Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCUK-JVSQ-06-14830-01
SIMONS, Acting P.J.
Jennifer E. (appellant), mother of Julia E. (born in August 2000), appeals a disposition order (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c)(1)) removing Julia from her custody, and an order limiting her right to make educational decisions for Julia. Appellant contends the orders must be reversed because the Mendocino County Department of Social Services (Department) failed to comply with the notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). She also contends the court erred in requiring her to undergo a substance abuse assessment and participate in a domestic violence class as part of her reunification case plan, and violated her due process rights by limiting her authority to make educational decisions for Julia. We reject the contentions and affirm.
All section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Background
Julia was detained on November 12, 2006. On November 14, the Department filed a dependency petition (§ 300, subd. (b)) alleging the following:
(1) Appellant’s mental illness inhibits her ability to provide regular care for Julia. Appellant said she is an “insulin diabetic” but does not need medication because she has a remedy for diabetes which was “stolen.”
(2) On November 12, appellant and Julia were found homeless and had been living in a van for two months. The van was cluttered, smelled of animals and body odor and had a very small sleeping space for appellant and Julia.
(3) On November 12, Julia had severe dental caries, head lice, was playing outside in the rain in cold weather with wet hair, clothing and boots that she had trouble walking in.
(4) In August 2006, Ukiah police found Julia sleeping in the front seat of appellant’s vehicle and appellant asleep on the grass in front of a Wal-Mart 150 feet away.
The Department’s November 15, 2006 detention report stated that appellant’s mother said appellant had schizophrenia when she was younger and that living with appellant had been “very difficult” in recent years. Appellant told the Department social worker that the American Medical Association and the Ukiah Brewery had stolen her remedies for diabetes. She also said her psychic abilities had been a problem between her and her family. Appellant informed the social worker that she is a Cherokee from North Carolina. The Department planned to have appellant complete a JV-130 (Parental Notification of Indian Status (Juvenile Court)) form and a JV-135 (parent history chart at the detention hearing) form.
Detention Hearing
At the detention hearing counsel was appointed for appellant and Julia. Appellant said she is a “16th Cherokee, Cherokee Nation, North Carolina.” Thereafter, the following colloquy occurred:
“THE COURT: Any other tribes that you may be connected with?
“[APPELLANT]: Well, in Minnesota there’s a tribe of Ojibwe. Well, there’s many tribes in the Ojibwe Nation, but I was not affiliated or claiming to be of any tribe officially.
“THE COURT: Okay. Other than the Cherokee that you might have ancestry in?
“[APPELLANT]: I do have ancestry, and I can prove that if I need to. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[DEPARTMENT COUNSEL]: And if you could inquire whether [the Ojibwe tribe is] an affiliation because she’s a descendant of a member?
“[APPELLANT]: No. Because I attended powwows and was an active social Indian, I guess. [¶] . . . [¶] Even though I’m a spirit native.”
Appellant testified she had been in the Ukiah-Willits area for about three months. She said she had never been diagnosed with schizophrenia, but had been diagnosed with “PTSD” at 26, and had since “healed.” She also said she regularly takes insulin for her diabetes. She admitted that Julia had three cavities, but said the dentists in Minnesota use mercury fillings, which Julia is allergic to, so she planned to have Julia’s cavities filled in California. She said nationally, Wal-Marts are a “sanctuary for travelers,” and you can camp in their lots. She said she discovered a remedy for diabetes but could not reveal what it was. She said she and Julia planned to move to the home of her friend Michael who lived in Paradise. She also said she received SSI and sold her crafts. On cross-examination appellant conceded that Julia’s cavities were diagnosed in November 2005 and remained untreated. She said she thought Julia’s head lice were “some kind of flea” and the lice were probably from a motel they stayed in that week.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered Julia detained and set a jurisdiction hearing for December 7, 2006.
On November 15, 2006, appellant executed a JV-130 form and checked the boxes stating that she and Julia, were or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in the “Cherokee of North Carolina.” The form was filed November 20. On November 16, appellant executed another JV-130 form prepared by her counsel. This form stated that appellant was or may be a member of or eligible for membership in the “Cherokee – North Carolina – Colorado.”
