Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. JV32051
McAdams, Judge
Judith S. appeals from the juvenile court’s order committing her to a county ranch facility. She contends that Welfare and Institutions Code section 731, subdivision (b) (now subd. (c)), confers upon the juvenile court the discretion to set her maximum period of physical confinement at the ranch at less than the maximum term of imprisonment imposable on an adult offender, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of her case. She also contends that after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham), Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (c) is unconstitutional in that it mandates imposition of a maximum term of confinement on a juvenile offender equal to the upper term of imprisonment imposable on an adult convicted of the same offense, without requiring the juvenile court to find aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
In 2007, former subdivision (b) of section 731 was amended and re-numbered as subdivision (c). The current subdivision (c) is essentially the same as the former subdivision (b), save for nonsubstantive changes. For example, “minor” is now the “ward,” the “CYA” is now the “Department of Juvenile Facilities” and the “Youth Authority Board” is now the “Board of Parole Hearings.” (Stats. 2007, ch. 257, § 2, eff. Sept. 29, 2007; ch. 175, § 20, eff. Aug. 24, 2007, operative Sept. 1, 2007.) Because the minor’s arguments refer to the statute in question as section 731, subdivision (b), we will continue to refer to the subdivision under consideration as “subdivision (b)” of section 731.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On September 28, 2006, an original Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed alleging that the minor had committed a commercial burglary and taken or used a vehicle without authorization, on February 5, 2006. (Pen. Code §§ 459/460, subd. (b); Veh. Code § 10851, subd. (a).) That petition also alleged a second count of car theft, committed on February 8, 2006. On November 8, 2006, a subsequent section 602 petition was filed alleging the commission of a third car theft on March 8, 2006. That same day, the two petitions were consolidated and, on the basis of the minor’s admissions, the court sustained the allegations. The court found that all of the counts were felonies. On the district attorney’s motion, the February 8, 2006 car theft was dismissed.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
On November 17, 2006, another section 602 petition was filed alleging commission of a car theft on March 11, 2006. On December 12, 2006, the minor admitted the new allegation. That same day, the court sustained the latest petition, adjudged the minor a ward of the court, placed her on probation on various terms and conditions, and returned her to her parents’ custody.
On March 20, 2007, a petition was filed alleging that on March 17, 2007, the minor, then age 16, took or used a vehicle without authorization, a felony, and used or was under the influence of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor. (Veh. Code § 10851, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code § 11550, subd. (a).) On March 27, 2007, another section 602 petition was filed alleging that the minor had taken or used a vehicle without authorization on October 12, 2006. On April 10, 2007, on the basis of the minor’s admissions, the court sustained both petitions and found that both car thefts were felonies.
Following a dispositional hearing, the court committed the minor to the Santa Clara Juvenile Rehabilitation Facility Enhanced Ranch Program for six to eight months. Over the minor’s constitutional objection, the court set the minor’s aggregated maximum period of physical confinement at six years eight months.
The minor’s aggregated six year eight month maximum term consists of the three-year upper term for second degree burglary, plus five consecutive eight-month terms for five vehicle thefts (1/3 the midterm of three years), plus four months for the misdemeanor (1/3 of one year).
Inasmuch as the historical facts underlying the sustained petitions are not pertinent to the issues raised on appeal, we do not summarize them.
DISCUSSION
Scope of Discretion under former section 731, subdivision (b)
Minor contends that former section 731, subdivision (b), permits the juvenile court to set the minor’s maximum period of physical confinement at less than the upper term for a given offense under the Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL), on the basis of the particular facts and circumstances of the minor’s case, even when the minor is not committed to the California Youth Authority (Youth Authority or CYA). She argues that the 2004 amendment to section 731, subdivision (b), which conferred on the juvenile court the discretion to set the minor’s maximum period of confinement in the CYA at less than the upper term imposable on an adult convicted of the same offense, applies whenever the juvenile court is required by section 726, subdivision (c), to set a maximum term of confinement, regardless of the disposition selected by the court. She reasons that any other construction of section 731, subdivision (b) conflicts with section 726, subdivision (c), and that the construction she proposes is the only one that harmonizes the two statutes. She further argues that she is entitled to a remand, because the juvenile court was unaware it had the discretion to reduce the minor’s maximum period of physical confinement in the context of a ranch disposition. As we explain below, we reject these assertions.
