This Court in In re J.T.S. interpreted the meaning of "a period of at least one year" as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-906.1(n)(1). In re J.T.S., 268 N.C.App. 61, 66-72, 834 S.E.2d 637, 642-646 (2019). There, this Court noted, "the evidence gleaned from a continuous period of at least one year would provide the trial court the best evidence of stability and permanency[,]" which is consistent with the goals of the Juvenile Code.

¶ 38 We have vacated and remanded permanency planning orders when "the trial court made no findings as to the costs associated with supervised visitation, who would bear the responsibility of paying such costs, or [the r]espondent's ability to pay the costs." In re J.T.S. , 268 N.C. App. 61, 74, 834 S.E.2d 637, 646 (2019) ; accordIn re Y.I. , 262 N.C. App. 575, 582, 822 S.E.2d 501, 505–06 (2018). ¶ 39 Here, the trial court erred by failing to assign responsibility for the costs of supervised visitation in its order.

Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which are reviewed de novo by an appellate court." In re J.T.S., 268 N.C.App. 61, 67 (2019) (citation and marks omitted). A. Constitutionally Protected Status of Parent

When the trial court orders supervised visitation, it must make findings "as to the costs associated with supervised visitation, who would bear the responsibility of paying such costs, or [the] [r]espondent's ability to pay the costs." In re J.T.S., 268 N.C.App. 61, 74, 834 S.E.2d 637, 646 (2019). This Court has specifically held a trial court must make findings regarding a parent's ability to pay the costs of supervised visitation when ordered, otherwise this Court cannot determine whether a trial court abused its discretion when setting conditions for visitation.

Furthermore, this Court should, and has, vacated and remanded permanency planning orders when "the trial court made no findings as to the costs associated with supervised visitation,... or [the respondent's ability to pay the costs." In re J.T.S., 268 N.C.App. 61, 74, 834 S.E.2d637, 646 (2019); In re Y.I., 262 N.C.App. 575, 582, 822 S.E.2d 501, 505-06 (2018). Here, the trial court made no findings as to the costs associated with supervised visitation or Mother's ability to pay the costs of supervised visitation.

Although the statute does not address the costs associated with supervised visitation, this Court has vacated visitation orders when the trial court ordered supervised visitation without making a finding as to what costs, if any, would be associated with supervised visitation, the responsibility for the costs, and the parent's ability to pay for the supervision. In re J.T.S., 268 N.C.App. 61, 74, 834 S.E.2d 637, 646-47 (2019); See also In re Y.I., 262 N.C.App. 575, 582, 822 S.E.2d 501, 506 (2018) (vacating the portion of the permanency planning order regarding visitation and remanding for additional findings of fact addressing whether the respondent mother is to bear any costs associated with supervised visitation and, if so, whether the respondent mother has the ability to pay those costs). Our Supreme Court has held that when the trial court orders the supervision be at the parent's expense, the trial court must make findings as to the parent's ability to pay for the supervised visitation.

As we stated supra , we review a permanency planning order's conclusions of law to determine whether they are supported by its findings of fact. In re J.T.S. , 268 N.C. App. 61, 67, 834 S.E.2d 637, 642 (2019) ; In re J.C.S. , 164 N.C. App. at 106, 595 S.E.2d at 161. Any unchallenged finding of fact is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and, thus, binding on appeal.

¶ 13 We review a permanency planning order to determine "whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings and whether the findings support the conclusions of law." In re J.T.S., 268 N.C.App. 61, 67, 834 S.E.2d 637, 642 (2019) (quoting In re P.O., 207 N.C.App. 35, 41, 698 S.E.2d 525, 530 (2010)); see In re A.C., 247 N.C.App. 528, 532, 786 S.E.2d 728, 733 (2016). Any unchallenged finding of fact is "deemed to be supported by the evidence and . . . [is] binding on appeal."

¶ 47 Because mother affirmatively accepted the trial court's visitation restrictions prior to the trial court's order, mother has not preserved this challenge for appellate review. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1); see also In re J.T.S., 268 N.C.App. 61, 76, 834 S.E.2d 637, 648 (2019) ("[B]ecause Respondent consented to the terms of DSS's revised recommendation regarding the conditions required for visitation and the role of Family Abuses Services, she did not properly preserve for appeal [these] contentions regarding the permanency planning order[.]" (citation and quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original)); State v. Holliman, 155 N.C.App. 120, 123, 573 S.E.2d 682, 685 (2002) ("The defendant may not change his position from that taken at trial to obtain a steadier mount on appeal." (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

See, e.g., In re J.T.S., 268 N.C. App. 61, 74, 834 S.E.2d 637, 646 (2019). Here, however, respondent-mother was only awarded electronic visitation, which this Court has held does "not constitute visitation as contemplated by [the Juvenile Code]."