In re Justin W.

Full title: In re Justin W. [1] In re Destiny W

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Jan 19, 2016

H12CP10013477A (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2016)

Opinion

H12CP10013477A H12CP11014104A

01-19-2016

In re Justin W. [1]; In re Destiny W

Nicola E. Rubinow, J.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

Nicola E. Rubinow, J.

Justin W., born September 29, 2010, Destiny W., born August 5, 2011, and their parents have long engaged in litigation initiated by the Commissioner of Children and Families (DCF or the department). Justin and Destiny have spent their entire lives in DCF foster care.

The court now addresses the termination of parental rights (TPR) petitions filed by DCF on April 18, 2013 for Destiny as the allegations relate to her mother, the respondent Yashika W. and to her father, the respondent Stanley W. The court also addresses the TPR petition filed by DCF on May 14, 2014 for Justin as the allegations relate to his father, Stanley W.²

2 As discussed in Part I, the parental rights of Justin's mother, Yashika W., were terminated on November 18, 2013. " 'Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed by [General Statutes] § 17a-112 . . . Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in § 17a-112(j)(3) exists by clear and convincing evidence.' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 500, 78 A.3d 797 (2013). 'If the trial court determines that as statutory ground for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial court must determine whether termination is in the best interest of the child . . . The best interest determination also must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Melody L., 290 Conn. 131, 163, 962 A.2d 81 (2009), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn. 726, 91 A.3d 862 (2014); see also General Statutes § § 17a-112(k) and 45a-717(h)." In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 582-83 n.12, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015).

The court has reviewed the verified petitions, as amended in court. The parties had due notice of the proceedings, which do not involve any " Indian child" as that term is used by Practice Book § 32a-3; no claims affecting the children's custody have been shown to be pending elsewhere; and the court has jurisdiction over the matter. Each party has been represented by skilled and experienced counsel, who have filed comprehensive and detailed briefs, as directed, concerning matters of law arose during the course of this TPR litigation.

Finding all allegations based on failure to achieve rehabilitation in favor of the department as to Yashika W. and Stanley W., both TPR petitions are hereby GRANTED.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following portions of the parties' attenuated child protection litigation history is relevant to the TPR issues.³ See In re Paul O., 141 Conn.App. 477, 480, 62 A.3d 637, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 933, 64 A.3d 332 (2013); In re Tremaine C., 117 Conn.App. 521, 597, 980 A.2d 317, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 920, 984 A.2d 69 (2009).⁴

3 After hearing, the court ruled that judicial notice would be taken of the appropriate content within the juvenile court files maintained for Justin and Destiny, and of juvenile court files maintained for Justin's and Destiny's siblings. See Docket Nos. H12-CP09-012602-A (Quandrea B.), H12-CP09-012604-A (Shadiamond W.), H12-CP09-012605-A (Terran W.), H12-CP09-012603-A (Tayjanae W.). This ruling also applies to the juvenile court file maintained for Sanai D., Docket No. H12-CP14-015777-A. The court has limited its attention to the uncontroverted aspects of these court files, as contemplated by In re Stacy G, 94 Conn.App. 348, 354-55, 892 A.2d 1034 (2006). The court has adopted the spelling of the name Taynajae as used in her prior court files, although the name is sometimes spelled in other ways.

4 " In order for the court to make a determination as to the respondent's prospects for rehabilitation, the court [is] required to obtain 'a historical perspective of the respondent's child caring and parenting abilities.' In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 361, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995). 'Because the parent-child relationship is at issue, all relevant facts and family history should be considered by the trial court when deciding whether to terminate the respondent's parental rights . . . The parent-child relationship presents an ongoing dynamic that cannot be frozen in time. The entire picture of that relationship must be considered whenever the termination of parental rights is under consideration by a judicial authority.' In re Brianna F., 50 Conn.App. 805, 814, 719 A.2d 478 (1998)." (Emphasis added.) In re Anna Lee M., 104 Conn.App. 121, 128, 931 A.2d 949, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 939, 937 A.2d 696 (2007). See also In re Christopher L., 135 Conn.App. 232, 243, 41 A.3d 664 (2012). Furthermore, the trier of fact may consider evidence of the respondent's arrests even though those arrests did not result in conviction; that evidence is relevant to establish that whether the respondent's pattern of misconduct has or will deny his or her child the care, guidance or control necessary for the child's physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being. See In re Helen B., 50 Conn.App. 818, 828-29, 719 A.2d 907 (1998) (no error in admitting evidence of the respondent's arrests which did not result in conviction); In re Brianna F., supra, 50 Conn.App. 814.

On July 23, 2009, DCF imposed ninety-six-hour holds and assumed custody of four of Yashika W.'s children: Quandrea B., born December 29, 1998; Tayjanae W., born September 14, 2004; Shadiamond W., born January 13, 2008; and Terran H., born July 7, 2009.⁵ The respondent-father, Stanley W., is the father of Shadiamond.

5 DCF filings and other records reflect various spellings for the children's formal names and various nicknames by which they are known. For consistency, the court has adopted the names used in the original petitions establishing jurisdiction over the children's well-being, or the names approved by the court for use by the department after submissions such as DCF's oral motion to change the spelling of Tayjanae's name presented in court on November 21, 2011, or DCF's Ex Parte Motion to Correct Court Record, filed 2/4/13 on behalf of Quandrea.

On July 27, 2009, DCF filed ex parte applications for Orders of Temporary Custody (OTCs) for Quandrea, Tayjanae, Shadiamond and Terran. The court (Keller, J.) granted each application, finding that in the custody of Yashika W., each child was in immediate physical danger from the surroundings, that continuation in Yashika W.'s home was contrary to the welfare of each child, that reasonable efforts to prevent removal had been made by the state, and that temporary and custody of each child should be vested in DCF. On that date, DCF also filed neglect petitions for Quandrea, Tayjanae, Shadiamond and Terran, placing alleging that while in the care of Yashika W., each child was being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, and/or that the child was being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to his or her well-being. DCF also alleged abuse as to Tayjanae and that she has a condition which is the result of maltreatment such as sexual molestation and/or emotional maltreatment.⁶ On July 27, 2009, the court (Keller, J.) issued specific steps requiring Yashika W., among other things, to " [p]articipate in counseling and make progress toward [the following] treatment goals: Mother to gain knowledge regarding the trauma of sexual abuse experienced by Tayjanae . . . Mother to bring the children to all medical appointments." ⁷ Specific steps also were issued for Stanley W., who was incarcerated at the time. On July 31, 2009, the court (Olear, J.) sustained the OTC for each child, and issued amended steps, with like goals, for Yashika W. The court also issued steps for Stanley W. on that date requiring him, among other things, to undergo a substance abuse evaluation and to have no involvement with the criminal justice system.

6 Through the Summary of Facts and Addendum to Petition of Neglect filed with these petitions, DCF alleged, among other things, that: Yashika W. is also the mother of James W., born January 29, 1989 and Tiquana W., born August 24, 1990; both James and Tiquana had disclosed sexual abuse by a maternal uncle, but Yashika W. failed to cooperate with relevant services following these disclosures; DCF had conducted thirteen investigations of the family from 1994 to 2009; in 1997 Yashika W. was substantiated for physical neglect as to James and Tiquana; in 2002 Yashika W. was substantiated for physical neglect as to James, Tiquana and Quandrea; in 2006 Yashika W. was substantiated for educational neglect as to Tiquana and Quandrea; and that in 2009 Yashika W. was substantiated for physical neglect as to Tayjanae; in 2008, Stanley W. was substantiated for sexual abuse as to Tayjanae; in 2009, Yashika W. allowed Stanley W. to be around Tayjanae after her disclosure of his sexual abuse; and that Yashika W. failed to take Tayjanae to assessments or treatment scheduled to address the trauma of sexual abuse the child had experiences, so that the child was discharged for lack of compliance; that Yashika W. failed to follow through with recommended mental health services for James, Tiquana and Tayjanae; Yashika W.'s grandchild Quirvontrey W., born June 28, 2008, had sustained bilateral proximal humerus fractures that did not match the explanations provided, which serious injuries were sustained by Quirvontrey while he lived with Yashika W.

7 Upon execution, specific steps become enforceable court orders. See In re Jeffrey C., 261 Conn. 189, 192, 196-97, 802 A.2d 772 (2002). " Specific steps provide notice and guidance to a parent as to what should be done to facilitate reunification and prevent termination of rights." In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. supra, 507-08. " [S]pecific steps are considered to be 'fair warning' to a parent of the potential termination of parental rights in subsequent proceedings . . . Indeed, the failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding." (Internal citation omitted.) In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003); see also In re Cheila R., 112 Conn.App. 582, 591, 963 A.2d 1014 (2009). Insofar as § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) is concerned, a parent's compliance with treatment programs, even when termed substantial, is relevant but not dispositive as to the rehabilitation finding. See In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 791, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008). See also In re Elvin G., supra, 310 Conn. 508; In re Coby C., 107 Conn.App. 395, 406, 945 A.2d 529 (2008).

On October 26, 2009, Yashika W. signed a plea of no contest to allegations that Quandrea, Shadiamond, Terran and Tayjanae had been exposed to conditions injurious to their well-being, and also that Tayjanae had been abused. On November 10, 2009, the court (Dannehy, J.) adjudicated Quandrea, Shadiamond, Terran and Tayjanae neglected and ordered their commitment to DCF.⁸ The court utilized the OTC specific steps as final steps for Yashika W., requiring her, among other things, to " [p]articipate in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals: Mother to gain knowledge and understanding of the trauma of sexual abuse experienced by [Tayjanae] . . . Mother to bring the children to all medical appointments . . . Do not allow Stanley [W.] or anyone convicted of sexual assault to reside in the home or be in the presence of the children . . ." The court similarly reviewed, approved and ordered Stanley W.'s July 31, 2009 OTC specific steps as final steps to facilitate his reunification with Shadiamond.

8 The court (Dannehy, J.) has approved a permanency plan of long-term foster care for Quandrea.

On July 27, 2010, three years after the children's OTC and neglect petitions had been filed, DCF submitted TPR petitions for Tayjanae, Shadiamond and Terran. As to Yashika W., the TPR petitions alleged, among other things, that: DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with each child; she was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts; and she had " failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child [, she] could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . ." As to Stanley W., the father of Shadiamond, the TPR petition alleged, among other things, that: DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the child; he was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts; he had statutorily abandoned Shadiamond; he had no ongoing parent-child relationship with Shadiamond; and that he had failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation.⁹

9 In its Summary of Facts to Substantiate Petition for TPR, filed July 27, 2009, DCF specifically claimed, among other things, that " [t]he presenting problems with this family were sexual abuse, physical neglect, lack of supervision, inadequate parenting skills, physical abuse, educational neglect and incarceration of [fathers]." As to Yashika W., that summary of facts specifically alleged that: she " has not engaged in services designed to address her mental health and parenting deficiencies [and d]espite mother's completion of a Non-Offender's Group for parents whose children have been sexually abused, mother has repeatedly expressed that she does not believe that her former paramour sexually abused her daughter, Tayjanae." Through that summary of facts, DCF specifically claimed that: Stanley W. " has not made himself available to engage in any services that could address his parenting deficiencies and sexual offending behaviors."

On September 29, 2010, while the TPR petitions for Tayjanae, Shadiamond and Terran were pending, Justin W. was born to Yashika W. and Stanley W.¹⁰ DCF claimed that Yashika W. had limited prenatal care; that Justin was born prematurely; and that the respondent-mother was taking barbiturates prescribed for her migraines. (Social Worker Affidavit, 10/4/10.) On October 4, 2010, the court (Wollenberg, J.) granted DCF's Ex Parte Motion for OTC as to Justin, placing him in the temporary custody of the department. The court issued specific steps requiring the respondent-mother, among other things, to " [t]ake part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals: Control Anger, Refrain from DV"; to undergo individual therapy and medication management at PATH; and to participate in drug testing, anger management and domestic violence services at Community Health Services (CHS)." Also on October 4, 2010, DCF filed a neglect petition for Justin identifying Yashika W. as a respondent although the identity of the child's father remained an issue.¹¹

10 Keith W., Karl B. and John Doe were originally identified by DCF or Yashika W. as being Justin's father. As discussed below, Stanley W. was not found to be Justin's biological father until the December 8, 2011 ruling of the court (Keller, J.).

11 In its Summary of Facts Substantiating Allegations of Neglect filed with Justin's petition, DCF claimed, among other things, that Tayjanae had disclosed to the respondent-mother on July 19, 2008 that Stanley W. had sexually abused her; that Yashika W. failed to cooperate with services recommended for that child; that while living in Yashika W.'s home, her grandson Quirvontry had sustained serious physical injuries at the hands of his mother Tiquana, who is Yashika W.'s daughter.

On October 8, 2010, the court (Keller, J.) sustained Justin's OTC and issued specific steps requiring Yashika W. to, among other things, " [t]ake part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals [of] safe + nurturing parenting"; cooperate with " HBH or Intercommunity Mental Health for Individual [counseling, and] My People's Clinical Services for parenting"; and " visit child . . . as often as DCF permits."

On June 7, 2011, while the TPR petitions were pending and while the question of Justin's paternity remained unresolved, the court (Frazzini, J.) accepted Yashika W.'s nolo contendere plea; adjudicated the child neglected; ordered Justin's commitment to DCF; and re-issued the October 8, 2010 OTC specific steps as final steps for the respondent-mother as to Justin.¹²

12 On June 7, 2011, the court (Frazzini, J.) granted DCF's oral motion to amend Justin's neglect petition to cite in Karl B. and John Doe as respondent-fathers. On July 8, 2011, DCF filed an Amended Neglect petition and an Addendum to Justin's neglect petition naming Karl B. as the child's paternal-respondent. DCF also filed an Amended Summary of Facts to support Justin's amended neglect petition, claiming, among other things, that Yashika W. does not believe Tayjanae's statements of sexual abuse, and does not believe that Tiquanna injured Quirvontry although the abuse was witnessed by others and although Tiquana had confessed.

Destiny W. was born to Yashika W. on August 5, 2011, before the start of her sibling's TPR trials. DCF implemented a ninety-six-hour hold for the child on August 6, 2011. On August 10, 2011, the court (Keller, J.) granted DCF's ex parte motion for an OTC, vesting the child's temporary custody in DCF. The court ordered specific steps for both parents.¹³ (Ex. 12.) On August 11, 2011, DCF filed a neglect petition alleging that Destiny.

13 Stanley W. was issued OTC steps for Destiny although DCF or Yashika W. also had alternatively identified Paylon J. or Kenneth M. as Destiny's father. The OTC steps for Destiny required Yashika W. to, among other things; take part in individual counseling " and make progress toward the identified treatment goals" which were " [e]ngage in counseling to address life issues that are impacting her inability to parent/protect child"; undergo " [c]ounseling with Valerie Williams or other provider who offers service. St. Francis Hospital CATS program"; " [g]et and/or maintain adequate housing and a legal income"; " [l]et DCF . . . know where you . . . are at all times"; " [v]isit the child as often as DCF permits; " and " [s]ign releases allowing DCF to communicate with service providers to check on your attendance, cooperation and progress toward identified goals." (Ex. 11.) The court ordered OTC steps for Stanley W. to facilitate his reunification with Destiny, requiring the respondent-father to, among other things: " [t]ake part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals: Learn effective parenting skills. Father to be assessed for mental health treatment"; " [n]ot use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol or medicine"; " [s]ubmit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about treatment . . . [s]ubmit to randum drug testing"; " [c]ooperate with . . . Parenting-Radiance or similar service and mental health assessment + treatment. Substance abuse random urine screen and treatment--ADRC . . ."; " [g]et and/or maintain adequate housing and a legal income"; " [l]et DCF . . . know where you . . . are at all times"; and " [v]isit the child as often as DCF permits."

On August 19, 2011, the court (Keller, J.) sustained Destiny's OTC; affirmed the OTC steps as amended that date for Yashika W. and Stanley W.; ordered a paternity test for Stanley W.; and ordered that Stanley W.'s steps were contingent on the outcome of the paternity test. On November 3, 2011, in accordance with laboratory testing, the court (Frazzini, J.) entered a finding that Stanley W. was Destiny's biological father. Accordingly, Stanley W.'s OTC steps for Destiny became effective that date.

On September 23, 2011, DCF filed a TPR petition for Justin, naming Yashika W. as the only respondent. The petition alleged, in relevant part, that: DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunify Justin with Yashika W.; the respondent-mother had failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation; and that TPR was in Justin's best interests. On November 10, 2011, DCF filed a second TPR petition for Justin, naming Yashika W., Stanley W. and John Doe as respondents. Allegations as to the respondent-mother repeated those filed on September 23, 2011. As to Stanley W., this TPR petition alleged that: DCF had made reasonable efforts to locate him and to reunify him with Justin; he was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts; he had abandoned Justin; there was no ongoing parent-child relationship; and that Justin's best interests would be served by TPR.

On November 1, 2011, following a juvenile court hearing, Yashika W. verbally " threatened to punch [Amita P.] in the face" when the DCF social worker attempted to engage the mother in conversation at the courthouse.¹⁴ (Ex. 2; see Tes. Amita P.)

14 This behavior mimics Yashika W.'s angry and hostile conduct toward DCF following a juvenile court hearing on November 10, 2009, involving commitment of four of her children. The mother screamed and yelled outside the courthouse and, coming extremely close to the face of the object of her ire, verbally threatened to subject a DCF social worker to investigation and disciplinary action. (Tes. Alexa R.)

Trial of Tayjanae's, Shadiamond's and Terran's TPR petitions commenced on November 10, 2011. On December 8, 2011, in accordance with paternity test results, the court (Keller, J.) entered a finding that Stanley W. was Justin's biological father.¹⁵ On February 10, 2012, the court (Cofield, J.) consolidated trial of Stanley W.'s TPR petition for Justin with the other trials. On February 28, 2012, the court (Frazzini, J.) ordered Destiny's neglect petition to be tried in consolidation with the pending matters. The parties rested on April 16, 2013 and filed trial briefs thereafter.

15 As discussed below, specific steps were not ordered for Stanley W. in Justin's case until March 25, 2014 (Burgdorff, J.).

On April 18, 2013, pending resolution of her neglect trial, DCF filed a TPR petition for Destiny naming Yashika W. and Stanley W. as respondents. As amended, the petition alleges that: DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate both respondent-parents and to reunify them with Destiny; the both respondent-parents are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts; that the child had been adjudicated neglected in a prior proceeding and that neither respondent-parent had achieved statutory rehabilitation; that there was no ongoing parent-child relationship between either Yashika W. and Destiny or between Stanley W. and Destiny; that Destiny is under the age of seven, is neglected, that each respondent-parent has been subject to termination of parental rights to another child, and that neither respondent-parent has achieved statutory rehabilitation; and that the child's best interests would be served by TPR.¹⁶

16 On April 28, 2014, the first day of trial for Destiny's TPR petition, this court granted DCF's motion to add the ground established by General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) as to both Yashika W. and Stanley W. On May 12, 2014, after receiving evidence from DCF that, if credited, could indicate the respondents' conduct contributed to the absence of an ongoing parent-child relationship with Destiny, this court placed the parties on notice that it was considering amendment of Destiny's TPR petition, as to both Yashika W. and Stanley W. by adding the ground of lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). See Practice Book § 34a-1(d) (child protection " petition may be amended at any time by the judicial authority . . . prior to any final adjudication"). In view of the fact that the trial continued for months thereafter, no continuance was necessary to enable the respondent-parents to respond to such an amendment. The subject was discussed with all parties and their counsel present on June 9, 2014. While the court's Memorandums of Hearing do not reflect a ruling on the proposed amendment, DCF has addressed the no-ongoing amendment in its thoughtful analysis of the relevant legal and factual issues in its initial and amended Memorandums of Law. As all parties were long aware of the court's concerns as to this statutory ground, the court considers Destiny's petition amended as proposed on May 12, 2014.

On November 18, 2013, the court (Frazzini, J.) issued its written decision addressing Destiny's neglect petition and the TPR petitions that had been tried before him. See In re Tayjanae W., et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Juvenile Matters, Docket No. H12-CP09-012603-A, et seq.¹⁷ The court terminated Yashika W.'s parental rights to Tayjanae, Shadiamond, Terran and Justin upon findings that: DCF had made reasonable efforts to locate her; DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children; she was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts; she had failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation; and TPR was in the children's best interests.¹⁸ (Court Exs. AA, BB, CC, DD; Memorandum of Decision, 11/18/13.) The court terminated Stanley W.'s parental rights to Shadiamond upon findings that: DCF had made reasonable efforts to locate him; DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the child; that he had abandoned the child, had no ongoing parent-child relationship with her, and had failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation; and that TPR was in Shadiamond's best interests. The court dismissed DCF's petition to terminate Stanley W.'s parental rights to Justin. (Court Exs. AA, CC; Memorandum of Decision, 11/18/13.) The court adjudicated Destiny neglected, ordered her committed to DCF, and ordered Destiny's OTC steps to remain in effect for Yashika W. and Stanley W. (Memorandum of Decision, 11/1/13.)