Section 731, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part: “A minor committed to the … Youth Authority may not be held in physical confinement for a period of time in excess of the maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses that brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. A minor committed to the … Youth Authority also may not be held in physical confinement for a period of time in excess of the maximum term of physical confinement set by the court based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters that brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which may not exceed the maximum period of adult confinement as determined pursuant to this section. This section does not limit the power of the Youth Authority … to retain the minor on parole status for the period permitted by Section 1769.”
Until 2004, it was well-understood that “[i]n the case of a juvenile, computation of the maximum period of confinement involves determining the upper term of imprisonment for the most serious offense … then adding any consecutive time imposed for other counts. … Whereas in the case of an adult, a special finding of aggravation must be made before the upper term for an offense can be imposed …, the same is not true in the case of a juvenile adjudged a ward of the court.” (In re Manzy W. (1997)14 Cal.4th 1199, 1202, fn. 1.) The 2004 amendment to section 731 changed existing law by adding the second sentence to subdivision (b) which permits the court to lower the maximum imposable period of confinement from the DSL’s upper term for the offense, “based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Stats. 2003, ch. 4, § 1, operative Jan. 1, 2004, italics added.) It is now well-accepted that section 731, subdivision (b) limits the length of a minor’s physical confinement in the Youth Authority in two ways: first, the minor’s confinement may not be longer thanthe maximum period of adult imprisonment as determined by statute; additionally, the minor’s confinement cannot be longer than the maximum period of physical confinement as determined by the court, based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters before the court. (In re Sean W. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1177; In re Carlos E. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1529.)
Minor acknowledges that the language of section 731, subdivision (b) “expressly mentions that its provisions are triggered whenever ‘a minor is committed to the … Youth Authority,’ ” and that “[n]o mention is made of the applicability of the subdivision when minors are confined in institutions other than the Youth Authority.” However, the minor posits that “it would be irrational to construe” section 731, subdivision (b) as applying exclusively to Youth Authority commitments, because section 726, subdivision (c) requires the juvenile court to set the minor’s maximum term of physical confinement “whenever ‘the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602,’ ” and “defines ‘physical confinement’ as ‘placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile home pursuant to section 730, or in any institution operated by the Youth Authority.’ ”
As defendant recognizes, a similar argument was recently rejected in In re Geneva C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 754. In that case, a minor committed to a camp argued that the juvenile court had failed to exercise its discretion to set a maximum term of physical confinement based on the facts and circumstances of the case. (Id. at p. 756.) Applying traditional rules of statutory construction, the court in Geneva C. determined that the plain meaning of the words used in section 731, subdivision (b), as amended in 2004, did not give the juvenile court the discretion to set the maximum term of physical confinement at less than the maximum term imposable on an adult convicted of the same offense, when the minor was committed to an institution other than the Youth Authority. (Id. at pp. 758-759.) The court also reviewed the legislative history of the 2004 amendment to section 731, subdivision (b), and concluded that the legislative history supported the court’s construction of the statute. (Id. at pp. 759-760.) Defendant argues that Geneva C. was wrongly decided and urges us to disagree with it. We decline to do so. Our independent review of the statutory language and the legislative history, set forth below, leads us to conclude that Geneva C. is correct.
Our task is to determine whether the 2004 amendment to section 731 permits the court to consider the facts and circumstances concerning the minor’s case in setting the minor’s maximum period of commitment when he or she is confined in a setting other than the Youth Authority. As always, we are guided by the cardinal principle of statutory construction: “In determining intent, we must look first to the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute governs.” (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1056.)
