Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD229749.
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
S.R., mother of infant minor J.W., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders, which placed the minor in mother’s custody under dependent supervision. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395.) Mother contends there is no substantial evidence the minor would currently be at risk of serious physical harm if returned to her custody without supervision. We shall affirm.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 21, 2009, Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) filed a section 300 petition as to the minor, a two-month-old male, alleging: (1) Mother and father (D.W.) had more than once engaged in domestic violence, most recently on or about May 14, 2009, in the minor’s presence; mother had failed to take reasonable steps to protect the minor in that she had not obtained a restraining order against father. (2) Knowing that the maternal grandmother (C.E.) had a substance abuse problem, on or about April 12, 2009, mother left the minor in C.E.’s care; law enforcement found C.E. and the minor lying on the floor next to an empty wine bottle, and C.E.’s blood-alcohol content was.26 percent.
On October 7, 2009, the restraining order clause was deleted because mother had obtained such an order.
The Department’s request for protective custody warrant further alleged:
Investigating a referral on April 24, 2009, the Department was told that on February 6, 2009 (approximately two weeks before the minor’s birth), mother had found C.E., who had a long history of alcohol abuse, in an alcoholic coma. Mother also admitted to marijuana abuse.
Mother confirmed C.E.’s drinking problem, but denied leaving the minor alone with C.E. Mother understood the risk of doing so.
On May 11, 2009, the Department received another referral, which reported the April 12, 2009, incident with C.E. and the minor alleged in the petition. Law enforcement arrested C.E. at that time, but mother came home and the minor was not put into protective custody.
Father had a criminal history including several drug possession and sale charges. He was a registered drug offender on searchable probation.
On May 14, 2009, the Department received another referral reporting the domestic violence incident cited in the petition.
Interviewed by the social worker on May 15, 2009, mother said she had allowed C.E. to take the minor home for the night on April 11, 2009, despite being “concerned, ” because C.E. claimed to have been sober for 30 days and attending 12-step meetings.
Mother said the domestic violence episode of May 14, 2009, was not the first--father had pushed her to the ground when she was pregnant. On May 14, he just started hitting her. The social worker directed her to get a restraining order against him, but she did not have time and transportation was hard for her. She had a bus card valid through the end of June 2009, and the social worker provided her with bus passes; nevertheless, she had not yet obtained a restraining order.
A Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department report stated that mother reported an argument between the parents on May 12, 2009, during which father punched her in the jaw, chest, and head, and tackled her to the ground. She said he had done this to her before and she wanted him jailed.
Finding an imminent threat to the minor’s health or safety and no reasonable means to protect the minor short of removal from the parents’ home, the juvenile court ordered the minor’s detention.
On May 26, 2009, mother obtained a temporary restraining order against father and requested an order for domestic violence protection.
After extending the temporary restraining order several times, the juvenile court entered a restraining order on August 12, 2009, to last for two years.
The detention report recommended out-of-home detention for the minor pending the jurisdiction/disposition hearing due to the parents’ domestic violence and mother’s failure to provide adequate supervision. On May 27, 2009, at the detention hearing, the juvenile court so ordered.
On May 29, 2009, at the initial hearing on the section 300 petition, the juvenile court ordered the minor placed in mother’s home under the Department’s supervision, with reunification services for her. The court also ordered her not to contact father or allow the minor contact with him, and to submit to drug tests as arranged by the Department. The court set a hearing on the requested restraining order on June 10, 2009, and a jurisdiction/disposition hearing on June 23, 2009.
The jurisdiction/disposition report recommended the minor be adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court and placed with mother under dependent supervision, with reunification services for her to include counseling, parenting education, and substance abuse assessment and testing. Services were not recommended for father because he was only the alleged father and his whereabouts remained unknown.
According to the report, mother said she did not immediately get a temporary restraining order after the May 14, 2009, incident because she “didn’t think it was that severe”; she “had other things to do and he hadn’t been back.” Now, however, she understood the danger father’s conduct could pose to the minor.