On November 27, 2006, the Department sent a JV-135 notice of involuntary child custody proceedings for an Indian child (juvenile court) form to appellant, the Cherokee Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). Signed return receipts for certified mail for all those sent JV-135 notices were filed with the court on December 8. Subsequently, all three Cherokee tribes responded that Julia is not an Indian child as to those tribes.
Jurisdiction Report
The Department’s December 7, 2006 jurisdiction report stated that at the detention hearing appellant said she might have Native American ancestry with the Cherokee tribe of North Carolina, and as a result, the Department noticed the BIA and the three Cherokee tribes.
The report also stated that shortly after Julia’s birth in Minnesota, appellant exhibited signs of a thought disorder, refusing to reveal the name she had chosen for the baby so the staff would not “gain power over her.” She also refused to cooperate with staff help with breast feeding and refused permission for the staff to bottle feed Julia for fear they would “poison the baby.” The psychiatric opinion was that appellant suffered from a severe thought disorder. A hold was placed on Julia prior to appellant’s hospital discharge and Julia was ordered detained. However, in October 2000, the case was dismissed due to psychological and psychiatric reports suggesting there was no need for further services. A Minnesota child protective services referral was made in November 2001, but there were no findings of mistreatment of Julia and the case was closed.
In October 2006, the Department received a referral for general neglect and that appellant was living in her van across from a store parking lot and leaving Julia alone in the store. Appellant told the social worker that Julia was “self-schooled.” The social worker concluded the allegation of general neglect was unfounded.
In November 2006, the Department social worker talked to appellant’s mother who said appellant was hospitalized for 11 months at age 15 due to mental health issues. The social worker confirmed that appellant received SSI and had been able to hide her mental illness from some mental health professionals in the past.
Addendum to Jurisdiction Report
An addendum to the jurisdiction report included photographs of appellant’s van taken by the Ukiah police. The report noted the gums surrounding Julia’s decayed teeth were severely inflamed, indicating possible gingivitis. The maternal grandmother told the social worker that appellant neglected Julia’s physical and dental health and there were no immunization, dental or hospital records. While placed at the shelter, Julia’s lice were eradicated. Julia told the social worker she liked being at the shelter, was not sure she wanted to return to living with appellant and wanted to live with her grandmother in Minnesota.
When the social worker visited appellant on November 21, 2006, appellant said her skin turned red from the soap Julia’s clothes were washed in, but the social worker did not notice this.
At the December 12, 2006 jurisdiction hearing, appellant submitted on the reports after “schizophrenia” was stricken from the petition. A psychological evaluation was scheduled for December 14 and a disposition hearing for December 27.
Disposition Report
The Department’s December 27, 2007 disposition report again stated that based on appellant’s stating she may have ancestry with the Cherokee tribe of North Carolina, the Department had noticed the BIA and the three Cherokee tribes. Attached to the report was a letter from the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians stating there was no evidence that Julia is or is descended from anyone on the Keetoowah Roll and therefore, she was not eligible for enrollment in that tribe. The Cherokee Nation and the Eastern Band of Cherokee had not yet responded to the JV-135 notices.
The report stated that during most contacts with the Department appellant was “uncooperative, emotional, irrational, verbally abusive and hostile” and the social worker was unable to discuss appellant’s position regarding disposition. The report also stated that on November 12, appellant was charged with child cruelty (Pen. Code, § 273a), and on December 13 was taken into custody after failing to appear on a bench warrant. The report also stated that the Department social worker spoke to Brian Newman of the Mendocino County District Attorney’s Office who said that appellant had been seen smoking marijuana in her van and Julia may have been exposed to it. As a result of this information, the report recommended that appellant participate in a drug and alcohol assessment and follow any recommendations.
The report stated that Julia was placed in a long-term foster home on December 7, 2006. Her dental appointment revealed that she required nine fillings, one extraction and a cleaning. The dentist opined that she had lived with pain for so long she “[did] not know any better.” The report noted that Julia had started school for the first time in her life and was placed in kindergarten. Because appellant on more than one occasion told the social worker that formal education is unnecessary, the report stated the social worker would request that the court issue an order limiting appellant’s right to make educational decisions for Julia and appoint the foster parents as educational representatives.
The report said appellant refused to accept the Department’s referral for a mental health assessment and said she would go to a doctor of her own choosing. She also showed up late for the social worker to transport her to the December 14, 2006 psychological assessment, and it was rescheduled for January 11, 2007.