In our view, the language of the 2004 amendment to section 731, subdivision (b), is unambiguous. The 2004 amendment addressed the parameters of the court’s power to set a maximum term of confinement when committing a minor to the CYA. It does not refer to placements in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile home, despite the inclusion of those placements in Section 726, subdivision (c). In our view, this bespeaks a legislative intent to confine the court’s newly-expanded discretion to the most restrictive placement available to the juvenile court. Where, as here, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, “ ‘there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it.’ ” (People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 30.)
Because this language is clear, we need not delve into the legislative history of the amendment. Nevertheless, we note that the legislative history of SB 459, of which the amendment of section 731 is one part, supports our reading of the statute.
It is true, as the minor asserts, that our task is to “harmonize competing statutes to effectuate the legislative policy,” but we see no conflict between sections 726 and 731. (Johnston v. Sonoma County Agricultural Preservation & Open Space Dist. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 973, 986.) Consistent with the equal protection principles it was designed to implement, section 726 sets the outermost limit of a minor’s physical confinement at the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed on an adult. It defines the maximum term of imprisonment as the upper term calculated pursuant to Penal Code section 1170. It permits the court to increase the overall maximum term of imprisonment by aggregating the period of physical confinement on multiple counts or multiple petitions, including previously sustained petitions, and it defines “physical confinement” as “placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile home … or in any institution operated by the Youth Authority.” (§ 726, subd. (c).) Nothing in section 731 affects these provisions. Section 731 simply adds that the court may set the maximum term of physical confinement in the CYA at less than the overall maximum term of imprisonment set by section 726. The two provisions complement each other. Section 731 did not change, supersede or repeal section 726.
Section 726, subdivision (c) provides in relevant part: “If the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. [¶] As used in this section and in Section 731, ‘maximum term of imprisonment’ means the longest of the three time periods set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code, but without the need to follow the provisions of subdivision (b) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code or to consider time for good behavior or participation pursuant to Sections 2930, 2931, and 2932 of the Penal Code, plus enhancements which must be proven if pled. [¶] … [¶] ‘Physical confinement’ means placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile home pursuant to Section 730, or in any institution operated by the Youth Authority.”
Minor argues that it would be more “logical to imply that the Legislature intended that [the discretion conferred by section 731] be exercised at the time the period first be set.” However, her argument is more properly addressed to the Legislature, for courts may not “rewrite the statute in the guise of construing it.” (Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198.) “The court is limited to the intention expressed.” (People v. One 1940 Ford V-8 Coupe (1950) 36 Cal.2d 471, 475.)
In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeal in In re Geneva C., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th 754, that section 731, subdivision (b) does not vest the juvenile court with the discretion to set the maximum term of confinement at less than the maximum term of imprisonment for an adult convicted of the same offense, based on the facts and circumstances of the minor’s case, when the minor is confined in a placement other than the Youth Authority. Since we find the court lacked the discretion to so set the maximum term of confinement, we also reject the minor’s contention that we must remand the matter to the trial court to exercise the discretion we conclude it did not have.
Maximum Term of Confinement under section 726, subdivision (c)
Section 726, subdivision (c) provides in pertinent part: “If the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to Section 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. [¶] As used in this section and in Section 731, ‘maximum term of imprisonment’ means the longest of the three time periods set forth in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code, but without the need to follow the provisions of subdivision (b) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code or to consider time for good behavior or participation pursuant to Sections 2930, 2931, and 2932 of the Penal Code, plus enhancements which must be proven if pled. [¶] … [¶] ‘Physical confinement’ means placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile home pursuant to Section 730, or in any institution operated by the Youth Authority.”
Prior to its amendment in 2007, Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) provided in relevant part: “When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.” (Stats. 2004, ch. 747, § 1.)