17 Hereinafter referenced as Memorandum of Decision, 11/18/13.

18 Tayjanae's biological father, Denzel H., is deceased. Terran's father, Roy H., consented to TPR on November 10, 2011.

On March 11, 2014, DCF filed a Motion for In-Court Review admitting, among other things, that no specific steps had even been issued for Stanley W. with regard to Justin although the department had known, since October 2011, this respondent to be the child's biological father. On March 25, 2014, the court (Burgdorff, J.) granted DCF's motion and issued specific steps to facilitate Stanley W.'s reunification with Justin.¹⁹ These steps required the respondent-father to, among other things: " [t]ake part in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals: . . . Father to develop appropriate coping skills, learn parenting skills, achieve and maintain sobriety"; " [n]ot use illegal drugs . . ."; " [s]ubmit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about treatment . . . [s]ubmit to random drug testing"; " [c]ooperate with service providers [including[ ADRC-Substance Abuse Evaluation, mental health assessment and drug screen. Father to Father Program--Institute of Hispanic Families Catholic Charities--Parent Education Program. Individual Counseling Provider to be determined"; " get and /or maintain adequate housing and a legal income; " [l]et DCF . . . know where you . . . are at all times"; and " visit the child(ren) as often as DCF permits."

19 The March 25, 2014 Memorandum of Hearing indicates that Stanley W. was not present in court when the steps were issued.

On May 14, 2014, DCF filed the pending TPR petition for Justin naming only Stanley W. as a respondent. As amended, this TPR petition alleges that: DCF had made reasonable efforts to locate Stanley W. and to reunify him with Justin; DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the father; the father was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts; Stanley W. had failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation; there was no ongoing parent-child relationship between Stanley W. and Justin; and the child's best interests would be served by TPR.²⁰ Through counsel, the respondent-father agreed to be served with the new TPR petition for Justin on May 14, 2014. On May 15, 2014, noting this court consolidated trial of Justin's TPR issues with Destiny's TPR trial, incorporating evidence presented on May 12, 13, 14 and 15, 2014 as applicable to both or either respondent-parent, and as applicable to both or either child.

20 As originally filed, DCF had alleged Stanley W.'s abandonment of Justin: the department effectively withdrew this claim on December 8, 2014. On that date, the department also effectively withdrew its original allegation that reasonable efforts to reunify Stanley W. and Justin were not required because of a previous permanency plan ruling. (Notice Regarding Grounds A and 17a-111b, filed 12/8/14.)

II.

INITIAL FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court used the relevant legal standards to assess the evidence as a whole.²¹ Exhibits included: visitation reports; specific steps ordered by the court; evaluator's and/or provider's reports, an affidavit and correspondence; a resume; program certificates; criminal court documentation; juvenile court orders related to previous TPR proceedings for Taynajae, Shadiamond, Justin and Terran; electronic recordings; DCF status reports, plans, narratives and social studies, including redacted documents.²² Witnesses included: Stephanie K., a substance abuse counselor; Joel C., a fatherhood educator; Garrick M., a visitation supervisor; DCF employees Eileen B., Ama T., Carmen F., Alexa R., Amita P., Zaida R. and Carlos T.; Stephen G., a foster parent; Michael S., a behavioral health clinician; Audrey C., a nurse practitioner; Julie C., a housing specialist; Valerie W., a licensed professional counselor; Kathleen S., a parent educator; Paula H., a clinical supervisor; Jill F., a family advocate and family educator; Eric Mart, a forensic psychologist and psychotherapist; Quandrea B.; Stanley W., the respondent-father and Yashika W., the respondent-mother; ²³ and Bruce Freedman, Ph.D., the court-appointed psychological evaluator.²⁴

21 " 'It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony . . . The credibility and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible . . . It is the quintessential function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony . . . The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Rafael S., 125 Conn.App. 605, 611-12, 9 A.3d 417 (2010); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous ), 177 Conn. 648, 668, 420 A.2d 875 (1979) (psychological testimony from professionals is rightly accorded great weight and appellate courts not in position to second-guess opinions of expert witness)." In re Santiago G., 154 Conn.App. 835, 857, 108 A.3d 1184, aff'd, 318 Conn. 449, 121 A.3d 708 (2015). Accordingly, " [c]ourts are entitled to give great weight to professionals in parental termination cases." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn. 161. " The factfinding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Musolino v. Musolino, 121 Conn.App. 469, 476, 997 A.2d 599 (2010). " [T]he trial court may, '[i]n the absence of an express statutory provision to the contrary . .., draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances [that] it finds established by the evidence . . .' (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 635-36, 847 A.2d 883 (2004)." In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 595. Moreover, " 'In considering the evidence introduced in a case, [triers of fact] are not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door . . . nor are they expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observations and experience of the affairs of life, but, on the contrary, to apply them to the facts in hand, to the end that their action may be intelligent and their conclusions correct.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kristy A., 83 Conn.App. 298, 316, 848 A.2d 1276, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 921, 859 A.2d 579 (2004)." Welsch v. Groat, 95 Conn.App. 658, 666-67, 897 A.2d 710 (2006).

22 In considering the entirety of the documents ostensibly prepared by DCF, the court has considered constructional anomalies and inconsistencies as appear from time to time. However, the court finds fully creditable and adopts the department's factual recitals of Yashika W.'s and Stanley W.'s personal histories and/or past experiences with the foster care system, presented throughout the otherwise highly reliable Social Studies in evidence. (Exs. 1, 2, 3-A, 4, 5, 7, 27, 28-A. See also Tes. Dr. Freedman.) See, e.g., In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 574 n.3.

23 As with any other witness, " [a]s the finder of fact and the arbiter of credibility, the court was free to believe all, some or none of the respondent-[parent]'s testimony. See In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 729, 994 A.2d 233, cert. granted on other grounds, 297 Conn. 915, 995 A.2d 954 (2010)." In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 663, 6 A.3d 86, 95 (2010).

24 The court credits and gives great weight to the majority of the evidence adduced through Dr. Freedman, a licensed psychologist. The findings and opinions presented through his reports and testimony were founded upon his considerable skill, training, education, and experience in like matters; valid testing and personal interviews of Yashika W. and her children Tayjanae and Quandrea; and analysis of collateral resources made available by the court. Subject to vigorous and sustained cross examination, and further tested by the evidence adduced through Dr. Mart, a psychologist proffered by the respondent-mother, the court found Dr. Freedman's opinions to be independent of bias, detailed, consistent with other reliable and relevant evidence, well-founded, " thorough and perceptive, and based on substantially accurate information and observations, and therefore, credible." In re Cesar G., 56 Conn.App. 289, 296-97, 742 A.2d 428 (2000), cited in In re Santiago G., supra, 154 Conn.App. 857. (Exs. 9, 28-A, A, B; Tes. Dr. Freedman.) See also In re Melody L., supra, 290 Conn, 161; In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 772-73, 23 A.3d 18, (2011), aff'd, 306 Conn. 438, 51 A.3d 334 (2012). Using the appropriate standards for measuring the value of expert testimony, this court has determined that the opinions of Dr. Freedman are entitled to great weight, and credits his testimony and opinions over that proffered by Dr. Mart, whose submissions the court finds to have little value. See In re Santiago G., supra, 154 Conn.App. 857, citing In re Cesar G., supra, 56 Conn.App. 296-97.

All facts as found throughout this decision have been proved by clear and convincing evidence.²⁵

25 " 'Proof of a material fact by inference from circumstantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability of the existence of the material fact . . . In other words, an inference need not be compelled by the evidence; rather, the evidence need only be reasonably susceptible of such an inference.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Curran v. Kroll, 303 Conn. 845, 857, 37 A.3d 700 (2012)." In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 595.

II. A.

YASHIKA W.--THE MOTHER

Born on October 2, 1974, Yashika W. has completed the eleventh grade, and is literate. She was married to Jerome W. on October 8, 2000. Yashika W. has nine children, but she is often unsure as to the identity of their fathers.²⁶ (Exs. 1, 3-A, 28-A; Tes. Yashika W.) James W., born January 29, 1989, has been incarcerated from time to time; Tiquana W., born August 24, 1990, has been incarcerated for Assault in the first degree, Risk of Injury and Violation of Probation. Yashika W.'s other children include: Quandrea B., born December 29, 1998; Tayjanae W., born September 12, 2004; Shadiamond W., born January 13, 2008; Terran W., born July 6, 2009; Justin W., born September 29, 2010 and Destiny W., born August 5, 2011, who are the immediate subjects of this court's attention; and Sanai D., born October 13, 2014.

26 While the mother and/or DCF have suggested paternal sources, the court files and evidence reflects that Jerome W., Karl B., Denzel H., Kenneth M., Roy H., Stanley W. and/or Tyrell J. have been identified as the fathers of Yashika W.'s children. (Ex. 1; Tes. Yashika W.)

Yashika W.'s history with DCF dates back to 1994.²⁷ Yashika W. has only been employed on a temporary and sporadic basis.²⁸ She receives food stamps, and maintains housing through Section 8 support " which covers her rent and all of her utilities." (Ex. 3-A; see Exs. 1, 28-A; Tes. Yashika W., Julie C.) In the past, Yashika W. has maintained unstable and unsanitary housing conditions for herself and children who have lived with her. (Exs. 1, 28-A; Tes. Yashika W.) As found in Part I, her parental rights to Tayjanae, Shadiamond, Terran and Justin were terminated by the court on November 13, 2013; Destiny was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF on that date. Since birth, Yashika W.'s children Justin and Destiny have been in DCF non-relative foster care; Sanai has been placed by DCF with her maternal grandparents. ²⁹

27 DCF reports that Yashika W.'s " family has a total of fifteen investigations from 1994 to 2011, eight of which were substantiated." (Ex. 3-A.) In 1997, Yashika W. was substantiated for physical neglect as to James and Tiquanna; in 2002, she was substantiated for physical neglect as to James, Tiquanna and Quandrea; in 2006, she was substantiated for educational neglect as to Tiquanna and Quandrea; in 2008, the department substantiated Stanley W., Yashika W.'s romantic partner who was to become the father of Justin and Destiny, for sexual abuse of Tayjanae; in 2009, Yashika W. was substantiated for physical neglect as to Tayjanae. (Ex. 3-A.) In August 2011, the department explained that its long involvement with Yashika W. had been " due to concerns of sexual abuse, educational neglect and physical neglect. Mother's home lacked appropriate sleeping accommodations, was roach and rat infested and often lacked an appropriate amount of food for all of the children in the home. Mother had also failed to follow through with meeting all of the children's educational, medical and mental health needs as recommended by providers." (Ex. 1.) See also In re Tayjanae W., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. H12CP09012603A, (Nov. 18, 2013, Frazzini, J.)

28 Yashika W. receives government support for housing and food. (Exs. 1, 2; Tes. Dr. Freedman, Julie C.) The court credits the evidence establishing that the respondent-mother has some experience as a hairdresser, but finds insufficient basis to credit DCF's report that she was lawfully employed in this capacity in 2013. Consistent with Dr. Freedman's report that the mother has worked perhaps thirty to forty days in her entire life, the court instead credits Yashika W.'s admission to the department that when she earns income, it is " under the table", rendering any employment unmeasurable at best. (Exs. 2, 3-A; Tes. Dr. Freedman.) When services are extended to her, then, the court received no credible evidence to establish that other than occasional meetings with counselors, DCF, or her physicians, she had any obligations that superseded the opportunities to experience contact with her children. (See Ex. O.) " '[P]roof of a material fact by inference from circumstantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in the probability of the existence of the material fact . . . In other words, an inference need not be compelled by the evidence; rather, the evidence need only be reasonably susceptible of such an inference." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Curran v. Kroll, 303 Conn. 845, 857, 37 A.3d 700 (2012)." In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 595.

29 DCF has acknowledged that James and Tiquanna had reported that they were both sexually abused while they were committed to the department and had been placed in the care of their maternal grandmother. (Tes. Ama T.)

Prior to Destiny's birth, Yashika W. knew that her older children, James W. and Tiquana W. each had been sexually abused. When she was approximately eighteen years old, pregnant and the mother of a son with cancer, Tiquana informed Yashika W. that she had been sexually abused while living at her maternal grandmother's home, two months after DCF had removed her from her home. Thereafter, the mother of James's child told Yashika W. that James, too, had been sexually abused at the home of the maternal grandmother. (Ex. 3-A; Tes. Yashika W.)

In 2008, Yashika W. was romantically involved with Stanley W. (Ex. 1.) On July 17, 2008, when Taynajae was approximately three years and ten months old and in her mother's care, the child " cried because it hurt" when she went to the bathroom; Yashika W. noted that " the toilet was full with stool and blood. The water in the toilet was red. At that time [the respondent-]mother asked Taynajah if anyone was messing with her and Taynajah named Stanley [W.]." ³⁰ (Ex. S.) Although " Tayjanah was not acting like herself. She was not interacting or playing with other children, " Yashika W. did not immediately seek medical attention for her daughter. (Ex. S.) On July 19, 2008, the respondent-mother brought Tayjanae to the Connecticut Children's Medical Center's (CCMC) emergency room " after [the child told] her mother that mother's ex-boyfriend 'placed his penis in her vagina'." (Ex. S; see Ex. 28-A.) CCMC's examination disclosed " no acute findings" but " for evaluation of a complaint of sexual abuse" referred the child to the Children's Advocacy Center at St. Francis Hospital (CAC).³¹ (Ex. S.)

30 Yashika W. has also described the contents of the toilet bowl as looking like " juice or blood." (Tes. Yashika W.)

31 " The goals of the [CAC] program are a psycho-education group to teach about dynamics of sexual abuse, what to do if (sic) child discloses sexual abuse, distorted thinking and grooming." (Ex. 3-A.) CAC does not provide risk assessment and " is unable to predict a parent's ability to protect a child from further sexual abuse" even if a non-offending caregiver has completed its seven-session program. (Ex. 3-A.)

On July 23, 2008, three and a half-year-old Tayjanae underwent a forensic oral interview conducted by Stacey K., a CAC staff member who skillfully used neutral and proper forensic methods in her exchange with the child. Tayjanae was physically energetic and verbally active during the interview, process, a videotaped record of which was played at trial. Given Taynajae's age and stage of development at the time of the interview, the oral statements she then rendered are sufficiently audible, comprehensible, expressive, and consistent; her non-verbal demonstrations then delivered are similarly sufficiently clear and expressive. (Ex. 10; see Exs. 9, 28-A, T; Dr. Freedman.) Yashika W. persists that Tayjanae complaints of sexual abuse by Stanley W. were false and fictitious.³² The court concludes to the contrary, finding that Tayjanae's detailed statements, using family nomenclature for body parts that were consistent with her recorded demonstrations of inappropriate touching by Stanley W., were highly reliable within the appropriately conducted interview process.³³ All told, the child's demonstrative and oral recitals were sufficiently understandable so as to render the reports made at that time reflecting specific acts of sexual misconduct or sexual assault by Stanley W. not only highly credible but also clearly and convincingly compelling in and of themselves.³⁴ The significant weight of Tayjanae's reports during this interview, although discounted by Yashika W., are found to be even more indicative of exposure to sexual abuse because they were consistent with: the report of vaginal and anal sexual contact by Stanley W. she had made to her mother several days earlier; with Yashika W.'s reported observation of blood in the toilet after the child had used it; with the child's pain upon elimination; and also with Tayjanae's changes in behavior.³⁵ (Ex. B, S, T; Tes. Dr. Freedman, Audrey C.) Because of the risk of abuse to a child, and the forensic interviewer's identification of a strong indication of abuse, it is the responsibility of the parent to learn how to protect the child and to ensure that the child won't suffer further damage from the experience, whether it actually occurred or not. (Tes. Dr. Freedman.)

32 Yashika W. also attempts to discredit Tayjanae's 2008 disclosure of sexual abuse by referencing the fact that in 2013, the state determined it would no longer pursue charges against Stanley W. related to those events. (FA-1.) Given the focus in this case, which is not upon whether Stanley W. is guilty but whether Yashika W. has the capacity to properly parent a child who makes such disclosures, whether they are true or not, and given the burden of proof applicable to criminal prosecutions and the lesser burden of proof in this case, the court finds this argument to have no weight in these TPR proceedings. See In re Dylan C., 126 Conn.App. 71, 87-88, 10 A.3d 100, 111 (2011) (defining clear and convincing burden of proof for use in TPR cases).

33 The court concurs with Dr. Freedman's opinion that while the videotaped report does not support the conclusion that Tayjanae was subjected to anal penetration by Stanley W., the child had given clear statements to the hospital staff about being sexually abused by Yashika W.'s boyfriend, and the videotape confirms strong indications of such sexual abuse. (Tes. Dr. Freedman.)

34 The court finds the statements to be intelligible and clear as presented, utilizing the terms Taynajae employed, at the time, to positively identify the sexual orifices into which Stanley W. inserted parts of his own body. As Dr. Freedman credibly explained, at age three and a half, a child is generally well able to recite events sufficient to support a civil allegation of abuse; the most reliable, or the only reliable, interview of a child related to sexual abuse is the one conducted by a neutral and trained evaluator soon after the event, as occurred in this case. (See Ex. T; Tes. Dr. Freedman, Audrey C., Amita P.) Recantations that occur years later have far lesser value, as they are vulnerable to pressure and influence to which the child may have been subject as in this case, in which Yashika W. offered Tayjanae a new bedroom set if the child engaged in conduct more likely to bring her back to the care of her biological mother. (Tes. Dr. Freedman.)

35 In reaching this conclusion, the court has carefully considered, but attributes no measurable weight, in the context of this case, to Dr. Mart's written report or to his testimony on the subject of the reliability of Tayjanae's intra-interview communications delivered during the present TPR trial. As previously discussed, the court finds the testimony of Dr. Freedman, Audrey C. and the content of Exs. 10, 28-A, S and T to be more credible, and consistent with other aspects of the evidence establishing Tayjanae's statements concerning and demonstrations of Stanley W.'s sexual contact with the child. Accordingly, the court finds the conflicting evidence offered by the respondent-mother, suggesting that Stacey K.'s interview of Tayjanae was forensically insufficient, to have no value in this case. (Exs. A, B, N; Tes. Dr. Mart.) See In re Santiago G., supra, 154 Conn.App. 857, citing In re Cesar G., supra, 56 Conn.App. 296-97. See also Vitali v. Southern New England Ear, Nose, Throat and Facial Plastic Surgery Group, LLP, 153 Conn.App. 753, 755, 107 A.3d 422 (2014) and Dallaire v. Hsu, 130 Conn.App. 599, 603, 23 A.3d 792, 795-96 (2011), holding that where expert testimony " does conflict, 'the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony . . . The credibility and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible . . .' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bay Hill Construction, Inc. v. Waterbury, 75 Conn.App. 832, 838, 818 A.2d 83 (2003)."

On July 24, 2008, Tayjanae underwent a physical examination at the CAC conducted by Audrey C., an APRN. (Ex. S.) Yashika W. reported that on July 13, 2008, the child had gone to the bathroom and the toilet was full of blood; when the mother asked if anyone had touched her, Taynajae said " Stanley"; two days later, concerned about the child's demeanor, Yashika W. had brought her to the emergency room at CCMC, from which she was referred to the CAC. (Tes. Audrey C.) Audrey C. had accessed the CCMC records reflecting the child's examination on July 19, 2008; the child reported pain " from her bottom where she went to the bathroom." (Ex. S.) At CAC, after a pre-examination interview of the mother, Audrey C. examined Tayjanae's genitals under magnification, which process reflected " normal" findings; " [t]here were no abrasions or fissures seen", and laboratory testing was negative for sexually transmitted disease, although " [m]icroscopic hematuria" was found.³⁶ (Ex. S; see Tes. Audrey C.) Taynajae's anogenital examination was normal, but these physical results were " consistent" with the child's report " of penile-vaginal and penile-anal penetration, history of rectal pain [and] blood in the toilet" as observed by the respondent-mother; a normal physical examination of a child of this age, four days after the alleged events, does not mean that sexual abuse did not occur. (Ex. S; see Tes. Audrey C.) CAC then planned for Tayjanae obtain counseling to address her experiences. (Ex. S.) DCF referred Tayjanae to the Klingberg CATS program, where Yashika W. and the child " participated in an intake where it was recommended that Tayjanae receive weekly therapy to address the trauma of the sexual abuse she experienced." (Ex. 3-A.) Discrediting the child's allegations of abuse, the respondent-mother did not bring Tayjanae to three scheduled appointments, and Tayjanae " was discharged from the program for non-compliance." (Ex. 3-A.)