The Department recommended reunification services for appellant and supervised visitation. The report summarized that appellant appeared to be suffering from a mental disability that rendered her incapable of adequately caring for Julia and she disobeyed a court order to participate in a psychological evaluation. At appellant’s request the disposition hearing was continued to January 17, 2007.
Addendum to Disposition Report
The Department’s January 17, 2007 addendum to the disposition report stated that all of the identified tribes had responded and indicated that Julia is not eligible for enrollment in those tribes and therefore, the ICWA does not apply. Copies of letters received from the tribes were attached to the report. The report noted that the social worker had transported appellant to her January 11 psychological evaluation.
Second Addendum to Disposition Report
The Department’s January 30, 2007 second addendum stated that on January 11 appellant participated in a psychological evaluation by Dr. Jacqueline Singer. Dr. Singer reported that because appellant was uncooperative in completing the “MMPI-2,” scoring of the test was impossible. Dr. Singer stated that test results revealed that appellant is a “very self-centered woman” who has great difficulty understanding her impact on others. She also appears to have a “fixed delusional disorder maintaining a belie[f] that she has been the inventor of various items that have been stolen from her.” When under stress, she can decompensate into a psychotic, delusional state. When she does not feel support, she can become argumentative or paranoid. Dr. Singer opined that maintaining a therapeutic alliance would be challenging because appellant has little insight into her need for help or support. Dr. Singer diagnosed appellant as suffering from delusional disorder; psychotic disorder, NOS (post-partum psychosis), by history; and narcissistic and paranoid personality features. Dr. Singer recommended that the first treatment goal would be to help appellant better understand the circumstances that led to Julia’s removal. However, Dr. Singer opined that appellant’s paranoia would make her reluctant to engage with and resistant to treatment providers. While she might benefit from group therapy, her unwillingness to remain in one place and avail herself of resources make benefiting from such services more limited. Dr. Singer also opined that a psychiatric evaluation might be warranted if appellant’s thinking becomes more actively psychotic or her delusions more pervasive.
Dr. Singer’s report is included in the appellate record.
Dr. Singer indicated to Julia’s counsel that without a support system, appellant would not be able to parent and until appellant was able to admit she needed help, Dr. Singer did not believe appellant would be able to use services. However, Dr. Singer believed there was a risk to Julia given appellant’s level of denial about any need for services or the state in which Julia was found.
Disposition Hearing
At the January 30, 2007 disposition hearing, the Department social worker said the Department was continuing to recommend reunification services for appellant. The Department requested that appellant undergo a psychiatric medication assessment, to which appellant responded, “Absolutely not.” Appellant also objected to the Department’s request for an evaluation of Julia’s relatives in Minnesota. The court ordered the psychiatric assessment and ordered the Department to make contact with the Minnesota relatives. The court then stated it had signed the orders limiting appellant’s right to make educational decisions for Julia. Appellant’s counsel said she was unaware of such an order and appellant wanted input into educational decisions.
The two orders were identical, however one had the names of the foster parents blacked out, and the other listed as “confidential” the identifying information regarding the foster parents.
The court found that based on the responses from the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the Cherokee Nation and the Keetoowah Band of Cherokee, the ICWA did not apply. The court sustained the allegations of the section 300 petition, as amended, and found there was a substantial danger to Julia if she were returned home. Julia was declared a dependent child of the court and the court approved the Department’s reunification case plan for appellant. It scheduled a 30-day substance abuse review for February 2007 and a 60-day substance abuse review for March 2007. Appellant then said she did not do drugs and also said she had been tested “voluntarily before this came up, so if you guys want the test results you can get them from the hospital.”
Discussion
I. ICWA Notice
Appellant contends the Department failed to comply with the ICWA notice provisions, requiring reversal of the disposition order.
“In 1978, Congress passed the [ICWA], which is designed to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian children from their families and placement of such children ‘in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and family services programs.’ [Citations].” (In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731, 734 (Marinna J.).) “The ICWA presumes it is in the best interests of the child to retain tribal ties and cultural heritage and in the interest of the tribe to preserve its future generations, a most important resource. [Citation.] Congress has concluded the state courts have not protected these interests and drafted a statutory scheme intended to afford needed protection. (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) The courts of this state must yield to governing federal law.” (In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 469 (Desiree F.).)