Minor’s contention on appeal is that, after Cunningham, section 726, subdivision (c) denies her due process of law because that statute mandates imposition of a maximum term of physical confinement equal to the upper term of an adult’s sentence for the same offense, without requiring the trial court to find true, beyond a reasonable doubt, aggravating factors that justify the upper term. Minor’s argument, as we understand it, is as follows: In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 holds that “proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the ‘essentials of due process and fair treatment’ required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult” (id. at p. 359, fn. omitted). Cunningham holds that, with respect to the DSL applicable to adults, the middle term is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant, and any fact (other than a prior conviction) that exposes defendant to a greater sentence must be proven to a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, or admitted by the defendant. Section 726, subdivision (c), imposes on juvenile offenders the maximum term that may be imposed on adults convicted of the same offense, but sets it at the upper term. If the middle term is the maximum term of imprisonment that may be set for adult offenders, absent additional factfinding by a jury (or a judge, if jury is waived, or a defendant’s admission), beyond a reasonable doubt, then the maximum term of physical confinement must also be set at the middle term for juvenile offenders, in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating facts exist.
As minor recognizes in her opening brief, a very similar contention was advanced, and rejected, in In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522 (Eric J.). There, the minor complained that section 726 “denie[d] him equal protection of the laws by providing that the maximum term of confinement for a juvenile is the longest term imposable upon an adult for the same offense, without the necessity of finding circumstances in aggravation of the crime justifying imposition of the upper term as is required in adult criminal procedure by Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b).” (Eric J., at p. 528.) Our Supreme Court rejected the equal protection challenge because “[a]dults convicted in the criminal courts and sentenced to prison and youths adjudged wards of the juvenile courts and committed to the Youth Authority are not ‘similarly situated.’ ” (Id. at p. 530.) The high court reasoned: “The state does not have the same purpose in sentencing adults to prison that it has in committing minors to the Youth Authority. Adults convicted in the criminal courts are sentenced to prison as punishment … while minors adjudged wards of the juvenile courts are committed to the Youth Authority for the purposes of treatment and rehabilitation [citation.] [¶] This distinction has been significantly sharpened recently. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law … the purposes of imprisonment were deterrence, isolation and rehabilitation. [Citation.] Not the least of these was rehabilitation. ‘It is generally recognized by the courts and by modern penologists that the purpose of the indeterminate sentence law, like other modern laws in relation to the administration of the criminal law, is to mitigate the punishment which would otherwise be imposed upon the offender. These laws place emphasis upon the reformation of the offender. They seek to make the punishment fit the criminal rather than the crime.’ [Citations.] [¶] The enactment of the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act marked a significant change in the penal philosophy of this state regarding adult offenders. ‘The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment. This purpose is best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with provision for uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense under similar circumstances. The Legislature further finds and declares that the elimination of disparity and the provision of uniformity of sentences can best be achieved by determinate sentences fixed by statute in proportion to the seriousness of the offense as determined by the Legislature to be imposed by the court with specified discretion.” (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (a)(1).) [¶] There has been no like revolution in society’s attitude toward juvenile offenders. It is still true that ‘[j]uvenile commitment proceedings are designed for the purposes of rehabilitation and treatment, not punishment.’ ” [Citation.] Therefore, Juvenile Court Law continues to provide for indeterminate terms, with provision for parole as soon as appropriate. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1176.)” (Id. at pp. 531-532.)
Admittedly, with the enactment of section 202 in 1984, the Legislature’s treatment of juvenile offenders has “shifted its emphasis from a primarily less restrictive alternative approach oriented towards the benefit of the minor to the express ‘protection and safety of the public.’ ” (In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576.) Nevertheless, rehabilitation remains “an important objective of the juvenile court.” (Ibid.; see also In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614-615.)