36 This finding was not indicative of a current urinary tract infection in the child. Upon inquiry, Tayjanae told Audrey C. that the blood came from her bottom where the poop comes from. (Tes. Audrey C.)

At CAC during the summer of 2008, Tayjanae had been referred for treatment at the CAC and/or at the Klingberg CATS program, a trauma-focused program for children who had suffered severe abuse. DCF had conferred with Yashika W. to ensure that Tayjanae received the recommended services. However, by March 2009, DCF was working with Yashika W. to address its concerns that although treatment had been recommended for Tayjanae in response to the child's allegations of sexual abuse, the mother had not accessed any services. During home visits in April, May and June 2009. DCF expressly dealt with the mother's responsibility to bring Tayjanae for treatment related to her allegations of sexual abuse; the department had made an appointment for Tayjanae to participate in an intake at Klingberg's CATS program, which the child attended in late May 2009. However, Yashika W. never brought the child in for further care, and Klingberg discharged Tayjanae from further participation in this highly appropriate program. (Tes. Alexa R.)

In July 2009, Tiquanna and her son Quirvontrey were living in Yashika W.'s home; Yasika W. and Tiquanna were the child's only caretakers. Quirvontrey sustained injuries to his right arm, requiring emergency medical treatment. Yashika W. " could not give an explanation for the child's injuries, " and DCF removed all children from her home pursuant to the July 23, 2009 OTC described in Part I. (Ex.3-A; see Tes. Alexa R.)

Although she denied having any mental health issues, in 2009, Yashika W. went to CHS and Charter Oak " on her own accord" for behavioral health attention. (Ex. 1.) CHS would not treat her in the absence of a documented diagnosis; she remained on a waiting list at Charter Oak. Yashika W. attended an intake for mental health treatment at Hartford Behavioral Health (HBH) in late September 2009. Relying solely upon Yashika W.'s self-report, the only information then available to him, HBH evaluator identified no symptoms and no need for treatment, and so no therapy was then provided. Soon after his meeting with Yashika W., however, the HBH evaluator called DCF to gather additional information about the department's concerns, which conflicted with the history given by the mother. After considering the needs of the mother, the HBH evaluator determined that Yashika W. needed to undergo assessment by a psychiatrist, and assigned her for treatment with an HBH clinician. (Tes. Michael S.; see Ex. 3-A.)

In September 2009, Yashika W. began participating in Klingberg Family Center's (Klingberg's) Parent Education/Support Group " [i]n an effort to improve her general parenting skills" and to enhance her awareness of safety issues related to her children. (Ex. H; see Ex. 3-A.) By November 18, 2009, having determined that she had " successfully met the requirements to complete the program", the provider awarded a certificate to Yashika W.³⁷ (Ex. H. See Ex. I; Tes. Ama T.)

37 Klingberg's educational sessions address topics " including but not limited to: Purpose of a Visit and Effective Communication, Nutrition, Child Development, Discipline Techniques, Budgeting, Substance Abuse, Domestic Violence and Healthy Relationship, Parent's Rights, Anger and Stress Management and Lets Talk part I and II, The Effects of Trauma on Parents." (Emphasis in original.) (Ex. H.)

In fall 2009, Yashika W. attended a seven-week group " Child Sexual Abuse Education" course at the CAC for caregivers designated as " Non Offending." (Ex. J.; see Ex. 3-A.)

On January 25 and 26, 2010, Dr. Freedman conducted court-ordered psychological evaluations of thirty-five-year-old Yashika W., eleven-year-old Quandrea and five-year-old Tayjanae.³⁸ Dr. Freedman credibly concluded that the respondent-mother " lived a lifestyle which had caused her and her children many significant problems. Her children were conceived in a series of failed relationships, most relatively casual relationships, none stable, long-lasting relationships. She had moved far too many times, with significant problems in many of her residences . . . [Yashika W.] blamed DCF staff, neighbors, one of the fathers of her children, her mother, and medical staff for her problems. She insisted that her daughter Tayjanah had never been sexually abused, and that [Tiquanna] had not physically injured her son." (Ex. 28-A.)

38 DCF elected to pursue the psychological evaluations in lieu of the psychiatric assessment recommended by HBH in the fall of 2009. (Tes. Alexa R.)

Dr. Freedman observed that Yashika W. was angry and upset about Tayjanae's 2008 allegations of sexual misconduct by Stanley W. Although Dr. Freedman acknowledged several possible explanations for the child's report, he concluded that " [the respondent-mother] certainly did not have a reliable basis to dismiss the sexual abuse allegations in the manner she displayed" at the January 2010 psychological evaluation. (Ex. 9, 28-A; see Tes. Dr. Freedman.) Generally, at that time, he concluded that Yashika W. " showed signs of deeply ingrained personality and interpersonal problems. This directly impacted the care of her children and her ability to raise healthy children into adulthood." (Ex. 9; see Tes. Dr. Freedman) Acknowledging the mother's " stubborn resistance to dealing with the allegations of physical abuse" made by Tayjanae, after full evaluation and ruling out issues of substance abuse or domestic violence, Dr. Freedman determined that Yashika W.'s mental health " problems were much broader than her lack of knowledge of sexual abuse and its effects on children. She needed personal counseling for her personality problems, and could probably benefit from participation in DBT group sessions. She needed to learn to take responsibility for her own behavior, address problems directly and effectively, and accept appropriate help in creating a safe, nurturing home for her children." (Ex. 9.) Dr. Freedman's recommendation for Yashika's treatment was not limited to DBT; his identification of her " personality problems" indicated that effective counseling was needed to render her a safe and adequate parenting resource.³⁹ (Tes. Dr. Freedman.)

39 On cross examination, counsel for Yashika W. inquired of the IQ testing performed by Dr. Freedman. Although the psychologist's January 2010 report references Yashika W.'s cognitive status, the court files do not reflect any request for a competency evaluation made by the respondent-mother's attorney. (Ex. 9.) Upon direct examination by the mother's counsel, her witness Jill F. indicated that the mother had acquired knowledge during the so-called non-offender's sexual abuse classes at St. Francis Hospital, and that she had no concerns about the mother's intellectual functioning. (Tes. Jill F.) Moreover, during the many days devoted to presenting evidence at trial of the TPR petitions in 2014, which included Yashika W.'s own testimony, and the argument that occurred in 2015, this court observed neither any conduct on the respondent-mother's part nor any manifestation of her behavior that could reasonably suggest mental impairment or " the desirability of ordering such a hearing sua sponte." In re Zowie N., 41 A.3d 1056, 135 Conn.App. 470, 496, cert. denied, 305 Conn. 916, 46 A.3d 170 (2012), citing In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557, 565-58, 613 A.2d 780 (1992).

On November 18, 2010, Yashika W. self-referred herself to " weekly therapy sessions" with Valarie W., a licensed professional counselor and founder of the Circle of Life Transition Center.⁴⁰ Without DCF's involvement, Valarie W. and the mother " came up with a set of goals for therapy" which were based on Yashika's report that DCF had removed the children in 2009 because Quivontry had been injured in her home; she never informed the therapist about issues related to Stanley W.'s alleged sexual abuse of Tayjanae, or about the earlier sexual abuse allegations that had been made by James and Tiquanna.⁴¹ Although the mother attended scheduled therapy sessions, she expressly instructed Valarie W. to disclose neither her goals, the respondent-mother's diagnosis, nor what was discussed in therapy either to DCF or to the court.⁴² (Exs.3-A, F; Tes. Valarie W., Ama T., Amita P.) At Yashika W.'s express request, Valarie W.'s initial therapy primarily dealt with helping her in " dealing with DCF involvement regarding the removal of her children and individual counseling to cope with significant losses and stress management." ⁴³ (Ex. 16; see Ex. 3A, Tes. Valarie W.)

40 Valarie W., who had previously provided therapy for Quandrea and with whom Yashika W. had been familiar since November 2010, does not provide the DBT type of counseling referenced by Dr. Freedman. DCF validated the referral to Valarie W. but deferred making other recommendations for mental health treatment when the department learned of the mother's involvement with this provider. (Tes. Valarie W., Ama T., Amita P.)

41 At some point, Yashika W. did disclose to the therapist issues related to her own childhood trauma, sexual abuse by a relative, and that she had her first child at the age of fourteen. However, while Yashika W. was in treatment with Valarie W. during August 2011, the mother never told the therapist why it was that DCF had removed Destiny immediately after the child's birth. (Tes. Valarie W.)

42 Valarie W.'s work with Yashika W. generally addressed the past week's experiences, which often involved the mother's disaffection and distrust for the department and its workers. The therapist assisted the mother by teaching her techniques to control her anger. (Tes. Valarie W.)

43 The evidence does not reflect whether Yashika W. ever shared with Valarie W. any specific steps that had been ordered, or whether she ever shared the goals identified in those steps, so there is insufficient evidence to establish whether or not Valarie D.'s " goals for therapy" comported with the goals identified in the respondent-mother's specific steps. See Ex. 11.

In December 2010, Yashika W. had acquired a one-bedroom apartment and had acquired Section 8 benefits to cover the rent.⁴⁴ (Ex. 3-A; Tes. Julie C.)

44 Yashika W.'s housing subsidy, and thus the number of bedrooms to which she may have access through Section 8, is related to the number of dependents living in her household. (Tes. Julie C.)

At some point in late 2010 or early 2011, Yashika W. became pregnant with a child fathered by Stanley W.; the respondent-mother did not inform the department of this pregnancy stating that " it was none of DCF's business." (Ex. 1.)

On January 31, 2011, during a supervised visit provided by DCF, Yashika W. " administered her own asthma pump" to four-month-old Justin in an effort to clear what she noted to be his congestion.⁴⁵ (Ex. Ch-1; see Tes. Eileen B.) Instructed to refrain from using adult medication for Justin, the respondent-mother became upset, " acted in a wild manner during part of the visit and became very . . . agitated and aggressive." (Ex. Ch-1.) Justin was hospitalized for care of the respiratory conditions including pneumonia and RSV, whose symptoms Yashika W. had observed. (Ex. E-1; Tes. Eileen B.)

45 In Exhibit E-1, submitted by the respondent-mother, DCF describes the related February 2011 events as follows: " TC from Attorney Gore (Children's Attorney). S.W. informed him of the response received from visitation company about Mother giving Justin her asthma pump. S.W. stated that Mother did it very fast and she sprayed it in his mouth. Worker heard the spray but was writing notes when she did it. When worker looked up saw (sic) the albuterol on her leg. She asked if mother sprayed in his mouth and mother stated that (sic) did."

On July 18, 2011, at DCF's referral, Yashika W. attended an intake at the Institute of Living's (IOL) DBT program. Without referencing specific symptoms she may have noted at the intake, the licensed clinical social worker who managed the IOL's DBT program determined that the respondent-mother " does not have a psychiatric diagnosis of Borderline personality Disorder which is a prerequisite for admission to the DBT program", and the IOL did not make DBT services available to Yashika W. (Ex. L.) Thereafter, DCF did not refer Yashika L. to any other DBT providers. (Tes. Eileen B.)

On August 18, 2011, despite Judge Keller's OTC specific steps for Destiny that required the mother's cooperation with the department, Yashika W. refused to allow DCF social workers Eileen B. and Amita P. into her home.⁴⁶ (Tes. Eileen B.)

46 The court notes that although a subsequently assigned DCF social worker, Ama T., encountered some resistance from Yashika W. in the spring of 2012, the mother eventually allowed her to visit at her home and to discuss services in June 2012. (Tes. Ama T.)

By August 19, 2011, Yashika W. was still attending sessions with Valarie W. While the therapist was planning to reduce her treatment schedule, the therapist wrote to DCF indicating that she had a diagnosis for her client, although Yashika W. would not permit her to disclose that information to the department. Valarie D. recommended involvement of multiple other providers with the respondent-mother " if reunification is the plan . . ." and recommended that Yashika W. receive wrap around support services and family therapy in addition to her individual counseling. (Ex. F; see Tes. Valarie W.)

On August 29, 2011, DCF referred Yashika W. to a second round of CAC's group sessions for caregivers designated as non-offenders. (Exs. 2, 3-A, 29; Tes. Eileen B.)

Early in the fall of 2011, it became apparent to DCF that despite a year of therapy with Valerie W., Yashika W. would not allow the department sufficient access to Valarie W. to determine what progress, if any, the mother had made in developing the insight sufficient to effectively address the issues that were impeding her from learning the parenting skills needed to protect children from harm, or to ensure that the children were properly attended to if they complained of harm. To address the department's continued concerns about Yashika W.'s parenting deficits, DCF informed her that the department was willing to referring her for more mental health treatment at My People Clinical Services (MPCS).⁴⁷ Even though MPCS offered the family counseling and wrap around services that her own counselor, Valarie W., had recommended, Yashika W. refused to partake of any services offered by the new provider.⁴⁸ (Tes. Eileen B., Amita P.)

47 Conveniently accessible by Yashika W. through public bus service, MPCS is an agency that provides wrap around services for clients including mental health evaluations, individual and family counseling, intensive family preservation therapy, and transportation. (Tes. Eileen B.)

48 The court acknowledges that in August 2011 the mother's therapist recommended implementation of IICAPS; there is no showing that such a service would then have been appropriate given the fact that Destiny was a newborn. Moreover, although Valarie D. may have recommended in-home services, given the fact that Destiny had been removed from the care of Yashika W., there is no basis for concluding that such a service, if available, would have been of value under the circumstances of this case. (Ex. F; Tes. Eileen B., Ama T., Amita P.)

On September 29, 2011, Yashika W. expressly informed DCF that she refused to participate in any additional services, whether individual treatment sessions with the nonoffendered group at CAC or at the sexual crisis center, or otherwise. (Tes. Amita P.)

Valarie W. had been prepared to discharge the respondent-mother from counseling as of October 15, 2011, after more than a year of services.⁴⁹ However, on November 11, 2011 during the TPR trial before Judge Frazzini, Valarie W. learned for the first time that there were allegations of sexual abuse regarding one of Yashika W.'s children. Yashika W. had never informed the therapist of these allegations, so that the schedule for ending treatment became unclear. After this experience, Valarie W. changed her goals somewhat to help the mother process the possibility that her daughter had been sexually abused; therapy sessions involved conversations with Yashika W. about predators and their behaviors. (Ex. 3-A; Tes. Valarie W.)

49 The court fully credits the testimony of DCF social worker Eileen B. establishing that the department contacted Valarie W. several times during the summer of 2011 to inquire about the mother's status, her diagnosis, her level of compliance and progress, goals that had been identified and whether other services were recommended. In response but adhering to Yashika W.'s instructions, the counselor wrote to the department without answering substantive questions about status, diagnosis, goals or recommendations. (Tes. Eileen B.)

By November 30, 2011, after attending six out of seven available treatment sessions, CAC indicated that the respondent-mother had completed its program. However, it was not until November 28, 2011, that Yashika W. authorized DCF to share with CAC information concerning the respondent-mother's need to address issues such as her continued contact with Stanley W., the father of Justin and Destiny and the alleged perpetrator of Tayjanae's sexual abuse.⁵⁰ (Exs. 1, 2, K.) Upon receiving this information from DCF, CAC recommended Yashika W.'s participation in individual treatment sessions with the CAC or through the Sexual Assault Crisis Services (SACS). Yashika W. declined these services after DCF gave her the providers' contact information. (Exs. 2, 30, 34.)

50 Even Dr. Mart, the mother's expert witness, opined that it would be problematic if Yashika W. had two more children with Stanley W. while the charges were still pending based on allegations of his sexual abuse of Tayjanae. That is exactly what occurred in this case; instead of exercising parental caution and avoiding further contact with Stanley W. while his criminal charges were pending, as suggested by Dr. Mart, Yashika W. engaged in repeated intimate relations with her paramour, culminating with the births of Justin, for whom her parental rights have already been terminated, and Destiny, the daughter who is the subject of the pending TPR petition. (Tes. Dr. Mart.)

Following Valarie W.'s November 2011 testimony at the TPR/neglect trial before Judge Frazzini, Yashika W.'s attendance at counseling sessions became sporadic. Given the mother's non-attendance, the therapist's office attempted to contact her, but without success, and the pattern of sporadic attendance continued. (Tes. Valarie W.)

In May 2012, when she was seven and a half years old and had been in foster care for nearly three years, Tayjanae reportedly recanted her 2008 report of Stanley W.'s sexual abuse. In June 2012, Taynajae underwent a repeat psychological evaluation by Dr. Freedman. Cognitively, Tayjanae was of average ability, " developing at or above normal levels for her age." (Ex. 28-A.) At that time, she explained she had previously told people " that her boyfriend Stanley touched her . . . because she got a little jealous that mommy was sleeping in the bed with Stanley" when she was used to sleeping in a bed with Yashika W., Tiquana, Quandrea, Terran and Shadiamond. (Ex. 28-A.) Tayjanae " fought back tears, and apologized repeatedly for telling the lies that Stanley did things to her." (Ex. 28-A.) She stated that her paternal grandmother never hit her with a belt, and again apologized when Dr. Freedman raised the subject of her claims that her older sister Tiquanna had abused her baby Quivontrey. (Ex. 28-A.)

As time went on, Yashika W. effectively discontinued attending therapy with Valarie W. The therapist wrote to Yashika W. in October 2012 indicating that if she did not improve her participation, she would be discharged. (Tes. Valarie W.)

Commencing in June 2012, DCF social worker Ama T. began to meet with Yashika W. monthly; the mother rejected DCF's June 2012 referral to parenting services. (Tes. Ama T.)

The mother returned for one session with Valarie D. in October 2012. Sometime in the fall of 2012 DCF social worker Ama T. spoke to Valarie W. about Yashika W.'s need to deal with issues related to her own sexual abuse as a child, and with the issues about which the therapist had learned during her November 2011 court appearance. Thereafter, Yashika W. never returned to Valarie W.'s care, and received an " unsuccessful termination" from services due to the mother's " noncompliance." (Tes. Valarie W.; see Tes. Ama T.)

Commencing in January 2013, during her monthly meetings with Yashika W., DCF social worker Ama T. offered referrals to parenting and mental health services. The mother refused the opportunity to partake of any of these referrals, which were continued through December 2013. (Tes. Ama T.)

In January 2014, as she was no longer engaged in services from Valarie W., DCF offered Yashika W. a referral for individual counseling; the mother again rejected DCF's proffer of an opportunity to improve her mental health status and related lack of insight into her parenting issues, stating that she did not see any need to engage in therapy at that time. However, Yashika W. did accept DCF's January 2014 referral to a second round of generalized parenting education; a part of this curriculum deals with the topic of " trauma, " its impact on children, and how the caregiver should respond. Yashika W. graduated from this program in April 2014. (Tes. Kathleen S.)

Yashika W. had become pregnant in early 2014; by May 2014, the mother had engaged in individual counseling for the first time since leaving Valarie W. (Tes. Ama T.; see Ex. O.)

By June 2014, Yashika W. was still not employed. She had lived with her own mother for a time, but then secured a one-bedroom apartment. She was accepting Ama T.'s assistance in procuring bus transportation to visit with Destiny but continued to reject service referrals proffered by DCF, consistently indicating that she was not interested in engaging in individual therapy or parent education of any sort. (Tes. Ama T.)

Sanai D. was born to Yashika W. and Tyrell D. on October 30, 2014, while Justin's and Destiny's TPR trials were pending. On November 3, 2014, DCF imposed a 96-hour-hold on the infant, and on November 7, 2014, the court (Gilligan, J.) granted the department's ex parte OTC. At the preliminary hearing on November 14, 2014, the OTC was sustained by agreement, and Sanai was placed with Yashika W.'s mother and father, who had intervened in those proceedings and who were identified as DCF licensed relative foster parents. (Tes. Yashika W.) On January 6, 2015, the court (Dannehy, J.) adjudicated Sanai neglected and committed her to DCF.

On February 13, 2015, through counsel, then sixteen-year-old Quandrea filed a Motion for In Court Review with regard to his status as a child committed to DCF; he admits having been missing from his foster home from about October through December 2014, when he went to live with Yashika W. He also admits to having had serious anger problems when he was younger, leading to disruption of multiple foster placements and requiring inpatient treatment at Klingberg where he was medicated and restraints were imposed. Quandrea claims to reside in Waterbury at present. (Tes. Quandrea B.)

On February 25, 2015, mere weeks after Sanai's adjudication and commitment, the department filed a Motion to Revoke Quandrea's commitment claiming, among other things, that the teenager " was disrupted from foster care on January 8, 2015, " was currently living with Yashika W., had refused DCF's services and that " [t]he cause for commitment no longer exists . . ." After hearing on March 12, 2015 attended by Quandrea, the court (Dannehy, J.) revoked that child's commitment and restored legal guardianship in Yashika W.⁵¹

51 As to Quandrea specifically, Judge Dannehy found " that cause for no commitment longer exists, that Quandrea is 16 and has indicated he does not want to stay with the department. He wants to go back to live with his mother; and that's what his mother wants. So it is in his best interest." (Tr. 3/12/15.)