When the social services department has reason to know the proceeding involves an Indian child, the department must notify the Indian child’s tribe, or the BIA (if the tribe’s identity cannot be determined), of the pending proceedings and of the right to intervene. (Marinna J., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 739-740, fn. 4.) The department’s duty is to inquire into the possibility of the child’s Indian ancestry and to act upon the information the family provides. The agency is not required to conduct an extensive independent investigation or to “cast about, attempting to learn the names of possible tribal units to which to send notices[.]” (In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 199 (Levi U.).)
California Rules of Court, rule 5.664 (former rule 1439) provides in relevant part, “if there is a reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the social worker . . . must send [notice] to . . . the Indian child’s tribe, in accordance with . . . section 224.2.” (Rule 5.664(f).) Section 224.2 provides that “[n]otice shall be sent to all tribes of which the child may be a member or eligible for membership, until the court makes a determination as to which tribe is the child’s tribe . . . .” (§ 224.2, subd. (a)(3); see In re Louis S. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 622, 632-633.) Furthermore, “[n]otice to the tribe shall be to the tribal chairperson, unless the tribe has designated another agent for service” (§ 224.2, subd. (a)(2)), and must be sent with a copy of the petition by which the proceeding was initiated. (§ 224.2, subd. (a)(5)(D).) “Determination of tribal membership or eligibility for membership is made exclusively by the tribe.” (Rule 5.664(g); see In re Edward H. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.) “‘Indian tribe’ means any tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians eligible for services provided to Indians by the Secretary of the Interior because of their status as Indians . . . .” (Rule 5.664(a)(6).) If the information is insufficient to identify a specific tribe, the notice requirement is satisfied by notice to the BIA. The notice must include the names of the child’s ancestors and other identifying information, if known, and be sent registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 175-176 (Karla C.); see § 224.2, subd. (a)(1), (5).) The agency providing notice is required to file with the court “a copy of the notice sent and the return receipt, as well as any correspondence received from the Indian entity relevant to the minor’s status.” (Marinna J., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 739-740, fn. 4; Karla C., supra, at pp. 175-176.)
All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
Substantial compliance with ICWA notice requirements may be sufficient under certain circumstances. (In re Christopher I. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 533, 564.) Additionally, “errors in ICWA notice are subject to harmless error review” (Nicole K. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 779, 784), and reversal and remand is not necessarily required if “the tribe had . . . expressly indicated no interest in the proceedings.” (Desiree F., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 472.) In such circumstances it must be established that proper notice was given, or at the very least that the person indicating no interest had the authority to do so on the tribe’s behalf. (See In re H.A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1213-1215; In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 509.) In short, “[d]eficient notice under the ICWA is usually prejudicial [citation] but not invariably so.” (In re Antoinette S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1411.)
In particular, appellant argues that the Department had reason to know that Julia was an Indian child, but erroneously failed to give notice to the Ojibwe tribe. She asserts that at the November 2006 detention hearing she informed the court that she “could be connected to the Ojibwe tribe,” triggering the Department’s duty to notify the Ojibwe tribe. Appellant’s argument is belied by the record before us. Contrary to appellant’s rendition of her testimony at the detention hearing, appellant did not state that she “could be connected to the Ojibwe tribe.” Instead, in response to the court’s question, “Any other tribes [other than Cherokee, Cherokee Nation, North Carolina] you may be connect with?” appellant responded, “Well, there’s many tribes in the Ojibwe Nation, but I was not affiliated or claiming to be of any tribe officially.” Later in the colloquy, in response to the Department counsel’s question, “And if you could inquire whether [the Ojibwe tribe is] an affiliation because she’s a descendant of a member,” appellant said, “No. Because I attended powwows and was an active social Indian, I guess. [¶] . . . [¶] Even though I’m a spirit native.”