And it is still true that the Juvenile Court Law continues to provide for indeterminate terms, with provision for parole. “The maximum period of confinement set by the court is not a determinate term, it is the ceiling on the amount of time that a minor may be confined in CYA…. The Youth Authority Board retains the power, subject to applicable rules and regulations, to determine the actual length of confinement at or below the ceiling set by the juvenile court….” (In re Carlos E., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1542.) Thus, while the court decides the outer limits of the minor’s indeterminate period of confinement, the parole board still determines the ward’s actual length of stay, pursuant to its broad discretion to release the juvenile offender as soon he or she is deemed deserving of parole, regardless of the theoretical maximum term of physical confinement set by the court pursuant to section 726, subdivision (c). (§ 1176.)
Our Supreme Court’s rationale for rejecting the minor’s equal protection claim in Eric J. remains vital today. It provides the backbone for the courts’ rejection of claims very similar to minor’s due process claim in two recent Court of Appeal opinions, In re Christian G. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 708 (Christian G.) and In re Alex U. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 259 (Alex U.). In Christian G., a minor challenged his commitment to the Youth Authority pursuant to section 731 on the ground that Cunningham mandated imposition of the DSL’s middle term, and not the upper term, as the maximum period of physical confinement for his offense. In rejecting the argument that Cunningham applies to the juvenile court law, the Christian G. court reasoned that (1) there is no right to a jury trial in juvenile court; (2) the 2004 amendment to section 731, subdivision (b), gave the juvenile court the discretion to set the theoretical maximum term of physical confinement at less than the maximum imposable on an adult offender convicted of the same offense, based on the facts and circumstances of each case; and (3) notwithstanding the maximum term set by the court, the actual term served by juvenile offenders was indeterminate and was set by the parole board.
Christian G.’s discussion echoes Eric J., and is particularly instructive here, even though it concerns section 731, subdivision (b) and not section 726, subdivision (c), the statute at issue here. In discussing the legislative changes made by the 2004 amendment to section 731, subdivision (b), the Christian G. court observed: “In exercising its discretion whether to set the minor’s theoretical maximum term of physical confinement at less than the maximum term of imprisonment, the juvenile court is not required to follow the procedures applicable to adult sentencing.… ¶ ‘There is nothing in the legislation or its history to suggest the Legislature sought to make sweeping changes in the commitment of a minor to CYA from an indeterminate term to a determinate term, nor is there any provision that the Legislature is restricting the juvenile court to the adult sentencing triad. … The juvenile court’s determination must be tied to the purposes of the juvenile system, which include the protection of the public as well as the rehabilitation of the minor.’ Citation. [¶] Thus, in setting a minor’s theoretical maximum term of physical confinement based on the facts and circumstances of the case, section 731, subdivision (b), does not compel a juvenile court to adhere to the Cunningham restrictions or the aggravating/mitigating circumstances scheme applicable to the sentencing of adult felons. A contrary interpretation of the statute would ignore the distinction between the [DSL], which provides for fixed terms designed to punish, and the juvenile justice system, which provides for indeterminate terms designed to rehabilitate. ‘Any parallel between the adult felon and the juvenile delinquent who have violated the same penal statute ends at the point of beginning of two separate, distinct punishment/rehabilitation statutory schemes. The commitment of the youth, processed through the juvenile court, to the Youth Authority for the maximum period under … section 731 is in no way the equivalent of the commitment of the adult to prison for the same crime for the upper term based upon aggravation factors. [¶] When the juvenile is committed for the maximum period, he is in fact being committed for an indeterminate period. The adult sent to prison for the upper ‘term prescribed’ will be confined for that specific period less any behavior-performance credits. [Citation.] At the heart of the [DSL] is the concept of a fixed term. [¶] In contrast, to the juvenile, the ‘maximum’ term is simply the outside time limit for a statutory program aimed directly at rehabilitation.’ ” (Christian G., supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 714-715, quoting from In re Robert D. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 767, 774-775 (Robert D.).)