As to leaving the minor with the maternal grandmother (C.E.) on April 12, 2009, mother said again that C.E. had apparently been sober for at least a month, and mother had not thought C.E. would relapse with the minor around. When she was able to reach C.E. and realized how drunk she was, mother immediately called 911. She had not understood the seriousness of C.E.’s substance abuse problem: “She fooled us all. My trust in her is gone now.” Mother had not realized that putting the minor with C.E. could put him at risk; she would not do it again.
Mother had an alcohol and other drug (AOD) assessment on May 27, 2009, conducted by early intervention specialist Leslie Alexander. Alexander observed that mother had “a level of co-dependency with” C.E., a long-term alcoholic, and “displayed a similar enmeshment with” father; mother spoke of “having to” trust C.E. and allow father contact with the minor because of their blood ties.
Mother admitted to Alexander that she had been convicted of possession for sale of marijuana in March 2009 in an incident that involved father. Mother had a strong family history of addiction. Now 20 years old, she had used marijuana since she was 16 years old, most recently on January 1, 2009, while pregnant; she denied use of other illicit substances. She admitted occasional use of alcohol, but generally avoided it because of her mother’s history.
Alexander assessed mother as a substance abuser with related problems. She was referred to STARS for supportive services, to Valley Toxicology for testing on a random schedule set by STARS, and to outpatient treatment at Strategies for Change. She was also referred to 12-step groups and required to document attendance at meetings. Due to her codependency, she was advised to participate in Alanon as well as AA.
STARS intake specialist Linda Guzman stated that at mother’s intake hearing on June 9, 2009, she tested presumptively positive for THC. She denied current marijuana use and claimed she tested positive because she had been with father when he was using; she had last seen him on May 14, 2009. Guzman stated that was possible, but mother’s levels would be monitored to determine whether they came from past exposure or current use.
The Department concluded that mother could now adequately protect the minor, but only with supervision, because she did not yet fully comprehend the risks to the minor from her past conduct and continued to minimize them.
An addendum report filed July 17, 2009, updated mother’s participation in services, which was spotty at best.
Since mother’s admission into STARS, she had tested positive for marijuana on June 9 and June 16, 2009, and had two pending test results. On June 24, 2009, mother failed to complete her intake requirements with Strategies for Change, rendering her noncompliant with her case plan in this respect, though she was in compliance as to face-to-face contacts and support group attendance.
STARS worker Guzman reported that mother claimed she had not returned to treatment because she thought she needed a tuberculosis test and a physical examination done first; Guzman urged mother to get these services from the Primary Care Center if she could not get them elsewhere. Mother also told Guzman she was going to be thrown out of her apartment; she said she was going through all of this only because she had called Child Protective Services (CPS) about the domestic violence, and next time she would just let father beat her to death. However, mother finally promised to comply with her services.
Mother was referred to WEAVE for domestic violence counseling on June 8, 2009, but at her request, this referral was changed to Strategies for Change. However, as of July 15, 2009, mother had not yet enrolled there. On July 17, 2009, mother said she now wanted to enroll in services at WEAVE instead. She had still not begun services at either agency.
Mother was referred to the parenting orientation group on June 8, 2009, to sign up for parenting classes; the social worker advised her to do so as soon as possible. On June 30, 2009, mother said she had signed up for a class in North Highlands to begin on July 6, 2009; the social worker suggested there might be classes closer to her home. On July 6, 2009, mother asked if her classes could be changed to Strategies for Change. As of July 15, 2009, however, mother had not enrolled in services there. On July 17, 2009, mother claimed she had enrolled in parenting classes with a different agency, to begin on July 21, 2009.
Mother’s Black Infant Health Program case worker, Shawnte Sheffield, stated that mother had started services with the program in February 2009. Sheffield visited the home once a month and called mother three times a month. She had worked with mother on housing, parenting skills, and child development education. Mother appeared to be doing well, although she did not fully understand crib safety. Sheffield would continue to work with mother until the minor was a year old, visiting more often if resources permitted.
On June 30, 2009, mother told the social worker she did not feel she was getting the full benefit of services through Black Infant Health because the assigned worker was not following through; mother desired a new case worker.