Thereafter, appellant completed two JV-130 forms indicating that she might be a member of or eligible for membership in the Cherokee of North Carolina. At no time did she indicate on these forms that she might be a member of or eligible for membership in the Ojibwe tribe. “Although in the first instance it is the duty of the juvenile court to attempt to ascertain the identity of one’s claimed tribal affiliation, if appellant had additional information suggesting the minor was a member of a particular tribe, or if she had evidence indicating the minor was eligible for membership in one such tribe, then appellant should have tendered that information to the court.” (Levi U., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 198.) Here, appellant, on numerous occasions, expressly informed the court of her possible ancestry in the Cherokee tribe of North Carolina, and expressly disavowed an ancestral connection to the Ojibwe tribe. The Department’s obligations under the ICWA were satisfied by their sending the proper notice to the three Cherokee tribes, the BIA and appellant. No notice error is demonstrated.
II. Substantial Evidence Supports Appellant’s Reunification Plan
Next, appellant contends her reunification plan was not narrowly tailored to her needs. The thrust of her claim of error is that there is insufficient evidence to support the requirement that she submit to a drug assessment and domestic violence class as part of her reunification case plan. She requests that these case plan components be stricken.
“The juvenile court has wide latitude in making orders necessary for the well-being of a minor. By statute, the court may make ‘all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the child . . . .’ (§ 362, subd. (a).) However, the same statute limits such orders to those that are designed to eliminate the conditions that brought the minor to the attention of the court. (§ 362, subd. (c).)” (In re Jasmin C. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 177, 180.)
We review a finding that reasonable reunification services have been provided for substantial evidence. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971 (Alvin R.); Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, and if the juvenile court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be disturbed. (Angela S., supra, at p. 762; In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545 (Misako R.).) Reunification services should be tailored to meet the needs of a particular family. (Alvin R., supra, at p. 972.) “Services will be found reasonable if the [Bureau] has ‘identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Alvin R., supra, at pp. 972-973.) The test is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. (Misako R., supra, at p. 547.)
A. Drug Abuse Component
Appellant’s case plan required her to stay free from illegal drugs, show her ability to live free from drug dependency and comply with all required drug tests. In particular it required that appellant successfully complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all treatment recommendations.
Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s order requiring her to submit to a drug assessment as part of her reunification case plan. She argues that the issues which led to the dependency were largely “lifestyle issues” regarding her camping out with Julia and living in her van, neglect of Julia’s dental care and appellant’s mental health issues. She asserts there was no allegation of her drug use in the section 300 petition and the drug assessment condition was based solely on the hearsay statement of someone in the district attorney’s office that appellant had been seen smoking marijuana in her van.
For the first time on appeal, appellant appears to be raising a hearsay challenge to the statements by the district attorney to the Department social worker that appellant was seen smoking marijuana in her van. However, appellant’s failure to raise a hearsay objection below to the district attorney’s statement contained within the disposition report waives the claim on appeal. (People v. Rodriguez (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 757, 759 [failure to object to admission of hearsay statement is waiver of such objection]; see also § 355, subd. (c) [timely objection required to challenge hearsay in dependency social study].)
We conclude that the information the Department social worker received from the district attorney and appellant’s own statements at the disposition hearing that she had been previously drug tested, support the reunification case plan requirement that it would be in Julia’s best interests to determine whether appellant has a substance abuse problem and if so, to participate in a substance abuse treatment program.
B. Domestic Violence Class Component
Appellant’s case plan required her to “[c]onsistently, appropriately and adequately parent [Julia].” Included within this service objective was the requirement that appellant “Participate and successfully complete the MCDSS Parenting Education program: [¶] a. Completion of the Level I classes of ‘Breaking the Cycle’ and ‘Basic Communication.’ [¶] b. Completion of required Level II Parenting Class.”
The record does not reveal for what MCDSS stands.
At the disposition hearing appellant stated, “The In-Home Violence class is a standard class, but not necessarily suited to my needs.” However, as respondent notes, there is no “In-Home Violence Class” included within appellant’s case plan, and there is no evidence that “Breaking the Cycle” is a domestic violence class. All that the record before us reveals is that the Breaking the Cycle class is part of a parenting education program. Consequently, there is no merit to appellant’s claim that her case plan erroneously required her to participate in a domestic violence class.
III. The Court Properly Limited Appellant’s Right To Make Educational Decisions for Julia
Finally, appellant contends the court’s order limiting her right to make educational decisions for Julia violated her right to due process and there was insufficient evidence to support the order.
