Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD222789, JD222790
BUTZ, J.
Karlee H., mother of the minors, appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Appellant contends the court abused its discretion in failing to find she had established an exception to the preference for adoption as a permanent plan. We shall affirm.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In March 2004, Kaden H., age 3, and Alexa H., age 8, were removed from appellant’s custody in Santa Clara County due to appellant’s prescription drug abuse and resulting neglect of the minors. In 2005, the juvenile court adopted a reunification plan and later transferred the case to Sacramento County.
Services were provided to appellant over the next year. Appellant regularly visited the minors when they were placed out of the home and progressed to unsupervised visits although appellant’s care of the minors during these visits was inconsistent. Alexa particularly looked forward to visits with appellant and wanted to stay with her. The minors were returned to appellant’s custody under supervision in June 2006, although it appeared her participation in drug and family counseling was minimal.
Almost three months after their return home, the minors were again removed on a supplemental petition (§ 387) because appellant had left Alexa, now 11 years old, alone for an extended period and the home was in disarray. Appellant blamed Alexa for the breakup of the family. Relatives reported that circumstances in appellant’s home were much the same as they had been prior to the removal in 2004, with Alexa responsible for parenting and appellant sleeping a good deal of the time. It appeared that appellant was still abusing prescription drugs and not able to care for the minors. Alexa expressed a desire to return to appellant but wanted appellant to help with her homework and get her to school. The court sustained the supplemental petition and set a selection and implementation hearing.
The assessment for the hearing stated appellant had ongoing weekly supervised visitation, which was positive and enjoyed by the participants. According to the assessment, Alexa had a significant relationship with appellant but a stronger one with the maternal aunt and uncle and was looking forward to being placed with them. Alexa expressed a desire to be adopted by the maternal aunt and uncle.
The hearing was continued to complete bonding studies on the minors. The study for Kaden found he did not have a significant relationship with appellant, did not need her and showed a weak emotional connection to her. Kaden had a desire to visit appellant, but nothing more, and needed a stable placement. The study for Alexa stated she had a strong, but negative, relationship with appellant. The negative aspects of the relationship resulted in a long-term pattern of Alexa engaging in attention-seeking behavior, which appellant saw as demanding. Because of the negative pattern of interaction, Alexa was disheartened and disappointed after visits, and she was led to feel unsafe and insecure in the relationship. The study concluded the strong but negative relationship had an overall harmful impact on Alexa, who needed a stable, structured environment to overcome the effects of the relationship with appellant.
By the date of the selection and implementation hearing, the minors had been moved to their prospective adoptive placement. Minors’ counsel stated both minors wanted to maintain a relationship with appellant but Alexa had made it clear she wanted to be adopted. Appellant’s counsel objected to termination of her parental rights and argued the benefit exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) applied based upon the evidence already before the court. County counsel responded that appellant had not shown that the relationship between appellant and the minors would outweigh the benefit to the minors of a permanent home. The court found termination would not be detrimental to the minors because the relationship was not of a nature that permanency should be delayed. The court selected adoption as the permanent plan and terminated appellant’s parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to find that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to Alexa because she had established that Alexa would benefit from continued contact with her. She further argues that, since parental rights as to Alexa were wrongly terminated, in order to maintain the sibling bond, parental rights as to Kaden should be reinstated as well. We disagree.
“‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) There are only limited circumstances that permit the court to find a “compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The party claiming the exception has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252; In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1373; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(e)(3); Evid. Code, § 500.)
One of the circumstances in which termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor is: “The parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) The benefit to the child must promote “the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) Even “‘frequent and loving’” contact is not sufficient to establish this benefit absent a significant, positive emotional attachment between parent and child. (In re Teneka W. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728-729; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419; In re Brian R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 904, 924.)
The evidence showed appellant regularly visited the minors and the visits were generally positive, but that appellant’s inability to interact effectively with the minors left Kaden indifferent to her and Alexa disappointed. The bonding studies concluded Kaden had no significant relationship with appellant and Alexa’s relationship, while significant, was also negative and had led to Alexa’s behavioral problems. The studies both discussed the need for each child to have permanence and stability after years of inconsistent parenting by appellant whose drug addiction left her unavailable as a parent much of the time. It is true that Alexa had repeatedly stated during the dependency that she wanted to live with appellant; however, prior to the hearing she began to qualify these statements with conditions that appellant help her with homework or otherwise act in a parental fashion. At the time of the hearing, Alexa had stated her preference for adoption by the maternal aunt and uncle.
Appellant did not meet her burden to establish an exception to adoption for Alexa, and the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating appellant’s parental rights. Because appellant has not prevailed on her claim as to Alexa, we need not address her dependent claim as to Kaden.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J. MORRISON, J.