On September 11, 2009, the Department filed a second addendum report with a further update on mother’s participation in services. STARS worker Guzman reported that mother was noncompliant for the period August 1 through August 15, 2009, because she had missed a support group; however, she had been compliant with face-to-face contacts and testing, and had not tested positive for drugs. As of August 31, 2009, she had not signed up for domestic violence classes or parenting classes.
Mother explained that C.E. had relapsed again, which had frustrated mother and discouraged her from participating in services. It had also created a problem because C.E. could no longer help mother pay rent. She did not know how she could go to work and participate in services at the same time. Mother agreed to talk to her counselor and STARS worker about moving to evening classes so she could work during the day.
On October 7, 2009, the juvenile court conducted the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing.
Mother testified as follows:
She had not seen or spoken to father since May 14, 2009. She was pressing charges against him. Father had sent mother a text message, demanding to see the minor; she did not respond.
She had waited four days after the domestic violence incident to seek a restraining order because she did not have transportation and did not think it was necessary at first; mother told the apartment manager to call the police if father came onto the property. She was not currently in a relationship.
Mother’s domestic violence classes taught her how to recognize signs of a potential abuser. She had taken only three so far because her counselor at Strategies for Change told her not to try to “cram in” all of her services in the beginning. Mother began taking these classes in mid-September 2009, although she had been referred to them as of June 9.
She participated in parenting classes from the start; she was now halfway through. Mother had learned a lot about communicating with children and understanding their feelings, and how to discipline them without hitting them. She knew that domestic violence could negatively affect her son.
On cross-examination, however, mother admitted that she might not have started them until August 2009. She did not know why she had waited so long, except that she was trying to “juggle” attendance at services and also still trying to get her TB test.
Mother did not currently have a relationship with C.E. She saw C.E. about once a month. C.E. had not been alone with the minor or provided care for him since April 12, 2009. Mother knew C.E. had a drinking problem and persons with drinking problems should not be left with children.
She attended three AA meetings a week. She was learning a lot from them about the character and behavior of an alcoholic, which she could apply to her relationship with C.E.
Mother had tested positive twice for marijuana, but not again since the last positive test. She tested twice a week for the first 60 days; after which she tested once a week, unless her “recovery specialist, ” Linda Guzman, with whom she spoke to once or twice a week, thought she should test more. She understood that being high on marijuana could be harmful to her child.
Asked about the support group meeting she allegedly missed during the first half of August, mother said she was missing a signature because she had not double checked her form before turning it in.
Mother may have meant that she actually attended the meeting but forgot to get the signature to prove it.
Mother had stable housing for a month, relocating from the south side to the north side of Strategy for Change.
She had individual counseling. Mother just switched counselors because of her move. Before the move, she saw her former counselor three or four times, and found these sessions helpful.
She would voluntarily participate in services even without a court order. Mother had trouble complying at first because of her son’s health and the confusion about her TB test, but now that her situation was more stable, she liked her services and learned a lot from them every day. In August 2009, mother was still trying to figure out whether she should move, get a roommate, or go into a shelter; she was also trying to get a job. Now, all of her problems were resolved.
Mother’s counsel asked the juvenile court to dismiss the section 300 petition and return the minor to mother’s custody without supervision because there was no evidence the minor would currently be at risk in her care. The Department and the minor’s counsel opposed this request.
The juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition and ordered the minor’s return to mother under dependent supervision, with services to be provided to her. The court explained its decision as follows:
“What I see in this case assessment is that--taking all the evidence in account--the child should be with the mother, but under the supervision of the court. There is--this is kind of a mixed bag. The mother’s obviously made some progress, but at the same time I think my assessment of the evidence is that she was--she’s early in services, very early. She was initially resistant to services, but is now coming around and learning[, ] which is positive.
