Opinion
No. 6-040 / 05-1976
Filed February 15, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Gary K. Anderson, District Associate Judge.
The father appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his son. AFFIRMED.
Ryan M. Sewell, Council Bluffs, for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew D. Wilber, County Attorney, and Dawn Eimers, Assistant County Attorney for appellee-State.
Scott Strait of Shanks Law Firm, Council Bluffs, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Joshua, who was born on August 26, 2004 to Jackie and Jeffrey, came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) shortly after his birth when Jackie admitted to using methamphetamines several times during her pregnancy. Jackie and Jeffrey were not married. On August 28, DHS placed Joshua in a foster care home, and on August 31 the State filed a petition alleging him to be a child in need of assistance (CINA). Joshua was later adjudicated as CINA pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(n) (2005). After a brief return to his mother's care, Joshua was again removed when Jackie was imprisoned in Nebraska. On August 17, 2005, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate Jackie's and Jeffrey's parental rights to Joshua. Following a subsequent hearing, the court terminated their parental rights. It terminated Jeffrey's rights under sections 232.116(1)(b), (d), (e), and (h). Jeffrey appeals from this order.
Scope and Standards of Review.
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). While the district court terminated Jeffery's parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we will affirm if at least one ground has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995).
Motions for New Trial and to Reopen Evidence.
On November 1, 2005, the court entered its termination order. Jeffrey filed a motion for new trial on November 1 and a motion to reopen the record on November 9. Jeffrey claimed newly discovered evidence, including a letter from Joshua's foster mother in which she reported a health issue would preclude her from adopting Joshua, justified a new trial. However, the foster mother testified at the subsequent hearing on the motions that she had recently been given a "clean bill of health" and that she again wished to adopt Joshua. The court denied both motions.
In her report to the court, a case worker had noted the foster parents' interest in adopting Joshua.
We find no error in the court's rulings on Jeffrey's motions. Because the foster mother's report of a health problem was clearly refuted at the hearing on the motions, there was no "newly discovered evidence" that would warrant a new trial or a reopening of the record. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.1004(7).
Termination of Parental Rights.
Upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude the court properly terminated Jeffrey's parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h) (child is three or younger, has been adjudicated CINA, has been removed for six months, and cannot be returned to parent's custody). A review of this case's timeline reveals the minimal extent to which Jeffrey has been involved in Joshua's life despite the opportunity, and the minimal effort he has made to prove himself capable of caring for Joshua. On the date of Joshua's CINA adjudication, Jeffrey was incarcerated on a forgery conviction, where he remained from December of 2004 to September of 2005. On August 17, 2005, Jeffrey was released to a work release facility in Council Bluffs. Jeffrey's decision to engage in criminal activities precluded the formation of any sort of bond or relationship with Joshua. Further, even between August and December of 2004, prior to Jeffrey's incarceration, he only had one supervised visit with Joshua, had not participated in family-centered services, had not obtained a chemical dependency evaluation, see TLR 1.16 and had not submitted to random urinalysis screenings as requested.
At the time of the termination hearing, Jeffrey was residing at the residential facility. Joshua was not allowed to live there with Jeffrey. For this reason alone, we would conclude the juvenile court properly found that Joshua cannot be returned to the custody of his father. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4). Moreover, as Joshua's caseworker Kara Nickels opined, because Jeffrey must obtain appropriate housing, maintain employment, and demonstrate sobriety for a sufficient period before reunification could be considered, it would be inappropriate to return Joshua to his care now or within the foreseeable future.
Best Interests.
We recognize that even if statutory requirements for termination are met, the decision to terminate must still be in the child's best interests. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). Based on the facts laid out in the preceding division, we conclude termination of Jeffrey's parental rights is in Joshua's best interest. The choices made by Jeffrey led to his incarceration, refusal to accept services aimed at reunification, and resulting absence from Joshua during his critical early years. Joshua deserves permanency in a stable, wholesome environment. See In re T.D.C., 336 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Iowa 1983). Jeffrey has not established that he can provide Joshua such a home.
Conclusion.
We have considered all arguments raised, but find them to be either not preserved or without merit. We therefore affirm the termination of Jeffrey's parental rights.