Section 361 provides, in relevant part: “(a) In all cases in which a minor is adjudged a dependent child of the court on the ground that the minor is a person described by Section 300, the court may limit the control to be exercised over the dependent child by any parent . . . and shall by its order clearly and specifically set forth those limitations. Any limitation on the right of the parent . . . to make educational decisions for the child shall be specifically addressed in the court order. The limitations may not exceed those necessary to protect the child. If the court specifically limits the right of the parent . . . to make educational decisions for the child, the court shall at the same time appoint a responsible adult to make educational decisions for the child . . . .”
Similarly, rule 5.695(c) provides: “(1) If a child is declared a dependent, the court may clearly and specifically limit the control over the child by a parent . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (3) The court must consider whether it is necessary to limit the right of the parent . . . to make educational decisions for the child. If the court limits the right, it must appoint a responsible adult as the educational representative under rule 5.650 to make educational decisions for the child.”
A. Due Process
In particular, appellant argues the court signed the order limiting her educational rights over Julia without prior notice to appellant that the issue was still before the court, and without an opportunity to present evidence and contest the Department’s request for the order. She also argues that there was insufficient evidence justifying the order.
The Department’s disposition report filed December 26, 2006, noted that Julia had started school for the first time in her life. It also stated that based on appellant’s statements to the social worker on more than one occasion that formal education was unnecessary, the social worker would request the court to issue an order limiting appellant’s right to make educational decisions for Julia and appoint the foster parents to do so. The report’s “Summary Evaluation” section requested that the court make an order limiting appellant’s right to make educational decisions for Julia and appoint the foster parents as educational representatives. It appears that a JV-535 form “Order Limiting Parent’s Right to Make Educational Decisions for the Child and Appointing Responsible Adult as Educational Representative –Juvenile” was attached to the disposition report. A proof of service establishes that the disposition report was served on appellant and her counsel on December 26.
Thereafter, the disposition hearing was continued from December 27, 2006 to January 17, 2007. The Department’s January 17, 2007 addendum report includes requested court disposition orders, but does not include an order limiting appellant’s right to make educational decisions for Julia. At the January 17 hearing at which appellant was present, the following colloquy occurred:
“THE COURT: Now, we’re continuing the disposition to the 30th . . . . The question becomes must we now deal with the educational request?
“[APPELLANT]: I’d like to get her tested in the home school thing.
“[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your honor, in terms of dealing with the educational decision making I’d like to defer that. Apparently they’ve enrolled [Julia] in a school; my client is not doing anything to interfere with that
“[APPELLANT]: No, I’m not.
“[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: -- enrollment. She may disagree with that
“[APPELLANT]: And I don’t.
“[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: -- procedure, but she’s not interfering with it, and I think that some of the stuff in this case is a matter of maybe personalities and not necessarily based on my client’s
“THE COURT: All right. [Minor’s counsel], do you want to continue that to the 30th?
“[MINOR’S COUNSEL]: . . . That’s fine, Judge.
“THE COURT: Okay.”
Thereafter, the court continued “all matters” to January 30, 2007. Upon commencement of the hearing, in response to the court’s question, “Are we ready to proceed,” appellant’s counsel stated that appellant had not yet had an opportunity to review the disposition report, “an addendum” and the psychological report and appellant wanted to address the court. The court asked appellant if she was ready to proceed or she wanted a continuance, and appellant stated she wanted to proceed. The court indicated it had read the reports, intended to adopt the Department’s proposed findings and order, and then asked if anyone wanted to be heard. Discussion then ensued on the issue of reunification and the Department’s request for a psychiatric assessment for appellant. Near the end of the recommenced disposition hearing on January 30, 2007, the following colloquy occurred:
“THE COURT: Okay. I’m also indicating for the record that I’ve signed both educational orders that were submitted. Now I’m going to make the findings.
“[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: What educational orders, your Honor? I’m not aware of any educational orders.
“[APPELLANT]: What are you talking about? Yeah.
“THE COURT: I’ve signed an order limiting the mother’s right to make educational decisions. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, there’s no information -- [¶] . . . [¶]
“[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: -- to say that she’s trying to interfere with the educational. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: She wants input into it and she has agreed to the kindergarten. So with respect to that we had an objection to the orders with respect to the educational planning because it appears that she was enrolled in -- [¶] . . . [¶]
“THE COURT: The child was removed from the custody of the mother and the Department . . . has the right to, you know, control and care and planning for the child.