“One evidence to support the initial resistance, I think, if you look at page 2 of the addendum report, July 22nd, line 17, it says Miss Guzman, her recovery specialist, stated she was concerned about the mother not completing her services because the mother still had the child in her care and hoped the mother was continuing with AOD services. Miss Guzman stated the mother informed her that she had called CPS to go to domestic violence and the reason she was going through all of this was because she had called and the next time she would simply let the father beat her to death. And I know there’s been progress made since she made that statement. She said the--one of the reasons she didn’t get the restraining order right away, although she has the restraining order now, is for certain reasons. One was she considered the situation not too severe and that’s concerning[, ] since the evidence is the alleged father punched her in the face, the jaw, the chest, and the back. She screamed and called 911 and has had a sore jaw. That seems pretty severe actually.
“Certainly I understand the situation. It is understandable about not having stability, but I don’t think that was the only reason. I think there was an initial resistance of services initially not only because of the lack of stability and housing, and also this is the second domestic violence incident. This is domestic violence incident number two, the one in May. And the incident with the grandmother, obviously, while I don’t think it’s likely that she’ll leave the child with the grandmother again, it was obviously poor judgment--very poor judgment to do that. That’s what counseling and services can address and she should have known better as she knew there was a pattern of relapse. She even admitted that in the report[, ] that her mother had a pattern of relapsing, so that put the child at risk and that put the child particularly at risk because of his extremely young age and is really vulnerable. The mother is starting to do well. I hope we can terminate this case soon, but today is not that day.”
DISCUSSION
Mother contends no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings because there was no showing of present risk to the minor’s physical health while in mother’s custody. We disagree.
Under section 300, subdivision (b), a child needs the protection of the juvenile court if he or she “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent... to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent... to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left.”
Evidence of past conduct, without more, does not support a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b). What is required is “some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136.) In other words, the evidence must show that, because of the risk of the alleged conduct recurring, there is a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the minor in the future. (Id. at p. 135.)
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jurisdictional finding under the substantial evidence standard, resolving all evidentiary disputes in favor of the court’s rulings and drawing all reasonable inferences to support them. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 450-451.)
Here, as the juvenile court explained, mother had recently displayed very poor judgment about two different matters which put the minor at risk of physical harm: her slowness to recognize the danger of father’s physical abuse in the minor’s presence and to respond appropriately, and her entrustment of the minor to the care of her alcoholic mother. She had begun services very recently and only after significant resistance; thus, though she claimed to have learned from her services, it was still too early for the court to feel confident that she had truly internalized those lessons. Furthermore, she was still very young and had not yet lived independently of her mother or shown that she could avoid falling into other abusive relationships. Therefore, the court could reasonably conclude that, if left unsupervised, mother could not yet be trusted to avoid the kinds of conduct that had put the minor at physical risk in the past. Substantial evidence supported that finding.
Mother’s contrary arguments wrongly presume that the court should have taken her testimony at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing as dispositive. But the court was not required to do so, and on review we must construe the evidence most favorably to the court’s ruling.
Mother relies on In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126. This case is distinguishable. In Nicholas, the only allegation of physical harm by the parents was a single isolated event six months before the jurisdiction hearing. Here, the allegations and supporting evidence concerned more than a single isolated incident long before the jurisdictional hearing. They revealed mother’s pattern of failing to deal properly with two persons central to her life who had acted in ways that endangered the infant minor.
Mother also relies on In re James R., supra, 176 Cal.App.4th 129. That case is also distinguishable. The mother, though having a history of mental instability and substance abuse, had not abused or neglected the minors or put them at serious risk of harm. (Id. at pp. 136-137.) Here, mother lived with a man who used violence against her in the minor’s presence, and turned the minor over to an alcoholic who passed out from intoxication with the minor in her care.
Mother notes that the Department did not immediately file a section 300 petition after learning of the April 12, 2009, incident involving the grandmother. However, whether the Department should have filed the petition sooner is immaterial at this point. Furthermore, as respondent observes, the Department did not receive a referral from the April 12 incident until May 11, 2009, three days before the referral which led to the minor’s detention; thus, the record does not show that the Department was dilatory or that it did not consider mother’s conduct in the former incident to put the minor at risk.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (jurisdictional and dispositional orders) is affirmed.
We concur: RAYE, J., HULL, J.