By July 2015, Yashika W. was homeless and living in a shelter. She lost her access to Section 8 housing when her adult son Carl B. had words with a neighbor in October 2014; the neighbor reported the incident to the landlord, Section 8 stopped paying her rent, and Yashika W. had to leave the one-bedroom apartment she had occupied most recently. (Tes. Quandrea B.)

Sometime after losing her housing, Yashika W. suffered a heart attack and/or pulmonary embolisms. (Tes. Yashika W.)

DCF consistently made visits available for Yashika W. and Destiny, before and after Judge Frazzini's November 2013 order terminating the mother's parental rights to Justin. By late 2011, DCF was providing Yashika W. with twice weekly two-hour visits with infant Destiny and baby Justin, supervised by B-Healthy.⁵² The provider was available to transport Yashika W. approximately two hours, by car, to visit that were scheduled near Destiny's foster home, with like time for the return trip. During travel time, parent coaching was provided by the visitation supervisor, extending information about appropriate activities and maintaining a safe environment for the children. Sometime in 2013, the visitation schedule was reduced to once-weekly. Generally, the visits Yashika attended with her young children during this period were unremarkable, with some notable concerns about her capacity to safely parent young children, and without manifestation by Yashika W. of significant warmth or engagement with either Destiny or Justin. As Yashika W. did not make herself available for a number of visits scheduled in April and early May 2013, B-Healthy instituted a reasonable protocol requiring her to contact Garrick M., who provided both transportation and parent training, the day before the scheduled visit to confirm her availability; the respondent-mother did not attend the May 13, 2013 meeting scheduled at DCF for review of this new protocol. Yashika W. did call to cancel the visit scheduled for July 15, 2013, but did not confirm her availability for the July 29; August 5, 12, 19 and 26; or the September 2, 2013 visits, which resulted in cancellations. After Judge Frazzini's November 18, 2013 termination of Yashika W.'s parental rights to Justin, visits were scheduled with Destiny alone. Yashika W. visited her children with great inconsistency; prior to Justin's TPR, the mother had attended just over half of the supervised visits that were available with the children, acknowledging harsh weather conditions that sometimes interfered with the visitation schedule. Even after Justin's TPR, from November 18, 2013 until February 2014, Yashika W. visited Destiny inconsistently, attending approximately one-third of the visits available when weather permitted mother-daughter contact.⁵³ On February 14, 2014, due to her lack of compliance with the protocol requiring her timely cancellation of visits that were expected to take the provider's entire day, B-Healthy discharged Yashika W. from further services. (Exs. 3-A, 8-A, 25; Tes. Garrick M., Ama T.) As B-Healthy was no longer unavailable, DCF had no access to visitation transportation or visitation services from February through April 2014, when visits resumed with extra time provided for mother-daughter contact to redress the " hours . . . which were missed . . ." (Ex. 6.) In April 2014, DCF secured visitation supervision through Connecting Families; Yashika W. was required to take public transportation to New Haven, and then the provider would bring her to visit with Destiny. While Yashika W. was required to expend some energy to procure the bus pass from DCF, to obtain the subsidized bus ticket, and to call the visitation supervising service to confirm that she was en route, she has been given the opportunity to visit her daughter twice per week. Although approximately 12 visits were scheduled from April to June 2014, Yashika W. attended only two sessions with Destiny.⁵⁴ As of December 9, 2014, Yashika W. was not sure when she had last seen her three-year-old daughter; she had not visited Destiny in September, October, or December although DCF had arranged for her transportation to New Haven except for the weeks immediately following the birth of Sanai. (Tes. Ama T., Yashika W., Zaida R.)

52 In April 2013, prior to the termination of the respondent-mother's parental rights to Justin, Yashika W. and Stanley W. visited Destiny and Justin together. (Ex. 25.)

53 As a whole, the evidence supports the inference that Yashika W. was unable or unwilling to attend the supervised visits with both children available through B-Healthy from late 2011 through early 2014; the court received no credible evidence that she had obligations that superseded the opportunities to experience contact with Justin prior to his TPR, or with Destiny.

54 Similar to her experience with B-Healthy, as a whole, the evidence supports the inference that Yashika W. was unable or unwilling to attend the supervised visits with Destiny available from April through June 2014; the court received no credible evidence that the mother had obligations that superseded the opportunities to experience contact with her children.

II. B.

STANLEY W.--THE FATHER

Born on September 26, 1969, Stanley W. was in foster care and was himself adopted at a young age. He has either graduated from high school or from an adult education program.⁵⁵ He has an older son, Troy W., who was adopted at age two. (Exs. 3-A, 13; Tes. Stanley W.)

55 Various exhibits introduced at trial identify Stanley W.'s birth date as either September 26, 1969 or September 26, 1964. The court has adopted the birthdate of September 26, 1969 as reflected on Exhibit 13, a set of documents containing data collected by independent substance abuse evalutors, which specifies that birth date and narratively corroborates that birth date by referencing Stanley W. as being a " 42 year old" male as of March 12, 2012.

Stanley W. has know Yashika W. since he was a teenager. They have had three children together, as found in Part II. A.: Shadiamond W., born January 13, 2008; Justin W., born September 29, 2010; and Destiny W., born August 5, 2011. None of these three children has ever been in Stanley W.'s custody; Justin and Destiny entered DCF foster care soon after birth. Yashika W. and Stanley W. retain their close friendship, although their parental rights to Shadiamond have been terminated, and although Yashika W.'s parental rights to Justin have been terminated, as well. (Ex. 3-A; Tes. Stanley W., Yashika W.)

Stanley W. has a relatively remote criminal history related to sale of controlled substances, sale and possession of narcotics, and violation of probation. In 2009, charges were brought against him alleging his sexual abuse of Tayjanae. (Ex. 3-A.)

Stanley W. has had long-standing problems with housing, homelessness, and mental health and substance abuse issues, often had food stamps as his only financial support, and vacillated between living in shelters and with relatives. Living a transient lifestyle, he uses relatives' addresses for receipt of mail. Stanley W. had long-term unemployment with only sporadic " very short side jobs in recent years, " including work in maintenance, construction, landscaping and roofing, accruing only unreported income. (Ex. 13; see Exs. 2, 3-A.) By September 2012, however, he had secured lawful employment at a recycling facility; he held this job through April 2013, although he was not compensated when work was slow. Even with this legal employment, he was not able to obtain stable housing, and remained homeless. (Ex. 3-A.)

In May 2009, Stanley W. was arrested and charged with Sexual Assault in the 1st degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(1); Sexual Assault in the 1st degree with a victim under the age of thirteen in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(2); and Risk of Injury to a Minor in violation of General Statutes § 53-21a.⁵⁶ (Exs. 3-A, Fa-1.)

56 Stanley W. admits that he was able to maintain abstinence only for the nine months of incarceration that followed his arrest based on allegations of sexual abuse to Tayjanae. (Ex. 13.)

In 2010, Stanley W. was involved in evaluation and treatment at the ADRC Alcohol & Drug Recovery Centers, Inc. (ADRC); he was diagnosed with " Depressive Disorder NOS and rule Out Substance Induced Mood Disorder." (Ex. 13.) At ADRC, he " unsuccessfully completed IOP [intensive out patient] program on 12/2010 with a referral to ADRC Intensive Program which he did not keep." ⁵⁷ (Ex. 13.)

57 ADRC's IOP program is an entry-level of care for individuals with substance abuse and/or mental health issues. Three and a half hour treatment sessions are held three days a week for three to four weeks. (Tes. Stephanie K.) As a whole, the evidence supports the inference that Stanley W. was unable or unwilling to attend the ADRC treatment available to him in 2010; other than when he was held in lieu of bond, he had no superseding obligations.

In August 2011, when Destiny was born, Stanley W. was homeless. He has remained effectively homeless thereafter, living with relatives or in shelters, and lacking housing resources sufficient to meet Justin's or Destiny's needs for a stable residence. (Exs. 1, 2.)

In August 2011, Stanley returned to ADRC. " He was admitted to inpatient on 8/2011 and left AMA . . ." (Ex. 13.) He received no substance abuse or mental health treatment from that date through March 20, 2012, although he claims to have been abstinent while incarcerated in lieu of bond. (Ex. 13.)

In March 2012, while the consolidated TPR and Neglect trials were ongoing before Judge Frazzini, DCF referred Stanley W. to parenting classes at the Hispanic Heath Council that would be held on Wednesday mornings commencing April 25, 2012; the respondent-father signed a document indicating his awareness of this opportunity. (Ex. 31-A.)

DCF also referred Stanley W. to the ADRC for where he attended a substance abuse evaluation and screening on March 20, 2012. Although the tests were negative, in addition to drinking alcohol, he admitted having used marijuana and " PCP" approximately two months earlier.⁵⁸ ADRC then diagnosed the respondent-father with Depressive Disorder, rule out for Major Depressive Disorder, and Alcohol, Cannabis, Nicotine, and Phencyclidine Dependence. Stanley W. lacked healthy coping skills and had a very limited support systems other than DCF; he used alcohol and illegal drugs to manage his depression, negative moods, and stress related to his lack of work or housing. ADRC recommended that Stanley W.: participate in a five-week IOP, with three treatment sessions from 5-8:15 p.m. each week, starting March 26, 2012; undergo psychiatric evaluation at ADRC within a month; and then attend ADRC's Relapse Prevention program. However, Stanley W. did not comply, and was discharged by ADRC in 2012 for failure to attend program sessions and non-compliance.⁵⁹ (Exs. 13, 31A; Tes. Stephanie K.) Stanley W. has informed DCF that he does not have a drug problem so he has no need for ADRC's services. (Tes. Ama T.)

58 " PCP" is the informal name for Phencyclidine, an illegal hallucinogenic drug. See State v. Barnes, 112 Conn.App. 711, 716, 963 A.2d 1087 (2009), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 938, 17 A.3d 472 (2011); In re Jocquyce C., 124 Conn.App. 619, 622, 5 A.3d 575 (2010). Stanley W. admitted to have started using marijuana and alcohol as a teenager; his PCP use commenced later in life. He claimed to have smoked five bags of PCP on January 20, 2012, but that he had been abstinent from all drugs from that date until his March 2012 ADRC evaluation.

59 After his discharge in 2012, Stanley W. did not return to ADRC for substance abuse and/or mental health treatment. (Tes. Stephanie K.) Again, as a whole, the evidence supports the inference that Stanley W. was unable or unwilling to attend the ADRC treatment available to him in 2012; other than when he was held in lieu of bond, he had no superseding obligations.

On May 14, 2013, all criminal charges that had been brought against Stanley W. based on Tayjanae's claims of sexual misconduct were dismissed. (Ex. Fa-1.)

On November 25, 2013, DCF referred Stanley W. to the Fatherhood Program, a parenting education program sponsored by Catholic Charities Institute for the Hispanic Family. (Ex. 5.) The provider reached out to Stanley W. to engage him in services; although appointments were made, Stanley W. did not show up, and never called to cancel. On January 14, 2014, the program facilitator reached Stanley W. in an valiant effort to obtain his cooperation with a new group: however, the father refused to attend, stating that he had " no interest in the Fatherhood Program services." ⁶⁰ (Ex. 15; see Tes. Joel C.)

60 The Fatherhood Program's sessions could be scheduled to accommodate a client's work or other obligations. The eight-week Fatherhood Program was available to provide Stanley W. with: case management; economic assistance through help in finding employment, interview training, clothing for work, job application support and access to groceries; parenting education through classes instructing on child development, appropriate discipline, and handling stress related to child care; and relationship counseling, building partner communication skills. (Tes. Joel C.) While Stanley W. claims to have had some employment during the time when this program was available, as a whole, the evidence supports the inference that Stanley W. was unable or unwilling to attend the Fatherhood Program, and that he had no superseding obligations.

On November 26, 2013, DCF again referred Stanley W. to the ADRC for a substance abuse evaluation, testing, and clinical services; however, because Stanley W. was unable or unwilling to execute the necessary release, ADRC was unable to provide him with treatment. (Exs. 5, 14; Tes. Carmen F.)

By June 2014, Stanley W. was not engaged in any type of individual counseling or substance abuse therapy. He remained unemployed, and lacked a residence; he slept at the home of family members and friends. (Tes. Ama T.) As of late September 2014, notwithstanding the specific steps, Stanley W. had refused to undergo a substance abuse assessment since March 2012. (Tes. Carmen F.)

As with Yashika W., by late 2011, DCF was providing Stanley W. with twice weekly two-hour visits with infant Destiny and baby Justin, supervised by B-Healthy.⁶¹ The provider was available to transport Stanley W. approximately two hours, by car, to visit that were scheduled near the children's foster home, with like time for the return trip. During travel time, parent coaching was provided by the visitation supervisor. Sometime in 2013, the visitation schedule was reduced to once-weekly. Generally, the visits Stanley attended with his young children during this period were unremarkable, although he did not appear to have much interest in attaching to either Destiny or Justin instead seeming to be present merely as a support for Yashika W. Stanley W. made himself available for even fewer visits than Yashika W. had; thus, by spring 2013 B-Healthy had instituted its reasonable protocol requiring him to contact Garrick M., who provided both transportation and parent training, the day before the scheduled visit to confirm that he would attend; Stanley W. visited Justin and Destiny inconsistently from January 2012 through February 2014, attending less than half of the visits available when weather and his health permitted him and the children to spend time together. As found in Part II.A., B-Healthy became unavailable in February 2014; although DCF was unable to provide visitation transportation or visitation services for Stanley W. for a period in the late winter of 2014; the father's health care needs prevented visits anyway.⁶² In April 2014, visits resumed under the supervision of Connecting Families, with extra time provided for father to redress the visits that were missed due to weather, health, or the lack of transportation/supervision. Stanley W.'s access to Justin and Destiny through this visitation provider required him to utilize public bus service to New Haven, where the provider would pick him up and bring him to visit the children. Again, Stanley W.'s visits were inconsistent through June 2014, during which time he attended no more than two of the twelve scheduled visits. (Ex. 8-A; Tes. Garrick M., Ama T., Yashika W.) In August of 2014, he saw the children at a visit in a New Haven Park. (Tes. Stanley W.) He did not visit the children at all in October 2014. (Tes. Zaida R.)

61 In April 2013, prior to the termination of the respondent-mother's parental rights to Justin, Yashika W. and Stanley W. visited Destiny and Justin together. (Ex. 25.)

62 Stanley W. claims to have been involved in a motor vehicle accident sometime prior to commencement of this trial; visits were not permitted at the nursing home where he was confined in March and April 2014. (Tes. Ama T.) Nonetheless, as a whole, the evidence supports the inference that Stanley W. was unable or unwilling to attend visits supervised by B-Healthy or Connecting Families; other than when he was held in lieu of bond or was under medical care, he had no superseding obligations.

II. C.

JUSTIN W. AND DESTINY W.--THE CHILDREN

Justin, born September 29, 2010, was removed from Yashika W.'s custody and placed in DCF foster care on October 4, 2010. Slightly premature, he initially required extra medical visits to attend to a heart murmur and pulmonary problems, which have abated with age. A healthy and active pre-schooler, Justin requires treatment for his asthma only when he has a headcold, and is extremely well-adjusted to his foster parents and to the only home he has ever known. (Tes. Steven G.)

Born full term on August 5, 2011 and apparently healthy, DCF removed Destiny from Yashika W.'s care on August 8, 2011. Placed in foster care with Justin, Destiny is a relatively well-developing and normal child.⁶³ (Ex. 1; Tes. Eileen B.) As of April 2013, when she was approximately a year and a half old, Destiny recognized and was comfortable in the presence of both her biological parents. By that date, however, she was " extremely bonded and attached" to her long-term foster parents, to whom she had begun referring as " mom" and " dad." (Ex. 3-A.)

63 In August 31, Destiny was dropped on her head at the foster home and required hospital care for two to three days. (Tes. Eileen B.) There is no evidence from which the court could conclude that there are any sequellae from this incident. In September 2011 DCF raised concerns that Destiny suffered from hypothyroidism and/or a " heart murmur." (Ex. 1.) However, by April 2013, DCF reported that the child was " medically up to date with no issues or concerns . . . on target and . . . reaching all her mile stones." (Ex. 3-A.)

Approximately ten months apart in age, Justin and Destiny are very close to each other. Destiny has two visits per week scheduled with Stanley W. and Yashika W. Both children have met their developmental milestones.⁶⁴ Justin, who is able to speak, never asks about Stanley W. Destiny's foster parents are " committed" to adopting both children if they are available. (Ex. 5; Tes. Steve G., Ama T.)

64 The court recognizes Yashika W.'s continued concern with the quality of care provided at Destiny's foster home. (Tes. Ama T., Amita P.) The child's placement is beyond the scope of the TPR petition now before the court.

III.

ADJUDICATION--INTRODUCTION

To prevail on the pending TPR petitions as to Justin and Destiny, DCF must prove the following adjudicatory elements by clear and convincing evidence: that " (1) the Department . . . made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . . (2) termination is in the best interest of the child, and (3)(B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent . . . and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child; [and/or] (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child; [and/or] (E) the parent of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected or uncared for, has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and such parent's parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by [DCF] . . ." ⁶⁵ § 17a-112(j); see Practice Book § 32a-3(b).

65 In determining whether the TPR issues, the foregoing legislative " provisions . . . shall be liberally construed [by the court] in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed." General Statutes § 17a-112(q).

As DCF has made no claim that the amendments to the TPR petitions impact the location or reunification elements of § 17a-112(j)(1) as alleged for Destiny as to Stanley W. and Yashika W., the court has utilized the adjudicatory date of April 18, 2013, when that child's TPR petition was filed.⁶⁶ Similarly, the court has utilized the adjudicatory date of May 14, 2014, when Justin's TPR petition was filed naming Stanley W. as a respondent, when considering the § 17a-112(j)(1) issues. However, the court has considered each parent rehabilitative efforts subsequent to the filing of the TPR petition when determining whether the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a foreseeable period of time, as contemplated by the pending allegations brought pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) and § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).⁶⁷

66 " '[I]n determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child or whether there is sufficient evidence that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis of events preceding the date on which the termination petition was filed . . . This court has consistently held that the court, [w]hen making its reasonable efforts determination . . . is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition . . .' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., 153 Conn.App. 584, 596, 102 A.3d 141, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 902, 104 A.3d 106 (2014)." (Footnote omitted.) In re Joseph M., Jr., 158 Conn.App. 849, 861, 120 A.3d 1271, 1280 (2015).

67 Practice Book § 35a-7(a) provides that " [i]n the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights ." (Emphasis added.) Such consideration of subsequent events is highly relevant to whether a parent has achieved statutory rehabilitation. See, e.g., In re Luciano B., 129 Conn.App. 449, 469, 21 A.3d 858 (2011); In re Gianni C., 129 Conn.App. 227, 234, 19 A.3d 233 (2011), In re Keyashia C., 120 Conn.App. 452, 457 n.12, 991 A.2d 1113, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 909, 995 A.2d 637 (2010).

For the reasons stated below and in Parts IV. and V., and incorporating each of the factual findings and conclusions made by clear and convincing evidence throughout this decision, the court finds that DCF has met its burden of proving that Stanley W. has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) and § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i); that DCF has met its burden of proving that Yashika W. has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) and § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i); but that DCF as not met its burden of proof on the allegations based on § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) as to either respondent. Accordingly, as the department's allegations must be assessed in the alternative, DCF has prevailed on the adjudicatory phase so as to support termination of parental rights as to both Yashika W. and Stanley W.⁶⁸

68 Each of the grounds for termination set out in § 17a-112(j)(3) is " an independent ground for termination, " so that to prevail with regard to a respondent-parent, DCF is required " to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the specified statutory bases for termination has been established." (Emphasis added; citations omitted.) In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). " See In re Daniel A., 150 Conn.App. 78, 98, 89 A.3d 1040 (only one of statutory grounds for TPR need be proved by clear and convincing evidence) cert. denied, 312 Conn. 911, 93 A.3d 593 (2014)." In re Kylik A., 153 Conn.App. 584, 586 n.3, 102 A.3d 141, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 902, 104 A.3d 106 (2014).

III. A.

LOCATION EFFORTS--STANLEY W. AND YASHIKA W.

Clear and convincing evidence establishes that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the respondent-parents throughout this litigation, as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1). Yashika W. and the department have maintained contact generally through phone conversations and letters although, on occasion, the respondent-mother's phone has no service, her number has changed many timed since April 2012, her residential address has changed often, and she sometimes rebuffed DCF social workers' efforts to visit with her. Although Stanley W. often had no address at all, often lives at shelters, and often lacks telephone service and often lives at shelters, DCF reasonably has attempted to contact Stanley W. through mail to his last known address, phone calls to known numbers and home visits. These efforts commenced with Destiny's birth on August 5, 2011 and continued after paternity was established for Justin.⁶⁹ (Exs. 3-A, 6; Tes. Eileen B., Ama T., Amita P., Dr. Freedman, Yashika W., Zaida R.)

