Opinion
No. COA12–486.
2012-10-2
In the Matter of J.S.C. and A.M.L.C.
Haywood County Department of Social Services, by Rachael J. Hawes, for Petitioner–Appellee. Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Theresa M. Sprain and Kristen Y. Riggs, for Guardian ad Litem.
Appeal by Respondent from orders entered 13 February 2012 by Judge Monica H. Leslie in Haywood County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 September 2012. Haywood County Department of Social Services, by Rachael J. Hawes, for Petitioner–Appellee. Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Theresa M. Sprain and Kristen Y. Riggs, for Guardian ad Litem.
Wyrick Robbins Yates & Ponton, LLP, by Tobias S. Hampson for Respondent–Appellant Mother.
BEASLEY, Judge.
Respondent appeals from the adjudication order and disposition order entered terminating her parental rights to J.S.C. (“Jackson”) and A.M.L.C. (“Abigail”). We affirm the trial court's orders.
Jackson and Abigail are pseudonyms used to protect the identity of the juveniles.
On 27 October 2010, Haywood County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received a report that Respondent had given birth to Abigail and Respondent tested positive for amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana at the time of Abigail's birth. Abigail was born premature and also tested positive for amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana. On 29 October 2010, Abigail and her four-year-old brother, Jackson, were placed in DSS's custody. Following a hearing on 22 December 2010, the trial court entered an order on 18 January 2011 adjudicating Abigail abused and dependent and Jackson neglected and dependent. The trial court continued custody with DSS with a plan of reunification.
On 4 May 2011, DSS was relieved of making further efforts toward reunification. Following a permanency planning review hearing on 12 July 2011, the trial court entered an order on 27 July 2011 changing the permanent plan to adoption. On 13 September 2011, DSS filed petitions to terminate Respondent's parental rights. DSS alleged the following grounds for termination: (1) neglect; (2) dependency; and (3) prior termination of Respondent's parental rights to four other children and her inability or unwillingness to establish a safe home.
In filing the petitions for termination of parental rights, DSS attached three exhibits pertaining to Abigail to the petition for Jackson, and three exhibits pertaining to Jackson to the petition for Abigail. DSS made an oral motion to amend the petitions to correct the error. By order entered 27 September 2011, the trial court granted DSS's motion to amend the petitions.
The matter came on for hearing on 17 January 2012. On 13 February 2012, the trial court entered the adjudication order finding grounds, as alleged in the petition, existed to terminate Respondent's parental rights. The trial court also entered the disposition order on that date concluding that termination of Respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests. Respondent appeals.
Respondent contends the trial court erred in granting DSS's motion to amend the petitions to terminate parental rights. Respondent relies on In re B.L.H., 190 N.C.App. 142, 660 S.E.2d 255,aff'd per curiam,362 N.C. 674, 669 S.E.2d 320 (2008), to support her contention. In B.L.H. the trial court, after hearing evidence from a social worker, allowed Petitioner to amend the petitions to conform to the evidence presented. Petitioner was allowed to include an allegation that grounds existed to terminate parental rights on the basis that the children had been left in a foster care or out of home placement for a period of twelve months preceding the filing of the petitions (N.C.Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(2)). Id. at 145, 660 S.E.2d at 256. This Court noted that Article 11 of Chapter 7B permits amendment of petitions in abuse, neglect, and dependency proceedings, but is silent on amendment of petitions or motions in termination proceedings. Id. at 146, 660 S.E.2d at 257. This Court stated that it would not “superimpose a right to amend a petition or motion for termination of parental rights to conform with the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing and the trial court erred by allowing the amendment.” Id. However, the Court's analysis did not end there. The Court went on to address whether the original petitions provided respondent with sufficient notice. The Court reversed the trial court, holding that the original petitions, without the amendments, were insufficient to give respondent mother notice that her parental rights were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B–1111(a)(2). Id. at 148, 660 S.E.2d at 258.