“[APPELLANT]: I haven’t interfered with that at all.
“[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: She hasn’t interfered with that, your Honor. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[DEPARTMENT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, it was discussed on page six and seven [of the disposition report], and the Department is concerned because the mother doesn’t believe in formal education.
“[APPELLANT]: That’s not true. [¶] . . . [¶]
“[APPELLANT]: She had a charter school lined up.
“THE COURT: Okay. I’ve signed it.”
We first reject appellant’s contention that the court failed to give her notice that the issue of limiting her right to make educational decisions for Julia would be heard on January 30, 2007. The record before us establishes that the issue of such a limiting order was first raised in the disposition report, which was served on appellant and her counsel. The issue of the educational decision limiting order was then expressly raised at the January 17 hearing by appellant’s counsel, who asked to defer the matter. The court, appellant’s counsel and Julia’s counsel agreed the matter would be deferred to the January 30 hearing.
At the January 30, 2007 hearing, appellant’s counsel stated that appellant had not had an opportunity to review the disposition report, but appellant expressly stated she did not want a continuance in order to review the report.
Appellant contends that even if she had proper notice, the court denied her an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence on the issue of the limiting order. Specifically, she argues that although the court was aware that appellant had objected to such order at the January 17, 2007 hearing, it signed the limiting order on January 30 without entertaining the objection or hearing evidence on the necessity for the order. Again, we reject the contention. At no time during the hearings on January 17 and 30 did appellant inform the court that she wanted to present evidence on the issue of the education orders or request a continuance to do so. Moreover, she does not assert on appeal what evidence she wanted to present on the issue. The colloquy reported above from the January 30 hearing establishes that appellant’s counsel argued against the limiting order, the Department’s counsel argued in favor of it. Apparently, appellant’s argument did not convince the court to change its decision, and it stated it had signed the limiting order. No due process error is shown.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Finally, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to justify the limiting order. She argues that the Department social worker “assumed” the order was necessary because appellant stated to her more than once that she did not feel a formal education is necessary. She argues that at the January 17, 2007 hearing, she made clear that she did not object to Julia’s enrollment in kindergarten, and at the January 30 hearing she stated she had “lined up” a charter school for Julia.
In reviewing the court’s issuance of the limiting order for substantial evidence, we resolve all conflicts and make all reasonable inferences from the evidence to uphold the juvenile court’s orders, if possible. (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 828.)
We conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s order. The jurisdiction report stated that in October 2006, the Department received a referral for general neglect and that appellant was living in her van across from a store parking lot and leaving Julia alone in the store. Appellant told the social worker that Julia was “self-schooled.” Julia was found to have head lice and severely decayed teeth and inflamed gums, requiring numerous fillings and a tooth extraction. The disposition report stated that appellant had told the Department social work numerous times that formal education is not necessary. Significantly, appellant’s contacts with the Department were “uncooperative, emotional, irrational, verbally abusive and hostile.” Similarly, Dr. Singer was unable to score appellant’s psychological assessment because appellant was uncooperative during the testing. Dr. Singer’s report noted that appellant’s unwillingness to remain in one place and avail herself of resources made benefiting from services more limited. The report also noted that appellant had little consideration for the impact of her behavior on others, exhibited “significantly poor boundaries,” paranoia and her insight and judgment “appeared to be poor.” Despite appellant’s testimony at the disposition hearing that she did not object to Julia’s enrollment in kindergarten and did not intend to interfere with that enrollment, the court could reasonably conclude that appellant would likely have difficulty following through in making sure Julia attended school, cooperating with teachers and other school personnel and making necessary educational decisions for Julia.
Disposition
The orders are affirmed.
We concur. GEMELLO, J., NEEDHAM, J.
In 2006, when the Department provided the ICWA notice, the governing rule was denominated as California Rules of Court, rule 1439. We refer to that rule as it is presently denominated because the Department will be required pursuant to our ruling to provide notice on remand pursuant to the existing framework. We also note that certain Welfare and Institutions Code sections have now become a part of the ICWA notice framework, most notably section 224.2, referred to in rule 5.664. The requirements we discuss are essentially the same in substance as those contained in former rule 1439.