69 On occasion, Stanley W. has given his sister's address; however, when DCF has attempted to reach him there, the sister explains that he does not live there. (Tes. Amita P.) Stanley W. claims to have lived for two years in a two-bedroom apartment occupied by his nephew's baby's mother and her two children, and that he previously lived at a shelter. (Tes. Stanley W.)

III. B.

§ 17a-112(j)(1) REUNIFICATION EFFORTS FOR STANLEY W.

Clear and convincing evidence, as recounted in Parts I., II.B. and throughout this memorandum of decision, establishes both that DCF made reasonable reunification efforts for Stanley W. during the adjudicatory periods for Destiny and for Justin, and that this respondent was " unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . ." as contemplated by the statute.⁷⁰ § 17a-112(j)(1). Thus, DCF has met its burden of proof on this TPR element.

70 " As part of a termination of parental rights proceeding, § 17a-112(j)(1) requires the department to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it 'has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . .' (Emphasis added.) Because the two clauses are separated by the word 'unless, ' this statute plainly is written in the conjunctive. Accordingly, the department must prove either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element." (Emphasis in the original; external citations omitted.) In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552-53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).

DCF's multiple reunification efforts for Stanley W. during the relevant adjudicatory phase, included: case management and administrative case reviews; foster care and medical attention for Destiny and Justin; written communication and oral conversation concerning referrals to service providers; supervised visits, including make-up visits when DCF was unable to arrange for scheduled contact due to weather or provider's unavailability; correspondence defining the visitation schedule and the need for the respondent-father to call in advance to confirm whether he would be spending time with his children; transportation to and from visits, with parent coaching during transportation and sessions provided by B-Healthy through February 2014; supervised visitation provided by Connecting Families, with transportation by provider and passes for bus transportation starting in April 2014.⁷¹ (Exs. 3-A, 5, 6, 29, 30, 34; Tes. Amita P.) In addition, as found in Part II.B., DCF made multiple referrals to facilitate Stanley W.'s access to mental health and substance abuse treatment, necessary predicates to the personal stability he would require in order to reunify with either Justin and/or Destiny. Before Destiny's TPR petition was filed on April 18, 2013, DCF referred Stanley W. to: ADRC for inpatient care in October 2010; ADRC for IOP in December 2010; to the ADRC Intensive Program again in December 2010; to ADRC's inpatient program again in August 2011; to the ADRC for a substance abuse evaluation in March 2012; to ADRC's IOP again in March 2012; and to the Hispanic Health Council for parenting classes in March 2012. After Destiny's TPR petition was filed but before Justin's TPR petition was filed on May 14, 2014, DCF referred Stanley W. to: the Fatherhood Program at the Institute for the Hispanic Families/Catholic Charities in November 2013; to the ADRC for an assessment in November 2013; to the ADRC for clinical services including an evaluation and or drug-testing in December 2013; to the Fatherhood Program again in January 2014; and to the ADRC for substance abuse and mental health assessments in January 2014. (Exs. 5, 13, 14, 31-A; Tes. Stephanie K.)

71 DCF reasonably determined that it was appropriate to transport the adult, not the child, to visitation sessions. In February 2014, when B-Healthy became unavailable to transport Yashika W. to and from visits with Destiny, DCF made reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to secure alternate transportation by contacting Wee Care, Radiance Innovative, My People's Clinical, and Family Connections. By April 2014, DCF was able to secure transportation to visits using bus passes to New Haven, then transportation for both father and children through Connecting Families. (Ex. 6.)

Stanley W.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts related to Destiny and/or Justin is clearly and convincingly established through four aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case. First, despite DCF's repeated efforts over the course of years to encourage this respondent to effectively engage in the mental health and substance abuse services available at ADRC, as recounted in Part II.B., Stanley W. only rarely accepted DCF's referrals and, when he did, he never followed through with the provider's treatment recommendations. For instance, although he was referred to care at ADRC in the fall of 2010, he was unsuccessful and failed to keep the provider's appointment for necessary inpatient follow-up services. When he acquiesced and participated in ADRC inpatient care in August 2010, he left against medical advice without completing even the preliminary portion of his substance abuse and mental health treatment. He attended the substance abuse and mental health evaluations scheduled at the ADRC in March 2012, but did not follow through with treatment as recommended, leaving himself still suffering from depression, alcohol and drug dependence, and lacking the social conduct skills that would enable him to cope with managing even the challenges of his own life, even without the responsibility of providing consistent access to food, clothing and a home environment suitable for the two young children with whom he claims to wish to be reunited. Even in December 2013 and in January 2014, when DCF again attempted to secure mental health and substance abuse treatment for Stanley W. at ADRC, he either failed to respond or demonstrated his rejection of services by refusing to execute the releases necessary to engage with that provider. This conduct, on the part of the respondent-father, clearly and convincingly demonstrates his inability or unwillingness to even participate in, and his concomitant inability or unwillingness to benefit from substance abuse and mental health serves even when they are extended to him. (Exs. 5, 13, 14, 31-A; Tes. Stephanie K.)

Second, Stanley W. did not complete the parenting education program he commenced at the Hispanic Health Council, and was never able to demonstrate improvement in his ability or willingness to engage with his children despite partial participation in that service. He refused to accept or engage in any of the wrap-around social support services and parenting education available to him through the Fatherhood Program sponsored by Catholic Charities and the Institute for the Hispanic Family. Despite multiple attempts on the part of the Fatherhood Program to encourage the respondent-father to take part in its many-faceted programs, as discussed in Part II.B., Stanley W. unequivocally refused to participate. In this way, he deprived himself of access to assistance with personal management skills, housing benefits, social strategies, and other services that were designed to aid him in gaining the skills necessary to provide adequate care for his own needs, as a predicate to learning to serve as an adequate parent for Justin and Destiny. Through this conduct, Stanley W. again clearly and convincingly established his inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts. (Exs. 5, 7, 15; Tes. Joel C.)

Third, Stanley W.'s lackluster participation in the visitation opportunities provided by DCF clearly and convincingly illustrates not only that he is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, but also that he actually has little interest in maintaining any relationship at all with either Destiny or Justin. The father's poor attendance at visits, as found in Part II.B., does not indicate a desire to serve in a parenting role when contact with the children is made available to him; that same poor attendance indicates a lack of commitment to the reunification process that is founded upon maintaining a place in the lives of Destiny and Justin. As previously found, Stanley W. attended visits more as a support for Yashika W. than in any other context. His scant interaction with the children, even when visits occurred, and his reduced participation in visits as time has passed, further demonstrates his inability or unwillingness to benefit from this valuable reunification service. (Exs. 3-A, 6, 8-A, 25; Tes. Garrick M., Ama T., Zaida R., Stanley W.)

Fourth, and consistent with the disinterest Stanley W. exhibited in visiting either Destiny or Justin over time, Stanley W. repeatedly failed to meet with the department, to make himself available for discussion of the status of his children, or to attend the department's administrative case reviews. Through this behavior, he again clearly and convincingly evinced his inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts, as well as his inability or unwillingness to even keep himself apprised of his children's well-being. (Ex. 3-A, 5, 7.)

Given Stanley W.'s repeated rejection of reunification efforts, it would have been unnecessarily futile for the department to have attempted to engage him in any further services.⁷² Having proved, by clear and convincing evidence, both that it made reasonable reunification efforts for Stanley W., and that this respondent is unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts, DCF has met its burden of proving this element of § 17a-112(j)(1).

72 In considering the provision of reunification efforts related to § 17a-112(j)(1), " '[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act.' In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999)." In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 873, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 468 (2014).

III. C.

REUNIFICATION EFFORTS--YASHIKA W. AND DESTINY

Clear and convincing evidence establishes that DCF made reasonable reunification efforts for Yashika W. and Destiny during the relevant adjudicatory period and further establishes that this respondent was " unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . ." as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1).⁷³ Thus, DCF has met its burden of proof on this TPR element.

73 As previously discussed, the department is not required to prove both that it made reunification efforts and that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts; either element of the statute, if proved by clear and convincing evidence, is sufficient for DCF to prevail on this element. See In re Jorden R., supra, 293 Conn. 552-53.

DCF made multiple reunification efforts for Yashika W. prior to the filing of Destiny's TPR petition on April 18, 2013. Those efforts included: case management and administrative case reviews; foster care and medical attention for Destiny; written communication and oral conversation concerning referrals to service providers; supervised visits with Destiny, including make-up visits when DCF was unable to arrange for scheduled mother-daughter contact; correspondence defining the visitation schedule and the need for the respondent-mother to call in advance to confirm whether she would attend; and transportation to and from visits, with parent coaching during transportation and sessions provided by B-Healthy.⁷⁴ In addition DCF re-referred Yashika W. to CAC counseling services in late August 2011, providing a bus pass to facilitate her attendance; referred her for individual treatment sessions at CAC or the Sexual Assault Crisis Services programs in late December 2011. (Exs. 3-A, 5, 6, 25, 29, 34, K; Tes. Amita P.) In addition, as found in Part III. A., Yashika W. had access to Section 8 housing and utility subsidies as well as food stamps, and had referred herself to weekly individual therapy sessions with Valarie W. that continued during the adjudicatory period.⁷⁵ DCF made reasonable efforts to communicate with this counselor to obtain valid and useful information regarding treatment and progress toward the goals defined by the court, but without success, as found in Part II.A.⁷⁶ (Exs. 3-A, 16, F; Tes. Valarie W.)

74 As discussed in Part IIIB., DCF reasonably determined that it was appropriate to transport the adult, not the child, to visitation sessions.

75 There is no basis, in law or reason, for DCF to duplicate services available to a parent through a coordinate program such as probation or another community agency. See generally In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 56-57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).

76 To the extent that DCF may have an obligation to provide reunification efforts for Yashika W. after the adjudicatory phase, the court notes that in February 2014, as found in Part III.B., when B-Healthy was no longer available to provide parent coaching and transportation for Yashika W. to and from visits with Destiny, DCF made reasonable yet unsuccessful efforts to promptly secure alternate services through Wee Care, Radiance Innovative, My People's Clinical, and Family Connections. By April 2014, DCF was able to secure transportation for Yashika W. to meet with Destiny through Connecting Families; although Yashika W. was required to take public bus transportation to New Haven, DCF paid her travel expenses. (Ex. 6; Tes. Zaida R.)

Yashika W.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts related to Destiny is clearly and convincingly established through several pivotal aspects of the evidence. First, she has repeatedly informed the department that she does not want to accept any additional services. Yashika W. made this clear through her statement to DCF on September 29, 2011, and manifested her statement through her rejection of the opportunity to become informed about the need to timely and adequately respond to a child's reports of physical assault through individual treatment sessions to which DCF attempted to refer her at CAC or at the Sexual Assault Crisis Center, or through any other provider. Even though she had attended a second round of CAC non-offender's group sessions, as referred by DCF during the weeks following Destiny's birth and removal from her care, the mother either was unable or unwilling to benefit from that program sufficiently to understand that she required individual treatment sessions to learn how to process the fact that Tayjanae had alleged sexual abuse by Stanley W., whether that abuse had actually occurred or not. Stubbornly focused only on her perception that Tayjanae had lied about her experiences, even after the renewed CAC group treatment Yashika W. remained as unable or unwilling to understand that any child who makes a similar report requires immediate parental support and professional intervention with follow-up counseling to prevent long-lasting effects; thus, she was as unwilling and unable to process the impact of parental inattention to a child who complained of such experiences after the 2011 CAC treatment as she had been after refusing for months after Tayjanae's 2008 referral to the Klingberg CATS program, and as she had been following that child's CATS intake followed by the mother's refusal to bring her daughter in for the post-report counseling recommended by CAC and Klingberg. As referenced in Part II.A., Yashika W. also refused to accept DCF's referral to MPCS, whereby she was unable to access to the valuable type of wrap-around social support services that Valarie W. had recommended for her; through her unwillingness to participate, she lost the opportunity for additional individual counseling, family counseling, family preservation therapy and assistance with transportation to services. (Exs. 3-A, 29, 24, K, S; Tes. Amita P., Eileen B., Alexa R.) As also found in Part II.A., after her parental rights were terminated as to Tayjanae, Shadiamond, Terran and Justin in November 2013, Yashika W. made it abundantly clear that she would reject any further reunification efforts extended to her by DCF, declaring that " she does not want any services from the Department knowing that the children will not be returning to her care." (Ex. 5. See Ex. 30, Tes. Ama T.)

The respondent-mother's inability or unwillingness to benefit from such efforts is also evident in her lack of cooperation with DCF. Her absence from five Administrative Case Reviews held from August 2011 through January 2013, during which planning for Destiny was the focus of discussion, exemplified Yashika W.'s inability or unwillingness to even listen and learn about the circumstances affecting her young daughter's health and well-being. Yashika W.'s unwillingness to sign releases for DCF and her avoidance of multiple home visits scheduled with DCF prior to April 15, 2013 further indicates her inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts, as does both her refusal to allow Valarie W. to share her diagnosis with DCF and her inability or unwillingness to share with her chosen therapist the actual reason why individual counseling had been ordered by the court, or the fact that the father of Justin and Destiny was the subject of criminal charges related to Tayjanae's 2008 reports of sexual abuse. (Ex. 11; Tes. Valarie W. See Exs. 2, 3-A, 16, F.)

Equally troubling and further clearly and convincingly establishing Yashika W.'s inability or unwillingness to benefit from reunification efforts is her inconsistent attendance at a great number of the visits with Destiny scheduled both before and after the TPR petition for that child was filed. Even when B-Healthy was available to pick Yashika W. up at her home and transport her to see baby Destiny, the mother missed an unreasonable number of visits without explanation or cause; often Destiny was brought to visits even when Yashika W. was absent, because the mother was not at home to be picked up. Of the forty-eight supervised visits scheduled for her from August 27, 2012 through April 2013 when Destiny's TPR petition was filed, the mother attended only twenty-five sessions with her daughter, calling only on one occasion to indicate she was too ill to come see the child. When DCF implemented its reasonable, written explanation of the visitation schedule and the protocol to follow if the respondent-mother would not be traveling to visit the child, Yashika W. chafed at her new responsibility, and her attendance at visits did not improve. Even when DCF procured a new visitation supervision service, and although she had no other designated obligations, Yashika W. was less than cooperative with the process that reasonably required her to obtain a local bus pass from DCF and travel on a public bus to New Haven where she would be picked up by Connecting Families and brought to spend time with her daughter. As found in Part II.B., Yashika W. attended only slightly more than fifteen per cent of the visits with Destiny that were scheduled from April to June 2014.⁷⁷ She did not visit Destiny the fall of 2014 and, as of December 9, 2014, after the birth of her youngest child Sanai, could not even when she had last seen then three-year-old child Destiny.⁷⁸ (Exs. 3-A, 5, 29, 30; Tes. Ama T., Yashika W., Zaida R.)

77 Similar to her experience with B-Healthy, as a whole, the evidence supports the inference that Yashika W. was unable or unwilling to attend the supervised visits with Destiny available from April through June 2014; the court received no credible evidence that the mother had obligations that superseded the opportunities to experience contact with her children.

78 Yashika W.'s pattern of inconsistent and insufficiently frequent visits with Destiny was nearly identical to the pattern she had exhibited with regard to Justin's visitation schedule, prior to her termination of parental rights to that child. Even when DCF offered back-to-back daily visits to make up for cancellations due to weather or other circumstances, Yashika W. declined, claiming that the long drive to see her children was unduly burdensome. (Ex. 8-A; Tes. Garrick M.) Again, as previously indicated, the evidence as a whole supports the inference that Yashika W. was unable or unwilling to attend all available visits with Destiny because she could or would not place her parental role above that of serving her own needs; the mother's decision not to travel to see Destiny, when she had no superseding obligations, is clear and convincing evidence of her inability or unwillingness to benefit from any parent coaching or supervised visitation.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the repeated CAC services and the individual counseling with Valarie W. she chose to attend in connection with efforts extended to help Yashika W. reunify with Destiny in particular, Yashika W. is unable or unwilling to effectively control her conduct when she is angry or frustrated, and acts impulsively without regard for the effect of her behavior on others.⁷⁹ As found in Part II.B., in November 2011, mere months after Destiny was born and taken directly into DCF custody, Yashika W. engaged in threatening behavior in a public place. She became so frustrated and angry at DCF's failure to produce a bus card for her on June 13, 2012 that she put her own needs ahead of Destiny's, and cut short a visit that was being held on that day. In February 2013, Yashika W. abruptly ended a conversation with the family's DCF social worker concerning the scheduling of visits, although she had been previously informed about certain changes that had been made to accommodate Destiny's visits with her siblings. Claiming to be enrolled in school, Yashika W. refused to provide DCF with information concerning her educational schedule so that visits with Destiny could be more easily scheduled. (Exs. 2, 3-A; Tes. Amita P.) This conduct, despite years of enrollment in and/or opportunities to engage in services, clearly and convincingly establishes that Yashika W. is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1).⁸⁰

79 The implications of this aspect of Yashika W.'s unwillingness or inability to benefit from reunification efforts is magnified when it is viewed in connection with the panoply of services offered to the mother when DCF became involved with the family in 2008. Even when Yashika W. was willing or able to extend herself and to attend services, and even if she received certificates from the sponsoring provider, she did not benefit therefrom in any measurable way. (See, e.g., Exs. 1, 2, 3-A, 5, 6, 7, 16, 29, F, H, J, K, L; Tes. Valarie W.)

80 Yashika W. has argued that DCF's failure to timely pay B-Healthy's invoices unreasonably interfered with her opportunity to visit Destiny from later 2013 through early 2014. This argument must fail given the mother's rather dismal record of attendance at visits when they were available to her, and the lack of any reasonable basis upon which the court could conclude that this hiatus had any measurable impact upon Yashika W.'s engagement in the reunification process. Similarly, although Yashika W.'s attorney argued valiantly that DCF's reunification efforts were insufficient in this case, the court is not persuaded. As found in Parts IA. and above, given the respondent-mother's lack of cooperation and rejection of services over the course of years, DCF's efforts were reasonable and appropriate. The circumstances of this case presents no valid basis for concluding that Yashika W. would have engaged in other services if offered, that family placement of the child would have in any way enhanced or even affected the reunification process, or that the would have in any way benefitted from other attempts to reunify her with Destiny. Thus, it would have been an unnecessary and futile for the department to have made any efforts other than those tendered.

IV.

ADJUDICATION--TPR GROUNDS AS TO STANLEY W.

As found in Part I., as to Stanley W., the pending termination of parental rights petitions for Justin and Destiny raise identical alternative statutory grounds in the alternative. The court now addresses DCF's § 17a-112(j)(3)(E), § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) and § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) allegations as to the father in series, considering his circumstances and those of the children.⁸¹

81 For TPR purposes, our courts have defined the minimal parental responsibilities in the conjunctive: " The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes: (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care; (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance . . ." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Lukas K., 120 Conn.App. 465, 487-88, 992 A.2d 1142 (2010), aff'd, 300 Conn. 463, 14 A.3d 990 (2011). In reaching its conclusions on the issues related to the father's rehabilitative status as it relates to Justin and Destiny, the court has fully considered the father's parenting history and the evidence in its entirety; acknowledged the implications of the children's particular needs; and remained aware that Stanley's past and present circumstances are ridden with hardship and trauma.

IV. A.

§ 17a-112(j)(3)(E) FAILURE TO REHABILITATE--STANLEY W.

DCF has met its burden of proving its allegations based upon § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) as to Stanley W., supporting termination of his parental rights as to both Justin and Destiny. Insofar as this statutory ground is concerned, it remains uncontested that Stanley W. is the parent of Justin, a child under the age of seven years who was adjudicated neglected on June 7, 2011, that he is the parent of Destiny, a child under the age of seven years who was adjudicated neglected on November 18, 2013, and that Stanley W.'s parental rights to his child Shadiamond were terminated on November 18, 2013 in response to a petition filed by the department. Clear and convincing evidence in the current case establishes that notwithstanding access to appropriate services, Stanley W. has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation, through improvement of his mental health, substance abuse, social conduct and parenting deficits, as would encourage the belief that, considering Justin's and Destiny's young ages and need for total care by a reliable, sober and capable caregiver, the father could assume a responsible position in either child's life within a reasonable period of time.⁸²

82 See In re Mia M., 14 A.3d 1024, 127 Conn.App. 363, 376 (2011) (examining degree of § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) personal rehabilitation required for termination of parental rights); see also In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 524, 939 A.2d 16, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 902, 947 A.2d 341, 342 (2008) (facts supported trial court's finding of failure to achieve sufficient § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) personal rehabilitation). While requiring consideration of a respondent-parent's ability or unwillingness to achieve statutory rehabilitation, Section 17a-112(j)(3)(E) does authorize but does not anticipate assessment of a respondent-parent's compliance with specific steps; unlike § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i); the text of subsection (B) contains no reference to such orders. The legislative purpose in enacting subdivision (E) of § 17a-112(j)(3) was to provide an expedited ground for termination of parental rights in a " . . . case where a parent had, had one or more children already taken away and had, had parental rights terminated and where all concerned really felt there was no hope of rehabilitation of the parent, where in addition the child that was abused or neglected and before the court was at a young age so that prompt determination of parental rights would be important to free up the child for adoption and permanent placement. And when we looked at all of those concerns it led us to this new termination procedure, or ground." 39 H.R. Proc., Pt. 6, 1996 Sess., pp. 4980-81, remarks of Representative Ellen Scalettar.

