In re Julian L.

52 Citing cases

  1. In re R.B.

    No. E060811 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2014)

    Therefore, the Department’s failure to send the most recently mailed notice to her new address in Texas did not violate her due process rights. Mother’s reliance on In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109 and In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204 is misplaced. First, in In re Jasmine G., at a review hearing, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a search declaration “and nothing else, ” indicating that the mother’s address and telephone number were unknown.

  2. In re Phillip F.

    78 Cal.App.4th 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 53 times
    In Phillip F., the mother was served with notice of the initially scheduled section 366.26 hearing. (Phillip F., at p. 255.)

    (See, e.g., People ex rel. San Francisco Bay Conservation etc. Com. v. Smith, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 129 [defendant's presence at settlement conference gave him actual notice that matter was continued; he then had duty to stay informed of all further continuances; plaintiff did not have to give renewed formal notice after matter was continued].) A subsequent case, In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204, [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 839], is instructive. There, the incarcerated mother waived her right to be present at a section 366.26 hearing set in October 1997.

  3. In re J.B.

    No. H033873 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2009)

    Representation is one of the constitutional safeguards built into the statutory dependency scheme. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307-308; In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204, 207.) “The counsel appointed by the court shall represent the parent... at the detention hearing and at all subsequent proceedings before the juvenile court. Counsel shall continue to represent the parent... unless relieved by the court upon the substitution of other counsel or for cause.”

  4. In re Axsana S.

    78 Cal.App.4th 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 49 times

    He submits, the matter could have been continued while the court used judicial process to compel Los Angeles to release him for transport to the dependency hearing or until his counsel could consult with him regarding how to present his testimony in his absence. He relies on In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 839] . There the juvenile court refused to grant a continuance when new counsel, who had been assigned to the case for only one week, informed the court that he had not had an opportunity to ascertain the mother's wishes in regard to the section 366.26 hearing. ( 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 207.) The appellate court reversed; a brief continuance was compelled to afford counsel an opportunity to ascertain the mother's wishes and to effectively represent her. ( Id. at p. 208.)

  5. In re Isaiah W.

    No. B219900 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 19, 2010)

    Father argues that the juvenile court failed to comply with section 366.26, subdivision (h)(1), which provides: “At all proceedings under this section, the court shall consider the wishes of the child and shall act in the best interests of the child.” “‘What the court must strive to do is “to explore the minor’s feelings regarding his/her biological parents, foster parents, and prospective adoptive parents, if any, as well as his/her current living arrangements.... [A]n attempt should be made to obtain this information so that the court will have before it some evidence of the minor’s feelings from which it can then infer his/her wishes regarding the issue confronting the court.”’” (In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204, 208.) A child’s testimony is not required to ascertain his or her wishes. (In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 820.)

  6. In re I.B.

    No. G039620 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2008)

    B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Violate Due Process by Substituting Fathers Counsel Without a Noticed Hearing Relying on In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204 (Julian L.), father argues the court prejudicially erred on October 5 when it appointed substitute counsel to represent him without a noticed hearing. As noted above, fathers previous appointed counsel declared a conflict and the court immediately appointed a new lawyer.

  7. In re A.B.

    No. C041328 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2003)

    Likewise, it was incumbent upon appellant to maintain contact with his attorney in order to exercise the due process that had been accorded him. Appellants reliance on In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204 (Julian L.) is misplaced. In that case, an incarcerated mother was not notified of the date to which the section 366.26 hearing was continued and did not waive her presence at that hearing.

  8. San Joaquin Cnty. Human Servs. Agency v. P.M. (In re T.S.)

    No. C099680 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2024)

    That is unlike the situation in In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204, which mother cites. In that case, the mother's attorney, who was appointed one week before the section 366.26 hearing, stated that he had been unable to speak to his client and ascertain her wishes.

  9. Contra Costa Cnty. Children & Family Servs. Bureau v. R.M. (In re N.H.)

    No. A169108 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 15, 2024)

    A number of courts have since rejected Diana G.'s strict reading of section 366.26, subdivision (g). (See In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204, 208-209 [Second District]; In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 820 [Fourth District]; In re Leo M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1591-1593 [Fifth District].) Under the Julian L. line of cases, the perspective of the minors matters-a lot-but courts must always be sensitive to how their perspective is elicited.

  10. L. A. Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. Davon L. (In re D.L.)

    No. B319995 (Cal. Ct. App. May. 17, 2023)

    [notice inadequate when mailed to mother's former address after she had notified the court of her new address]; In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204, 208 [mother's waiver of her appearance for a permanency planning hearing did not apply to the continued hearing].) Father points out that the United States Postal Service Web site indicates that first class mail is delivered within one to five business days. Father argues that notice via first class mail a mere five days before the hearing, two of which fell on a weekend, was not a reasonable period of time prior to the hearing date, thus violating father's right to procedural due process of law.