as one of the elements of his voluntary case plan, appellant had agreed to submit to drug testing three times weekly. Moreover, appellant had failed to begin the counseling to which he had agreed.
DHHS recommended the minor be adjudged a dependent child and removed from parental custody. Noting appellant’s “recent instability, his relationship with the mother, and his active drug use and lifestyle,” the social worker opined that appellant presented an “escalating risk” to the minor. The social worker also stated in part that, “[p]rior to reunification, [appellant] must not only comply with the case plan but must make behavioral changes that indicate he is capable of providing adequate care and supervision of the child on a long-term basis. Successful reunification should not be measured by mere compliance with the case plan, but rather by [appellant’s] ability to provide long term care and provision of the child without the constant support of his family. It is critical to the reunification process [appellant] show evidence he is capable of seeking out alternative strategies for coping with stress and that he can maintain sobriety while doing so. [Appellant] must remain substance free and must truly overcome his drug addiction. Specifically, [appellant] must be able to acquire skills and acquire a support group to deal with life’s challenges without resorting to the use of illicit substances.”
The social worker’s report summarized appellant’s history and recent circumstances: “. . . [T]here is a preponderance of evidence [appellant] has a substance abuse problem which impairs his judgment and from which he has failed to rehabilitate, and which continues to render him incapable of providing adequate care and supervision of the child. [Appellant] has a history of extensive use of marijuana and methamphetamine, with his first use at the age of fourteen. Further, by [appellant’s] own admission, he smoked marijuana in December 2006 to help him ‘cope with stress’ despite the fact he had just completed a drug treatment program in September 2006. [¶] The investigation of this case revealed [appellant] was Court ordered on or about October 7, 1998, to participate in Drug Court, which he failed to complete. Furthermore, [appellant] has a drug-related criminal history, which spans a six-year period from 1998 to 2003 with [appellant] only recently demonstrating a willingness to comply with the conditions of his parole. [Appellant] last tested positive while on parole in June of 2006. [¶] When interviewed by the undersigned, [appellant] asserted his substance abuse does not affect his parenting skills and ability to provide adequate care for the child. He indicated he is prepared for the child and is willing to do what is necessary to make sure the child’s needs are met. Furthermore, [appellant] asserted he has discontinued his drug use. Although the undersigned credits [appellant] for his eagerness to take responsibility for the child, there is a preponderance of evidence to support the fact [appellant’s] substance abuse has a direct impact on the child’s health and well-being. By [appellant’s] own admission he was fully aware of the mother’s methamphetamine use during her pregnancy with the child and he admitted to residing with the mother in a hotel just prior to the birth of the child and yet took no action toward intervening on behalf of the child to stop the mother’s ingestion of illegal and dangerous drugs during her pregnancy. Furthermore, [appellant] was incarcerated during the early stages of the mother’s pregnancy with the child due to his failure to comply with the conditions of parole, including maintaining a clean and sober lifestyle. Thus, this is evidence and a direct link that [appellant’] substance abuse has an impact on the child.”
At the February 21, 2007, combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained in part the amended petition as amended, adjudged the minor a dependent child of the court, and ordered the minor removed from parental custody. In doing so, the court encouraged appellant to participate in reunification services and expressed optimism about appellant’s prospects for reunification with the minor. However, the court also stated in part that “to say that since getting out of your treatment program in September and then having a brief relapse, which is what the evidence show[ed] me in December, to say that you’ve rectified those problems such that there’s not a risk to the [minor] in the home after only a few months that’s where I differ with you . . . .”
DISCUSSION
I
Jurisdictional Finding
Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jurisdictional finding pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 300. According to appellant, no evidence was adduced of any risk of harm to the minor posed by his past drug abuse, he had used illegal drugs only once in the last eight months, he was willing to drug test regularly, he had a strong desire to parent the minor, and appellant was living in a stable home environment.
Our “review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment is limited to whether the judgment is supported by substantial evidence. Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trial court and not the reviewing court. The power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact.” (In re Christina T. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 630, 638-639.)
The purpose of section 300 is to protect minors from conduct or omissions by parents that place the minors at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. (§§ 300, subd. (b); 300.2.) In this case, the amended petition alleged generally that the minor was at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm as a result of appellant’s past and recent substance abuse. In evaluating the evidence, the emphasis must be on circumstances existing at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824.) However, evidence of past problems may be relevant to current circumstances and thus may be considered. (Cf. In re Michael S. (1981) 127 Cal.App.3d 348, 358.)
