Therefore, failure to strictly comply with rule 2.831 is a waiveable error. ( In re Richard S., at pp. 865-866; In re Julio N. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1123 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 86].) More to the point, it is also now settled that a stipulation for the appointment of a temporary judge need not be in writing or even expressly made but can be implied from the conduct of the parties. ( Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 988 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 618].)
" 'An attorney may not sit back, fully participate in a trial and then claim that the court was without jurisdiction on receiving a result unfavorable to him. [Citation.]" ' (Id. at p. 91.)" (Inre Julio N. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1123; see also Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 988-989.) In this case, although Facebook is not a party to the underlying juvenile proceedings and did not enter into a written stipulation consenting to the juvenile court commissioner's jurisdiction, there is no question that the company, through its counsel, fully participated in the sanction hearing "without complaint and without objection to the [commissioner]."
In fact, it has been held that merely by intending to have the subordinate judicial officer decide the case, the parties may impliedly confer temporary judge status on the officer even without their knowledge that a stipulation is required. ( In re Julio N. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1123 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 86], citing In re Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 98.) "Under the `tantamount stipulation' doctrine, the parties confer judicial power not because they thought in those terms; had they done so, the stipulation presumably would be express.
(See, e.g., In re Julio N. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1123 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 86] [parties to juvenile proceeding who tried case without objection sufficiently stipulated under rule 244].) The court in the case of In re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 857 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 819 P.2d 843], interpreting the language of rule 244, concluded the clause requiring a written stipulation was directory only, and hence failure to execute a written stipulation did not deprive the court of jurisdiction.
Although Hemant also contends that he did not stipulate to the judge pro tempore, his attorney stipulated in writing to the superior court commissioner’s jurisdiction. (In re Julio N. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1122-1123.) At oral argument, Hemant cited Nierenberg v. Superior Court (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 611, for the first time, to support his argument that his attorney’s stipulation at the hearing did not give the commissioner the authority to conduct the trial.