Stanley W.'s failure to achieve § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) rehabilitation is clearly and convincingly evident in many ways. Incorporating and making a part of this discussion all of the facts as found throughout this decision, including those found in Parts II.B., III.A. and III.B., it is overwhelmingly apparent that since the birth of Justin and Destiny, the father has been provided with access to multiple services that could assist in the treatment and of his ongoing issues with depression and substance abuse, conditions which limit his capacity to manage his own life in a stable and predictable manner. As the children have spend years in foster care, however, Stanley W. has, far more often than not, rejected involvement in the very rehabilitative services recommended for him by ADRC. Without professional intervention to address and remediate these issues, he has remained adversely impacted by the mental health and drug use which, relentlessly and consistently, limits his ability to function safely in the community. Overall, Stanley W. has avoided almost all of the substance abuse and/or mental health treatment services DCF has extended to him over time; he has often declined to sign releases that would facilitate the process of obtaining relevant treatment for his conditions and, as a result, not achieved a degree of sobriety that could, realistically, represent the achievement of the capacity to organize his own life, let along serve in a responsible parenting role for his children.

Over time, as well, by rejecting access to wrap-around community supports such as those available through the Fatherhood Program, Stanley W. has elected to forgo valuable opportunities to acquire the basic life skills necessary to maintain a structured and sober lifestyle, to earn lawful income, to acquire and keep stable housing, or even to provide a structured environment in which he could live himself. Often homeless, he has not kept DCF informed of his whereabouts, effectively foreclosing options for department support in obtaining treatment for the critical parenting deficits, including but not limited to substance abuse and mental health issues, that were long ago identified as impeding his capacity to fulfil a parental role for Shadiamond; those conditions, unremediated, persist and similarly impede his capacity to fulfill a responsible role in the lives of Justin or Destiny. Stanley W. is now forty-six years old. He still relies upon such friends and family as he can, from time to time identify, and the community to provide him with shelter. He has never acquired or maintained stable housing on his own or with support; certainly, he has never secured or maintained a home environment that could, in any realistic way, meet the needs of five-year-old Justin or four-year-old Destiny. The totality of the clear and convincing evidence of the facts as found throughout this decision, reflecting Stanley W.'s continuing behavior patterns, compels the conclusion that even if he now was to become able or willing to access wrap-around support services from DCF or a community agency, his past history of failing to make progress even in achieving the capacity to manage his own affairs by staying sober and creating a home for himself. With the clear and convincing finding that he has failed to make any progress in achieving personal stability since the termination of his parental rights to Shadiamond, the court concludes that Stanley W. could not achieve sufficient personal stability to encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, considering Justin's and Destiny's young ages and immature stages of development, he could fulfill the parental role contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(E).⁸³

83 The court maintains this position notwithstanding the fact that the criminal charges brought against Stanley W., based on Tayjanae's allegations of his sexual abuse, have since been dismissed. As previously discussed, the state's election to discontinue prosecution does not in any way establish that the respondent father, at one time, engaged in sexual misconduct with the daughter of his paramour.

Young Justin and Destiny are totally dependent upon sober, suitable, fit and available adults to meet their basic daily needs, for emotional support for a consistent environment befitting their circumstances. Without even scant improvement in his personal functioning, the father lacks any of the caretaking attributes that his children require. Even after attending the greater portion of parenting education services sponsored by the Hispanic Council, there is no evidence from which the court could reasonably conclude that the father achieved any benefit from that program; his parenting skills certainly have not improved, as is evident from the inconsistent and unpredictable schedule with which he chooses to visit Destiny and Justin, even though he remains unemployed and has no other known demands absorbing his time or attention. Sadly, when he testified at trial, Stanley W. seemed unsure as to when he had last seen his children, although he remembered a visit at a New Haven Park in the summer of 2014. He did not visit them at all during October 2014, supporting the inference that although he may facially claim to request reunification with Justin and Destiny, Stanley W. actually has no desire to serve them in the parental role these young children require. He has not inquired about their well-being, has not expressed interest in their activities or their stages of development, and seems just as satisfied when he is not required to visit the children as when he is asked to make the effort to travel to see them. The evidence supports the determination that, despite the years his children have spent in foster care, Stanley W. has never even achieved the capacity to express love or affection for Justin and Destiny; he has never achieved the capacity to meet their basic needs for stable housing, a nurturing home environment, guidance, clothing, food and/or medical care. In sum, Stanley has never achieved the capacity to demonstrate toward his children that he possesses even the minimum attributes of parenting, and the evidence supports the inference that he has no desire to do so.⁸⁴ (Exs. 3-A, 5, 7, 8-A, 26, 27; Tes. Garrick M., Zaida R., Stanley W.)

84 See In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487-88.

Given the totality of the circumstances, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that Stanley W. has failed, is unable and/or is unwilling to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation that would render it reasonable to believe that, at some foreseeable point in the future relevant to Justin's and/or Destiny's particular needs, he could assume a responsible position in the life of these children. Thus, the department has proved the essential elements of its § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) allegation as to the respondent-father in this case.⁸⁵

85 In re Mia M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 376; In re Joseph L., supra, 105 Conn.App. 524.

IV. B.

§ 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) FAILURE TO REHABILITATE--STANLEY W.

DCF also has met its burden of proving its allegations based upon § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) failure to achieve personal rehabilitation as to Stanley W., further supporting termination of his parental rights to Justin and Destiny. Insofar as this statutory ground is concerned, it is uncontested that Stanley W. is the parent of both children; that Justin was adjudicated neglected on June 7, 2011; that Destiny was adjudicated neglected on November 18, 2013; that the father was provided with specific steps to facilitate the return of Destiny to him by November 18, 2013; and that the father was provided with specific steps to facilitate the return of Justin to him by March 25, 2014. The court incorporates into and makes a part of its § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) discussion each of the findings and conclusions made in Part IV.A. relevant to Stanley W.'s failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering Justin's and Destiny's age and needs, this respondent could assume a responsible position in the life of either child under § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). To support its conclusion that the father has failed to achieve the requisite degree of statutory rehabilitation under § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), the court next examines the nature and extent of Stanley W.'s compliance with the specific steps identified in Part I.⁸⁶

86 " Specific steps provide notice and guidance to a parent as to what should be done to facilitate reunification and prevent termination of rights." In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 507-8, 78 A.3d 797 (2013). Specific steps are an express element of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i); upon execution, they become enforceable court orders. See In re Jeffrey C., 261 Conn. 189, 194, 802 A.2d 772 (2002). " The specific steps are . . . considered 'fair warning' of the potential termination of parental rights in subsequent proceedings pursuant to § 17a-112." In re Jeffrey C., 64 Conn.App. 55, 62, 779 A.2d 765 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Conn. 189, 802 A.2d 772 (2002). However, " a parent's compliance with rehabilitative programs, while relevant, is not dispositive as to the rehabilitation finding. In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 791, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622. " Failure to complete specific steps is evidence that the respondent has not achieved a sufficient degree of rehabilitation. In re Ashley M., [82 Conn.App. 66, 72, 842 A.2d 624 (2004).]" In re Shane M., 84 A.3d 1265, 148 Conn.App. 308, 321-22 (2014), aff'd, 318 Conn. 569, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015). " Indeed, the failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding." In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003).

Overall, while he has from time attended some services to which he has been referred in conjunction with the specific steps, such as mental health and substance abuse evaluations or treatment at ADRC or parenting education at the Hispanic Council, and while he was not arrested after Justin or Destiny were born, the evidence as a whole clearly and convincingly establishes that Stanley W. has failed to comply with any specific steps ordered for him.⁸⁷ His compliance with DCF was extremely unsatisfactory, failing to provide the department with his address and remaining whereabouts unknown for prolonged periods of time, failing to attend administrative case reviews as scheduled, failing to sign releases as required by the specific steps except on rare occasion. Stanley W. repeatedly rejected DCF's referrals for the continued attention to mental health and substance abuse issues that adversely impacted the father's parenting capacity, refusing to attend ADRC evaluations or to attend drug screens on many occasions in express violation of the specific steps, and leaving against medical advice on one occasion when he did agree to submit to inpatient care. Stanley W. had only brief access to the legal income required by the specific steps, when he worked at a mattress factory; otherwise his only legal income was in the form of food stamps, insufficient to meet the needs of either of his children. He never maintained the adequate housing mandated by the steps, was often homeless, residing in shelters or, when permitted, with family or extended family members on a temporary basis; none of these housing environments even began to approach the level of stability and consistency needed by Destiny and/or Justin. Stanley W. further violated the steps, and self-created a substantial impediment to his achievement of personal rehabilitation, when he consistently rejected the entreaties of the Fatherhood Program sponsored by the Catholic Charities Institute of Hispanic Families. This program's wrap-around services were available to assist Stanley W. in acquiring employment, clothing, parenting education and social communication skills, all sorely needed by this respondent. However, Stanley W.'s refusal to participate in this program left him adversely affected by his parenting deficits in violation of both the letter and the spirit of the steps. (Exs. 3-A, 5, 15; Tes. Joel C.)

87 In assessing Stanley W.'s compliance with the separate specific steps issued for Destiny in November 2013 and for Justin in March 2014, the court has remained aware that the criteria are so similar as to be considered nearly identical. Given the father's dismal record of failing to adhere to the steps issued for Destiny, as described above, no aspect of the § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) analysis purpose would be served by measuring his compliance in the context of Justin's steps, alone; instead, parental rehabilitation for this respondent must take into account the degree to which, if at all, Stanley W. has been motivated to follow one set of court orders or another. See In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 593, 595.

The most compelling aspect of Stanley W.'s failure to comply with the specific steps as ordered, however, is his inconsistent and unpredictable attendance at the visits that were regularly scheduled by the department, in an effort to maintain paternal contact with the children. Whether visitation was supervised by B-Healthy or Connecting Families, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Stanley W. did not comply with the steps requiring him to visit either child as often as DCF permits, even though he had no other known obligations. In this way, the father not only demonstrated a failure to follow the orders of the court, but evinced a functional disinterest in his young daughter and young son that is markedly inconsistent with achievement of the personal rehabilitation contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). (Exs. 3-A, 5, 8-A; Zaida R.)

Given the totality of the evidence relevant to Stanley W.'s non-compliance with the specific steps ordered by the court, and given the finding of his failure to achieve personal rehabilitation as set forth in Part IV.A., above, the department has met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, each of the elements of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) sufficient to support termination of the father's parental rights to Destiny and to Justin.

IV. C.

No ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)--STANLEY W.

DCF asserts that it has proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Stanley W., Justin and/or Destiny, so that it must prevail on this aspect of its TPR petition. " To establish the ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child [is lacking] and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re S.D., 115 Conn.App. 111, 122-23, 972 A.2d 258 (2009). This element requires the court to undertake " a two-pronged analysis. 'First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, [469-70], 586 A.2d 597 (1991), our Supreme Court defined an ongoing parent-child relationship as it applies to noncustodial parents. The court stated that termination of a noncustodial parent's rights requires a finding that the child has no present memories or feelings of the natural parent.' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christian P., 98 Conn.App. 264, 269, 907 A.2d 1261 (2006)." In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 485-86, 992 A.2d 1142 (2010), aff'd, 300 Conn. 463, 14 A.3d 990 (2011). DCF urges the court to undertake this two-pronged analysis, and to rely upon the fact that neither Justin nor Destiny has any present memories of or feelings for Stanley W., in a parenting capacity, and that the children's best interests will not be served by allowing additional time for such a relationship to develop, when determining that there is no relationship as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).⁸⁸ While acknowledging the value of this measure, the court finds it inapposite to the present case, whose facts do not support the application of the statute. Thus, the court declines to terminate Stanley W.'s parental rights to Justin and/or Destiny on this ground.

88 See Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended Ground D: No-Ongoing Parent/Child Relationship, filed December 8, 2014.

Insofar as Stanley W. is concerned, whether focusing on his parent-child relationship with Destiny, whom he knew to be his daughter conceived with Yashika W., or focusing on Justin, whom the court did not confirm was his son until November 3, 2011 more than a year after he was born, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that DCF obtained temporary custody of both children almost immediately after their entrance into this world. Despite DCF's emphatic claim to the contrary, it was the department's own active intervention, well-meaning and intended to provide physical safety for the infants, that created the conditions preventing the development or maintenance of the parent-child relationship placed at issue by the § 17a-112(j)(3)(D). DCF argues that Stanley W.'s inability, unwillingness, lack of capacity and/or lack of interest in either Destiny or Justin created the circumstances that required the children's removal soon after birth. Those subjects are placed at issue by the department's allegations of failure to achieve rehabilitation brought pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) and § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), which the court has already found in favor of DCF.

Under the facts of this case, the court is constrained from finding a lack of ongoing parent-child relationship where both Destiny and Justin were removed from parental custody at birth by the series of Supreme Court decisions that render the application of the statute an inappropriate ground for TPR in like circumstances. These opinions have made it clear that the trial court should not terminate the parental rights of an individual when it is the conduct of the department that " is largely or solely responsible for the existence of the grounds upon which termination is based, " relegating TPR to other statutes if a father or mother lacks the capacity to serve the child in a responsible caretaking or custodial role. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal (84- BC), 194 Conn. 252, 256 n.6, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984) and In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 613 A.2d 748 (1992).

In In re Valerie D., the Supreme Court examined the issue of whether the termination of the respondent's parental rights was proper where the child was in the department's custody since birth. In that case, the newborn child was removed from the mother by DCF and placed in foster care upon discharge from the hospital; the infant remained in DCF's custody until and after the trial court terminated parental rights, adjudicating on the ground of lack of on-going parent-child relationship, approximately three and one-half months later. Id., 532. During its TPR hearing, the trial court found that the mother " had only seen the child a handful of times in the first three months of life" and that there was no evidence of a parental relationship between her and the newborn. Id., 531. The Supreme Court in In re Valerie D. observed that because the child was placed in the department's custody at birth, " once the child had been placed in foster care pursuant to the determinations made under § 46b-129, a finding of a lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship . . . was inevitable . . . because absent extraordinary and heroic efforts by the respondent, the petitioner was destined to have established the absence of such a relationship." (Emphasis added.) Id., 533. The court further noted that even if a parent, faced with an OTC or neglect petition, may feel " unable to care properly for [a] newborn infant and, therefore, may acquiesce in that petition . . . That acquiescence, moreover, was in the child's best interests. To permit that acquiescence to ripen into a ground for termination of parental rights, however, simply by virtue of the practical impossibly of maintaining the kind of contact with the child required to establish an ongoing parent-child relationship, would turn the statutory promise of appropriate care for the child into a cruel statutory hoax of termination of parental rights ." (Emphasis added.) Id., 534. Thus, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that, because " the petitioner's assertion and maintenance of custody of the child led directly to the conditions supporting the termination of parental rights, " the trial court erred in terminating the respondent's parental rights. Id., 535.

Our Appellate Court in In re Kelly S., 29 Conn.App. 600, 616 A.2d 1161 (1992), reached the same conclusion. In In re Kelly S., the child was placed in the department's custody three days after her birth. Id., 603. During the TPR hearing, the trial court found that although the respondent visited the child regularly during a eleven-month time span, the " respondent did not question the foster mother or the [DCF] worker about the child's care, requirements or her medical condition. The respondent did not ask to feed, diaper or even hold the child." Id., 607. In addition, the trial court found that the respondent did not express any real depth of understanding of the child's needs during the visitation sessions. Id. Relying on the rationale articulated in In re Valerie D., the Supreme Court in In re Kelly S. concluded that, because the child was taken from the respondent's custody at birth, " [t]he lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship . . . appears to be the direct result of that custody determination. Accordingly, the termination of the respondent's parental rights cannot be sustained under [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(D)]." Id., 617. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court pointed to the trial court's observation that the lack of the ongoing parent-child relationship was due, in part, to the fact that the mother was not provided an opportunity to bond with her child and that " the supervised visitation sessions did not permit the child to develop any recognition of the parents as her parents." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 616 n.8.

The court well recognizes that there are factual dissimilarities between the circumstances of In re Valerie D., In re Kelly S., and the present TPR litigation. Here, however, the similarities predominate: DCF removed both Destiny and Justin from family care immediately after birth and DCF placed the children in a foster home requiring Stanley W. to make an effort, however reasonable, to spend sufficient time in their presence so as to even begin to build a parenting relationship with them. This is not a case in which Stanley W. engaged in intentional criminal conduct that caused him to be isolated in incarceration for a prolonged period of time and subsequently prohibited from contact with his children due to the imposition of a protective order, even though his involvement in sexual abuse charges had, for a brief period, caused him to be held in lieu of bond after his arrest in 2009.⁸⁹ (Exs. 3-A, Fa-1.) The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes, by inference, that Stanley W. was at liberty when Justin was conceived in early 2010 and when Destiny was conceived in late 2010. Thus, with regard to the two children who are the subject of the pending TPR petition, having removed them from parental care nearly immediately after their births, DCF, having created the circumstances that caused the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship to be developed with either Destiny or Justin, cannot prevail on its § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) allegations in either pending case.

89 Compare In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), holding that it was not DCF's conduct in removing the child, but the respondent-father's conduct in sexually assaulting the child's half sister, with subsequent incarceration and the imposition of a restrictive protective order, that had created the conditions leading to the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship, and supporting TPR pursuant to the statutory predecessor to § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).

V.

ADJUDICATION--TPR GROUNDS AS TO YASHIKA W.

As found in Part I., as to Yashika W., the pending termination of parental rights petitions for Justin and Destiny raise identical alternative statutory grounds in the alternative. The court now addresses DCF's § 17a-112(j)(3)(E), § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) and § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) allegations as to the mother in series, considering her circumstances and those of the children.⁹⁰

90 In assessing Yashika W.'s capacity to fulfil a responsible role in Destiny's life, the court has considered the previously cited minimal parental responsibilities in the conjunctive, acknowledging that a parent must express love and affection for the child; express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; supply the child with necessary food, clothing and medical care; provide an adequate domicile for the child; and furnish her with social and religious guidance. See In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487-88. In reaching its conclusions on the issues related to the mother's rehabilitative status as it relates to Destiny, the court has fully considered her parenting history and the evidence in its entirety; acknowledged the implications of the young child's particular needs; and remained aware that the most recently received evidence reflects changes and instability in Yashika W.'s personal circumstances.

V. A.

§ 17a-112(j)(3)(E) FAILURE TO REHABILITATE--YASHIKA W.

DCF has met its burden of proving its allegations based upon § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) as to Yashika W., supporting termination of her parental rights to Destiny. Insofar as this statutory ground is concerned, it remains uncontested that Yashika W. is the parent of Destiny, a child under the age of seven years who was adjudicated neglected on November 18, 2013, and that Yashika W.'s parental rights to her children Tayjanae, Shadiamond, Terran and Justin were terminated on November 18, 2013 in response to petitions filed by the department. Incorporating the findings made throughout this memorandum of decision, the clear and convincing evidence establishes that notwithstanding access to appropriate services, Yashika W. has failed, is unable or is unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation, through improvement of her mental health, parenting deficits, and social conduct, as would encourage the belief that, considering Destiny's young age and need for total care by a reliable, sober and capable caregiver, the mother could assume a responsible position in this child's life within a reasonable period of time.⁹¹ Accordingly, DCF prevails on this ground of the TPR petition.

91 See In re Mia M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 376; In re Joseph L., supra, 105 Conn.App. 524. In resolving this aspect of the department's allegations as to Yashika W., the court has acknowledged the legislative language that, as previously discussed, § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) requires consideration of a respondent-parent's failure, ability or unwillingness to achieve statutory rehabilitation but does not require assessment of a respondent-parent's compliance with specific steps as unlike § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), the text of subsection (E) contains no reference to such orders.