The evidence before the juvenile court at the jurisdiction hearing was in the form of social worker’s reports. The juvenile court indicated it had considered the jurisdiction hearing report. That report also had referred to the detention hearing report.
Subdivision (b) of section 300 provides for jurisdiction where there is a substantial risk the minor will suffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of various types of conduct or acts of omission on the part of the parent of the minor.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment (In re Terry D. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 890, 899), the record in this case supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under subdivision (b) of section 300. Pursuant to subdivision (b), the record contains evidence that appellant was a frequent user of illegal drugs who, shortly after completing a treatment program, smoked marijuana. Appellant’s relapse was only about two months prior to the hearing that is the subject of this appeal. Moreover, appellant failed to undergo drug testing as often as he had agreed to, and did not begin his counseling in a timely manner.
On this record, which supports the inference appellant has not established his rehabilitation or maintained sobriety for a significant period of time, the court was justified in finding, as it did, that the minor would be at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm in appellant’s care.
Relying in part on In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, appellant argues the record contains no evidence that his substance abuse created a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the minor. We disagree. The record contains evidence that appellant had used methamphetamine in June 2006 and was a regular user of marijuana until recent times. Unlike in David M., supra, at pages 825 and 831, which involved drug use three years before the proceedings began, here the juvenile court had before it evidence of recent substance abuse. On this record, it is reasonable to infer that appellant’s drug lifestyle, criminal history, relationship with the mother, and history of poor decision-making interfered with his ability to provide proper care for the minor and placed the minor at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm.
In sum, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this case. (Cf. In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169.)
II
Removal of the Minor
Arguing the record contains no evidence of a risk of harm to the minor, or any lack of a reasonable alternative to removal of the minor, appellant contends insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing the minor from parental custody. Noting there was only speculation he might relapse, appellant argues the minor should have been returned to his care under strict supervision by the court and DHHS. In support of appellant’s claims, he relies in part on In re W.O. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 906.
To support an order removing a child from parental custody, the trial court must find clear and convincing evidence “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor parent’s. . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) The court also must “make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor” and “state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based.” (§ 361, subd. (d).)
Removal findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence test set forth above, drawing all reasonable inferences to support the findings and noting that issues of credibility are matters for the trial court. (In re Heather A., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 193.) Further, evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, particularly where there is reason to believe the conduct will continue in the future. (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824.)
Ample evidence at the disposition hearing supports the juvenile court’s order for continued removal of the minor. The court had before it evidence of appellant’s history of substance abuse, combined with his recent relapse and a failure to demonstrate appellant was remaining drug-free by taking every opportunity available to undergo drug testing. Moreover, the record also reflects appellant had not fulfilled his agreement to participate in counseling services. Finally, there was evidence suggesting appellant was minimizing his substance abuse: Appellant had reported that he was more addicted to the “lifestyle” than to illegal drugs.
Appellant’s reliance on In re W.O., supra, 88 Cal.App.3d 906 is misplaced. Unlike in that case, where the parents had established a pattern of proper care for the minors, despite the parents’ drug use (id. at pp. 907-908), here appellant had not established a pattern of behavior that would suggest he could provide proper care for the minor. In fact, the minor had never been in appellant’s care. Moreover, appellant had expressed concern about his ability to bond with the minor.
To appellant’s credit, he has demonstrated signs of progress recently, by refraining from drug use and residing in a stable living environment. But the record also reflects appellant has a long history of substance abuse, beginning at age 14, failing to complete remedial programs, and relapsing. Based both on appellant’s past and on more recent conduct, it is hardly surprising the juvenile court found that returning the minor to appellant would present a substantial risk of detriment to the minor.
At the time of the hearing that is the subject of this appeal, appellant was 27.
Appellant argues the juvenile court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to removal. But the record reflects, and the court found, DHHS had made reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for removal of the minor from parental custody. Those efforts, unfortunately, had not succeeded. Until appellant establishes he can benefit from the provision of additional services, there is ample evidence the minor’s safety and well-being in the home would be in serious jeopardy if the minor were returned to appellant’s custody.
Substantial evidence supports the dispositional order of removal, which the record reflects was supported by factual findings made by the juvenile court.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, J., NICHOLSON, J.