In Alex U., as in Christian G., the minor challenged his commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice (formerly the CYA) pursuant to section 731. In that case, the juvenile court had made findings regarding mitigating and aggravating circumstances before committing the minor to a theoretical maximum term of physical confinement of 16 years for his offenses. The minor argued that the juvenile court had violated Cunningham “and denied his federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection by committing him to the [Department of Juvenile Justice] for longer than the 12-year middle term the [DSL] authorize[d]” for his crime. (Alex U., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 263.) Relying in large part on Christian G., the Alex U. court rejected the minor’s constitutional challenge. With respect to the minor’s due process claim, the Alex U. court observed: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of a crime is a constitutional right of adults and juveniles alike…. (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 487, 503-504, (Eddie M.), citing In re Winship [supra] 397 U.S. 358, 368.) Th[is] standard[] of proof appl[ies] at the jurisdictional stage of a criminal delinquency proceeding. (Eddie M., supra, at p. 487.) ‘Less exacting rules govern disposition,’ however. (Ibid.) Alex argues that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a due process requirement for the court to calculate the theoretical maximum term of physical confinement at the dispositional phase. To the contrary, the juvenile court has broad discretion to do so.” (Alex U., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 265.) Using the same language from Christian G. and Robert D. that we quote above in our discussion of Christian G., the Alex U. court also relied on the differences between the determinate sentencing scheme applicable to adults and the indeterminate commitment scheme applicable to juveniles for its conclusion that Cunningham does not apply to the juvenile court law. (Id. at pp. 265-266.)
This review brings us back to the current case. Unlike Christian G. and Alex U., the minor here was not committed to the CYA or a successor institution pursuant to section 731. She was placed in a county ranch facility pursuant to section 726 for six to eight months. Therefore, as we have already determined, the court did not have the discretion to set this minor’s maximum term at less than the maximum term imposable on an adult convicted of the same offenses. To some extent, both Christian G. and Alex U. relied upon the discretion conferred upon the court by the 2004 amendment to section 731, subdivision (b), to differentiate the juvenile court law from the DSL. We recognize that this rationale does not apply in the present context, and distinguishes Christian G. and Alex U. from the case before us.
Nevertheless, we must reject the minor’s due process claim here. Winship expressly declined to extend its holding beyond the adjudicatory stage of juvenile court proceedings. (In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 359, fn. 1 [“As in Gault, ‘we are not here concerned with … the post-adjudicative or dispositional process’ ”].) “Winship thus stands for the seminal proposition that juveniles, like adults, are entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of an alleged crime. This due process rule applies at the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding in which the state ‘charge[s]’ the juvenile with an act that would result in criminal conviction ‘if committed by an adult.’ [Citation.] Nothing in Winship extends the same rarified standard of proof to either juvenile or adult proceedings involving allegations, interests, and consequences different from those at stake when a crime is alleged as such.” (Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 503-504, citing In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 359.)
This leaves Cunningham. Like its predecessors, Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, and United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220, Cunningham is firmly tethered to the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial and animated by Sixth Amendment concerns. Nothing in Cunningham suggests that the due process right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, independent of the right to a jury trial, compels the result reached in that case. Similarly, nothing in Cunningham suggests that it applies in the context of the juvenile court law, or extends the right to a jury trial to juvenile cases. Nothing in Cunningham extends Winship to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process in juvenile cases.
In Cunningham, the United States Supreme Court measured California’s DSL for adult offenders against the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial and found it constitutionally wanting. As described by the Cunningham court, under the DSL’s triadic sentencing scheme, “Penal Code § 1170(b) controls the trial judge’s choice; it provides that ‘the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.’ … [¶] … [¶] … California’s DSL, and the rules governing its application, direct the sentencing court to start with the middle term, and to move from that term only when the court itself finds and places on the record facts — whether related to the offense or the offender — beyond the elements of the charged offense.” (Cunningham, supra, 127 S.Ct. at pp. 861-863.)
