Opinion
03-25-2016
In the Matter of JULISSA P. a Child Under Eighteen Years of Age Alleged to be Neglected by, Lisa C., Respondent.
Joanna Kelly appeared as counsel for the Administration for Children's Services. Jim Kenniff of the Bronx Defenders appeared as counsel for the respondent mother. Legal Aid Society Juvenile Rights Practice by Jadera Ramirez–Garcia appeared as counsel for the subject child.
Joanna Kelly appeared as counsel for the Administration for Children's Services.
Jim Kenniff of the Bronx Defenders appeared as counsel for the respondent mother.
Legal Aid Society Juvenile Rights Practice by Jadera Ramirez–Garcia appeared as counsel for the subject child.
ALMA M. GOMEZ, J. This is a decision and order on a Notice of Motion filed by the Administration for Children's Services (ACS) on February 29, 2016, seeking to withdraw the neglect petition filed on July 15, 2015 against the respondent mother, Lisa C (Ms. C). The petition in this child protective proceeding alleges that Ms. C failed to provide her 17.9 year old daughter, Julissa P. (Julissa), with proper supervision and guardianship. The Bronx Defenders, attorneys for Ms. C, filed an Affirmation In Support of ACS' motion on March 17, 2016. The Legal Aid Society, attorneys for the subject child, also joined in ACS' application, and submitted an Affirmation in Support of the Respondent's Motion to Withdraw on March 24, 2016 (the court notes that the movant is the presentment agency and not the respondent mother). In the alternative, the attorney for the child seeks to dismiss the petition. All counsel cite Family Court Act (FCA) § 1051(c) in support of their respective positions.
For the reasons set forth below, ACS' motion to withdraw the neglect petition is denied in its entirety, and the matter is scheduled for a fact-finding hearing within 30 days.
BACKGROUND
The presentment agency, ACS, commenced this Article 10 proceeding with the filing of a neglect petition on July 15, 2015. Specifically, the petition alleges, in sum and substance, the following:
"Allegation 1a.: On or about May 15, 2015, the respondent mother stated to the undersigned that
the FBI hears everything and records everything that she does. The respondent mother also stated to the undersigned that she has video cameras in her eyes, microphones in her ears and fake skin. The respondent mother also stated that the undersigned needed to be careful if she goes to court, in that everyone who testified against her in the past has died.
Allegation 1b.: On or about June 1, 2015, during a home visit to the respondent mother's home, the respondent mother was extremely angry at CPS due to a bed being ordered for a family member and continued to insist that ACS was charging her for it despite CPS trying to explain that the bed was free. The respondent mother also stated that there was a contract in the bed from the FBI and that she did not want to have it in the apartment.
Allegation 1c.: According to the maternal sister, Gladys C, on or about the evening of June 1, 2015 the respondent mother tore apart the bed with a box cutter. As a result of this behavior, the maternal sister called 911 and the respondent mother was transported to Bronx Lebanon Hospital.
Allegation 1d.: According to records and staff from Bronx Lebanon Hospital the respondent mother was admitted and psychiatrically hospitalized from June 2, 2015 to June 24, 2015. According to the staff at Bronx Lebanon Hospital, during the respondent mother's stay she refused to take any recommended medication, participate in a mental health evaluation or sign any paperwork.
Allegation 1e.: According to the respondent mother and the subject child
Julissa P, Julissa has not attended school in approximately five years. According to the principal, Keenan Hugh at St. Margret School, the respondent mother was informed of the process regarding home schooling. The respondent mother stated to the undersigned that the child stopped going to school because of health reasons, but since then she never ensured that Julissa returned to school.
Allegation 1f.: According to Julissa's pediatrician, Dr. Anil Gupta, Julissa is obese and has only one kidney. Dr. Gupta indicated that the subject child was last seen on 12/24/10. A referral was given to
the respondent mother for the subject child to be evaluated by an endocrinologist, Dr. Genna Klein, and for mental health services at Montefiore Hospital based on her issues with obesity. To date, the respondent mother has not provided ACS with any documentation demonstrating follow up regarding Julissa's medical needs."
On July 15, 2015, the court ordered the temporary release of Julissa to Ms. C's care under the following conditions: (1) Ms. C was to engage in mental health services, (2) Ms. C was to attend to Julissa's medical needs, including scheduling appointments with an endocrinologist and nutritionist, (3) Ms. C was to sign all appropriate releases, including HIPAA forms for the release of medical and school information, (4) Ms. C was to comply with all reasonable referrals, (5) Ms. C was to comply with announced and unannounced home visits, and (6) Ms. C and Julissa were to comply with a mental health evaluation for Julissa.