The instant case is clearly distinguishable from B.L.H. In this case, DSS did not move to amend the petitions to conform to the evidence at the hearing. The trial court allowed DSS to correct an error regarding the documents attached to the petitions. Here, the allegations in the petitions did not change and there is no contention that Respondent received insufficient notice of the possible grounds for terminating her parental rights or that she was confused or misled by the corrections. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
Respondent next contends the trial court erred in finding grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. The statutory grounds for terminating parental rights are set forth in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111 (2011). A finding of any one of the grounds enumerated in Section 7B–1111 is sufficient to support termination of parental rights. In re Yocum, 158 N.C.App. 198, 204, 580 S.E.2d 399, 403–04,aff'd per curiam,357 N.C. 568, 597 S.E.2d 674 (2003). “The standard for review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law.” In re Clark, 72 N.C.App. 118, 124, 323 S .E.2d 754, 758 (1984).
A court may terminate parental rights upon finding that the “parental rights of the parent with respect to another child of the parent have been terminated involuntarily by a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent lacks the ability or willingness to establish a safe home.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(9) (2011). A safe home is a “home in which the juvenile is not at substantial risk of physical or emotional abuse or neglect.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101(19) (2011). “Termination under § 7B–1111(a)(9) thus necessitates findings regarding two separate elements: (1) involuntary termination of parental rights as to another child, and (2) inability or unwillingness to establish a safe home.” In re L.A.B., 178 N.C.App. 295, 299, 631 S.E.2d 61, 64 (2006).
Respondent mother does not dispute that her parental rights to four other children were terminated by a court of competent jurisdiction. Rather, Respondent contends the trial court's findings with respect to the second prong, her inability or unwillingness to establish a safe home, are insufficient. Respondent claims the trial court was “required to find a causal nexus between [her] substance abuse and [any] ongoing risk of harm to the children[,]” but failed to do so. We disagree.
Here, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact:
24. The Respondent Mother completed a Substance Abuse Assessment on January 10, 2011 and enrolled in the Substance Abuse Intensive Outpatient Treatment Program (SAIOP) at Meridian Behavioral Health Services (Meridian) pursuant to the recommendations of that Assessment. She stopped attending the SAIOP in March 2011, having completed only eight out of 20 classes.
25. After the Respondent Mother stopped attending the SAIOP, Meridian recommended inpatient treatment at the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Treatment Center (ADATC), which the Respondent Mother did not pursue.
26. In addition to the treatment recommended by the Substance Abuse Assessment that was completed on January 10, 2011, the Assessment also recommended that the Respondent Mother complete a Capacity to Parent Assessment (CPA) and attend parenting classes. She was also Court ordered to complete these items subsequent to the Assessment.
27. The Respondent Mother did not enroll in or participate in any parenting classes and did not complete Recovery–Discovery classes. She completed one portion of the CPA, but did not complete the second portion. Dr. Pete Sansbury prepared a written report and recommended inpatient substance abuse treatment for the Respondent Mother, which she has not completed.
....
30. The Respondent Mother was visiting the children regularly when they first came into custody in the fall of 2010. Her visitation then became irregular. She cancelled five offered visits in March 2011, stating she was ill. Prior to that, the Respondent Mother had been late for numerous visits.
....
32. The Department of Social Services had no contact with the Respondent Mother from the Court date on May 4, 2011 until the Court date on October 4, 2011.
....
41. The Respondent Mother has not corrected the conditions that led to the removal of [Jackson] and [Abigail] from her home on October 29, 2010.
42. Since March 7, 2011, the Respondent Mother has not undergone any treatment for her substance abuse issues.
Respondent does not challenge these findings of fact, and they are deemed supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). We conclude these findings of fact support the trial court's determination that Respondent lacks the ability or willingness to establish a safe home. The trial court did not err in finding grounds existed to terminate Respondent's parental rights pursuant to Section 7B–1111(a)(9). Having concluded that the trial court properly found this ground to terminate Respondent's parental rights, we need not address the arguments concerning the remaining grounds. In re Clark, 159 N.C.App. 75, 84, 582 S.E.2d 657, 663 (2003).
Lastly, Respondent contends that “[u]pon reversal of the trial court's order adjudicating grounds for termination of parental rights, the trial court[']s Order Determining Best Interests of Juvenile, which actually terminated parental rights, should also be reversed.” “After an adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent's rights exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1110(a) (2011). “We review the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. 94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). In this case, Respondent offers no argument regarding the trial court's best interest conclusion of law and does not allege an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Having failed to argue this issue, Respondent has abandoned it. SeeN.C.R.App. P. 28(b)(6).
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's orders are affirmed.
Affirmed.
Report per Rule 30(e).
Judges BRYANT and HUNTER, JR. concur.