Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. J211048 Michael A. Knish, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Dabney B. Finch, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Meagan J. Beale and Elizabeth S. Voorhies, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MILLER J.
After a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true allegations that J.W. (minor) committed the offenses of resisting an officer (count 1—Pen. Code § 148, subd. (a)(1)) and receipt of a stolen vehicle (count 2—§ 496d, subd. (a).) On appeal, minor contends insufficient evidence supports the true finding on the count 2 offense; in particular, on the element requiring that the vehicle have been stolen. We find substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding and, therefore, affirm the judgment in full.
All further statutory references will be to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the night of December 5, 2007, Jimmy Sillas loaned his vehicle to his cousin, Edgar. Edgar drove the car to his boss’s home the next morning, parked the car near the boss’s home around 7:30 a.m., locked the car, and carpooled with his boss to work. His boss lived immediately adjacent to the local middle school. Neither Sillas nor Edgar gave anyone else permission to use the car.
At approximately 9:30 a.m. that same morning, Colton Police Officer Jason Hanna was dispatched to the intersection of Buttonwood and Candleberry in reference to a possible hit-and-run collision. The nearest school in that particular area is the Jehue Middle School. Upon arrival, Officer Hanna witnessed two juveniles exiting Sillas’s vehicle from seated positions therein. The car was parked on the west side of Candleberry. Minor was exiting from the driver’s seat of the car. Officer Hanna immediately attempted to contact the juvenile exiting the passenger side of the car. Minor ran away.
Officer Hanna asked minor to stop but minor failed to comply. After running approximately two blocks, Officer Hanna caught minor and placed him under arrest. Officer Hanna testified that after giving minor Miranda advisements, which minor indicated he understood and waived, minor related the following events: Minor told Officer Hanna that he recognized the vehicle as one stolen by one of his friends. Minor decided to wait for his friend inside the car. Minor and his friend then put the car in neutral and rolled the car down the street and around the corner. Minor claimed he did not steal the car. Minor stated he ran away because he was scared. Sillas received the undamaged vehicle back that night.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
In finding the count 2 offense true, the court noted, “I do find based largely on [minor’s] statement that he did take the car—I don’t think it was stolen before. I think that’s kind of—that lacks believability. But I think that he did roll it down the street as he told the officer; that he entered it, that he rolled it down the street. I don’t find that he drove it. But that would be enough to actually comprise an asportation. And therefore I will find that charge to be true.”
DISCUSSION
Minor contends that the prosecution introduced insufficient evidence from which the juvenile court could determine that the vehicle was stolen when minor was caught in possession of it. Specifically, minor argues that the evidence fails to show that minor, or someone else, had the specific intent to permanently or, for an unreasonable length of time, deprive the owner of the vehicle.
“‘The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]’” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088.) “In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]”’” (Id. at p. 1054.)
“To sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property, the prosecution must prove: (1) the property was stolen; (2) the defendant knew the property was stolen (hereafter the knowledge element); and, (3) the defendant had possession of the stolen property.” (People v. Russell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1425.) The requirement that the vehicle be stolen is satisfied if the prosecution shows there was an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property or to deprive the owner of the property temporarily, “but for an unreasonable time so as to deprive the person of a major portion of its value or enjoyment.” (People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58.) One who steals property and is later found in possession of that property may be convicted of either stealing the property or receiving the stolen property, but not both. (Cf. § 496, subd. (a); see People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 856-857.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implied determination that, at the time minor was apprehended, he personally intended to either permanently or temporarily, but unreasonably, deprive the victim of his vehicle. Here, Edgar indicated he parked the vehicle in front of the local middle school at approximately 7:30 a.m. He locked the car before leaving it. Neither he nor Sillas gave anyone else permission to use the car. Officer Hanna found the vehicle two hours later in the possession of minor, whom neither Sillas nor Edgar knew. Minor informed Officer Hanna that he believed the vehicle was stolen, although he denied culpability for stealing it.
Nevertheless, minor admitted that he and his friend entered the car and rolled it down the street and around the corner. Officer Hanna testified that the incident occurred during school hours, that the juveniles appeared to be school-aged, and that minor told him they were ditching school. The “nearest” school to that particular location was the Jehue Middle School; a rational inference of which would be that the location the car was found in was not immediately adjacent to that school. Thus, the facts reasonably support the deduction that minor and his friend found the vehicle, broke into it, and decided to steal it by rolling it away from the school. Under these facts, the juvenile court could reasonably deduce that minor intended to remove the vehicle to a secure location.
While the court discounted minor’s statement that someone else stole the car, it still could have believed minor’s statement that he was aware the car was stolen. Indeed, the court stated that it believed minor took the car. The fact that minor immediately ran upon being approached by the officer also indicated a consciousness of guilt, which further supported such an inference. This is substantial evidence that minor intended to permanently or temporarily, but unreasonably, deprive Sillas of his vehicle. The fact that he did not succeed is immaterial; the intent was sufficiently demonstrated to support the court’s finding.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: GAUT Acting P.J., KING J.