On September 17, 2015, ACS reported that Ms. C failed to comply with the referrals. On September 22, 2015, Ms. C's attorney requested that ACS withdraw the neglect petition as the respondent mother had made an appointment for her daughter to be seen at Mt. Sinai Hospital, and Julissa was enrolled in an online GED course. Both Ms. C and Julissa contended that they did not want ACS "in their life." ACS was not prepared to withdraw its petition, and the court requested proof that the child had a medical appointment scheduled, and was enrolled in an educational program.
On December 18, 2015, ACS made an oral application to withdraw the petition because Julissa had turned 18, and the agency believed nothing further could be done for the child as she did not want ACS in her life. Additionally, Ms. C failed to engage in any services. Ms. C has failed to comply with the court's July 15, 2015 order. Prior to October 2, 2015, Julissa's 18th birthday, Ms. C had not taken Julissa to a doctor to address her many health issues, nor was Julissa enrolled in an education program. Further, Ms. C failed to comply with the court's order directing her to engage in mental health services and comply with all reasonable ACS referrals. On December 23, 2015, at the court's request, ACS submitted a report detailing the efforts made by the Child Protective Specialist to engage the family in services.
On January 29, 2016, ACS renewed its application to withdraw the petition. The court directed ACS to contact New York City Adult Protective Services (APS) regarding this matter, and submit a written report to the court regarding any assistance APS could offer the family. On February 5, 2016, ACS informed the court that APS determined that Julissa was ineligible for services as she did not suffer from any physical or mental impairment. On February 9, 2016, the court instructed ACS to file a motion to withdraw the neglect petition. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
A. WITHDRAWAL OF NEGLECT PETITION, PURSUANT TO FCA § 1051(c), PRIOR TO FACT–FINDING
The principal issue presented here, under FCA § 1051(c), is whether "the aid of the court" is still required. The court's resolution of the issue turns on the meaning and scope of FCA § 1051(c), and how it applies in this case.
ACS contends that because the respondent mother has repeatedly failed to comply with the court's order and its supervision, the court's aid is no longer required and, therefore, the petition should be dismissed pursuant to FCA § 1051(c). The court, however, does not find FCA § 1051(c) persuasive on this point. FCA § 1051(c), standing alone, fails to address the legal inquiry the court must make in deciding whether to grant an application to permit, what is in this court's view, a request to voluntarily withdraw a pending action.
Section 1051(c) governs orders sustaining or dismissing child abuse and neglect petitions. FCA § 1051(c) states:
"If facts sufficient to sustain the petition under this article are not established, or if, in a case of alleged neglect, the court concludes that its aid is not required on the record before it, the court shall dismiss the petition and shall state on the record the grounds for the dismissal."
This subdivision authorizes dismissal upon two separate and distinct grounds: (a) the petition is not established, i.e., ACS has failed to prove abuse or neglect; or (b) in neglect (but not abuse) cases, the court has concluded that its aid is not required. The first contingency, failure to sustain the petition, has been developed through extensive case law. However, the second contingency, that the court's aid is not required, has had limited case law development.
While there is little case law on point with this issue, the court, under this section, is permitted to dismiss a petition satisfying the formal requirements of neglect when it deems the matter not of sufficient seriousness to require the court's aid (see Matter of J.H. and J.G., 15 Misc.3d 1111 (A), 2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 50587(U), at *2, 2007 WL 925684 [Fam.Ct., Bronx County 2007], citing Committee Comments, N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act, quoted in Besharov, Practice Commentaries to McKinney's, Family Court Act § 1051 ). Nonetheless, the court's exercise of its authority under this section is discretionary and must be utilized in a manner that emphasizes and promotes the best interests of the child (id. ) Thus, in Matter of J.H., the court held that " [d]ismissal of a neglect case on the grounds that the aid of the court is no longer required should be applied in cases where the risk of danger to the child has passed."
In Matter of Sharnaza Q., 68 A.D.3d 436, 890 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1st Dept.2009), the Appellate Division, First Department, denied the respondent grandfather's motions to dismiss the neglect petitions under FCA § 1051(c). At the time, one child had been paroled to her mother, and the other was placed with the respondent's mother (the child's great-grandmother). Respondent grandfather appealed the court's order directing continued supervision. The grandfather repeatedly stated that he wished to have contact with his grandchildren, and he did, in fact, have unsupervised contact with them. Nonetheless, the court held that "The agreed-upon placement of the child with a relative did not, under the circumstances, obviate the necessity for the court to ... impose conditions upon respondent" ( Matter of Sharnaza Q., 68 A.D.3d at 436, 890 N.Y.S.2d 506, quoting Matter of Diana Y., 246 A.D.2d 340, 340, 666 N.Y.S.2d 912 [1st Dept.1998] ). Moreover, given the seriousness of the respondent's involvement with controlled substances, supervision by the agency was found necessary for the purpose of monitoring his conduct (Id., citing Matter of A.G., 253 A.D.2d 318, 328, 686 N.Y.S.2d 396 [1st Dept.1999] ).