As the United States Supreme Court saw it in Cunningham, the vice in this system was that the facts found by the jury, or admitted by the defendant, did not alone determine the maximum imposable sentence under the DSL’s triadic scheme. “Under California’s DSL, an upper term sentence may be imposed only when the trial judge finds an aggravating circumstance. [Citation.] An element of the charged offense, essential to a jury’s determination of guilt, or admitted in a defendant’s guilty plea, does not qualify as such a circumstance. [Citation.] Instead, aggravating circumstances depend on facts found discretely and solely by the judge. In accord with Blakely, therefore, the middle term prescribed in California’s statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant statutory maximum. [Citation.] ‘[T]he “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.’ (Emphasis in original.) Because circumstances in aggravation are found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, … the DSL violates Apprendi’s bright-line rule: Except for a prior conviction, ‘any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Cunningham, supra, 127 S.Ct. at p. 868.)
The juvenile court law, as expressed in section 726, subdivision (c), shares none of the constitutionally defective features of the DSL. The Legislature has determined that, under section 726, subdivision (c), the adjudicated facts found by the juvenile court beyond a reasonable doubt, or admitted by the juvenile offender, directly authorize the maximum imposable sentence, the DSL’s upper term. No additional judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence is needed for imposition of the maximum term for a given offense. Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) does not control the trial judge’s choice under section 726, subdivision (c). In fact, that subdivision expressly states that the upper term is to be imposed “without the need to follow the provisions of subdivision (b) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code.” (§ 726, subd. (c).) In our view, not even the rationale of Cunningham applies to section 726, subdivision (c).
Finally, we reiterate that the Juvenile Court Law is an indeterminate disposition scheme. It gives the juvenile court broad discretion to fashion any appropriate disposition for an adjudicated juvenile offender, from sending the minor home with his or her parents, to detention in “a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile home pursuant to Section 730, or in any institution operated by the Youth Authority.” (§ 726, subd. (c).) Nothing in Cunningham suggests that it applies to an indeterminate disposition scheme, such as the one at issue here.
In sum, we see nothing in Cunningham or Winship to support the minor’s contention that the section 726, subdivision (c) violates her due process rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the adjudicated facts that support her maximum period of confinement. Accordingly, we also reject minor’s constitutional challenge to section 726, subdivision (c).
CONCLUSION
The juvenile court does not have the discretion, under section 731, subdivision (b), to set the minor’s maximum term of confinement at less than the maximum term of imprisonment imposable on an adult convicted of the same offense, based on the facts and circumstances of the minor’s case, when the minor is committed to a ranch facility. Nothing in Cunningham or Winship compels the conclusion that Section 726, subdivision (c) violates the minor’s due process rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the adjudicated facts that support the maximum period of her confinement.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Mihara, Acting P.J., Duffy, J.
For example, the Senate Rules Committee report entitled “Unfinished Business” and dated April 4, 2003, (the day after the last amendment to the bill) states that “[i]n addition, this bill would enact the following changes pertaining to CYA powers and duties, effective January 1, 2004: [¶] … [¶] 2. [it] authorizes the court to set a maximum term of confinement that is not necessarily the adult term maximum.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 2nd reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 459 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 3, 2003, pp. 3-4.)
Similarly, the report for the Senate Committee on Public Safety dated March 13, 2003 states: “This bill would authorize the court to additionally set maximum terms of physical confinement in the CYA based upon the facts and circumstances of the matter or matters which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This new provision would provide for court consideration of factors about the offenses and the offender’s history which would be comparable to those employed now for the triad sentencing of adults, and have those considerations reflected in the CYA confinement term ordered by the court.” (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 459 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar.12, 2003, pp. I-J.) Senate Bill 459 was introduced on February 20, 2003, and was amended four times before it was chaptered on April 8, 2003. (See Sen. Bill No. 459, Complete Bill History (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.).) None of the amendments changed the original language added to section 731.