Opinion
No. COA12–627.
2012-12-4
In the Matter of K.A.M.L.-P.
Jon W. Myers, for petitioner-appellees. Laura Bodenheimer, for Guardian ad Litem.
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 23 March 2012 by Judge B. Carlton Terry in Davidson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 October 2012. Jon W. Myers, for petitioner-appellees. Laura Bodenheimer, for Guardian ad Litem.
Edward Eldred, Attorney at Law, PLLC, for respondent-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Respondent-mother (“respondent”) appeals from the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to the minor child, K.A.M.L.-P. (“Kevin”). We affirm.
Kevin is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the minor child.
I. Background
In February 2003, the Davidson County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) substantiated a report that respondent's home was an injurious environment for Kevin, because it was dirty and rat-infested. In March 2003, DSS began providing services for Kevin. On 11 July 2003, respondent placed Kevin in the physical custody of petitioners.
On 30 April 2004, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging Kevin was a neglected and dependent juvenile. On 13 July 2004, the trial court adjudicated Kevin as neglected and ordered that he be placed in the legal and physical custody of petitioners, his temporary guardians. On 8 November 2004, the trial court ceased reunification efforts with respondent and appointed the petitioners as Kevin's “guardians of the person.”
On 4 May 2011, petitioners filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Kevin's biological mother and father alleging multiple grounds for termination. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order on 23 February 2012 concluding multiple grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights. The trial court further concluded that termination of respondent's parental rights was in Kevin's best interests. Respondent appeals.
The trial court also terminated Kevin's biological father's parental rights, but the father does not appeal.
II. Grounds for Termination
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in its determination that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.
“The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law.” In re Clark, 72 N.C.App. 118, 124, 323 S .E.2d 754, 758 (1984). “[T]he trial court's findings of fact supported by clear and convincing competent evidence are deemed conclusive, even where some evidence supports contrary findings.” In re Helms, 127 N.C.App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997).
In the instant case, the trial court concluded grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1) (2011). A neglected juvenile is defined as one “who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker ... or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare....” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101(15) (2011).
“Neglect must exist at the time of the termination hearing, or if the parent has been separated from the child for an extended period of time, the petitioner must show that the parent has neglected the child in the past and that the parent is likely to neglect the child in the future.” In re C.W. & J.W., 182 N.C.App. 214, 220, 641 S.E.2d 725, 729 (2007) (citing In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 714–15, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231–32 (1984)). “[E]vidence of neglect by a parent prior to losing custody of a child—including an adjudication of such neglect—is admissible in subsequent proceedings to terminate parental rights.” In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984).
Where the evidence shows that a parent has failed or is unable to adequately provide for his child's physical and economic needs, whether it be by reason of mental infirmity or by reason of willful conduct on the part of the parent, and it appears that the parent will not or is not able to correct those inadequate conditions within a reasonable time, the court may appropriately conclude that the child is neglected. In determining whether a child is neglected, the determinative factors are the circumstances and conditions surrounding the child, not the fault or culpability of the parent.
In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984).
In the instant case, the trial court entered several findings regarding respondent's past neglect of Kevin, as well as findings addressing the likelihood of future neglect. Petitioner challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding of a likelihood of future neglect. Therefore, the issue is whether the trial court correctly found that respondent is likely to neglect Kevin if he was returned to her in the future.
The trial court's order includes findings regarding respondent's efforts and living environment. First, the trial court found that respondent made little to no effort to communicate or visit with Kevin, including not sending any cards, letters, or gifts. Second, the trial court found that respondent had not provided a history of steady employment or a stable living environment in which to raise him. Since March 2003, respondent resided in eight various residences, and Kevin resided in five of them. The residences were not maintained because respondent lacked continuous employment. At the time of the hearing, the trial court found that respondent lived in a two-bedroom apartment with approximately five people and that she was employed at McDonald's for one week. However, the court also found that, prior to trial, respondent's live-in boyfriend, who was her main source of income, moved out. In addition, respondent failed to obtain her driver's license although she continued to drive herself to work, and thus, she continuously subjected herself to being arrested.
Finally, the trial court found that respondent was unable to properly care for Kevin during an overnight visit on 25 November 2004. Specifically, respondent refused to feed Kevin anything during the entire 25–hour visit and sent him back to the petitioners with a severe rash due to improper hygiene. Based upon these findings, the trial court found a likelihood of repetition of neglect if Kevin was returned to respondent's care.
The trial court's findings, supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence presented at the hearing regarding respondent's past neglect and the likelihood of repetition of neglect of Kevin, were sufficient to support its conclusion that respondent's parental rights could be terminated on the basis of neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1). See Ballard, 311 N.C. at 715, 319 S .E.2d at 232. Respondent's argument is overruled.
Since we have found that the trial court properly terminated respondent's parental rights on the basis of neglect, it is unnecessary to address her arguments on the remaining grounds found by the trial court. See In re Humphrey, 156 N.C.App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003).
III. Best Interests
Respondent argues that the trial court erred in concluding that it was in Kevin's best interests for respondent's parental rights to be terminated. We disagree.
“After an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent's rights exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a) (2011). In determining whether terminating the parental rights is in the juvenile's best interests, the trial court must consider and make findings regarding the following factors which are relevant:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
Id. “We review the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002).
In the instant case, the trial court's order contains extensive findings addressing the factors set forth in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a). Specifically, the court made findings regarding Kevin's age, the high likelihood that petitioners would adopt him, his bond between he and petitioners, and his lack of a bond between he and respondent. As an additional relevant consideration, the trial court found that Kevin had a desire to identify with petitioners by taking their last name. These findings demonstrate that Kevin's best interests would be served by petitioners adopting him.
Ultimately, the trial court's findings, which comply with the requirements of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a), demonstrate that the court considered all the evidence presented and made a reasoned decision. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in Kevin's best interests. See In re T.M., 182 N.C.App. 566, 577, 643 S.E.2d 471, 478 (upholding best interests determination where the trial court found foster parents would be good candidates to adopt the juvenile), aff'd per curiam, 361 N.C. 683, 651 S.E.2d 884 (2007). This argument is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
The trial court's findings were supported by competent evidence, and the court properly terminated respondent's parental rights on the basis of the ground of neglect. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that termination of respondent's parental rights was in Kevin's best interests. The trial court's order is affirmed.
Affirmed. Judges BEASLEY and THIGPEN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).