This court views the issue presented here as similarly akin to the factual scenario in Matter of Billy R., 103 Misc.2d 988, 427 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Fam.Ct., Queens County 1980), where the court, when presented with a motion to withdraw filed by the Commissioner of Social Services, concluded that Section 1051(c) was not "necessarily controlling" since the petitioner was not seeking to dismiss the petition but instead sought to withdraw its neglect petition before a fact-finding hearing commenced (see Matter of Billy R., 103 Misc.2d at 991, 427 N.Y.S.2d 364 ). It appeared, therefore, to that particular court, that the relevant statute would be one dealing with the voluntary discontinuance of the petition, not the dismissal of a petition.
The method or procedure for voluntarily discontinuing an action is not prescribed in the Family Court Act. Therefore, the court must turn to the applicable provision of the Civil Procedure Law and Rules (CPLR). A voluntary discontinuance is governed by CPLR 3217(b), which provides: "an action shall not be discontinued by a party asserting a claim except upon order of the court and upon terms and conditions, as the court deems proper."
In a child protective proceeding, the right to terminate an action voluntarily is not absolute as other overarching interests and rights are involved in the proceeding. New York courts have traditionally observed that in matters involving the welfare of children, not only the parties to the action, but the "public has an interest in the continuation of the proceeding" (id., citing Matter of Rich v. Kaminsky, 254 App.Div. 6, 7, 3 N.Y.S.2d 689 [1st Dept.1938] ; Matter of Julie J. v. Edwin A., 86 Misc.2d 882, 883, 383 N.Y.S.2d 994 [Fam.Ct., New York 1976] ). Here, the court is dealing with a neglect petition, and therefore, the welfare and best interests of Julissa is of paramount concern.
The court finds that the allegations in the neglect petition are serious enough to warrant a continuation of the proceeding. Additionally, the court is reluctant to permit the dismissal or withdrawal of the petition because the person alleged to be a danger to the child continues to live with the child. Ms. C's poor judgment, and lack of insight into the damaging, and potentially life-threatening consequences of her failure to ensure that her daughter received necessary medical care and an appropriate education causes concern to this court, and permitting the dismissal or withdrawal of the present neglect petition would constitute an improvident exercise of discretion. The court cannot abdicate its statutory responsibility to protect children from injury or mistreatment. Hence, the aid of the court remains necessary.
Moreover, even if ACS were to argue that they no longer wish to prosecute this matter because the child is 18 years old, a proper motion to the court under the applicable CPLR provision would be required. Accordingly, the motion to withdraw the neglect petition, pursuant to FCA § 1051(c), is denied. B. EFFECT OF A DENIAL OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW IN A CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDING ONCE THE SUBJECT CHILD TURNS 18 YEARS OLD
Counsel argues that as the subject child has turned 18 years old, the petitioner lacks jurisdiction over the child. It is well-settled that the Family Court's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide a case involving child neglect does not terminate when a child turns 18 years of age (see Matter of Vernice B., 129 A.D.3d 714, 715, 10 N.Y.S.3d 323 [2d Dept.2015] ). It is incomprehensible to this court why the presentment agency would commence an action in Family Court when the subject child is 17.9 years of age, and then decide the matter no longer requires the court's aid because the child has turned 18. The authority of the court to determine this matter does not cease when a child turns 18. However, while there are limitations in the available and appropriate dispositional orders that the court can make the court is not without authority to hear and decide the issues raised at a fact-finding.
Therefore, when a child is less than 18 years of age on the date the proceeding is initiated, the case may continue, regardless of whether that child has reached 18 years old during the interim period (see Matter of Sheena B. v. Rory F., 83 A.D.3d 1056, 1058, 922 N.Y.S.2d 176 [2d Dept.2011] [Court held that the Family Court should have denied the discontinuance request, emphasizing the fact that the child could receive services until age 21] ). The court, however, is quick to point out that in some cases, there may be a valid reason to dismiss when a child has reached majority, but that is a dispositional matter, not a jurisdictional issue.
CONCLUSION
Although the court is ordinarily required to make a finding when there is sufficient proof, the court may dismiss a neglect petition if it "concludes that its aid is not required on the record before it." In this case, the presentment agency's basis for seeking withdrawal of the neglect petition is premised upon the subject child reaching the age of majority, coupled with the lack of cooperation by the subject child and the respondent mother.
For the reasons previously discussed, the court is unable to conclude that its aid is not required on the record before it because a fact-finding hearing has not yet been commenced and concluded. Therefore, the court is deny the application to withdraw or dismiss the petition at this time. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that ACS' Motion to Withdraw is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the matter be scheduled for fact-finding hearing within 30 days of this Decision and Order.