Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County (Super. Ct. No. DP012835), Caryl Lee, Judge.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Julie J. Agin, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Minor.
OPINION
RYLAARSDAM, ACTING P. J.
Appellant Rachael O., natural mother of Kaitlyn C., appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. The appeal is based on two contentions: (1) failure to assess Kaitlyn’s aunt and uncle for placement and (2) denial of her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388. (All further statutory references are to this code.) Mother, having failed to address the placement issue in the trial court, waived the issue. Her section 388 petition failed to show significant changed circumstances; nor did it demonstrate that delaying permanency was in her daughter’s best interest. We therefore affirm the order.
FACTS
Kaitlyn was taken into custody shortly after her birth because mother tested positive for methamphetamine. Kaitlyn’s father is deceased. At the 12-month review hearing, which mother failed to attend, services were terminated and the court ordered a section 366.26 hearing be scheduled. During this period Kaitlyn was placed with nonrelative foster parents. Although an aunt and uncle residing in North Carolina requested placement, mother did not want them to be considered and SSA deemed that it would not be in Kaitlyn’s best interest to live in North Carolina.
On the day the section 366.26 hearing was scheduled, mother filed a section 388 petition requesting the court return Kaitlyn to her or provide further reunification services. In the course of argument, counsel for Kaitlyn and for SSA pointed out that little of the petition’s allegations were supported by evidence and the court concluded the petition did not present a prima facie case requiring a hearing.
DISCUSSION
1. Mother waived the right to contest the nonrelative placement.
SSA states in its brief that mother never requested the trial court to place Kaitlyn with her relatives in North Carolina. We searched the record and looked in vain at appellant’s reply brief to find a single record reference to contradict this statement. Having failed to address the issue in the trial court and now raising for the first time, after her parental rights have already been terminated, mother has waived her right to argue the point. A party is precluded from urging on appeal any matter not raised in the trial court. (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 411-412.)
Relying on Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1035, SSA also argues that mother lacks standing to raise this argument after her rights were terminated. The cited case held that, after termination of reunification services, a parent has no independent standing to appeal a placement issue. And SSA’s position may have merit; “[a]n appellant cannot urge errors which affect only another party who does not appeal. [Citation.]” (In re Vanessa Z. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 258, 261.) Mother attempts to distinguish the facts in Cesar V. Because we conclude that mother waived the issue, we need not resolve the question of standing.
2. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the section 388 petition.
A party petitioning under section 388 has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there is a change of circumstances or new evidence, and that the proposed modification is in the child’s best interest. (§ 388, subds. (a), (c); In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415.) And “if the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on the petition. [Citations.] The prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition. [Citation.]” (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) “The petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (In re Jasmon O., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 415.)
Here, as noted by counsel at the trial court hearing on the petition, few of the facts asserted in the petition were adequately supported by evidence. In support of her claimed employment, mother only submitted a business card with another person’s name. The progress report from La Familia, a family treatment center, noted poor attendance and poor motivation. This absence of substantial evidence in support of the petition supports a conclusion that the court did not abuse its discretion.
The court based its decision to deny the petition on its review of the evidence. Mother does not argue that the court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. It noted that mother waited more than a year before engaging in the recommended programs and did not begin the program until a few months before the hearing. The court also pointed out that mother did not enroll in the La Familia program until almost a year after the disposition hearing and, even then, had poor attendance. It recognized that mother’s circumstances were “changing . . . rather than changed.” That was not enough at the late stage of the proceedings.
In addition, the petition failed to adequately address the second prong of the section 388 requirement that the proposed modification was in Kaitlyn’s best interest. Mother merely stated that she “had consistent visits with the minor since March 2007 [five months before the hearing and more than a year after Kaitlyn was taken into protective custody]. She is now in a safe home, employed, testing clean, in drug treatment and parenting class having completed a 10 week domestic violence class.” (Capitalization omitted.) The entire focus is on mother’s conduct; the petition is silent as to why a change would benefit Kaitlyn.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: ARONSON, J. IKOLA, J.