Yashika W.'s failure to achieve § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) rehabilitation is clearly and convincingly reflected in the findings made in Parts I., II.A., III. C. and VI. as, since Destiny's birth, the mother has not progressed in improving her capacity to fulfil even the most rudimentary aspects of parenting. She has attended the renewed referral to the CAC program directed at meeting the particular needs of Destiny, but without motivation, thus failing to acquire the ability to understand that she needed to participate in individual therapy at CAC or the Sexual Assault Crisis Center in order to become an effective parent for that child, refusing instead to accept referrals to that therapy. She rejected the wrap around mental health, parenting, employment, parenting and housing supports made available by DCF's proffer of a referral to MPCS, evincing her failure to achieve the capacity to understand that, as a parent with her own history, she simply could not make it on her own, and should utilize the community supports available. While Yashika W. loves Destiny, the mother has failed to participate in any meaningful aspect of the child's life, visiting too infrequently to even form a meaningful bond with her young daughter and maintaining a presence in the child's life that is at best that of a known adult, and more likely that of an unpredictable visitor. Yashika W. has avoided actual engagement in the counseling services made available to her; although she has attended, she has not improved her own mental health because she has remained secretive about her family's past experiences, which included serious physical injuries to Quivontry within her home, reported sexual abuse of James and Quivontry, or the criminal charges based on Tayjanae's allegations that were brought against her paramour, Stanley W., who was the father of Shadiamond and, later, Justin and Destiny. She has withheld from her providers critical information about her clinical needs, sometimes declined to sign releases that would have allowed DCF to facilitate the rehabilitation process, and as a result, has lost valuable opportunities to acquire the basic life skills necessary to maintain sobriety, to earn lawful income, to acquire and maintain stable housing, or even to provide a structured life for himself. She has focused her perception of a parenting role upon issues far too narrowly related to whether or not her daughter Tayjanae was sexually abused by Stanley W., arguing that DCF has failed to meet its burden of identifying the exact dangers which prevent Destiny from returning home and thus admitting that she has failed, is unwilling or unable to understand that it is the parent's responsibility to respond with consistent and prolonged support to a child's report of dangerous experiences, without dismissing the fact that the child made the report for a reason that requires timely professional intervention.⁹² Thus, although she may have participated in services, her failure to adequately address her own mental health and parenting issues leaves them markedly deficient.⁹³ The very issues that led to the termination of Yashika W.'s parental rights to four of her older children remain unresolved and unimproved in part because she has persisted in refusing offers of help from the department, and in part because even when she engaged in services, the mother lacked motivation to improve her capacity to serve a child in a caretaking role. Those issues which were long ago identified as requiring treatment from a fully informed provider remain extant; they impeded her capacity to fulfil a parental role for Tayjanae, Shadiamond, Terran and Justin, and similarly impede her capacity to assume a responsible role in Destiny's life.

92 Respondent Mother, Yashika [W.]'s Revised Post-Trial Brief, filed 3/20/15.

93 See In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 593. In addressing Yashika W.'s failure to achieve a degree of improvement in her capacity to assume a responsible position in the life of a child in the care of DCF, the court has remained mindful that " [w]hether the respondent was rehabilitated is demonstrated, not by mechanically tallying up his attendance at programs and services, but by whether he has gained insight into the problems that gave rise to the department's involvement in the life of the child and whether he had made appropriate changes in his behavior . Attendance at programs and services is not a means unto itself, but facilitates behavioral changes that contribute to rehabilitation" if the parent is sufficiently motivated to make the necessary changes. (Emphasis added.) In re Destiny R., 39 A.3d 727, 134 Conn.App. 625, 648, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012). Whether focused on the particular needs of Destiny and the services made available to the mother after the birth of that child, or whether including the panoply of services extended to Yashika W. during the long course of the department's involvement with her family, this respondent lacks the motivation to make the changes necessary to achieve rehabilitation. (See, e.g., Exs. 1, 2, 3-A, 5, 6, 7, 16, 29, F, H, J, K, L.)

Specifically, the clear and convincing evidence supporting § 17a-112(j)(3)(E)'s allegations, as found throughout this memorandum of decision, establishes that Yashika W. has failed to achieve development of the safety skill set a parent must know, understand, and implement when a child reports an event even suggesting that the child has been exposed to circumstances detrimental to the child's wellbeing. As Dr. Freedman cogently explained, in these situations, a minimally competent, reliable parent-figure must respond to a child's complaints in a supportive and positive manner, ensuring that the child's concerns are meaningfully attended to whether they reflect accurate or inaccurate accounts of events that have occurred; the child must receive prompt, professional attention to meet the child's particular needs, given any recital of facts indicating that the child is sufficiently concerned to have related endangerment to an adult. Without such positive support, the child's particular needs cannot be met whether the child has made reports that are factual or fictitious. A parent who has achieved rehabilitation will put the child's needs for support, positive attention, professional assessment and counseling or therapeutic management first, without doubting or second-guessing the validity of reported vulnerability to dangerous conditions. (Tes. Dr. Freedman.)

Psychologically, Yashika W.'s failure to achieve rehabilitation with regard to her mental health is thus clearly and convincingly evident in her misguided, perseverant focus on whether or not Stanley W. engaged in sexual misconduct with Tayjanae; her failure to achieve rehabilitation is further clearly and convincingly evident in her persistent conclusion that because her once-paramour did not violate that child, Tayjanae's needs did not require therapeutic attention, and her own maternal caretaking capacity did not require improvement through development of insight into her inadequate response to a child's cry for help. This conduct, on behalf of the mother, exemplifies failure to achieve rehabilitation sufficient to render Yashika W. capable of meeting the particular needs of any child who has expressed experience with untoward, potentially harmful or even devastating events. Again, as Dr. Freedman persuasively explained, the fact that Tayjanae made a report about being touched in a sexual manner by Stanley W. should have indicated to the parent that the child has an especial need for help and protection; Yashika W. did not possess the parenting capacity to meet Tayjanae's needs in 2008, and she has not developed the parenting capacity to meet any other child's similar needs, under similar circumstances as may arise, during any of the ensuing years. (Tes. Dr. Freedman.)

Instead of acknowledging her own need for improving her parenting skill set, Yashika W. has remained entrenched in her misperception that she is fully equipped to provide a physically and emotionally safe environment for any child in her care. The evidence in its entirety impels the contrary conclusion. Having refused to engage in services that could have helped her, having withheld from her chosen counselor specific information about the parenting deficits that have led so many of her children, including Destiny, to be removed from her care, and having failed to achieve rehabilitation, Yashika W. still lacks the capacity to recognize or even the desire to respond to a child's direct or oblique plea for help in the manner expected of a parent who is able to put her personal needs aside to make sure that her child is safe. As such, Yashika W. has failed to achieve the degree of parental rehabilitation necessary to meet young Destiny's needs for physical safety and stable, consistent emotional support in her environment. The respondent mother lacks the capacity to either keep her young daughter safe from sexual exploitation or to respond in an appropriate way by providing parental support and guidance, willingly accessing effective and valid professional aid for the child who has complained of exposure to harm, regardless of the merit of the child's claim.

Now that she has lost her Section 8 housing subsidy due to conflicts brought about when she allowed her adult son Carl B. to spend time at her apartment, subsequently having to in a shelter and remaining unemployed as she has been throughout nearly her entire life, Yashika W. has no access to a home environment that could, in any realistic way, meet the needs of four-year-old Destiny. Yashika W. is now forty-two years old. The totality of the clear and convincing evidence of the facts as found throughout this decision, reflecting her continuing failure, inability or unwillingness to accept and come to terms with her critical parenting deficit, related to her failure, inability or unwillingness to put a child's needs ahead of her own and to support and affirm any child who complains of having been subjected to harm, compels the conclusion that even if she now was to decide to access wrap-around support services from DCF or the community, her past history of failing to make progress even in achieving the capacity to manage her own affairs by maintaining a home for herself would not succeed in rendering her a safe, responsible parent for Destiny.⁹⁴ With the clear and convincing finding that she has failed to make any progress in achieving personal stability since the November 2013 termination of her parental rights to four of her older children, the court finds no evidentiary basis for concluding that Yashika W. could achieve sufficient personal stability to encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, considering Destiny's young age and immature stages of development, she could fulfill the role of a parent who has achieved statutory rehabilitation.⁹⁵ § 17a-112(j)(3)(E).

94 Moreover, as the legal guardian of seventeen-year-old Quandrea, she remains responsible for the support and maintenance of that youth, whether or not he lives with her; As Quandrea's mother, his history of disruptive, aggressive behavior and recent transience must be the subject of Yashika W.'s attention. (Tes. Quandrea B., Carlos T.) As Destiny's attorney has persuasively argued, the needs of the authority-challenging teenager are markedly different from the needs of four-year-old Destiny. However, the evidence in its totality clearly and convincingly establishes that Yashika W. has few personal resources with which to provide herself with a stable household; if Destiny is allowed to return to Yashika W.'s care, and if Quandrea is added to her household, even as a visitor, the mother's limited patience, propensity for angry responses when tested, and sub-minimal parenting skills will not be sufficient to keep Destiny safe from actual harm or from the results of harm the child may claim to have experienced in an effort to access the support and nurturance she requires, but Yashika W. cannot, or will not, deliver.

95 Another aspect of the clear and convincing evidence, referenced in Part II.A., further reflects that Yashika W. has not achieved the fundamental parental quality of putting her child's needs and desires ahead of her own. When offered the opportunity to do so, the respondent-mother unduly interfered with Taynajae's ability to develop an appropriate sense of self-awareness and self-reliance. Instead of allowing Tayjanae to do her best, even in the absence of counseling, to develop healthy behaviors to cope with what she had experienced while living with Yashika W., the respondent-mother instructed the child to act in a specific way, and to pass certain " information along to authorities who could help her get her daughter back." (Ex. 10.) To this effect, the respondent-mother actively coached Taynajae to " recant the sexual abuse disclosure toward the goal of returning [to Yashika W.'s] home. This source of contamination was clearly evident and powerful, reinforced by the mother, and the child's [recantation was thereafter] made to anybody who would listen" even though the recantation was inaccurate. (Ex. 10.) Such interfering, coercive behavior by Yashika W. was clearly intended to effectuate an outcome that would serve the adult's desires without meeting the best interests of her child. Given the intransigence of Yashika W.'s opinion as to whether or not Tayjanae was sexually abused in her home, and given her lack of understanding that the child needed professional help in any case, notwithstanding all the services she has received through Valarie W., it is highly likely that the respondent-mother's coercive parenting would continue. (Tes. Dr. Freedman, Audrey C.) Thus, any child in the respondent-mother's care would be subject to misguidance and pressured into unhealthy behaviors, all to the detriment of such child and adverse to such child's safe, healthy, development.

Destiny is a pre-schooler; she is completely dependent upon a stable, fit and emotionally realistic adult who not only desires to, but is actually able to meet her basic daily needs for emotional support when adverse events befall her, and for a consistent environment befitting her particular circumstances. Without even scant improvement in her personal functioning, the mother lacks almost all of the parental caretaking attributes that this child requires. Yashika W. loves Destiny, may express love and affection for the child, and clearly expresses to DCF concern over the health, education and general-wellbeing that the child is, or is not, experiencing in her foster home. However, love and even expression of concern are simply not enough when it comes to being capable of serving as an adequate parent for a child.⁹⁶ Despite the passage of the more than four years her daughter has spent in foster care, Yashika W. has continued to reject services and supports, has never changed her mind-set so as to acknowledge that the child's needs must take priority over the parent's, and has been and will in the reasonably foreseeable future unable to meet Destiny's particular needs for an adequate domicile; basic necessities such as food, clothing and medical care; or provide her with the social guidance necessary to enhance a youngster's appreciation that life's vicissitudes must be met with patience, resilience, and reliance on professional external resources, rather than with anger, hostility, and resentment.⁹⁷ Simply put, Yashika W. has failed, is unable and/or unwilling to achieve a degree of rehabilitation sufficient to fulfill the parental role of ensuring that Destiny, if returned to her care, will be living in the nurturing, physically and emotionally safe and structured environment, where the child's needs are understood, respected, and responded to in a prompt and effective manner, not dismissed because such a result is more convenient for the parent-figure. (Tes. Dr. Freedman.)

96 Our Appellate Court " recently observed that '[t]he sad fact is that there is a difference between parental love and parental competence.' In re Christina M., 90 Conn.App. 565, 575, 877 A.2d 941, cert. granted on other grounds, 276 Conn. 903, 884 A.2d 1024 (2005)." In re Halle, 96 Conn.App. 815, 817, 902 A.2d 670, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 924, 908 A.2d 1087 (2006). Similarly, in In re Melody L.; supra, 290 Conn. 164; we were reminded of the principle that " '[A] parent's love and biological connection . . . is simply not enough [where the department] has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that [the respondent] cannot be a competent parent to these children because [the parent] cannot provide them a nurturing, safe and structured environment.'" citing In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 667, 769 A.2d 718 cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001).

97 See In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 487-88.

Yashika W. has argued that DCF cannot prove her failure to achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation because the department never provided her with the DBT counseling referenced by Dr. Freedman when he evaluated the mother in 2010. (Ex. 9.) This claim carries no weight. First, the psychologist made it perfectly clear that his mention of this type of treatment was not exclusive, and that other effective individual counseling protocols could have assisted Yashika W. if, but only if, she had been forthcoming with the provider and had not remained so secretive that highly relevant information concerning her own past, her family's history, and her failure to properly meet Tayjanae's needs in 2008 and 2009 was withheld. Unfortunately, this is exactly the pattern of secretive behavior that Yashika W. exhibited during nearly the entirety of her counseling sessions with Valarie W., the mother's chosen provider, with HBH's evaluator, and even with the CAC; as a whole, the evidence provides no basis for concluding that even if DCF referred Yashika W. to another provider, the mother's reticence would have permitted effective treatment of her underlying personality and instability issues. Second, there is ample evidence to support the inference that Yashika W. would have rejected any attention by any additional providers to whom DCF might have referred her: she repeatedly declared to DCF that she would not accept its service referrals, and even after attending a second round of non-offender treatment in late 2011, rejected CAC's recommendation for individual counseling through its offices or through the Sexual Assault Crisis Center, as discussed throughout this memorandum of decision. Under these circumstances, with a record of refusing to partake of DCF's referrals and a pattern of withholding information crucial to the mental health treatment process, the court can attribute no value to this aspect of Yashika W.'s claim.

As such, Yashika W. has failed, is unable and/or is unwilling to achieve a degree of personal rehabilitation that would render it reasonable to believe that, at some foreseeable point in the future relevant to Destiny's age and needs, she could assume a responsible position in the life of this child. Thus, the department has proved the essential elements of its § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) allegation as to the respondent-mother in this case.⁹⁸

98 In re Mia M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 376; In re Joseph L., supra, 105 Conn.App. 524.

V. B.

§ 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) FAILURE TO REHABILITATE--YASHIKA W.

DCF also has met its burden of proving its allegations based upon § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) failure to achieve personal rehabilitation as to Yashika W., again supporting termination of her parental rights to Destiny. Insofar as this statutory ground is concerned, it is uncontested that Yashika W. is the parent of Destiny, a child who was adjudicated neglected on November 18, 2013, and that the mother has been provided specific steps to facilitate the return of the child to the parent. The court incorporates into and makes a part of its § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) discussion each of the findings and conclusions made in Part V.A. relevant to Yashika W.'s failure to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering Destiny's age and needs, this respondent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child under § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). To support its conclusion that the mother has failed to achieve the requisite degree of statutory rehabilitation under § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), the court next examines the nature and extent of Yashika W.'s compliance with the specific steps referenced in Part I.⁹⁹

99 The impact upon the sufficiency of personal rehabilitation, based on a parent's compliance with specific steps or failure to comply, is set forth in Part IV.B. and is incorporated herein. See In re Elvin G., supra, 310 Conn. 507-8; In re Devon B., supra, 264 Conn. 584; In re Jeffrey C., supra, 261 Conn. 194; In re Shane M., supra, 148 Conn.App. 321-22; In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 622; In re Jeffrey C., supra, 64 Conn.App. 62.

In general, Yashika W. has failed to substantially comply with the specific steps put in place to enhance her opportunity for reunification with Destiny. As found in Parts II.A., III.C. and IV.A., and as discussed throughout this decision, the mother did participate in court-ordered psychological evaluations with Dr. Freedman, went to the IOL for a consultation and attended most of the second round of CAC non-offender group sessions to which she was referred. Although she engaged in counseling with Valarie W., Yashika W.'s withholding of critical personal information rendered the provider's individual therapy merely situational, not sufficient to address the underlying family trauma and personality issues that impeded reunification and effectively prevented her from achieving rehabilitation; in addition, Yashika W. was discharged from Valarie W.'s counseling sessions due to non-attendance and non-compliance with that provider. Similarly, although Yashika W. attended the HBH evaluation to which she was referred by DCF, she was noncompliant with the step requiring cooperation with providers as she withheld information that would have facilitated her access to appropriate mental health treatment through that agency. Moreover, she failed to comply with the steps in that she did not keep all the appointments set by or with DCF, missing multiple administrative case reviews held since Destiny's removal, nearly always missing home visits that DCF had scheduled, and only occasionally allowing the department into her home. She did not follow through with the CAC's recommendations for individual treatment sessions at that office or at the Sexual Abuse Crisis Services center. She failed on multiple occasions to execute releases as requested by DCF, sometimes providing releases that unreasonably limited the department's access to information regarding her progress, in violation of the steps. While Yashika W. maintained legal housing for a long period of time, she did not inform DCF when she allowed her adult son, Carl B., to access her premises; she lost her Section 8 subsidy thereafter and most recently occupied shelter housing that is insufficient to meet Destiny's needs. The most compelling aspect of Yashika W.'s failure to comply with the specific steps as ordered for Destiny, however, is her inconsistent and unpredictable attendance at the visits that were regularly scheduled for her by the department, in an effort to maintain mother-daughter contact. Whether visitation was supervised by B-Healthy or Connecting Families, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Yashika W. did not comply with the step requiring her to visit the child as often as DCF permits. In this way, the mother not only demonstrated a failure to follow the orders of the court, but evinced a functional disinterest in her daughter that is markedly inconsistent with achievement of the personal rehabilitation contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). (Exs. 3-A, 5, 8-A; Tes. Quandrea B., Valarie W., Zaida R.)

Yashika W. argues that her fulfillment of the specific steps is apparent in her participated in a long series of services over the years since her older children were removed in 2009, in services specifically related to Destiny since that child's removal in August 2011, and in prolonged counseling with Valarie D. The court is not persuaded. As previously discussed, it is not the parent's attendance at services or counseling that establishes personal rehabilitation by means of adherence to specific steps.¹⁰⁰ In this case, where Yashika W. has gained no measurable improvement in her personal stability or her capacity to serve in a responsible parenting role for Destiny, the court may properly find that she has failed to achieve § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) rehabilitation even if she has attended some of the programs to which she has been referred by DCF, and even if she has attended counseling with her chosen provider.¹⁰¹

100 " The ultimate issue the court must evaluate is whether the parent has gained the insight and ability to care for his or her child given the age and needs of the child within a reasonable time." In re Destiny R., supra, 134 Conn.App. 627.

101 In re Destiny R., supra, 134 Conn.App. 627, citing In re Coby C., 945 A.2d 529, 107 Conn.App. 395, 406 (2008) (even substantial compliance with specific steps does not bar the court from finding a parent has failed to achieve statutory rehabilitation).

Given the totality of the evidence relevant to Yashika W.'s non-compliance with her specific steps, and given the court's finding of failure to achieve personal rehabilitation as set forth in Part V.A., above, the department has met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, each of the elements of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i) sufficient to support termination of the mother's parental rights to Destiny.

V. C.

NO ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)--YASHIKA W.

DCF asserts that it has proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Yashika W. and Destiny, so that it must prevail on this aspect of its TPR petition. As previously noted, " [t]o establish the ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child [is lacking] and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re S.D., 115 Conn.App. 111, 122-23, 972 A.2d 258 (2009). This element requires the court to undertake " a two-pronged analysis. 'First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, [469-70], 586 A.2d 597 (1991), our Supreme Court defined an ongoing parent-child relationship as it applies to noncustodial parents. The court stated that termination of a noncustodial parent's rights requires a finding that the child has no present memories or feelings of the natural parent.' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christian P., 98 Conn.App. 264, 269, 907 A.2d 1261 (2006)." In re Lukas K., supra, 120 Conn.App. 485-86, 992 A.2d 1142 (2010), aff'd, 300 Conn. 463, 14 A.3d 990 (2011). DCF urges the court to undertake this two-pronged analysis, to rely upon the fact that Destiny has no present memories of or feelings for Yashika W. in a parenting role, and that the child's best interests will not be served by allowing additional time for such a relationship to develop, when determining that there is no relationship as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).¹⁰² As discussed in the context of the TPR allegation pending as to Stanley W., while generally acknowledging the value of DCF's proposed measure, the court finds it inapposite to the present case, whose facts as found in Parts I., II. and throughout this memorandum of decision do not support the application of the statute. Thus, the court declines to terminate Yashika W.'s parental rights to Destiny on this ground.

