In re Kapcia

12 Citing cases

  1. In re Servaas

    484 Mich. 634 (Mich. 2009)   Cited 22 times
    Rejecting the notion that a quo warranto action "may only be brought for claims that an officer is currently exercising an invalid title to office."

    At the time the JTC brought its complaint for vacation of office against the respondent, respondent was currently in office. There is no support for this argument in MCL 600.4505, and In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306; 205 NW2d 436 (1973), does not support this assertion. Rather, the Court in Kapcia declared that its opinion did not consider whether a quo warranto action by the Court of Appeals was required for a judge who had lost his license to thereafter determine whether the judge had vacated his office.

  2. In the Matter of Ryman

    394 Mich. 637 (Mich. 1975)   Cited 16 times

    The commission did not err in considering these acts committed prior to the time respondent assumed judicial office. State Bar Grievance Administrator v Moes, 389 Mich. 258; 205 N.W.2d 428 (1973), and In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306; 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973). As to misconduct in office, it is a finding of fact by the master that respondent continued in the practice of law after taking judicial office and that respondent caused a deputy clerk of his court to perform the duties of magistrate without compliance with the statutory requirements for the appointment of magistrates.

  3. In re Adams

    No. 144985 (Mich. Jun. 19, 2013)

    Thus, I would accord the JTC's recommendation considerable deference, and adopt its recommended sanction. See In re Kapcia, 389 Mich 306, 311; 205 NW2d 436 (1973) (noting that Const 1963, art 6, § 30 contemplates that the JTC and this Court will make individualized determinations on the entire factual context). See In re Chrzanowski, 465 Mich 468, 487-488; 636 NW2d 758 (2001), citing In re Hocking, 451 Mich 1, 24; 546 NW2d 234 (1996); Matter of Mikesell, 396 Mich 517, 527; 243 NW2d 86 (1976).

  4. State Bar v. Del Rio

    285 N.W.2d 277 (Mich. 1979)   Cited 8 times
    Finding “dubious the notion that judicial or attorney misconduct cases are comparable beyond a limited and superficial extent”

    This Court's file on the rule reveals that as early as April 26, 1973, it was suggested that there was a need to address the problem of the lack of coordination between the proceedings of the State Bar Grievance Board and the Judicial Tenure Commission where a respondent was both an attorney and a judge. It is also clearly evident from the file that the impetus for the adoption of the rule was In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306; 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973), in which this Court was presented with the anomalous situation involving the suspension of the license to practice law of an attorney who was also a probate judge in a county where the probate judge was permitted to practice law. Thus, it is apparent that the origins of Grievance Board Rule 16.14(b) predate the Commission's complaint against Judge Del Rio by about four years and arose from substantially different circumstances.

  5. In re Gillard

    271 N.W.2d 785 (Minn. 1978)   Cited 54 times
    Holding in response to an argument that the Board acted without a quorum as required by its rules, that “[b]ecause this court conducts an independent review of the evidence and accords the Judicial Board's disciplinary recommendations no presumptive weight, the absence of a quorum should not be fatal”

    Respondent contends that the limitation upon the Judicial Board's review was a denial of due process and frustrated the implicit statutory obligation of the Judicial Board to make a separate review and disciplinary recommendation. Respondent cites as authority In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306, 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973); In re Moes, 389 Mich. 256, 205 N.W.2d 428 (1973); Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 114 S.E.2d 15 (1960), and Jenkins v. Oregon State Bar, 241 Or. 283, 405 P.2d 525 (1965). These cases do not clearly establish the proposition for which they are cited.

  6. In the Matter of Mikesell

    396 Mich. 517 (Mich. 1976)   Cited 36 times
    Declining to address allegations from the complaint that the master had found not proved and that were not part of the JTC’s recommendation

    Thus, we must look to all the circumstances in our determination. In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306, 311, 312; 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973). I

  7. State Bar v. Ryman

    394 Mich. 167 (Mich. 1975)   Cited 2 times

    The present State Bar and General Court Rules regarding the jurisdiction of the State Bar Grievance Board (State Bar Rules 15 and 16) and the Judicial Tenure Commission (GCR 1963, 932) appear to permit such parallel proceedings (Cf. In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306; 205 N.W.2d 436 [1973]). We hereby advise the Bar of our intention to consider amendments to these rules in order to give the Judicial Tenure Commission sole disciplinary jurisdiction over attorneys while they are serving in judicial capacities.

  8. Gantz v. Detroit

    392 Mich. 348 (Mich. 1974)   Cited 8 times
    In Gantz v Detroit, 392 Mich. 348; 220 N.W.2d 433 (1974), the Supreme Court construed the same Detroit residency ordinance with which we are involved in the instant case.

    But even the vacation of judicial office mandated by the constitution is not self-executing. Cf. In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306, 314; 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973). Until the jurisdiction of a court is properly invoked and entry of a judgment declaring the office vacant, a judge may continue to exercise his powers although he has in fact removed his domicile in violation of the constitutional provision. Labeling a discharge a "vacation" of position does not change the issue before us.

  9. In re Gorcyca

    500 Mich. 588 (Mich. 2017)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that due diligence is " ‘[t]he diligence reasonably expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an obligation’ "

    Respondent does not argue that we may not sanction her solely on the basis of violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, i.e., without also finding a violation of Const. 1963, art. 6, § 30 (2), see, e.g., In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306, 311, 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973) (once the JTC makes a recommendation, "the Supreme Court 'may censure, suspend with or without salary, retire or remove' a judge on grounds specified in the Constitution"), so I would not reach that question either. To hold otherwise seems tantamount to insulating judicial misconduct against its consequences by way of ineffective assistance of counsel.

  10. In re Adams

    494 Mich. 162 (Mich. 2013)   Cited 10 times
    Noting that the respondent-judge "did repeatedly testify falsely under oath in a courtroom, with all the gravity that such a venue should communicate, especially to a judge, in response to questions asked of her by a judge on the bench"

    Thus, I would accord the JTC's recommendation considerable deference, and adopt its recommended sanction. See In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306, 311, 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973) (noting that Const 1963, art 6, § 30 contemplates that the JTC and this Court will make individualized determinations on the entire factual context). See In re Chrzanowski, 465 Mich. 468, 487–488, 636 N.W.2d 758 (2001), citing In re Hocking, 451 Mich. 1, 24, 546 N.W.2d 234 (1996); Matter of Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 527, 243 N.W.2d 86 (1976).