102 See Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended Ground D: No-Ongoing Parent/Child Relationship, filed December 8, 2014.

Insofar as Yashika W. is concerned, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that DCF obtained temporary custody of Destiny almost immediately after her birth on August 5, 2011.

After hospital care related to her delivery, Destiny has never been in the custody of her biological mother. Despite DCF's emphatic claim to the contrary, it was the department's own active intervention, well-meaning and intended to provide physical safety for the infant, that created the conditions preventing the development or maintenance of the parent-child relationship between Yashika W. and her daughter, as placed at issue by the § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) allegation. DCF argues that Yashika W.'s inability, unwillingness, and/or lack of capacity to provide stable and adequate care for Destiny that created the circumstances that requiring the child's removal soon after birth. Those subjects are placed at issue by the department's claims that the mother failed to achieve rehabilitation brought pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(E) and § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), which the court has already found in favor of DCF.

Under the facts of this case, the court is constrained from finding a lack of ongoing parent-child relationship where Destiny was removed from her mother's custody at birth by Supreme Court decisions that render the application of § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) an inappropriate ground for TPR in like circumstances. These opinions have made it clear that the trial court should not terminate the parental rights of an individual when it is the conduct of the department that " is largely or solely responsible for the existence of the grounds upon which termination is based, " relegating TPR to other statutes if a father or mother lacks the capacity to serve a child in a responsible caretaking or custodial role. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Appeal (84- BC), 194 Conn. 252, 256 n.6, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984) and In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 613 A.2d 748 (1992).

In In re Valerie D., the Supreme Court examined the issue of whether the termination of the respondent's parental rights was proper where the child was in the department's custody since birth. In that case, the newborn was removed from the mother by DCF and placed in foster care upon discharge from the hospital; the infant remained in DCF's custody until and after the trial court terminated parental rights, on the ground of lack of on-going parent-child relationship, approximately three and one-half months later. Id., 532. During its TPR hearing, the trial court found that the mother " had only seen the child a handful of times in the first three months of life" and that there was no evidence of a parental relationship between her and the newborn. Id., 531. The Supreme Court in In re Valerie D. observed that because the child was placed in the department's custody at birth, " once the child had been placed in foster care pursuant to the determinations made under § 46b-129, a finding of a lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship . . . was inevitable . . . because absent extraordinary and heroic efforts by the respondent, the petitioner was destined to have established the absence of such a relationship." (Emphasis added.) Id., 533. The court further noted that even if a parent, faced with an OTC or neglect petition, may feel " unable to care properly for [a] newborn infant and, therefore, may acquiesce in that petition . . . To permit that acquiescence to ripen into a ground for termination of parental rights, however, simply by virtue of the practical impossibly of maintaining the kind of contact with the child required to establish an ongoing parent-child relationship, would turn the statutory promise of appropriate care for the child into a cruel statutory hoax of termination of parental rights ." (Emphasis added.) Id., 534. Thus, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that, because " the petitioner's assertion and maintenance of custody of the child led directly to the conditions supporting the termination of parental rights, " the trial court erred in terminating the respondent's parental rights. Id., 535.

Our Appellate Court in In re Kelly S., 29 Conn.App. 600, 616 A.2d 1161 (1992), reached the same conclusion. In In re Kelly S., the child was placed in the department's custody three days after her birth. Id., 603. During the TPR hearing, the trial court found that although the respondent visited the child regularly during a eleven-month time span, the " respondent did not question the foster mother or the [DCF] worker about the child's care, requirements or her medical condition. The respondent did not ask to feed, diaper or even hold the child." Id., 607. In addition, the trial court found that the respondent did not express any real depth of understanding of the child's needs during the visitation sessions. Id. Relying on the rationale articulated in In re Valerie D., the Supreme Court in In re Kelly S. concluded that, because the child was taken from the respondent's custody at birth, " [t]he lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship . . . appears to be the direct result of that custody determination. Accordingly, the termination of the respondent's parental rights cannot be sustained under [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(D)]." Id., 617. In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court pointed to the trial court's observation that the lack of the ongoing parent-child relationship was due, in part, to the fact that the mother was not provided an opportunity to bond with her child and that " the supervised visitation sessions did not permit the child to develop any recognition of the parents as her parents." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 616 n.8. Those circumstances are present in this case, where any absence of an ongoing parent-child relationship is due, at least in part, to the fact that Yashika W. was deprived by the department of the opportunity to bond with Destiny during her earliest period of development, and where the supervised visitation sessions, albeit available twice a week, were functionally insufficient to allow the child to see her biological mother in a parental role.

The court well recognizes that there are factual dissimilarities between the circumstances of In re Valerie D., In re Kelly S., and the present TPR litigation. Here, however, the similarities predominate: DCF removed both Destiny from family care immediately after birth and placed the child in a foster home requiring Yashika W. to make an effort, however reasonable, to spend sufficient time in her presence so as to even begin to build a parenting relationship with the baby. This is not a case in which Yashika W. engaged in intentional criminal conduct that caused her to be isolated in incarceration for a prolonged period of time and subsequently prohibited from contact with her daughter due to the imposition of a protective order, even though her absence from visitation sessions and her decision not to participate in DCF-recommended services was volitional on her part.¹⁰³ Thus, with regard to the child who is the subject of the pending TPR claim based on § 17a-112(j)(3)(D), having removed her from maternal care nearly immediately after her birth, DCF, having created the circumstances that caused the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship to be developed between Yashika W. and Destiny cannot prevail on this aspect of its termination petition.

103 Compare In re Alexander C., 67 Conn.App. 417, 787 A.2d 608 (2001), holding that it was not DCF's conduct in removing the child, but the respondent-father's conduct in sexually assaulting the child's half sister, with subsequent incarceration and the imposition of a restrictive protective order, that had created the conditions leading to the lack of an ongoing parent-child relationship, and supporting TPR pursuant to the statutory predecessor to § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).

VI.

DISPOSITION--BEST INTERESTS

The court next turns to the dispositional phase of these proceedings, focusing upon the children's " best interests." ¹⁰⁴ The totality of the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that continuation of the legal relationship between Stanley W. and Justin and Destiny not serve the children's best interests. Similarly, the totality of the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that continuation of the legal relationship between Yashika W. will not serve that child's best interests. Instead, the children's best interests will be served by terminating the parental rights of Stanley W. and Yashika W.¹⁰⁵ In this way, these children may, at last, attain stable access to the permanency in placement, sustained healthy growth, personal development, well-being, and environmental continuity to which they are surely entitled.

104 " 'After determining whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under . . . § 17a-112(j) exists by clear and convincing evidence, a judge is required to evaluate whether severing the legal tie between parent and child is in the child's best interest. That task is among the most sensitive and difficult with which a judge is charged. Although a judge is guided by legal principles, the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights is intensely human. It is the judge in the courtroom who looks the witnesses in the eye, interprets their body language, listens to the inflections in their voices and otherwise assesses the subtleties that are not conveyed in the cold transcript.' In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 43, 907 A.2d 126 (2006), aff'd, 285 Conn. 483, 940 A.2d 733 (2008)." In re Alison M., 127 Conn.App. 197, 210 n.9, 15 A.3d 184, 203 (2011). See also In re Nioshka A.N., 161 Conn.App. 627 (2015).

105 " In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of the child . . . The best interests of the child include the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, and continuity and stability of [his or her] environment . . . In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]. The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered . . . There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence." (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; external citation omitted.) In re Joseph M., Jr., 158 Conn.App. 849, 868-69, 120 A.3d 1271, 1284-85 (2015).

VI. A.

SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS

The § 17a-112(k) findings are based on the totality of the clear and convincing trial evidence, and incorporates all findings and conclusions reached throughout this decision.¹⁰⁶

106 " The court [has] thoroughly considered each of the seven criteria in its memorandum of decision before concluding that termination of parental rights [is] in the children's best interests." In re Joseph L., 105 Conn.App. 515, 530, 939 A.2d 16, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 902, 947 A.2d 342 (2008).

(1) The Timeliness, Nature and Extent of Services Offered, Provided and Made Available to the Parent and the Child by an Agency to Facilitate the Reunion of the Child With the Parent

Given the circumstances described throughout this decision, reunification services offered and/or provided by DCF in this case for Stanley W. and the children, and for Yashika W. and Destiny, were both timely and appropriate as articulated in Parts II.A., II.B., III.B. and III.C. of this memorandum of decision. Services were extended to the respondents both before and after the TPR petitions were filed for the children at issue in this case. Both Stanley W. and Yashika W. rejected or refused to participate in most of the services offered, provided and made available to them. Even when the respondents participated in services, however, neither improved his or her ability to serve as a safe, effective parent.

(2) Whether DCF Has Made Reasonable Efforts to Reunite the Family in Compliance With Federal Law

Through the efforts described in Parts II.A., II.B., III.B. and III.C., the department made reasonable efforts to reunite this family in accordance with federal law notwithstanding the respondent-parents' failure to benefit therefrom and as referenced above, and as further articulated in Parts IV.A., IV.B., V.A. and V.B.

(3) The Terms of Any Applicable Court Order Entered Into and Agreed Upon by Any Individual or Agency and the Parent, and the Extent to Which All Parties Have Fulfilled Their Obligations Under Such Order

As found in Part V.B., Yashika W. has not satisfactorily complied with multiple aspects of the specific steps ordered for Destiny, attending services such as counseling while secreting from the provider information that would have markedly impacted the content of therapy provided, or participating without motivation and without progressing toward the established goals of the steps or improving her parenting capacity. As found in Part IV.B., Stanley W. has not satisfactorily complied with multiple aspects of the specific steps ordered for Destiny, and has not progressed or met the goals established for him. The court acknowledges that although issues of Stanley W.'s biological relationship to Justin were resolved on December 8, 2011, specific steps directed at facilitating his reunification with Justin were not ordered until March 25, 2014, less than two months prior to the filing of the TPR petition for that child. The court further acknowledges, however, that the specific steps finally issued for Stanley W. and Justin largely mirrored the steps that had been in effect for him since November 18, 2013 when Judge Frazzini affirmed the OTC steps that had become effective November 3, 2011 with regard to Destiny. Accordingly, the court infers Stanley W. would have failed to adhere to specific steps for Justin if they had been ordered for him at an earlier date.¹⁰⁷

107 See In re Shane M., supra, 318 Conn. 595.

(4) The Feelings and Emotional Ties of the Child With Respect to the Child's Parents, Any Guardian of Such Child's Person and Any Person Who Has Exercised Physical Care, Custody or Control of the Child for at Least One Year and With Whom the Child Has Developed Significant Emotional Ties

Destiny recognizes and is comfortable in the presence of Yashika W. and Stanley W. However, any bond is based on familiarity resulting from those visits the respondent-mother has elected to attended, so the relationship does not approach that expected of a parent-child tie. Justin knows Stanley W., and has a similar relationship to him; when Stanley W. does choose to visit Justin, the child does not look to his biological parent as a father figure, for guidance or comfort. Both Destiny and Justin have firm emotional ties to each other. They are also bonded to their foster parents, whom they call " Mom" and " Dad" with whom they had been placed since birth.¹⁰⁸ (Tes. Ama T., Steven G.)

108 As the children have been placed with the foster parents for years, the finding regarding this aspect of their emotional ties is required by the text of § 17a-112(k)(4), and not offered for purposes of comparing any attributes of the foster parent to those of any biological parent. See In re Joseph M., Jr., 158 Conn.App. 849, 871, 120 A.3d 1271, 1284 (2015) (in TPR case, court was required to address child's bond with foster parents, in whose care he had been for the majority of his life).

(5) The Ages of the Children

Born on September 29, 2010, Justin is four years old. Born on August 5, 2011, Destiny is nearly three and a half years old. Neither child has ever lived with either respondent.

(6) The Efforts the Parent Has Made to Adjust Such Parent's Circumstances, Conduct, or Conditions to Make it in the Best Interest of the Child to Return Such Child Home in the Foreseeable Future, Including, But Not Limited to, (A) The Extent to Which the Parent Has Maintained Contact With the Child as Part of an Effort to Reunite the Child With the Parent, Provided the Court May Give Weight to Incidental Visitations, Communications or Contributions, and (B) the Maintenance of Regular Contact or Communication With the Guardian or Other Custodian of the Child

Neither respondent-parent has made adjustments so as to effectively benefit from the available reunification and rehabilitative services; Stanley W. only attended at his convenience, and although she attended some services, Yashika W. long withheld information concerning her historical experience with child abuse, significantly minimizing the effectiveness of her therapy with Valarie W. Although neither parent is employed on any measurable basis, neither has adjusted his or her circumstances so as to even begin to meet any aspect of the children's identified needs, as found in Parts III.B., III.C., IV.A., IV.B., V.A. and V.B. Although Yashika W. has most often kept in contact with DCF, Stanley W. has remained transient without contacting the department; neither has maintained consistent phone service, so that DCF encountered difficulties contacting them. Neither respondent has made consistent, effective use of the resources reasonably extended to them to facilitate visits with Destiny and/or Justin; neither parent has come to acknowledge or appreciate the negative effect their inattention to Destiny and/or Justin has had upon these children. With regard to Yashika W., the court adopts Dr. Freedman's credible conclusion that this respondent has never made changes in her own life that would indicate efforts to create a stable home environment of any of her children. (Tes. Dr. Freedman.)

(7) The Extent to Which a Parent Has Been Prevented From Maintaining a Meaningful Relationship With the Child by the Unreasonable Act or Conduct of the Other Parent of the Child, or the Unreasonable Act of Any Other Person or by the Economic Circumstances of the Parent

Neither unreasonable action or conduct by any other person nor either parent's economic circumstances has prevented the maintenance of a meaningful relationship with either child. Although neither parent had conflicting obligations, neither parent made effective use of the transportation services DCF provided to facilitate visits with Justin and/or Destiny; even though she had not adequately availed herself of the direct transportation services to visits the department had extended when it had access to B-Healthy's visitation supervision, in an effort to excuse her failure to attend visits supervised by Connecting Families commencing in April 2014, Yashika W. unreasonably complained that the process of accessing bus passes was simply too inconvenient and too unreliable. (Tes. Alexa R., Yashika W.) Although by early 2014 both Yashika W. and Stanley W. remained without the financial resources to meet their own needs, let alone those of Justin and/or Destiny, it was the respondent-parents' decisions to avoid involvement with reunification efforts, not economic factors, that impeded their development of parental-connectedness to Justin and/or to Destiny. Yashika W. has argued that she was prevented from forming a relationship with Destiny because she was mistreated by or received inadequate health care from DCF or her foster parents. However, there is insufficient evidence upon which the court could find that lack of attention to Destiny's needs in any way impacted the respondent-mother's lack of connectedness to the child.

VI. B.

BEST INTEREST ANALYSIS

In deciding § 17a-112(j)(2)'s best interest element, the court has considered Justin and Destiny's intrinsic needs for sustained growth, healthy development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment, along with the necessity for consistent, structured care by a responsible parent figure who is ready, willing and able to address to their needs without further delay. For these children, who have been placed in the same foster home throughout their entire lives, permanent resolution of the questions whether or not it is in the best interests to continue the respondents' extant legal relationships with their children, or whether those ties should be severed, is of critical importance.

Yashika W. loves Destiny. (Tes. Yashika W.) However, given the children's particular needs, the court is constrained to conclude that allowing more time for either the mother and/or Stanley W. to become able and willing to provide safe, reliable care for Destiny and/or Justin would unreasonably relegate the children's best interests to an unacceptable level of uncertainty, without any valid basis, current or historical, for determining that a different outcome will be reached by the biological parents. Given the children's life experiences, the court finds that further delay in TPR would unduly interfere with Justin's and/or Destiny's access to a permanent placement that will enhance their opportunities for healthy human growth and maximize their potentials.

In balancing the children's need for permanency against a benefit that might be achieved through denying TPR, the court has fully considered Yashika W.'s claim that her parents serve as support figures in her life, and has acknowledged DCF's decision to place baby Sanai in their home. Stanley W. has admitted that his supports are limited, although he has two friends residing in Manchester, and an aunt and a foster sister who live in Hartford. (Ex. 3-A.; Tes. Yashika W., Stanley W.) Placement of Justin and/or Destiny with any such relative resources, without TPR, would render these children, who have already been the subject of two protracted evidentiary trials, subject to the specter of continued litigation that cannot serve their best interest. The court has also carefully balanced Yashika W.'s and Stanley W.'s constitutionally protected relationship to the children who are the subject of their respective TPR petitions against the children's respective needs for permanency, security, safety, the opportunity for healthy growth and consistency in their environment.¹⁰⁹ With this additional perspective, it is overwhelmingly apparent that notwithstanding genetic connections, Justin's and Destiny's fundamental need for stability and permanency far outweighs any benefit of continuing a legal connection with either respondent.¹¹⁰ The permanency attendant TPR will finally enable Justin and Destiny to spend their remaining childhood years in a predictable, appropriate " forever home" in which they are nurtured and supported on a continuous basis, without risk of further delay.¹¹¹ In re Heather L., 49 Conn.Supp. 287, 313, 877 A.2d 27 (2004), aff'd, 274 Conn. 174, 874 A.2d 796 (2005). Therefore, " termination is in the best interest" of both children. § 17a-112(j)(2).

109 A parent may argue that his or her constitutional right to raise their child precludes a finding that TPR will serve the child's best interests, a result with which this court disagrees given the facts of this case. " The United States Supreme Court has recognized that 'freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.' Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) . . . The state has, however, an interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of a child. Id., 766. These interests conflict in cases involving the termination of parental rights, and state interference with the relationship between a parent and child is justified only in specific instances . . ." In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn.App. 592, 598, 767 A.2d 155 (2001) (discussing respondent mother's motion for continuance in TPR trial). " The desire and right of a parent to maintain a familial relationship with a child cannot be separated from the desire and best interest of a child either to maintain or to abandon that relationship, or the interest of the state in safeguarding the welfare of children. These legitimate interests of parent, child and state require balancing of the factors involved in those interests. See [ Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S.] 240. In every case involving parental rights, a struggle exists between parents and the state to determine what is in the child's best interest, the child being the focus of the struggle." Id., 598-99. " [The] right to family integrity includes the most essential and basic aspect of familial privacy--the right of the family to remain together without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state . . . The family is not, however, beyond regulation in the public interest, and the rights of parenthood are not beyond limitation . . . The state's countervailing interest in the welfare of a child justifies appropriately bounded state intervention . .., as long as the state acts in accordance with the requirements of procedural due process . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.) Lehrer v. Davis, 214 Conn. 232, 236-38, 571 A.2d 691 (1990) (discussing grandparents' motion for visitation pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-59). Moreover, a parent's " constitutionally protected right to raise and care for his own children . . . is not free from intervention by the state . .., when the continuing parens patriae interest of the state in the wellbeing of children is deemed by law to supercede parental interests. See General Statutes § 17-43a [now § 17a-112] . . ." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) In re Juvenile Appeal (83- DE), supra, 190 Conn. 318-19 (discussing application of res judicata to TPR proceeding). For the reasons discussed throughout this decision, implicating the clear and convincing evidence establishing the adjudicatory grounds predicate to TPR, comporting with the requirements of procedural due process, the court finds that the state's action on behalf of Justin and Destiny is fully justified in the context of this litigation and the family's history. Thus, while the court has fully acknowledged and considered the respondents' constitutional relationship to their biological children, under the circumstances of this case, it is abundantly apparent department's intervention is not only warranted and supported by the child herself, but is both lawfully and factually appropriate.

110 See In re Davonta V., supra, 285 Conn. 495; In re Alison M., supra, 127 Conn.App. 216 n.12.; In re Chevol G., supra, 125 Conn.App. 623; In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999) (" [T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider").

111 The court has not based its decision to grant the TPR petition " in order to substitute another, more suitable parent." In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 280; see also In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738, 977 A.2d 247 (2009). The availability of " [proposed] adoptive parents" has been considered only after grounds for termination were shown to exist as to each respondent and specifically in the context of § 17a-112(k)(4), as discussed above. In re Vincent D., supra, 65 Conn.App. 666.

VII.

ORDERS

The court terminates the parental rights of Yashika W. to Destiny W.

The court terminates the parental rights of Stanley W. to Justin W. and to Destiny W.

The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(m), and within thirty days shall report to the court on a case plan which includes measurable objectives and time schedules for the children, and shall file such additional reports in a timely manner as required.

The Clerk of any court with jurisdiction over any subsequent adoption of the children shall notify in writing the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford of the date when said adoption is finalized.

Judgment is entered accordingly this 19th day of February 2016.